Antigone's Flaw, Exams of Law

Download Antigone's Flaw and more Exams Law in PDF only on Docsity! 4 • Volume XII, No. 1, 1999 Patricia M. Lines Antigone’s Flaw Patricia M. Lines Some theorists define politics as who gets what, when and how. Alasdair MacIntyre defines it as “civil war carried on by other means.” I prefer a more hopeful definition, and lean toward Michael Oakeshott’s definition as “attending to arrangements.” Or, Claes Ryn’s definition—“the peaceful settlement of disputes”—es- pecially since Ryn correlates politics at its best with community. Such an emphasis would require the student of politics to examine not just who gets what, but how individuals arrange things, and how each takes into consideration the others who are trying to do the same. At the very least, the peaceful conduct of affairs would require some sort of agreement on the rules. To get that agreement without actual violence, participants might still use threats based on supe- rior power (natural or supernatural), although eventually a chal- lenge may require executing the threat. Peaceful arrangements could also depend on deceit, bribes, persuasion and an endless va- riety of human tricks. The goal is to obtain sufficient agreement among enough of the individuals subject to the arrangements to give the rules stability. This is true even for political regimes based on some principle other than consent of the governed. Failure leads to chaos, rebellion, war or permanent and physical separation of contending factions. How to attend to these arrangements and rearrangements? One choice is simply to vote, but the time-honored distrust of the tyr- anny of the majority would require something more. Ideally, the political community follows the advice of the wisest. But who is Deliberation, compromise central to good politics. HUMANITAS • 5Antigone’s Flaw wisest? Who decides who is wisest? Which decisions the wisest are to decide, which are for individuals, which should be left to habit or custom? The difficulty in answering such questions has led many thinkers to identify deliberation as essential to the political process. Political deliberation requires listening and persuading, engaging and being engaged. Success depends, above all, on com- promise. That is, it requires yielding here and there to the opposi- tion, and winning some concession here and there in return. The greatest obstacle to this kind of deliberation is hubris. It should be no surprise that the first to become aware of politics and identify it as a discipline—the Greeks—were also the first to worry about hubris. As Hannah Arendt reminds us, hubris has a corre- sponding virtue: the old virtue of moderation, of keeping within bounds, is indeed one of the political virtues par excellence, just as the political temp- tation par excellence is indeed hubris (as the Greeks, fully experi- enced in the potentialities of action, knew so well) and not the will to power, as we are inclined to believe. Implicit in Arendt’s analysis, and in that of the Greeks, is the notion that politics is the peaceful tending to arrangements. For those who prefer to take a cynical view, the will to power is both the chief po- litical virtue and the chief political vice. Those who take such a view need not worry about the qualities that allow one to engage in deliberation with others. For those who take the view adopted here, there is still much to be learned from the Greeks. Just as no one among the Greeks stated the case for moderation better than Aristotle, no one stated the case against hubris better than Sophocles. One might object that Sophocles did not have poli- tics in mind, and that he presented only legendary familiar rela- tionships. This would be selling Sophocles short, and it fails to un- derstand how pervasive politics can be. Within the family and the clan much human action may appear to lie outside politics. This is because such communities enjoy close and implicit agreement on basic premises and how they apply to most of the community’s routine. The basic arrangements are often invisible to the outsider. For the most part, tradition and habit prescribe the action the com- munity should take. But even families and clans engage in politics. New circumstances can challenge even the most insular and tradi- tion-bound peoples. External threats may require new or modified arrangements; new decisions must be taken. Factions spring up, Hubris greatest obstacle to deliberation. Politics transcends government. 8 • Volume XII, No. 1, 1999 Patricia M. Lines lectic theory, hailing Antigone as the “perfect example of the ethical imagination” in contrast to her sister, Ismene, who knows merely “the law of the community.” Both Antigone and Ismene are ethical, but Ismene lacks ethical imagination. As Babbitt sees it: This law, the convention of a particular place and time, is always but a very imperfect image, a mere shadow indeed of the unwrit- ten law which being above the ordinary rational level is . . . infinite and incapable of final formulation. While such interpretations no doubt are true—with each uncover- ing layers of meaning—alone they reduce Antigone to a morality play. Such interpretations fail to explain the play’s more complex and turbulent moods. So what drives the dramatic tension in Antigone? Consider the story anew: The two sons of Oedipus had shared the throne, alter- nating years as ruler. When Eteocles refused to turn over power at the end of his year, Polyneices attacked the city. The brothers died in single combat. Creon, their uncle, now king of Thebes, buried Eteocles with full honors as defender of the city. He left the body of Polyneices to rot, unmourned, outside the gates and decreed death to anyone who would honor the traitor with a burial. In the first lines of the play, Antigone has resolved to defy Creon’s decree. She has invited her sister to join her. Ismene has declined, recalling the family history of tragic defiance of both fate and lawful order. The stage is set. Alone, Antigone slips out and scatters funeral oil and earth over her brother’s body. Creon discovers the violation of his decree, and carries out its terms with one concession to Antigone’s position as member of the royal family. He does not execute her forthwith, but walls her up in a cave, to let the gods dispose of her as they will. In minor eddies within the play, the Aristotelian formula ap- plies—especially to Creon, usually judged to be excessively harsh. Possibly, it also applies to Ismene, who may seem excessively timid. Both are noble and both are flawed. Both reach a moment of truth and change course. Ismene wishes to stand by her sister’s side in death. Creon softens his hard rule. But the play is not their story; Sophocles named the work Antigone. Antigone stands no- blest and most heroic among all the characters, defiant of man’s rule and insisting on God’s justice. It is to her that we should look for the chief elements of the tragedy. And, if the Aristotelian for- mula applies, we must search for Antigone’s flaw. HUMANITAS • 9Antigone’s Flaw The suggestion that Sophocles intended to present a flawed Antigone rubs against the grain. She is the paragon. The religion of the Greeks, like virtually all religions, required burial of the dead— even the enemy dead. The ancient tales in the Iliad, the bible to the Greeks, warn of the anger of the gods upon a failure to honor the dead. Besides, the restless shades of the unburied could cause trouble. Antigone stands for all that is right and for opposition to tyranny. Thus, we have only a play about Creon’s excessive harsh- ness and his tragically delayed conversion. Yet, Sophocles provides a fair amount of evidence that he intended to create something more complex than a morality play. Consider first the parallels between Antigone and Oedipus Rex. Both stories begin with a problem facing family and polis, and with the central character resolving to make things right. Antigone pro- ceeds with unswerving resolution in her judgement of the situa- tion. She possesses complete confidence in her ability to choose and execute a just action. She does not see the full situation; she is blind to key elements of the problem. She is like her father in most re- spects. Both Antigone and Oedipus claim to know justice with the certainty of a god. Oedipus believes most in his cunning and strength, Antigone in her goodness. The flaw of hubris is easy to spot in Oedipus, but Antigone’s brilliance is so dazzling that we overlook her flaw. After all, she has formulated a great and noble truth and maintains it with courage. She asserts God’s law over man’s law. Especially in our own time, where we formally recognize the superiority, within specified spheres, of individual right over the demands of overly broad laws, Antigone seems a genius beyond her time. Creon, by contrast, understands the needs of the polis. Follow- ing a civil war, he has placed a premium on order. He will do what- ever is necessary, including the stern enforcement of harsh rules. He faces another dilemma in his role as leader: he forbade the burial of Polyneices and decreed this harsh punishment before he was aware of Antigone’s guilt. To pardon his future daughter-in- law as his first serious act as ruler of Thebes would compromise all future claims to fairness in his rule. Yet Creon listens to the chorus of old men; he listens to the blind seer. After struggling with the issue, he reconsiders his judgment; he determines to bury the body of Polyneices and to unbury Antigone with his own hands. Antigone, on the other hand, recognizes the demands of true 10 • Volume XII, No. 1, 1999 Patricia M. Lines justice and champions it. She spurns Ismene, who initially hesi- tated to assist her but soon after wished to share in her sister’s pun- ishment and death. Antigone refuses the offer. When Ismene asks whether her sister has cast her aside, Antigone’s answer ignores Ismene’s change of heart: “Yes. For you chose to live when I chose death.” Antigone seems to speak not to spare Ismene, but to wound her to the quick. Antigone leaves Haemon, her betrothed, in the cold, as she left Ismene. She never seeks him out, nor even men- tions his name.* Yet Haemon is ready to defy his father for Antigone’s sake, and he refuses to live without her. Ironically, this may be what he must do to win her affection, for Antigone reveals no tenderness for anyone except those already dead. Despite the solicitous love of Ismene and the fierce love of Haemon, Antigone complains of being alone and friendless: I call upon Thebes’ grove in the armored plain, to be my witnesses, how with no friend’s mourning, by what decree I go to the fresh-made prison-tomb. She compares her fate to Niobe’s—alluding to the stone image weeping on a cliff near Thebes. Significantly, Antigone overlooks the fact that hubris destroyed Niobe. Niobe had boasted that her six (in some versions seven) sons and six (or seven) daughters made her the equal of the goddess Leto, mother of Apollo and Artemis. Apollo and Artemis took offense on hearing of this inter- esting assertion of quantity over quality. They resolved the issue by killing the hapless children and turning Niobe to stone. The chorus, often the truth-sayer for Sophocles, provides more clues. Of Antigone, they tell us: The girl is bitter. She’s her father’s child. She cannot yield to trouble; nor could he. In perhaps the most revealing exchange, the chorus turns to Antigone and tells her, plainly: You showed respect for the dead. So we for you: but power Tenderness only for the dead. *There is one line that some translators, such as Townsend, attribute to Antigone that mentions Haemon, perhaps to soften her one-sidedness. Antigone, line 572: “Poor Haemon! See how much your father cares.” Wyckoff notes, how- ever, that all extant Greek sources give the line to Ismene. Creon responds to the comment with a reference to “your marriage” which provides some argument for attributing the line to Antigone, but, as Wyckoff points out, Creon’s remark could mean “the marriage of which you speak.” Wyckoff ed., 227. HUMANITAS • 13Antigone’s Flaw Sophocles created works that balance tensions in many dimen- sions. Each drama is different, of course. The tragedy of Oedipus seems unavoidable. Political deliberation would not have helped him much; the drama serves only to reveal the extent to which hu- bris can blind one to the truth. Antigone, on the other hand, might have avoided her tragic fate had she paid attention to and entered into discussion with others. To remain tragic, her story depended on a weak and inadequate recognition of her own failing. While they plainly ask “what is justice?,” the tragedies of Sophocles also ask the yet more difficult question, “how do we know it?” If Sophocles is right, there is something to learn from Antigone’s fate. When it comes to seeing the issues surrounding our understanding of justice, Creon may have something to offer after all. He believes justice requires him to give priority to the or- der of the polis, overruling individual judgments based on con- science. He believes in equal application of the laws, with no excep- tions for the royal family. He is at least partly wrong, by the judgment of most. Yet, he is ready to discuss the issue, to listen, to question, to entertain self-doubt. Although he believes that in a time of emergency the order of the polis may require harsh punish- ment for those who create disturbance, he is willing to reconsider. He listens to the chorus, to Teiresias, to others; and, although he seems adamant at times, he changes his mind. With his own hands he will unearth Antigone and bury the body of Polyneices. Antigone, on the other hand, has found a higher justice. Most commentators agree that she is right. But she will not discuss her judgment; she remains unyielding. She never doubts the wisdom of her course. She isolates herself. She acts under the illusion that only she is able to grasp the meaning of higher justice. She can only con- clude that she does not belong in this world, which so misunder- stands the nature of right action. Antigone’s self-certainty and self-isolation cut short all possi- bilities for full deliberation. Yet full deliberation was needed to per- suade Creon to change his mind. Had Antigone not isolated herself from her sister, Ismene would have stood by her side. Had she sought out Haemon, she would have had another ally. It seems likely that Eurydice, Haemon’s mother and Creon’s wife, would have joined the children’s revolt. She did register her objection to events in the end, through suicide. Had Antigone been ready to en- gage in politics, Creon would find himself facing the open opposi- Creon willing to entertain self-doubt. 14 • Volume XII, No. 1, 1999 Patricia M. Lines tion of all whom he loved. He has the capacity, as we know from his actions in the play, to yield. Antigone’s belief that she and only she understood justice and how it must apply in the particular situation before her left her with no choice but martyrdom. If she had only some portion of self- doubt, she may have waited just a few moments before her suicide. In that event, Haemon would have rescued her. Had she waited a few moments more, Creon would have done so. A happy ending required her to consider the position of others, to adjust to their views, and to hold her individual judgment of justice with some humility. It required an Antigone who could anticipate the gradual acceptance of her position by those around her. Her self-certainty brought her down. If all human beings suffer from short-sightedness, there is no certain source for a human grasp of truth. The best humans can do is to share insights in the hope of gaining a larger view of truth. The search for truth requires each to talk and consult with others, even such as come short . . . in ca- pacity, quickness and penetration; for . . . no one sees all and we generally have different prospects of the same thing according to our different . . . positions to it.* It is no accident that the author of these words, John Locke, was a leading advocate of government by consent. His remarks formalize the idea that mutual consultation is needed before formulating a vision of justice and choosing the right action for each particular case. Antigone’s flaw—the flaw of self-certainty—is the chief obstacle to this kind of deliberation. I probably do not need to draw atten- tion to the fact that politics in our time suffers from the same flaw. True believers, religious or secular, seek to replace deliberative politics with eternal principles. Such persons admit of just one right answer. Premises are beyond questioning. Defining political ques- tions as exclusively governed by immutable principles of right eliminates all need for further, often troublesome debate. Only the process of arriving at conclusions—whether the right principle was applied—can be questioned. It is easy to spot Antigone’s flaw in the character of an antago- nist one believes to be dead wrong. The rational mind easily identi- *John Locke, Of the Conduct of the Understanding § 3 (iii). True believers confuse politics with eternal principles. Failure to deliberate brings doom. HUMANITAS • 15Antigone’s Flaw fies religious fundamentalists as blinded by self-righteousness. This same rational thinker may fail to perceive his own blind spots. Antigone’s flaw has a subtle quality. She has indeed discovered a great truth. We must agree with her. We must admire her. We iden- tify with her. Her story reminds us, however, of how difficult it is to recognize hubris in our heroes or in ourselves. Upon the discovery of a cer- tain truth, there is a great temptation to believe one has access to all truth. To say it in traditional religious terms, it is a weakness of hu- man beings to believe that, once they have access to one of God’s truths, they know the full mind of God. From here it becomes ever so easy to mistake one’s own will for the will of God. Most true believers tend to enlarge their premises, leaving little to deduction. If one has determined that a particular action, and only that action, is the right thing to do, there is no choice but to take it, or to enter the realm of the immoral. Action based on such unquestioned belief lies beyond the realm of politics. I once sug- gested to a participant in what might be described as secular and left-leaning politics that a few leaders from that person’s organiza- tion hold a quiet, unpublicized retreat with selected leaders who are religious and right-leaning on an issue of common concern: the public school curriculum. The response was, “Whatever for?!” If I understand Sophocles correctly, such abrupt closing of the oppor- tunity for conversation could lead to a contemporary tragedy. If an individual as brilliant and noble as Antigone can succumb to hubris, anyone can. Antigone pursued goodness with a singular insight and courage. Discovering a flaw in a near-perfect character suggests a universal human weakness. Antigone’s flaw is a special kind of hubris that afflicts those who possess the greatest insights. Political modesty requires a recognition that one individual or group alone is likely to come up short in the search for truth: “something is left out which should go into the reckoning . . . .“ No one knows the whole truth, although each may know a part of it. All human beings are “shortsighted and very often see but one side of a matter . . . . From this defect . . . no man is free. We see but in part and we know but in part, and therefore it is no wonder we conclude not right from our partial views.”* Antigone’s flaw may be the plague of our times. *0f the Conduct of the Understanding § 3 (iii).