EC 355: Topics in Antitrust Law and Economics Syllabus at Boston College, Papers of Microeconomics

Download EC 355: Topics in Antitrust Law and Economics Syllabus at Boston College and more Papers Microeconomics in PDF only on Docsity! 1 BOSTON COLLEGE Department of Economics EC 355: Topics in Antitrust Law and Economics Spring 2003 Professor James A. Dalton Office Hours: Tuesdays and Thursdays 8:00am-8:45am; Office: Lower Campus Admin. Bldg. 480B 10:30am-1:15pm; or by appointment Email: jdalton7@attbi.com Description and Objectives: This course examines principal issues in antitrust economics and public policy through the study of the literature, case studies and a term paper. We will approach the study of key antitrust issues using as a backdrop the assumption that you are an economist retained by a party to an antitrust case. At the conclusion of the course students should have improved the ability to apply economic analysis to practical problems related to the exercise and impact of market power. Students should also leave with a better understanding of the reasons for antitrust policy, the role of economics in the enforcement of competition policy and the manner in which economists participate in antitrust enforcement. While such lessons contribute to understanding U.S. policy, they also can be applied to policy in other countries. Prerequisites: Students are expected to be well grounded in microeconomic theory. The course requirement is intermediate microeconomics, EC 201 or EC 203. Method: This course requires active participation on a class-by-class basis. Although I frequently will use the traditional lecture method, I also will call on students in each class to discuss assignments. Grading: The final grade will be based on performance in the following categories: Mid-Term Exam 30% Final Exam 35% Outlines for Term Paper 5% Term Paper 20% Class Participation 10% There will be no scheduling of makeup exams. Only under extremely extenuating circumstances will an excused absence be considered. Course Calendar, Syllabus and Assigned Reading: Your "Coursepak" contains most of the assigned readings. Additional material either is on reserve in the library or will be handed out in class. I reserve the option to change some of the assignments during the semester. 2 SYLLABUS and READING ASSIGNMENTS I. Introduction and Overview of Antitrust January 14 A. Introduction to the course “Historical Perspective From the Aged” and antitrust policy (handout); and “Antitrust Laws” (handout). January 16 B. Role of economics, and review H. Petersen, “Markets are Good” of key concepts (handout); Waldman & Jensen, Industrial Organization (2nd ed.) Ch. 2, esp. pp. 34-51 or chapters on monopoly, competition and oligopoly in any other intermediate microeconomics text; and Mankiw, Ch. 7, “Consumers, Producers and the Efficiency of Markets”, pp. 141-158 (handout). January 21 C. Anatomy of antitrust litigation “Introduction to the Litigation Process” (handout). D. Roles of economists in antitrust Carlton & Perloff, Modern Industrial litigation Organization (3rd edition), pp. 601-610; and Mankiw, Ch. 2, “Thinking Like an Economist”, pp. 19-34 (handout). D1. Approaches to Antitrust Analysis: Waldman & Jensen, Industrial Chicago School vs. S-C-P School Organization (2nd ed.), pp. 3-10; and “Some Comments on Schools of Thought Affecting Approaches to Antitrust Economics” (handout). D2. Responsibilities of economists: (a) assisting the court (b) constraints on scope of expert testimony. II. Market Power January 23 A. Market power and relevant “Summary Notes on Market markets: Definition” (handout); and Carlton & Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization (3rd edition), pp. 610-615. A1. Definitions A2. Relevance of market definition for Fisher, “Diagnosing Monopoly”, Antitrust cases Industrial Organization, Economics and the Law”, pp. 3-32. 5 March 25 B2. How does it work? ABA, Predatory Pricing Law, Ch. 1, pp. 1-20 March 27 Morton, “Entry and Predation: British Shipping Cartels”, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy (1997), p. 679-721; and Granitz and Klein, “Raising Rivals Costs: Standard Oil Case”, Journal of Law & Economics, April 1996, pp. 1-45. March 28 Optional: Detailed (sentence) outline of term paper via attachment to email. April 1 C. Monopolization: Tying, bundling and Microsoft C1. Issues in U.S. v. Microsoft Microsoft I (handout); and Ross, “Network Economics Effects and the Limits of GTE Sylvania’s Efficiency Analysis”, Antitrust Law Journal (2001), v. 68, no. 3, pp. 945-965. Grimes, “The Antitrust Tying Law Schism: A Critique of Microsoft…”, Antitrust Law Journal, 70, 1, pp. 199-229. April 3 Aron & Wildman, “Economic Theories of Tying and Foreclosure Applied – and Not Applied – in Microsoft”, Antitrust (Fall 1999), pp. 48-52. April 8 C2. Outcome of trial: Decision, Gavil, “A Analysis of Some Procedural remedy/settlement Aspects of the Microsoft Trial”, Antitrust, pp. 7-14; “Judge Orders God To Break Up Into Smaller Deities” (handout); and Microsoft II (handout). April 10 C3. Alternative viewpoints on James, “The Real Microsoft Case and settlement Settlement”, pp. 58-66; and Bresnahan, “A Remedy That Falls Short of Restoring Competition”, pp. 67-71, both in Antitrust (Fall 2001), v. 16, no. 1. 6 IV. Antitrust in the “New Economy” April 15 A. The issue of public policy Pitovsky, “Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property”, pp. 913-924; and Posner, “Antitrust in the New Economy”, pp. 925-943, both in Antitrust Law Journal, (2001), v. 68, no. 3. B. Empirical bases Jacobson, “Do We Need a ‘New Economy’ Exception for Antitrust”, Antitrust (Fall 2001), pp. 89-94; and Muris, “GTE Sylvania and the Empirical Foundations of Antitrust”, Antitrust Law Journal (2001), v. 68, no. 3, pp. 899-912. April 17 Religious Holiday April 22 C. International competitiveness Kauper, “The Legacy of LTV/Republic Steel”, Antitrust Law Journal (2001), v. 68, no. 3, pp. 753-769. D. Wartime? Steuer and Barile, “Antitrust in Wartime”, Antitrust (Spring 2002), pp. 71-75. E. Mergers in transnational Garza, “The Background”, Antitrust (Fall antitrust policy: The proposed 2001), v. 16, no. 1, pp. 6; and Reynolds & merger between GE and Honeywell Ordover, “Archimedean Leveraging & the GE/Honeywell Transaction”, Antitrust Law Journal, 70, 1 (2002), pp. 171-198 (handout). Optional: “Roundtable discussion” and Patterson and Shapiro, “Transatlantic Divergence”, Antitrust (Fall 2001), v. 16, no. 1, pp. 7-33. V. Damages in Antitrust Cases April 24 A. Concept and types of damages Blair and Page, “The Role of Economics in Defining Antitrust Injury & Standing”, pp. 69 84; Blair & Romano, “Distinguishing Participants…: Liability & Damages”, pp. 25- 38; Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, pp. 342-347. 7 April 28 B. Measurement O’Brien & Meyer, “A Guide to Calculating Lost Profits”, National Law Journal (handout). C. Causal links and a reasonable Dalton, “Impact of Revised Rules of Civil basis for opinions Procedure on the Use of Experts”, PHB Insights (handout). VI. Admissability of Expert Testimony of Economists: The Daubert and Kumho “Gateways” Eftinoff, “The Decade After Daubert Proves Tough on Expert Witnesses”, Litigation News, July 2002. April 28 Term Paper Due May 8, Final Exam 12:30