Article 14 of Indian Constitution, Study Guides, Projects, Research of Constitutional Law

Download Article 14 of Indian Constitution and more Study Guides, Projects, Research Constitutional Law in PDF only on Docsity! INTRODUCTION The makers of India’s Cons�tu�on were not sa�sfied with that kind of understanding of the right to equality. They knew that even though inequality in Indian society has been no�ced and a�acked ever since Buddha’s �me and has been Central to the social reforms from �me to �me, widespread social and economic inequali�es, o�en sanc�oned by law or public policies and exercise of public power, supported by religion and other social norms and prac�ces existed and flourished such inequali�es could not be removed minimised or dealt with by a provision like Ar�cle 14 alone. Even if they could be dealt with, it would have been a very slow process. Therefore, they expressly abolished and prohibited some of the exis�ng inequali�es prac�sed not only by public power or State but even by private persons, and expressly authorised the State to take necessary steps to remove them. Ar�cle 15 to 18 clearly express such inten�on of Cons�tu�on makers. Thus, the right to equality in the Cons�tu�on of India is not merely a nega�ve right not to be discriminated against, but also a posi�ve right to be treated as an equal. Under the later aspect of the right, which is the essence of the core of right to equality, the State is under an obliga�on to take necessary steps so that every individual receives equal respect and concern which he is en�tled to as a human being. Ar�cle 14, though much wider and general than Ar�cle 15 to 18 in its scope, it must be read in conjunc�on with Ar�cle 15 to 18 and should not either permit anything prohibited or prohibit anything permi�ed by the la�er. Ar�cle 14 guarantees to every person, including non-ci�zens and transgender , the right to equality before law or the equal protec�on of laws. The first expression equality before the law, which is said to have taken from the English common-law, is declara�on of equality of all person in the eyes of law, implying absence of any special privilege in any individual. Every person, whatever his rank or posi�on, is subject to the jurisdic�on of the ordinary courts. Explaining the concept of legal equality as it operated in England, Dicey said, “With us every official, from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done without any legal jus�fica�on as any other ci�zen. The second expression, “the equal protec�on of the laws”, which is rather a corollary Of the first and is based on the last clause of the first sec�on of 14th Amendment to the US Cons�tu�on, directs that equal protec�on shall be secured to all persons within the territorial jurisdic�on of the Union in the enjoyment of their rights and privileges without favour or discrimina�on. It has been said that “the equal protec�on of laws” is a pledge of protec�on or guarantees of equal laws. The two expression are simultaneously used in Ar�cle 7 of Universal Declara�on of Human Rights, 1948 which may have influenced the formula�on of Ar�cle 14. The underlying purpose of the two expression is to give as wide amplitude to Ar�cle 14 as possible. The obliga�on imposed on the State by Ar�cle 14 is for the benefit of all persons, within the territory of India. The benefit of Ar�cle 14 is, therefore, not limited to ci�zens. Every person whether natural or ar�ficial, whether he is ci�zen or an alien, is en�tled to the protec�on of this Ar�cle. In Na�onal Legal Services Authority V/s Union of India (2014), it was observed that the meaning of the term 'person' within Ar�cle 14, is gender neutral and also covers transgenders who are neither male nor female. They are en�tled to legal protec�on of laws in all spheres of State ac�vity, including employment, healthcare, educa�on as well as equal civil and ci�zenship rights, as enjoyed by any other ci�zen of India. Ar�cle 14 uses the two expressions to make the concept of equal treatment a binding principle of State ac�on. For long the nature and the extent of the guarantee has been understood to be the same under both the expressions. In the case State of West Bengal V/s Anwar Ali Sarkar(1952), Patanjali Sastri CJ observed that the second expression was a corollary of the first. Indeed, it will be difficult to imagine any viola�on of "the equal protec�on of the laws", which would not be a viola�on of "equality before the law". However, the court has also observed that even if there is much in common between the two expressions in Ar�cle 14, they do not mean the same thing. "The word 'law' in the former expression is used in generic sense - a philosophical sense — whereas the word 'laws' in the la�er expression denotes specific laws ". It has not explained this statement any further, but it means that equality for all is the law or standard norm of the land. As we will also no�ce below under the head "Expanding Horizons of Equality", some of the judges have been poin�ng out from the very beginning that equality is a dynamic concept which goes on changing with changing �mes and social contexts and must be understood in that sense. In Stephens College V/s University of Delhi, the Honourable Court held that the expression “equal protec�on of laws is now being read as a posi�ve obliga�on on the state to ensure equal protec�on of laws by bringing in necessary social and economic changes so that everyone may enjoy equal protec�on of laws and nobody is denied such protec�on. If the state leaves the exis�ng inequali�es untouched by its laws, It fails in its Where the law is challenged as offending against the guarantee in Art 14, the first duty of the court is to examine the purpose and policy of the Act and then to discover whether the classifica�on made by the law has a reasonable rela�on to the object which the Legislature seeks to obtain. The object of the Act is to found in its Title, Preamble and Provisions. It is not possible to exhaust the circumstances or criteria which may accord a reasonable basis for classifica�on in all cases. It depends on the object of the legislature. In order to be ‘Reasonable’, a classifica�on must not be arbitrary but must be ra�onal`. The Supreme Court in the case, LIC of India V/s Consumer Educa�on and Research Centre, has however warned against over-emphasis on classifica�on. The Court has explained that 'the doctrine of classifica�on is only a subsidiary rule evolved by the courts to give prac�cal content to the doctrine of equality, over-emphasis on the doctrine of classifica�on or anxious or sustained a�empt to discover some basis for classifica�on may gradually and impercep�bly erode the profound potency of the glorious content of equity enshrined in Ar�cle 14 of the Cons�tu�on. The over-emphasis on classifica�on would inevitably result in subs�tu�on of the doctrine of classifica�on for the doctrine of equality... Lest, the classifica�on would deny equality to the larger segments of the society'. Principles for determining Reasonableness of Classifica�on These principles were laid down in R.K. Dalmia v. Jus�ce Tendulkar, s�ll hold valid ground, which are follows - (a) A law may be cons�tu�onal even though it relates to a single individual, if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons, applicable to him and not applicable to other, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself.' For instance, Indian Military Nursing Service is a dis�nct separate class by itself, though a part of Indian Army, prescrip�on of dress code for the Nurses, has been held as not viola�ve of Ar�cle 14. (b) There is always a presump�on in favour of the cons�tu�onality of an enactment and the burden is upon him, who a�acks it, to show that there has been a clear transgression of the cons�tu�onal principles.' It is an accepted doctrine of American Courts. (c) It must be presumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that, its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that, its discrimina�ons. are based on adequate grounds. (d) The Legislature is free to recognise the degree of harm and may confine its restric�ons to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest. (e) In order to sustain the presump�on of cons�tu�onality, the Court may take into considera�on, ma�ers of common knowledge, ma�ers of common report, the history of the �mes and may presume every state of facts which can be conceived exis�ng at the �me of legisla�on." (f) While good faith and knowledge of the exis�ng condi�ons on the part of the Legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the no�ce of the court on which the classifica�on may reasonably be regarded as based, the presump�on of cons�tu�onality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjec�ng certain individuals or corpora�ons, to hos�le or discrimina�ng legisla�on. (g) The classifica�on may be made on different basis e.g., geographical or according to objects or occupa�ons or the like. (h) The classifica�on made by a legislature need not be scien�fically perfect or logically complete. Mathema�cal nicety and perfect equality are not required. (i) Ar�cle 14 applies to both, the discrimina�on of the substan�ve law as well as procedure law. If the classifica�on sa�sfies the above proposi�ons, the law will be declared Cons�tu�onal. Permina�on & Prohibi�on Of Ar�cle 14 Ar�cle 14 permits classifica�on but prohibits class legisla�on the equal protec�on of law guaranteed by ar�cle 14 does not mean that all laws must be general in character. It does not mean that the same laws should apply to all persons. It does not mean that every law must have universal applica�on for, all person are not, by nature, a�ainment or circumstances in the same posi�on. The varying need of different classes of persons o�en require separate treatment. From the very nature of society there should be different places and the legislature controls the policy and enacts laws in the best interest of the safety and security of the state. In fact, iden�cal amount to unequal circumstances would amount to inequality. Thus, a reasonable classifica�on is permi�ed for the develop society. Ar�cle forbids class-legisla�on but it does not forbids reasonable classifica�on. The classifica�on, however, must not be "Arbitrary, ar�ficial or evasive" but must be based on some real and substan�al Dis�nc�on bearing a just and reasonable rela�on to the object sought be achieved by the legisla�on. Ar�cle 14 is implied where equal are treated differently without any reasonable Basis.But where equals and unequal are treated differently, ar�cle 14 does not apply class legisla�on is that which makes an improper discrimina�on by conferring par�cular privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from a large number of persons. In Deepak Sibal V/s Punjab University, the Supreme Court has pointed out that a classifica�on need not be made with mathema�cal precision. But, if there is li�le or no difference between the persons or things which have been grouped together and was le� out of the group then classifica�on cannot be regarded as reasonable. The court has also pointed out that to consider reasonable Ness of the classifica�on it is necessary to take into account the objec�ve of such classifica�on if the objec�ve be illogical, unfair and unjust, necessarily the classifica�on will have to be held as unreasonable. A Dynamic Approach towards Ar�cle 14 The doctrine of reasonable classifica�on has been for long, the undisputed touchstone to determine the scope and content of Ar�cle 14. Over the years, Ar�cle 14 has received a liberal interpreta�on. Its scope has also been expanded by crea�ve interpreta�on of the Courts. The Supreme Court in E.P. Royappa V/s State of Tamil Nadu, however, has given a dynamic connota�on to the equalising principle, enunciated in the Ar�cle. The Supreme Court declared this equalising principle contained in Ar�cle 14 as a "'founding faith, a way of life" and for that reason it must not be subjected to "a narrow pedan�c or lexicographic approach." Bhagwa�, J. (as he then was) speaking for himself, Chandrachud and Krishna Iyer, J.J., propounded the new concept of equality from a posi�vis�c point of view and observed : Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be "cribbed, cabined and confined" within tradi�onal and doctrinaire limits. From a posi�vis�c point of view, equality is an�the�c to arbitrariness. In fact, equality of each case as also the provisions of a Statute or Statutory Rules. However, they are held to cons�tute "the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair play and jus�ce which is not the preserve of any par�cular race or country but is shared in common by all men. The first rule is that "no man shall be a judge in his own cause" and the second rule is "hear the other side". Another salutary requirement of natural jus�ce is spelling out reasons for the order made. "Reason" is said to be the heart beat of every conclusion and without the same, it becomes lifeless. Therefore, where the High Court refused to grant leave to appeal against acqui�al by a non-speaking order, it would be improper as viola�ve of Ar�cle 14. In Delhi Transport Corpora�on v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, the Supreme Court held that Regula�on 9(b) of the Delhi Road. Transport Authority (Condi�on of Appointment and Service) Regula�ons,- 1952, which conferred power on the. Authority, to terminate the services of a permanent employee by issuing a no�ce without assigning any reason and without giving .him any opportunity of hearing, was wholly arbitrary, unjust, unfair and unreasonable, viola�ng principles of natural jus�ce as well as Ar�cle 14. However, the rules of Natural Jus�ce are not embodied rules and undue reliance on these principles, may lead to miscarriage of jus�ce. There can be certain situa�ons in which an order passed in viola�on of natural jus�ce need not be set aside, e.g., where no prejudice is caused to the person concerned and if quashing of the order made in breach of natural jus�ce is likely to result in revival of another order which is in itself illegal. The Supreme Court in several cases has developed the principle that in addi�on to breach of natural jus�ce, prejudice must also be proved. Again, the principle of natural jus�ce, of giving opportunity of hearing, may be dispensed with on the ground of public policy and safety or in the interest of jus�ce. It may thus be said that the requirement of natural jus�ce must deperid on the facts and circumstances of the case. In State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann, the respondent's resigna�on from service was accepted for contes�ng elec�on to the Legisla�ve Assembly of the State. He having been defeated in the elec�on, sought reinstatement in service, on the ground that others, earlier had been so reinstated. Rejec�ng the claim of the respondent, the Supreme Court held that Ar�cle 14 would apply only when invidious discrimina�on was meted out to equals and similarly circumstanced without any ra�onal basis or rela�onship in that behalf. A wrong decision by the government, the Court ruled, did not give a right, to enforce the wrong order and claim parity or equality. The wrong order, .the Court said, could not be the founda�on, for claiming equality, for enforcement of the same order. In Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan , the respondent, a Laboratory Assistant, was deemed to have vacated his post, on the ground of overstaying of leave and unauthorised absence. The Court held that the absence of a no�ce to show cause did not make any difference, for the employee had already been told that his further overstay for con�nuing in the job with a foreign university was bound to be refused. Right cannot be waived: A person cannot voluntarily get discrimina�on or waive his Fundamental Right against discrimina�on. This was observed in Basheshar Nath V/s IT Commissioner(1959). MISTAKE NOT TO BE REPEATED The guarantee of 'equality before law' is a posi�ve concept. It cannot be enforced by a person in nega�ve manner. Therefore, if an illegality or irregularity is commited by the state in favour of a person or a group of persons, others cannot claim that the same irregularity or illegality be also commi�ed in their favour on thee principle of equality before law. A wrong decision/order in favour of any par�cular person does not en�tle any other party to claim the benefits on the basis of such wrong decision. illegality cannot be a basis for equal treatment. The principle of equality under Ar�cle 14, it has been ruled, does not apply when the order relied upon is unsustainable in law and is illegal. It is ruled that two wrongs do not make one right' and that an illegality cannot be allowed to be perpetuated under the so- called "equality doctrine". It is trite law that there is no equality in illegality. BASIS OF CLASSIFICATION It has been held that classifica�on to be reasonable must be founded on some intelligible differen�a which dis�nguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those le� out of the group. There may be different basis of classifica�on referable to different considera�ons in each case. Geographical Basis Ar�cle 14 does not require that uniform laws be enacted for the whole of the territory of India. A law may be applicable to one part of the territory of India and not to the other parts depending on par�cular circumstances and peculiar geographical condi�ons pervading in that area. A classifica�on may be, therefore, properly made, on geographical basis. Thus, favoured treatment to those situated in backward and tribal areas, cannot be held, to be illegal or arbitrary. In Ram Chandra v. State of Orissa, the State made two Acts for na�onalisa�on of road transport business. One of the Acts applied to the part of the State which was previously a part of Bri�sh India and the other Act applied to that part of the State which was previously a Princely State. As the condi�ons in the two parts were materially different, the Acts were upheld as not viola�ve of Ar�cle 14. But, if the basis of classifica�on is not ra�onal, it would not be upheld merely on the ground of par�cular geographical considera�ons. In the State of Rajasthan v. Rao Manohar Singhji, jagirdars in one area of the State of Rajasthan were allowed to collect the land rent, but the jagirdars in other Areas were not so allowed. There being no apparent difference between them, the law was struck down as having no ra�onal basis for classifica�on. Historical Considera�on A classifica�on may be made on the basis of historical reasons. Sec�on 87-B of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, granted immunity from civil process to the. ex-Rulers of Indian Princely States. This Sec�on was upheld in Mohanlal Jain v. Man Singhji, as the ex-Rulers cons�tuted a separate class on account of historical considera�on. Likewise, the Madras H.R.C.E, Act, 1951, which was applicable to only that Malabar area, which formerly formed part of Madras State, was held not discriminatory, since the classifica�on was based on geographical/historical reasons. Educa�onal Qualifica�ons Classifica�on on the basis of educa�onal qualifica�on has been held to be reasonable, said to sa�sfy the doctrine of equality as adumbrated in Ar�cle 14. The state, as an employer, therefore, is en�tled to fix separate quota for promo�on for the degree holder, diploma holders and cer�ficate holders separately in exercise of its rule making power under Ar�cle 309. CONCLUSION