Download Balancing Majority & Minority Interests: Role of Institutions & Norms in Govt. - Prof. Gle and more Study notes Local Government Studies in PDF only on Docsity! Lecture 6 We have seen that: (1) collective goods are provided both privately and through the auspices of government; (2) problems such as free-riding and exploitation (“tragedy of the commons”) arise in the provision of collective goods; (3) coercion is government’s solution to free-riding problems while other organizations providing collective goods (American Association of Retired People— AARP) rely upon selective incentives and their small size; (4) those groups best able to overcome problems of free-riding are most successful in influencing governmental policies; and (5) since both private and public entities can supply public goods, the question of whether to turn an activity over to government hinges upon any number of considerations, like the external costs and the motives of public officials. This issue arises throughout society and time. It is simply the question of what should be in the realm of governmental responsibility and what should remain in the purview of private citizens. We now turn to another activity of government—namely, resolving thorny social issues. And one of the thorniest has to do with balancing the interests of the majority against those of the minority. Or, put another way, how does government ensure that in acceding to the demands of majority opinion it doesn’t trample on the rights of minorities? One way the Founding Fathers (Madison et al.) addressed this issue was to assemble an intricate set of institutional checks and balances which has become our political process. As discussed in class, there are numerous hurdles to be surmounted before bills become laws and majorities have to be mobilized at each point along the way; then again, there are also numerous points (Senate filibuster) when even a majority cannot rule! So, the underlying premise of the formation of our checks and balances system—specifically, that majorities if left unconstrained will tyrannize the minority—is problematic for these reasons. First, majorities rarely rule. As noted, the legislative process provides numerous veto points for minorities (special interests) to modify legislation or bring it to a screeching halt. And elections are coalitions of groups, many with quite narrow interests (taxes); once, the election is decided, then, (narrow) special interests influence governmental policies until the next election. So, our political system is quite sensitive to the demands of minorities in society regardless of the structure of government. Indeed, better protections of the rights of minorities arise from the socializing experiences and agents (family, schools) that foster an appreciation and respect for the “rules of the game”—that is, those political actions and beliefs that are supported by a strong societal consensus and describe what are appropriate attitudes and proper behavior—and a similar level of support for policies advantaging certain groups (e.g., social security, Medicare). In short, the institutional checks and balances (i.e., separate institutions sharing power—Supreme Court, Presidency, Congress) that are generally believed to explain the inability of majorities to impose their will on minorities, ironically, has just the opposite effect: majorities are often stymied by the actions of narrow interests within society. Make sense?
