Prisoner's Abuse Lawsuit & Request for In Forma Pauperis in US District Court, Lecture notes of Law

Download Prisoner's Abuse Lawsuit & Request for In Forma Pauperis in US District Court and more Lecture notes Law in PDF only on Docsity! 1 3:20-cv-01265-GPC-AHG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA MARCELO LARIOS FERNANDEZ, BOP #87515-298, Plaintiff, vs. METROPOLITAN CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Defendant. Case No.: 3:20-cv-01265-GPC-AHG ORDER: 1) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS [ECF No. 2] AND 2) DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) Plaintiff Marcelo Larios Fernandez, currently detained, awaiting trial at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (“MCC”) in San Diego, California,1 and proceeding pro 1 Plaintiff was arrested on September 16, 2019 at the San Ysidro Port of Entry by a Customs and Border Protection Officer (“CBPO”) and charged with importation of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. See United States v. Larios-Fernandez, 3:19-cr-04102-BAS-1. See ECF No. 1 (“Complaint”). On September 23, 2019, he was ordered detained pending trial in that case. Id., ECF No. Case 3:20-cv-01265-GPC-AHG Document 4 Filed 09/14/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 10 2 3:20-cv-01265-GPC-AHG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 se, initiated this civil action on July 6, 2020 pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1. Plaintiff did not pay the $400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time of filing, but instead seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See ECF No. 2. Plaintiff has since filed an Amended Complaint as a matter of course pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), this time invoking jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Amend. Compl., ECF No. 3 at 1. Plaintiff seeks $840,000 in general and punitive damages against the MCC based on claims that unidentified correctional officers or “C/Os” there “abused their power” and inflicted “cruel and unusual punishment” upon him while he was “going to court” on October 14 or 15, 2019. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2‒3, 5; Amend. Compl., ECF No. 3 at 1‒3, 7. I. Motion to Proceed IFP All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the plaintiff is a prisoner and he is granted leave to proceed IFP, he remains obligated to pay the full entire fee in “increments,” Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002). 10. The case was dismissed on the government’s oral motion on January 10, 2020. Id., ECF No. 26. On January 9, 2020, however, Plaintiff was indicted by a federal grand jury on one count of importation of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960 in the related case entitled United States v. Marcelo Larios-Fernandez, 3:20-cr-0162-BAS-1. See id., ECF Nos. 1, 2; Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’”) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)). Case 3:20-cv-01265-GPC-AHG Document 4 Filed 09/14/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 10 5 3:20-cv-01265-GPC-AHG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). On the other hand, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In addition, the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)). However, it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). B. Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff names only the MCC as a Defendant in both his original and his Amended Complaints. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1‒2; Amend. Compl., ECF No. 3 at 1‒2. In his original Complaint, Plaintiff invokes federal question jurisdiction pursuant to Bivens, see Compl. ECF No. 1 at 1, but that pleading was superseded by his Amended Complaint,2 which cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as its statutory basis. See Amend. Compl., ECF No. 3 at 1. In both iterations, Plaintiff alleges that unidentified officers at MCC committed “abuse[s] of power” and violated his right to be “free[] from cruel and unusual punishment” on October 14, 2019, when they “scream[ed] at [him] because [he] had 2 “[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989). Case 3:20-cv-01265-GPC-AHG Document 4 Filed 09/14/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 10 6 3:20-cv-01265-GPC-AHG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 trouble taking off [his] uniform” while he was “going to court.” See Compl. at 5; Amend. Compl. at 3. Plaintiff alleges one officer cuffed him and “put [him] in a small room.” Id. Plaintiff claims that when he “told the officer that his handcuffs were to[o] tight,” and requested they be loosened or removed, “4 or 5 officers c[a]me into the room” and “started to hit [him] all over.” Id. Plaintiff claims the officers “hurt [him] pretty bad,” cut open his left eye, dragged him across the floor, and “beat [him] upon the back, arms, legs, [and] head … for no reason at all.” See Amend. Compl. at 3. Plaintiff claims he was transported to Paradise Valley Hospital on October 15, 2019, where he remained for more than two weeks. Id. He claims to have sustained injuries to his back, arms, and brain as a result of the beating, and is “still in a lot of pain.” Id. C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First, “[t]o establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Rawson v. Recovery Innovations, Inc., No. 19-35520, __ F.3d __, 2020 WL 5405684, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2020) (“Pursuant to § 1983, a defendant may be liable for violating a plaintiff’s constitutional rights only if the defendant committed the alleged deprivation while acting under color of state law.”). Plaintiff is a federal pretrial detainee seeking damages against the MCC for injuries he alleges to have sustained at the hands of unidentified MCC officers while held in their custody.3 He fails to allege that the MCC or unidentified 3 Because Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee and asserts a violation of his right to be “free[] from cruel and unusual punishment,” see Amend. Compl. at 3, the Court presumes his claims would arise under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which is applicable to the federal government, see Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008), and not the Eighth Amendment, which only applies after conviction. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536–37 (1979) (noting that while due process permits the government to “detain [a person] to ensure his presence at trial and … subject him to the restrictions and conditions of the detention facility,” … “those conditions and restrictions [may] not amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution.”); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199 n.6 (1989) (“The Eighth Amendment applies ‘only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees Case 3:20-cv-01265-GPC-AHG Document 4 Filed 09/14/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 10 7 3:20-cv-01265-GPC-AHG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 officers who beat him acted under color of state law. Therefore, he fails to state a claim under § 1983. Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1138; Rawson, 2020 WL 5405684, at *3. D. Bivens However, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and his original Complaint invoked federal jurisdiction pursuant to Bivens, the Court will liberally construe the allegations in his Amended Complaint to determine whether they state a plausible claim for relief under Bivens and its progeny. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675 (assuming, but not deciding, that an equal Bivens claim was actionable in order to determine whether plaintiff’s complaint stated a claim to relief). “In Bivens, the Supreme Court ‘recognized for the first time an implied right of action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.’” Vega v. United States, 881 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hernandez v. Mesa, __U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2006 (2017) (citation omitted)). “In the limited settings where Bivens does apply, the implied cause of action is the ‘federal analog to suits brought against state officials under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675-76 (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006)). Thus, to state a Bivens claim for damages, the plaintiff must allege facts showing that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated,4 traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions....[T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.’” (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671–672, n. 40 (1977)). 4 The Supreme Court has cautioned against expanding Bivens’ implied right of action into new contexts beyond those already recognized. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017). Although Bivens applies to alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures by federal agents, see Bivens, 403 U.S. at 391, and to inadequate medical care claims alleged by a federal inmate’s decedents under the Eighth Amendment, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), it remains unclear whether a Bivens cause action may be pursued by a federal pretrial detainee alleging excessive force. See e.g., Williams v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. CV 19-00081 JMS-KJM, 2019 WL 2518444, at *2 (D. Haw. June 18, 2019) (assuming on screening that Bivens applies to pretrial detainee’s excessive force and unconstitutional conditions of confinement claims). The Court will assume such a claim may be actionable, and that Plaintiff is not seeking to extend a Bivens remedy “to any new context or new category of defendants,” Corr. Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001)‒‒but it does so for initial Case 3:20-cv-01265-GPC-AHG Document 4 Filed 09/14/20 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 10