Download Arguments for God's Existence: Causal Arguments in Descartes' Meditations and more Study notes Introduction to Sociology in PDF only on Docsity! Philosophy 104 Prof. Don Rutherford Meditations 3 and 5: Arguments for God’s Existence I. First Causal Argument for God's Existence Formal reality = degree of ontological independence of a thing (idea < mind = body < God) Objective reality = the degree of reality an idea possesses by virtue of representing something with a given degree of formal reality. [1] “There must be at least as much <reality> in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause.” (CSM 91; known by the “natural light”) [2] An idea can only be caused by something that has at least as much formal reality as the idea has objective reality. (Follows from [1]; cf. CSM 92: “it is clear to me, by the natural light, that the ideas in me are like <pictures, or> images which can easily fall short of the perfection of things from which they are taken, but which cannot contain anything greater or more perfect.”) [3] I have an idea of God as a supremely perfect being. [4] That idea has infinite objective reality (cf. CSM 90: “the idea that gives me my understanding of a supreme God, eternal, infinite, <immutable>, omniscient, omnipotent and the creator of all things that exist apart from him, certainly has in it more objective reality than the ideas that represent finite substances.”) [5] So, there exists something (the cause of my idea of God) that has infinite formal reality (from [2] and [4]) [6] I know myself to be a limited being, so I do not have infinite formal reality. [7] Therefore, God, a perfect, infinite being distinct from me, exists (from [5] and [6]). II. Second Causal Argument for God’s Existence (CSM 95ff, starting at 48) [1] Either I derive my existence (a) from myself, or (b) from some other being(s) less perfect than God, or (c) from God. Subargument (a) [2] If I derive my existence from myself, then either (i) I “emerge out of nothing,” or (ii) I have always existed as I do now, as a consequence of my own power. 2 [3] Suppose (i): I emerge out of nothing, [4] In that case, I would have had the power to give myself all the perfections of which I have any idea (e.g. omniscience, omnipotence), i.e., I would be God. [5] I am in many ways imperfect (ignorant of many things, incapable of doing many things). [6] Therefore, I do not derive my existence from myself. [reject (i)] [7] Suppose (ii): I have always existed as I do now, as a consequence of my own power. [8] A lifespan can be divided into countless parts, each completely independent of the others. [9] Because each moment of existence is independent of the others, the same power and action are needed to preserve anything at each individual moment of its duration as would be needed to create it anew if it did not yet exist. [10] Because I am only a thinking thing, if there were such a power in me, I would be aware of it. [11] I am aware of no such power in me. [12] Therefore, I do not preserve my own existence. [reject (ii)] [13] Therefore, I do not derive my existence from myself. [reject (a)] Subargument (b) [14] Suppose I derive my existence from other causes less perfect than God. [15] There must be at least as much reality in the cause as in the effect. [16] I am a thinking thing and have within me an idea of God as a supremely perfect being. [17] Thus, whatever produces me must be a thinking thing and must possess the idea of all the perfections I attribute to God. (from [15]) [18] Any such cause (α) must derive its existence from itself or from another cause (β). [19] If α derives its existence from itself, then it is God. (see [4]) [20] If α derives its existence from another cause (β), then either β is God or it derives its existence from another cause (γ). [and so on…]