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Download Criminal cases with citation and full cases and more Assignments Criminal Law in PDF only on Docsity! 2018 REPORTED Mohd Aminurdin Ahmad v PP (2018) 2 CLJ 626 MOHD AMINURDIN AHMAD v. PP HIGH COURT SABAH & SARAWAK, MIRI ALWI ABDUL WAHAB JC [CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: MYY-42H-3-9-2017] 21 DECEMBER 2017 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Sentencing - Appeal against sentence - Accused charged for offence of rape under s. 376(2)(d) of Penal Code - Sessions Court sentenced accused to ten years' imprisonment - Grounds of appeal - Age and antecedents of accused - Youthful offender - Whether accused should be bound over under s. 293 and s. 294 of Criminal Procedure Code - Whether victim volunteered herself to incident - Whether sentence passed by Sessions Court appropriate On 12 March 2017, at about 10pm, the complainant ('the victim') went out with her female friend, Haslina together with two other males named 'Mirul' and 'Am'. Both the victim and Haslina later went their separate ways where Haslina followed Mirul whilst the complainant followed Am ('the appellant') on a motorcycle. The victim was brought to various places before they finally stopped at Lutong beach where the appellant raped the complainant. Thereafter, the appellant sent the victim back to her house. The appellant was arrested on 15 March 2017 and was subsequently charged under s. 376(2)(d) of the Penal Code. The appellant pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment by the Sessions Court Judge ('SCJ'). Dissatisfied with the sentenced imposed by the SCJ, the appellant appealed, inter alia, on the grounds that (i) the sentence imposed by the SCJ was manifestly excessive without judicially considering the age and antecedents of the appellant who was 19 years old at the time of the commission of the offence. It was the appellant's submission that the appellant, being a youthful offender, should be bound over under s. 293 and s. 294 of the Criminal Procedure Code; and (ii) the victim volunteered herself to follow the appellant who was unknown to her. Had she not followed the stranger, the incident could have been avoided. Held (dismissing appeal; upholding decision of Sessions Court): (1) The High Court will not normally interfere with a sentence judicially considered by a lower court as long as it passes sentence according to the correct principle of law. On the facts, the offence committed by the appellant was serious and its severity had far outweighed the clean record of the appellant. Further, the appellant's submission that the complainant should not have followed the appellant in the first place could not be used as an excuse for the appellant to commit rape against her. The complainant was merely following the appellant for the motorcycle ride and did not consent to such criminal act. (paras 7, 8 & 9 ) (2) The appellant's act was premeditated because the complainant was brought to various places after midnight before she was raped at a strategic location at Lutong beach. It would have been a different case if the sexual act is consensual, therefore no force was applied to cause the injury to the complainant. Also, s. 293 of the Criminal Procedure Code could not be used arbitrarily in the sense that, if the offence is committed by a youthful offender, he will automatically be entitled to a lenient sentence and to be bound over. (para 12) (3) The punishment for rape under s. 376(2)(d) of the Penal Code carries an imprisonment term of not less than ten years and not more than 30 years and also liable to whipping. In the present case, the SCJ had passed a minimum imprisonment sentence and spared the appellant from the sentence of whipping because of his young age. (para 14) (4) Considering the serious nature of the offence, the manner how it was committed by the appellant and the traumatic ordeal that the complainant has to go through for the rest of her life, the SCJ was not wrong in passing the sentence as he did. (para 16) Case(s) referred to: Nor Afizal Azizan v. PP [2012] 6 CLJ 370 CA (refd) PP v. Yap Huat Heng [1986] 1 CLJ 81; [1986] CLJ (Rep) 645 HC (refd) Tukiran Taib v. PP [1955] 1 LNS 166 HC (refd) Legislation referred to: Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 293, 294 Penal Code, s. 376(2)(d) Counsel: For the appellant - Shikh Rajjish Ahmad; M/s Shad & Partners Advocs For the respondent - Wan Mohd I'zzat Wan Abdullah; DPP Reported by Sandra Gabriel JUDGMENT Alwi Abdul Wahab JC: Introduction [1] This is an appeal on sentence by the appellant against the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge ("SCJ") handed down on 5 September 2017 whereby he sentenced the appellant to ten years' imprisonment for an offence of rape under s. 376(2)(d) of the Penal Code. The Charge Bahawa kamu pada 13.3.2017 jam lebih kurang antara 0130hrs hingga 0400hrs bertempat di tanduk beliau kerana pada usia ini, kebiasaannya mereka lebih suka ikut kata hati dan tidak berfikir panjang tanpa memikirkan kesan akibat perbuatan mereka sendiri. Namun begitu, penama menyesal atas perbuatan beliau dan beliau berjanji akan lebih berhati- hati serta tidak mengulangi kesalahan ini lagi. Pihak keluarga penama sanggup untuk menjamin mahupun menerima penama semula dalam keluarga mereka selepas ini. Whether The Sentence Passed On The Appellant Is Excessive [14] The punishment for rape under s. 376(2)(d) carries an imprisonment term of not less than ten years and not more than 30 years and also liable to whipping. In the present case, the learned SCJ had passed a minimum imprisonment sentence and spared the appellant from the sentence of whipping because of his young age. It goes without saying that the learned SCJ had considered the overall factors before passing sentence. Plea Bargaining [15] On the issue of plea bargaining claimed by learned counsel for the appellant, regret to say that the notes of proceedings did not show such plea bargaining had taken place before the learned SCJ. On the contrary, the notes of proceedings showed that the prosecution had pressed for a sentence that reflects the severity of the offence and the sentence imposed must be able to send a strong message to the public that the court views such offences with complete abhorrence. Conclusion [16] Considering the serious nature of the offence, the manner how it was committed by the appellant and the traumatic ordeal that the complainant has to go through for the rest of her life, I am of the view that the learned SCJ was not wrong in passing the sentence as he did. The appeal is dismissed, and the sentence imposed by the learned SCJ is accordingly upheld. [2017] 1 LNS 1990 Zulkarnain Harun v PP (2018) 1 LNS 319 ZULKARNAIN HARUN lwn. PP MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA, TEMERLOH HASSAN ABDUL GHANI PK [RAYUAN JENAYAH NO. CB-42S-11-08/2017] 15 MAC 2018 UNDANG-UNDANG JENAYAH: Kanun Keseksaan - Seksyen 376(2) - Pertuduhan rogol statutori - Mangsa berumur 19 tahun ketika memberikan keterangan - Bayi yang dilahirkan dan laporan analisa DNA mengesahkan tertuduh adalah bapa kandung bayi yang dilahirkan oleh mangsa - Mangsa dapat mengingati fakta kes yang material dengan terang dan jelas - Sama ada kes-kes seksual memerlukan keterangan sokongan - Sama ada keterangan mangsa merupakan keterangan substantif - Sama ada keterangan pakar DNA perlu diterima 'on its face value' PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Pembelaan - Penafian - Pertuduhan rogol - Tertuduh mendakwa zakarnya tidak berfungsi - Mangsa telah mengandungkan dan melahirkan anak hasil zuriat tertuduh - Laporan DNA mengesahkan tertuduh adalah bapa kandung bayi yang dilahirkan mangsa - Sama ada pembelaan tertuduh bersifat penafian semata-mata PROSEDUR JENAYAH: Rayuan - Rayuan terhadap hukuman - Kesalahan seksual - Rogol statutori - Tertuduh diperintahkan membayar pampasan kepada mangsa disamping hukuman penjara 20 tahun dan 10 sebatan - Mangsa terpaksa berhenti sekolah dan mencari nafkah sendiri untuk membesarkan anak - Sama ada kekerapan kesalahan rogol dan trauma yang terpaksa dilalui oleh mangsa perlu diambil kira - Sama ada mangsa wajar diberi pampasan [Rayuan perayu ditolak.] Kes-kes yang dirujuk: Ahmad Nazari Abd Majid v. PP [2009] 8 CLJ 417 HC (dirujuk) Aswan Muhammad lwn. PP & Satu Lagi Rayuan [2012] 8 CLJ 72 HC (dirujuk) Balachandran v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85 (dirujuk) DA Duncan v. PP [1980] 1 LNS 12 FC (dirujuk) Looi Kow Chai & Anor v. PP [2003] 1 CLJ 734 CA (dirujuk) Mohd Amin Ishak v. PP & Satu lg rayuan [2013] 3 CLJ 258 HC (dirujuk) Mohd Yusri Mangsor & Anor v. PP [2014] 7 CLJ 897 CA (dirujuk) Mohamad Radhi Yaakob v. PP [1991] 1 CLJ Rep 311 SC (dirujuk) Mohamed Yatin Bin Abu Bakar v. PP [1949] 1 LNS 50 HC (dirujuk) Munusamy v. PP [1987] CLJ Rep 221 SC (dirujuk) Peilis Sami v. PP [2014] 6 CLJ 670 CA (dirujuk) PP v. Ismail Ali [2008] 1 LNS 309 HC (dirujuk) PP v. Ling Tee Huah [1980] 1 LNS 212 HC (dirujuk) PP v. Mohamad Malek Ridhzuan Che Hassan [2013] 8 CLJ 359 CA (dirujuk) PP v. Yuvaraj [1968] 1 LNS 116 (dirujuk) Razali bin Hamzah v. PP [2010] 10 CLJ 462 HC (dirujuk) Razi Amnin v. PP [2010] 7 CLJ 771 HC (dirujuk) Sunny Ang v. PP [1965] 1 LNS 171 FC (dirujuk) Wong Swee Chin v. PP [1980] 1 LNS 138 FC (dirujuk) Perundangan yang dirujuk: Akta Kanak-Kanak 1950, s. 133A Kanun Keseksaan, ss. 376(2), 375 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, ss. 173(h),(i),(iii), 426 Kaunsel: Bagi pihak perayu/tertuduh - Hadir Sendiri Bagi pihak responden/TPR - Siti Hajar Mustafa DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI TEMERLOH DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR [RAYUAN JENAYAH NO. CB-42S-11-08/2017] ANTARA ZULKARNAIN HARUN ... PERAYU DAN PENDAKWA RAYA ... RESPONDEN [Dalam Perkara Mahkamah Sesyen Temerloh Kes No. 62JS-25-12/2005 Pendakwa Raya Lawan Zulkarnain Harun] PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalan [1] Perayu dalam kes ini dituduh dengan pertuduhan pindaan di bawah seksyen 376(2) Kanun Keseksaan [KK] kerana merogol XXX. Di akhir perbicaraan, Perayu telah didapati bersalah, hubungan seks. Dia tidak bersetuju dengan keputusan DNA. Keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Di Akhir Kes Pembelaan [15] Di akhir kes pembelaan berkaitan dengan beban pembuktian, HMS merujuk kes Mohamad Yatin Abu Bakar v. PP [1949] 1 LNS 50; [1950] MLJ 57, PP v. Yuvaraj [1968] 1 LNS 116; [1969] 2 MLJ 89, Mohamad Radhi bin Yaakob v. PP [1991] 1 CLJ Rep 311; [1991] 3 CLJ 2073 dan mengatakan tugas Mahkamah adalah untuk menentukan sama ada pihak pembelaan telah berjaya menimbulkan sebarang keraguan yang munasabah atau tidak terhadap kebenaran kes pihak pendakwaan. [16] HMS telah meneliti keseluruhan keterangan kes pihak pendakwaan dan pihak pembelaan dan memutuskan seperti berikut: (i) Pembelaan Perayu hanya bersifat 'bare denial' dan 'afterthought'. (ii) Keterangan Perayu bahawa mangsa tidak datang ke kedainya pada tarikh kejadian dan dia tidak melakukan hubungan seks dengan mangsa tidak disokong oleh keterangan bebas yang lain dan sukar dipercayai. (iii) Keterangan mangsa yang menceritakan secara terperinci peristiwa yang berlaku lebih meyakinkan dan lebih boleh dipercayai. (iv) Keterangan mangsa disokong oleh bukti-bukti perubatan iaitu dalam tempoh 9 bulan lepas kejadian mangsa telah melahirkan anak. (v) Hasil ujian DNA mengesahkan Perayu bapa kandung anak tersebut. (vi) Tidak ada keterangan daripada Perayu untuk menyangkal penemuan saksi pakar DNA pihak pendakwaan. (vii) Perayu mengakui anak tersebut anak kandungnya. [17] Di akhir kes pembelaan HMS telah memutuskan Perayu telah gagal menimbulkan sebarang keraguan yang munasabah ke atas kes pihak pendakwaan dan pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kesnya melampaui keraguan yang munasabah sehingga ke akhir kes pembelaan. [18] Setelah mendengar rayuan ringan hukuman Perayu dan Penghujahan TPR, HMS telah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 20 tahun penjara berkuat kuasa dari tarikh jatuh hukuman 9.8.2017 dan 10 kali sebatan. Perayu juga diperintah membayar pampasan RM30,000 jika gagal 6 bulan penjara. Keputusan Mahkamah [19] Tugas Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan telah dinyatakan dengan jelas dalam kes Mohd Yusri bin Mangsor v. PP & Anor. Appeal [2014] 7 CLJ 897 CA; [2014] 4 MLJ 875; [2014] MLRAU 284, di mana Mahkamah Rayuan mengatakan: "[4] We have also scrutinized the records available before us. We are mindful that this is a factual based appeal. It is trite that an appellate court will be slow to interfere with the findings of facts and judicial appreciation of the facts by the trial court to which that law entrusts the primary task of evaluation of the evidence. However there are exceptions. Where: (a) the judgment is based upon a wrong premise of fact or of law; (b) there was insufficient judicial appreciation by the trial judge of the evidence of circumstances placed before him; (c) the trial judge has completely overlooked the inherent probabilities of the case; (d) that the course of events affirmed by the trial judge could not have occurred; (e) the trial judge had made an unwarranted deduction based on faulty judicial reasoning from admitted or established facts; or (f) the trial judge had so fundamentally misdirected himself that one may safely say that no reasonable court which had properly directed itself and asked the correct questions would have arrived at the same conclusion, (g) then the appellate court will intervene to rectify that error so that injustice is not occasioned, (see: Perembun (M) Sdn Bhd v. Conlay Construction Sdn Bhd [2012] 1 LNS 1416; [2012] 4 MLJ 149 CA; Sivalingam a/l Periasamy v. Periasamy & Anor [1996] 4 CLJ 545; [1995] 3 MLJ 395 CA." [20] Setelah meneliti rekod rayuan Mahkamah berpuas hati HMS tidak gagal untuk mempertimbangkan secara kehakiman keterangan yang ada di hadapannya apabila beliau mensabitkan Perayu di atas pertuduhan. Justeru itu tidak ada sebab untuk Mahkamah campur tangan dan mengubah keputusan HMS. [21] Dalam kes ini HMS telah melihat CRT dan meneliti keterangan mangsa semasa beliau memberikan keterangan di Mahkamah. HMS berpuas hati mangsa telah memberi keterangan dengan jujur dan ikhlas. HMS juga mendapati mangsa mempunyai ingatan yang kuat dan dapat mengingati fakta kes yang material dengan terang dan jelas. Justeru itu kredibiliti SP2 adalah intact dan tidak boleh dipertikaikan. [22] Memandangkan ketika memberikan keterangan mangsa telah berumur 19 tahun keterangannya boleh diterima secara sendiri dan tidak tertakluk kepada s. 133A AK di mana keterangan seorang kanak-kanak memerlukan sokongan. [23] Oleh kerana Mahkamah telah berpendapat SP2 adalah saksi yang boleh dipercayai dan telah memberikan keterangan yang kredibel, maka Perayu boleh disabitkan dengan kesalahan tersebut walaupun tanpa keterangan sokongan. Dalam kes PP v. Mohamad Malek Ridhzuan Che Hassan [2013] 8 CLJ 359 Mahkamah memutuskan: "Walau apapun jua pada pandangan kami, sekiranya keterangan pengadu adalah 'unusually convincing', sabitan dalam kes-kes seksual boleh dibuat tanpa keterangan sokongan." [24] Nas-nas memutuskan kes-kes seksual tidak memerlukan keterangan sokongan. Mahkamah hanya melihat kepada keterangan sokongan atas amalan dan pruden sahaja dan ianya bukan merupakan suatu tuntutan undang-undang. Keterangan substantif berkaitan dengan kejadian rogol itu datang dari mangsa sendiri. Keterangan mangsa rogol bahawa dia telah dirogol boleh diterima oleh Mahkamah tanpa bantuan daripada keterangan doktor jika Mahkamah mendapati mangsa bercakap benar dan keterangan mangsa adalah kredibel dan boleh diterima masuk sebagai keterangan dengan bantuan keterangan-keterangan sokongan lain, Razali bin Hamzah v. PP [2010] 10 CLJ 462; [2010] 1 LNS 143. [25] Walaupun sabitan itu sah hanya berasaskan kepada keterangan mangsa sahaja, HMS dalam kes ini telah bertindak dengan betul apabila ia juga melihat kepada keterangan sokongan yang lain iaitu keterangan bayi yang dilahirkan dan laporan analisis DNA yang mengesahkan bahawa Perayu adalah bapa kandung bayi yang dilahirkan tersebut. Mahkamah berpendapat tidak ada keraguan berkaitan dengan keterangan DNA ini kerana ketepatan penemuannya ialah 99.9999%. [26] Keterangan pakar DNA perlu diterima 'on its face value' kecuali ianya sangat tidak berkemungkinan atau pihak pembelaan telah memanggil saksi pakarnya untuk mengakas penemuan tersebut, Munusamy v. PP [1987] CLJ Rep 221; [1987] 1 CLJ 250; [1987] 1 MLJ 492. Dalam kes ini keterangan pakar DNA bukanlah 'inherently incredible' kerana keterangannya disokong oleh keterangan mangsa yang mengatakan Perayu pernah merogolnya. [27] Keterangan mangsa juga disokong oleh keterangan perubatan di mana dalam tempoh 9 bulan selepas kejadian mangsa telah melahirkan anak. [28] Justeru itu, Mahkamah berpendapat tidak ada kekhilafan oleh HMS apabila beliau memutuskan pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan satu kes prima facie ke atas Perayu. Terdapat keterangan ikut keadaan di mana jika keterangan-keterangan ini dinilai secara bersekali kesan keseluruhan keterangan-keterangan di atas pada akhirnya membawa kepada satu kesimpulan sahaja iaitu Perayu telah melakukan hubungan seksual dengan mangsa, Sunny Ang v. PP [1965] 1 LNS 171. [29] Mahkamah berpendapat HMS betul apabila mengatakan pembelaan Perayu hanya bersifat penafian semata-mata dan "afterthought". Perayu hanya menafikan dia merogol mangsa tetapi tidak ada penjelasan diberikan bagaimana mangsa telah mengandungkan dan melahirkan anak hasil zuriatnya. [30] Penafian sahaja tanpa bukti tidak cukup untuk mematahkan kes pihak pendakwaan, Razi Amnin v. PP [2010] 7 CLJ 771 yang merujuk kes DA Duncan v. PP [1980] 1 LNS 12; PP v. Ling Tee Huah [1980] 1 LNS 212. [31] Keterangan Perayu bahawa beliau tidak ada di rumah pada masa kejadian pula tidak pernah diletakkan kepada mana-mana saksi pendakwaan terutama mangsa. Ianya bermakna segala pernyataan mangsa bahawa Perayu berada di rumahya semasa beliau pergi ke rumah Perayu telah diakui olehnya, Wong Swee Chin v. PP [1980] 1 LNS 138; [1981] 1 MLJ 212 FC. Justeru itu pembelaan ini hanya merupakan satu pemikiran semula Perayu sahaja. [32] Berkaitan dengan pembelaan Perayu bahawa zakarnya tidak berfungsi Mahkamah berpendapat ia juga hanya satu penafian semata-mata dan satu pemikiran semula kerana jika Soulemezis v. Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd [1987] 10 NSWLR (refd) Legislation referred to: Criminal Procedure Code, s. 183A Penal Code, s. 376(1), (2)(d) Counsel: For the appellant - In person For the respondent - DPP Lim Cheah Yit, Deputy Public Prosecutor IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN THE STATE OF PENANG, MALAYSIA. [CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: PA - 42H - 14 - 05/2017] BETWEEN NORDIN AHMAD ... APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ... RESPONDENT (In the matter of Sessions Court, Balik Pulau, In the State of Penang Arrest Case No: 62JS - 2 - 11/2013 PUBLIC PROSECUTOR V. NORDIN BIN AHMAD JUDGMENT Introduction [1] The accused was convicted for an offence under section 376(1) of the Penal Code and sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment and 15 strokes whipping. The accused only appeals against the sentence meted out by the learned Sessions Court Judge. In the present appeal, the accused is unrepresented. [2] Upon evaluating the appeal record and considering the appeal, I dismissed the appeal. The accused is not satisfied with the decision and filed an appeal. This is the grounds for my decision. The accused and the prosecution are referred to as they were at the lower court. For purposes of preserving the identity of the complainant, her name and certain particulars relating to her address are blacked-out in this judgment. Brief facts [3] The accused is charged with an offence of rape under section 376 of the Penal Code. The charge proffered against the accused reads- "Bahawa kami pada 28 Jun 2013 jam 11:30 malam di dalam bilik tidur sebuah rumah di alamat No. XXX, XXX, Kampung XXX, Teluk Kumbar, Pulau Pinang, di dalam Daerah Barat Daya, di dalam Negeri Pulau Pinang, telah merogol seorang perempuan nama XXXXXXXXX (No. Kad Pengenalan: 981020 - XX - XXXX) yang berumur 14 tahun 8 bulan. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 376(1) Kanun Keseksaan.". [4] The complainant (PW6) is the daughter of the accused, born out of wedlock. This fact is not disputed. PW6 stays at No. XXX, XXX, Kampung XXX, Teluk Kumbar, Pulau Pinang together with her grandparents, his aunties and the accused. It is a two-storey kampung house with 4 rooms. The accused stays alone at the sole room on the top floor, PW6's grandparents stay in a room on the ground floor, her auntie, Siti Zaleha bt. Ahmad stays in another room at the ground floor while PW6 and her other auntie named Siti Normala bt. Ahmad (PW2) stay in another room on the ground floor too. On the date of the incident at about 11:30pm, PW6 was at home. [5] On the night in question, PW2 had asked PW6 to help her prepare the infant formula for her child in the room who was crying. At the same time, PW6 too had wanted to get her laptop in the living room on the ground floor. PW6 went out to the living room and found that her laptop was not in the living room where she had left it. PW6 then searched for it and eventually saw that the accused was using her laptop in his room on the top floor. According to PW6, she found that her laptop had a "systems hang". PW6 then told the accused not to use her laptop because it is expensive. [6] Suddenly, the accused pulled PW6 into his room, pushed PW6 on to his bed and closed the doors and locked it. After that the accused forcibly took off PW6's shirt, pants and undergarments and the accused himself took off his sarong and underwear. The accused then held both PW6's hands with one hand and used his knees to spread PW6's legs open. After that, the accused inserted his penis into PW6's private part and kissed PW6. [7] PW6 tried to resist and get up but was helpless and PW6 felt afraid because the accused became violent. PW6 just cried. After about 10 to 15 minutes, the accused took out his penis from PW6's private part, threw PW6's clothes at her and asked PW6 to put them back on. After PW6 put on her clothes, she went downstairs and called her friend, Afdalfitri Ilham b. Jeferidin (PW5) to come and take her to the police station. After that, PW6 went in to her room and told PW2 of the incident. PW2 then told PW6 to get out from the house through the bathroom windows to meet up with PW5 for fear that PW2 may get caught up with the accused. [8] PW6 lodged a police report vide Teluk Kumbar Report No. 1362/13. Dr. Lee Yen Chyet (PW8) who examined PW6 confirmed a fresh hymen tear on PW6 at the position of 1, 5 and 9 o'clock. The hymen tear appears to be a fresh 24-hour injury. Upon examining PW6, PW8 also found the following injury on PW6: "fresh abrasion at posterior forchette due to penetration of blunt object". [9] At the close of prosecution, the learned Sessions Court Judge found that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing a prima facie case and called upon the accused to enter his defence. The accused elected to give his defence under oath. The accused was the only witness for the defence. [10] In his defence, the accused said that on the day in question, he went to his room on the top floor at about 10:30pm and retired early. According to the accused, no one came to his room until 4:30am the next day. The accused denied that PW6 was in his room. The accused said that he only got up when the police came knocking at his door. The accused said that there was no laptop belonging to PW6. The accused denied having raped PW6. [11] At the close of defence, the learned Sessions Court Judge found that the defence is a mere denial and that the defence has failed to create a doubt in the prosecution's case. The learned Sessions Court Judge also found that the prosecution has succeeded in proving its case against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused was convicted and sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment and 15 strokes of whipping. Deliberation of parties Contention of the accused [12] In support of his appeal for the sentence to be reduced, the accused advanced the following grounds: (a) that he has been in remand since the date of his arrest and the custodial sentence imposed against him is long; (b) he is married and has 1 child aged 6; (c) his wife works as a pharmacist at the hospital and his child stays with his mother; (d) he worked as a fisherman prior to the arrest; and (e) he has no previous convictions. Contention of the prosecution [13] The learned DPP argues that although the victim (PW6) was born out of wedlock, she is still the accused's own flesh and blood. Although in her judgment the learned Sessions Court Judge did not relate to the fact that she has taken into consideration public interest when passing sentence, the sentence imposed by the learned Sessions Court Judge reflects that public interest was in fact considered. The learned DPP submits that as the natural father of PW6, the accused should be the one protecting PW6 but it was the accused himself who had learned Sessions Court Judge provided her grounds as follows: "Mahkamah mendapati jenayah yang dilakukan adalah serius. Beliau telah menodai anaknya sendiri walau pun tidak dibintikan ke atasnya. Fakta bahawa mangsa ialah anak OKT tidak dipertikaikan. Hukuman berat perlu dijatuhkan ke atas perbuatan jijik OKT. Hukuman 20 tahun penjara dari tarikh tangkap serta 15 kali sebatan adalah wajar dan berpatutan.". [22] In Dickson Levy Maria George v. Public Prosecutor [2018] 1 LNS 135, His Lordship Mohd Zawawi Salleh JCA considered the doctrine behind the duty of judges to give reasons for their decisions. His Lordship considered the cases of Soulemezis v. Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd [1987] 10 NSWLR, R v. Sheppard [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, R (on the Application of Susan Angels Duncan) v. General Teaching Council for England [2010] EWHC 429, Flannery v. Halifax Estate Agencies [2000] 1 All ER 373 and our very own in Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. PP [2010] 9 CLJ 625 and made the following measured observations: "We venture to say that, a judge, though obliged to give reasons, it is not required to address every submission that was advanced during the course of the hearing. As long as the reasons deal with the principal issue upon which the decision turns, they will pass muster. Plainly, judges are not expected to deal with every consideration that passes through their minds as they proceed to their conclusion. However, any submission that is worthy of serious consideration should, ordinarily, receive same attention in the reasons provided.". [23] Although the learned Sessions Court Judge did not elaborate at length as to the reasons for having sentenced the accused to 20 years imprisonment and 15 strokes of whipping, I hold the considered view that she has, upon considering the plea in mitigation advanced by the learned counsel for the accused, the submissions of the learned DPP and the victim impact statement, the learned Sessions Court Judge had placed public interest consideration above the rest. The sentence imposed by the learned Sessions Court Judge is well within the limits of the law as it then applied to the accused. His Lordship Arifin Zakaria, CJ Malaya (as His Lordship then was) in Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. PP (supra.) explained in the following prose: "We agree that as a general rule, it is incumbent upon the court making a decision to provide reasons for its decisions as litigants are entitled to the same. But this ground of judgment, as we said earlier, need not be long, depending much on the subject matter in issue. In some instances, short and concise grounds of judgment will suffice.". [24] I hold the considered view that offenders convicted of sexually related offences, especially rape against young women as in the present appeal, deserve to be incarcerated for a substantially long period. This was conscientious in the judgement of the learned Sessions Court Judge. The accused's animalistic behaviour is beyond imagination. It is the duty of this court to display its abhorrence to crimes of this nature and send a crystal-clear warning as a deterrent to would-be offenders that their actions will be severely dealt with. [25] Rape is heinous. There is no other way to describe it. It obliterates the joy out of the life of the victim. The adverse psychological effect and mental trauma stay with the victim for a long time and in some cases remain unabated. When committed by a member of her own family, its destroys the very fabric that binds the good values and virtues of the family. This court would be failing in its onerous duty if a heavy sentence which commensurate with the gravity for such an offence is let to pass, save for very exceptional circumstances. [26] I am in full agreement with the sentence imposed by the learned Sessions Court Judge and I hold the considered view that the sentence is not manifestly excessive or wrong in the circumstances of the case. The fact that the conviction was not challenged by the accused in the present appeal should also be taken as a particular circumstance which could diminish any factor in mitigation of the sentence. Conclusion [27] For these reasons, I am of the considered view that there are no cogent reasons for this court to intervene in the sentence passed by the learned Sessions Court Judge. In the circumstances, the appeal is dismissed and the sentence imposed by the learned Sessions Court Judge is affirmed. Dated: 7 APRIL 2018 (AHMAD SHAHRIR MOHD SALLEH) Judicial Commissioner High Court Penang. UNREPORTED Mohd Al Khusaini Zakaria v PP (2018) 1 LNS 417 MOHD AL KHUSAINI ZAKARIA lwn. PP MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA, ALOR SETAR ABU BAKAR KATAR PK [RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: 42S-06-02/2017] 26 MAC 2018 Kes-kes yang dirujuk: Public Prosecutor v. Vijaya Raj [1980] 1 LNS 188 PP lwn. Mohamad Malek Ridhzuan Che Hassan [2013] 8 CLJ 359 Rabidin bin Satir v. Public Prosecutor [2017] 1 LNS 1166; [2017] MLJU 1162 Razi bin Amnin v. Public Prosecutor [2010] 7 CLJ 771; [2010] 7 MLJ 756 Othman Ahmad v. PP [2008] 10 CLJ 356 Ahmad Faizal Ali Aulad Ali & Ors v. PP [2009] 9 CLJ 745 PP v. Abdul Rahman Mohamad [2005] 1 CLJ 700 Public Prosecutor v. Mohd Ridzwan bin Mohd Borhan [2003] 1 LNS 589; [2004] 5 MLJ 300 Public Prosecutor v. Hassan bin Shamsuddin [1981] 2 MLJ i Din v. PP [1964] 1 LNS 33; [1964] MLJ 30 PP v. Mardai [1949] 1 LNS 65; [1950] MLJ 33 Zainal Ibrahim v. PP [2010] 3 CLJ 1018 Sidek bin Ludan v. PP [1995] 1 LNS 219; [1995] 3 MLJ 175 Abd Rahim Bin Abd Rahaman v. Pendakwa Raya [2010] 8 CLJ 519; [2010] MLJU 681 Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v. Pendakwa Raya and another criminal appeal [2015] 2 CLJ 145; [2015] MLJU 34 Public Prosecutor v. Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 1 LNS 102; [1976] 2 MLJ 256 Bhandulananda Jayatilake v. Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 LNS 139; [1982] 1 MLJ 8 Perundangan yang dirujuk: Kanun Keseksaan, ss. 376 (1), 377A, 377B Kaunsel: Bagi pihak perayu - Rosman Azwan Osman; T/n Ummi Zakaria & Partners Bagi pihak responden - Zabidah Ahmad, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya; Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Kedah DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI ALOR SETAR DALAM NEGERI KEDAH DARUL AMAN, MALAYSIA [RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: 42S-06-02/2017] ANTARA MOHD AL KHUSAINI ZAKARIA ... PERAYU DAN PENDAKWA RAYA ... RESPONDEN (DALAM PERKARA MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI ALOR SETAR iaitu: Keterangan mangsa [SP: 1] bercanggah dengan Pegawai Perubatan [SP: 2] [Nur Farihan Binti Mukhtar] dan SP: 3 [Dr Mohanasundram A/L Arumugam] berkaitan hubungan seks dengan perayu [13] Sebelum saya menyentuh isu tunggal yang ditonjolkan oleh peguam perayu yang terpelajar, eloklah saya menyentuh intipati pertuduhan bagi kesalahan di bawah s. 376(1) Kanun itu. HMS itu dalam penghakimannya telah memperincikan intipati kesalahan yang perlu dibuktikan oleh pendakwaan iaitu: (i) Perayu telah melakukan persetubuhan dengan mangsa [SP: 1]; (ii) Persetubuhan tersebut dilakukan tanpa kerelaan SP: 1; (iii) Terdapat kemasukan kemaluan perayu ke dalam kemaluan SP: 1. [14] Bagi kesalahan di bawah s. 377B Kanun itu, pendakwaan perlu membuktikan intipati kesalahan iaitu: (i) Perayu telah memasukkan zakarnya kedalam dubur SP: 1; (ii) Perbuatan tersebut dilakukan dengan sengaja. [15] Dalam penghakiman ini, saya akan menyentuh pertuduhan di bawah s. 376(1) Kanun itu terlebih dahulu. Bagi isu (i) dan (iii) : [16] Saya akan menyentuh isu (i) dan (iii) bersekali kerana ia saling berkaitan antara satu dengan yang lainnya. Saya telah meneliti penghakiman HMS itu [RR] [JILID1] [muka surat (14) hingga (38)]. Saya telah menimbangkan keterangan SP: 1 secara mendalam bagaimana menjalin perhubungan dengan perayu. SP: 1 mengenali perayu sejak bulan Mei 2015 melalui wechat dan menjalin perhubungan sebagai pasangan kekasih dengan perayu. SP: 1 akhirnya memutuskan hubungan kekasih dengan perayu. Perayu telah menghantar SMS kepada SP: 1 mengugut untuk menyebarkan gambar SP: 1 yang memakai singlet dan legging sekiranya tidak mahu berjumpa di rumah Jalan Langgar. SP: 1 telah meminta bantuan kawannya iaitu SP: 4 [Mohd Zazmi Bin Ibrahim] dengan menaiki motorsikal menghantar ke rumah di mana perayu menunggu kedatangan SP: 1. [17] Saya telah meneliti keterangan SP: 1 bagaimana hubungan seks antara SP: 1 dan perayu. SP: 1 dalam keterangannya menyatakan: "S: Bagaimana kamu tahu OKT memasukkan kemaluannya ke dalam kemaluan kamu? J: Sewaktu kejadian dia memegang kemaluannya dan memasukkan ke dalam faraj saya. S: Bagaimana keadaan kemaluan OKT ketika dia masukkan? J: Dalam keadaan tegang. S: Masa itu kamu rasa apa? J: Rasa sakit sangat." [RR] [JILID 2 (a)] [muka surat (61)] [18] Saya berpendapat HMS itu dalam penghakimannya menyatakan pendakwaan telah membuktikan intipati kemasukan kemaluan perayu ke dalam kemaluan SP: 1. Beliau dalam penghakimannya [RR] [JILID1] [muka surat (23)] ada menyentuh perkara ini: "Saya mendapati bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan elemen yang ketiga ini berdasarkan kepada keterangan SP1. SP1 mengatakan semasa kejadian OKT telah memegang kemaluannya dan memasukkan ke dalam faraj beliau. SP1 juga mengatakan keadaan kemaluan OKT itu dalam keadaan tegang. SP1 seterusnya mengatakan beliau rasa sangat sakit di faraj. SP1 juga dapat menceritakan secara terperinci apa yang dilakukan oleh OKT semasa itu iaitu OKT menghayunkan kemaluannya selama lebih kurang 10 minit. Selepas itu OKT telah melepaskan air maninya ke dalam kemaluan SP1." [19] Saya bersetuju dengan HMS itu berkaitan intipati kemasukan merupakan salah satu intipati bagi kesalahan di bawah s. 376 (1) Kanun itu. Saya merujuk kes Rabidin bin Satir v. Public Prosecutor [2017] 1 LNS 1166; [2017] MLJU 1162 di mana YA Abang Iskandar HMR menegaskan seperti berikut: "[47] To our minds, there is a very strong corroborative evidence of penetration of the Appellant's penis into the private part of the PW7, an essential legal ingredient required to be proven for an offence of rape under section 376 of the Penal Code." [20] Saya bersetuju dengan dapatan YA Ahmadi Asnawi PK (ketika itu) di dalam kes Razi bin Amnin v. Public Prosecutor [2010] 7 CLJ 771; [2010] 7 MLJ 756 yang mengatakan: "Now, as far as sexual intercourse is concerned it is governed by nature. One need not be married to know what is inside and what is outside. Equally, there is no necessity of gaining experience for a woman to know whether the male's private parts or other foreign objects had entered into her private parts, as nature would have taken its own course. As an analogy if one were to close his eyes and another were to put a piece of wood into his mouth, he would know instantly that a piece of wood was put into his mouth. Likewise if an iron rod or banana or finger or hot water or stone or sand was put into his mouth he would instantly recognise what was the object that was put into his mouth even though his eyes were tightly shut. Such was human instinct................." [21] SP: 1 sewajarnya dapat merasakan dan memastikan kemaluan perayu yang telah memasuki kemaluannya sebagaimana yang ditegaskan oleh YA Ahmadi Asnawi PK [ketika itu] dalam kes Razi bin Amnin [supra]. [22] Berbalik kepada hujahan peguam perayu yang terpelajar berkaitan percanggahan keterangan SP: 1 [mangsa] dengan keterangan SP: 2 dan SP: 3. Mengikut keterangan SP: 1, perayu merogolnya pada 26.9.2015 jam lebih kurang 9.45 pagi. SP: 2 telah melakukan pemeriksaan ke atas SP: 1 pada tarikh yang sama jam 10.45 malam di Hospital Sultanah Bahiyah iaitu 13 jam selepas SP: 1 dirogol oleh perayu. Sebaliknya mengikut keterangan SP: 2, mengesahkan selaput dara SP: 1 mengalami koyakan pada kedudukan jam 1, 3, 6 dan 9. SP: 2 turut mengesahkan ia koyakan lama. [23] Saya berpendapat walaupun keterangan SP: 2 yang menyatakan kesan koyakan lama, pembelaan tidak mempertikaikan pada tarikh, masa dan tempat yang dinyatakan dalam pertuduhan ada perhubungan seks antara perayu dan SP: 1. Perayu hanya menegaskan hubungan seks itu dilakukan secara sukarela dan bukannya paksaan. Sehubungan itu percanggahan yang cuba diketengahkan oleh pendakwaan tidak menjejaskan kewibawaan SP: 1 sebagai seorang saksi pendakwaan. Saya turut menimbangkan keterangan SP: 2 dan SP: 3 yang mengesahkan SP: 1 bukannya melakukan hubungan seks kali pertama dan ini boleh menyebakan kesan koyakan lama walaupun pemeriksaan dilakukan dalam tempoh kurang 72 jam. [24] Tambahan pula HMS itu dalam penghakimannya telah menerima keterangan SP: 1 dalam penghakimannya yang berbunyi seperti berikut: "[9] Sepertimana yang saya jelaskan tadi bahawa saya mendapati keterangan SP1 adalah jelas dan beliau konsisten sepanjang memberi keterangan, dengan itu tiada sebab untuk saya menolak keterangan beliau." [RR] [JILID 1] [muka surat (24)] [25] Secara sepintas lalu, saya akan menyentuh isu laporan DNA yang dihujahkan oleh peguam perayu yang terpelajar. Saya berpendapat walaupun laporan DNA tidak membantu kes pendakwaan, terdapat keterangan lisan yang kukuh untuk mengaitkan perayu dengan kesalahan di bawah s. 376 Kanun itu. [26] Saya berpendapat laporan DNA bukannya keperluan undang-undang bagi kesalahan di bawah s. 376 (1) Kanun itu. Saya bersetuju dengan pandangan YA Zainal Azman Abdul Aziz H dalam kes Othman Ahmad v. PP [2008] 10 CLJ 356 yang menyatakan seperti berikiut: "Ujian atau laporan DNA ke atas tertuduh bukanlah sesuatu yang mandatori dan ketiadaan ujian sedemikian tidaklah fatal kepada kes pendakwaan. Ini kerana Pihak Pendakwaan boleh mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan lain bagi mengasaskan kes mereka dan keterangan DNA hanyalah keterangan sokongan sahaja." [27] Saya turut merujuk kes Ahmad Faizal Ali Aulad Ali & Ors v. PP [2009] 9 CLJ 745 di mana YA Yeoh Wee Siam H (pada ketika itu) ada menzahirkan pandangannya seperti berikut: "[92] However, the failure of the prosecution to produce more evidence of DNA testing on more relevant specimens does not mean that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, in particular SP2, SP4 and SP3 should be rejected by the court. There is still no law to require that rape cases can only be proved by DNA tests and reports. As such, for the purpose of this case, the court can still, and will accept, the existing evidence adduced by the prosecution." [28] Saya tidak sependapat dengan apa yang dihujahkan oleh peguam perayu yang terpelajar dalam hujahannya berkaitan isu laporan DNA ini. Bagi isu (ii) : [29] Saya telah meneliti penghujahan bertulis perayu, nampaknya tidak menyentuh langsung isu kerelaan memandangkan semasa kejadian rogol SP: 1 berumur melebihi 16 tahun. kerelaan SP: 1. [37] Saya selanjutnya menyentuh isu keterangan sokongan bagi kesempurnaan penghakiman ini. Peguam perayu yang terpelajar langsung dan tiada secebis perkataan dalam hujahannya menyentuh isu keterangan sokongan. [38] Saya bersetuju ianya bukan keperluan undang-undang di Malaysia bagi kesalahan seksual keterangan pengadu/mangsa perlu keterangan sokongan. Saya mengikuti amalan yang digariskan dalam kes Din v. PP [1964] 1 LNS 33; [1964] MLJ 30 seperti berikut: "But the desirability for corroboration of the evidence of the prosecutrix in a rape case (which in any event has not yet crystallized into something approaching a rule of law and which is still a rule of practice and of prudence) springs not from the nature of the witness but from the nature of the offence. Never has it been suggested that the evidence of a woman as such invariably calls for corroboration. If a woman says her handbag has been snatched and if she is believed there can be no question of a conviction on such evidence being open to attack for want of corroboration. If, however, she complains of having been raped then both prudence and practice demand that evidence should be corroborated." [39] Saya juga merujuk kes PP v. Mardai [1949] 1 LNS 65; [1950] MLJ 33 di mana Spencer Wilkinson J berkata di halaman 33: "Whilst there is no rule of law in this country that in sexual offences the evidence of the complainant must be corroborated; nevertheless it appears to me, as a matter of common sense, to be unsafe to convict in cases of this kind unless either the evidence of the complainant is unusually convincing or there is some corroboration of the complainant's story." [40] Saya selanjutnya merujuk kes Zainal Ibrahim v. PP [2010] 3 CLJ 1018 di muka surat 1023 yang menyatakan: "[11] It has been well established by numerous authorities that in cases of alleged rape, the evidence of the complainant must be corroborated. Thompson LP in Din v. PP [1964] 1 LNS 33 FC said: If however she complains of having been raped, then both prudence and practice demand that her evidence should be corroborated." [41] Saya telah meneliti penghakiman HMS itu berkaitan isu keterangan sokongan atas keterangan SP: 1. Saya bersetuju dengan pandangan HMS itu yang menyatakan keterangan SP: 1 telah disokong oleh keterangan SP: 4. HMS itu di perenggan [21] penghakimannya [RR] [JILID 1] [muka surat (28) hingga (29)] menyatakan: "[21] Di dalam kes ini saya mendapati keterangan SP1 adalah "unusually convincing". Oleh yang demikian saya berpendapat keterangan SP1 boleh berdiri dengan sendirinya. Namun pihak pendakwaan telah mengemukakan banyak keterangan sokongan yang menguatkan lagi kes mereka. Antaranya adalah keterangan SP4 iaitu kawan SP1 yang menghantar SP1 ke rumah OKT pada hari kejadian. SP4 mengesahkan keterangan SP1 yang pada hari kejadian beliau ada pergi ke sana. Selain itu SP4 juga menyatakan SP1 datang semula ke tempat yang beliau dihantar SP1 dalam keadaan menangis dan memberitahu telah dirogol." [42] Saya telah merujuk kes Sidek bin Ludan v. PP [1995] 1 LNS 219; [1995] 3 MLJ 175, di mana mangsa telah melaporkan perbuatan rogol kepada ibunya. Mahkamah telah menerima keterangan ini sebagai keterangan sokongan di mana dalam penghakiman dinyatakan... "it is also my judgment that the evidence of the victim was corroborated by her mother." Saya berpendapat keterangan SP: 4 terjumlah kepada keterangan sokongan atas SP: 1. [43] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, saya berpendapat pendakwaan telah mengemukakan keterangan sokongan yang memadai atas keterangan SP: 1 berkaitan kesalahan di bawah s. 376 Kanun itu. [44] Sekarang saya akan beralih kepada pertuduhan tambahan iaitu kesalahan di bawah s. 377B Kanun itu. Bagi isu (i) dan (ii) : [45] Saya akan menyentuh isu (i) dan (ii) bersekali dalam penghakiman ini kerana ia saling berkaitan antara satu dengan yang lainnya. [46] Eloklah dirujuk peruntukan s. 377A Kanun itu yang memberikan takrifan persetubuhan yang bertentangan dengan tabii seperti berikut: "377A. Carnal intercourse against the order of nature Any person who has sexual connection with another person by the introduction of the penis into the anus or mouth of the other person is said to commit carnal intercourse against the order of nature. Explanation - Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual connection necessary to the offence described in this section." [47] Peruntukan s. 377B Kanun itu memperuntukan seperti berikut: "377B. Punishment for committing carnal intercourse against the order of nature Whoever voluntarily commits carnal intercourse against the order of nature shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty years, and shall also be punished with whipping." [48] Berbalik kepada kes perayu sekarang bagi pertuduhan s. 377B Kanun itu, HMS itu dalam penghakimannya telah merujuk keterangan SP: 1 bagaimana kejadian liwat ini berlaku. Saya merujuk keterangan SP: 1 [RR] [JILID 2 (a)] [muka surat (51)] yang menyatakan: "...................Apabila dia sudah puas dia ingin memasukkan kemaluannya di dubur saya, saya merayu tidak mahu melakukan, cukup untuk dia tekan muka saya dengan bantal dan dia masukkan kemaluan dia ke dalam dubur saya secara paksa. Saya meraung kesakitan dia tidak endah, dia terus melakukan lagi sehingga dia puas." [49] SP: 1 selanjutnya menyatakan: "S: Bagaimana keadaan kemaluannya ketika dia masukkan dalam dubur kamu? J: Tegang. S: Boleh kamu ceritakan dengan lebih jelas kamu mengatakan kaki kamu kangkang kemaluan OKT tegang bagaimana kemasukan tersebut berlaku di dubur itu? J: Saya menghalangnya untuk memasukkan kemaluannya, dia menolak tangan saya dan memasukkan kemaluannya di dubur saya secara paksa dan keras dan menghayunnya beberapa kali sehingga saya terpaksa menolak sekeras hati. S: Berapa lama kemasukkan di dubur tersebut itu berlaku? J: Seminit." [50] Saya turut merujuk keterangan SP: 1 semasa dipanggil semula oleh TPR, keterangan SP: 1 secara jelas menguatkan tindakan perayu meliwat sebagaimana berikut: "S: Apa yang kamu rasa pada dubur kamu apabila OKT meliwat kamu? J: Sangat sakit di bahagian dubur. S: Selepas dia liwat kamu ada rasa apa-apa di bahagian kulit dubur? J: Sakit." [51] Saya berpendapat berdasarkan keterangan SP: 1 yang dirujuk di atas, pendakwaan telah membuktikan kemaluan perayu ada memasuki dubur SP: 1 dan ia memadai bagi maksud "Explanation" kepada s. 377A Kanun itu. [52] Saya sedar bagi kesalahan di bawah s. 377B Kanun itu isu kerelaan tidak penting. Kedudukan undang-undang ini ada dikupas dalam kes Abd Rahim Bin Abd Rahaman v. Pendakwa Raya [2010] 8 CLJ 519; [2010] MLJU 681 di mana YA Suriyadi Halim Omar HMR [pada ketika itu] ada menukilkan pandangannya: "On the issue of consent it is trite that in Malaysia, whether consent is given or not, is irrelevant for a prosecution under s. 377B of the Penal Code, as opposed to a charge under s. 377C of the same Code. A person may be charged under the latter provision if no consent is forthcoming from the victim. Consent is the distinguishing element between the two provisions. But it must be understood that it is the right of the Public Prosecutor to select the provision for which an accused person is to be charged." [53] Saya berpendapat pendakwaan telah memilih peruntukan s. 377B Kanun itu, pembelaan tidak boleh bergantung kepada isu kerelaan SP: 1 bagi melepaskan daripada pertuduhan. HMS itu dalam penghakimannya telah membuat penemuan fakta yang betul iaitu perayu ada meliwat SP: 1 pada tarikh, masa dan tempat yang dinyatakan dalam pertuduhan. [54] Sebagaimana pertuduhan di bawah s. 376 Kanun itu, kesalahan di bawah s. 377B Kanun itu juga memerlukan keterangan sokongan lainnya berkaitan pertuduhan perayu meliwat SP: 1. Mahkamah ini merujuk kes Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v. Pendakwa Raya and another criminal appeal [2015] 2 CLJ 145; [2015] MLJU 34 di mana YAA Arifin Zakaria KHN [pada masa itu] ada menyentuh keperluan keterangan sokongan apabila melibatkan kesalahan seksual seperti berikut: "[73] The law on corroboration of the evidence of a victim in a sexual offence is settled in our jurisdiction. In this regard, the Court of Appeal had correctly addressed the law by referring to various authorities both here and in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. As a matter of practice and prudence, not of law, corroboration is normally required in a sexual offence. Where corroboration is dispensed with, and the complainant's evidence is accepted as having established the case against an accused, the judge as a matter of law is required to warn "[30] Begitu juga dengan pertuduhan liwat, di mana OKT hanya menafikan telah meliwat SP1. Kes pihak pendakwaan sangat kuat dengan kehadiran air mani OKT dan terdapat kesan koyakan yang baru di dubur SP1. Oleh yang demikian penafian OKT tidak dapat menjejaskan kes pendakwaan walaupun secalit." [RR] [JILID1] [muka surat (32)] [63] Saya juga bersetuju apabila HMS itu memutuskan pembelaan perayu gagal menimbulkan sebarang keraguan yang munasabah atas kes pendakwaan. HMS itu pada akhirnya memutuskan perayu bersalah dan disabitkan atas kedua-dua pertuduhan iaitu pertuduhan bagi s. 376 (1) Kanun itu dan pertuduhan tambahan di bawah s. 377B Kanun itu. HUKUMAN [64] Peguam perayu yang terpelajar dalam hujahan bertulisnya langsung tidak menyentuh hukuman walaupun dalam notis rayuannya menyatakan "Rayuan ini adalah terhadap sabitan dan hukuman". [65] Sebelum saya menyentuh hukuman yang dijatuhkan oleh HMS itu ke atas perayu, eloklah dijenguk kembali nas-nas duluan yang memberikan panduan dalam menggarap rayuan hukuman daripada Mahkamah Rendah. Saya merujuk kes tersohor iaitu Public Prosecutor v. Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 1 LNS 102; [1976] 2 MLJ 256 di mana YA Hashim Yeop A. Sani menzahirkan pandangannya: "The High Court sitting in exercise of its revisionary powers will not normally alter the sentence unless it is satisfied that the sentence of the lower court is either manifestly inadequate or grossly excessive or illegal or otherwise not a proper sentence having regard to all the facts disclosed on the record or to all the facts which the court ought to take judicial notice of, that is to say, that the lower court clearly has erred in applying the correct principles in the assessment of the sentence. It is a firmly established practice that the court will not alter a sentence merely because it might have passed a different sentence." [66] Saya selanjutnya merujuk kes Bhandulananda Jayatilake v. Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 LNS 139; [1982] 1 MLJ 8, di halaman 84 YAA Raja Azlan Shah [Baginda pada ketika itu] berpendapat: "... that the very concept of judicial discretion involves a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred. That is quite inevitable. Human nature being what it is, different judges applying the same principles at the same time in the same country to similar facts may sometimes reach different conclusions (see Jamieson v. Jamieson). It is for that reason that some very conscientious judges have thought it their duty to visit particular crimes with exemplary sentences; whilst others equally conscientious have thought it their duty to view the same crimes with leniency. Therefore sentences do vary in apparently similar circumstances with the habit of mind of the particular judge. It is for that reason also that this court has said it again and again that it will not normally interfere with sentences, and the possibility or even the probability, that another court would have imposed a different sentence is not sufficient, per se, to warrant this court's interference." [67] Saya telahpun meneliti penghakiman HMS itu semasa menjatuhkan hukuman terhadap perayu melibatkan pertuduhan di bawah s. 376 Kanun itu dan s. 377B Kanun itu. HMS itu dalam penghakimannya [RR] [JILID 1] [muka surat (33) – (37) secara panjang lebar telah menyentuh prinsip-prinsip penghukuman yang betul terutamanya melibatkan kesalahan merogol. [68] Saya berpendapat perayu gagal menunjukkan sebarang kekhilafan HMS itu dalam penghukumannya. Saya telah meneliti keseluruhan fakta kes dan penghakiman HMS itu, saya bersetuju dengan hukuman yang dijatuhkan oleh HMS itu ke atas perayu. Hukuman penjara 10 tahun dan 1 sebatan bagi setiap pertuduhan ia tidak berlebihan yang mewajarkan untuk diganggu oleh saya. [69] Saya turut mengesahkan perintah HMS itu berkaitan hukuman penjara 10 tahun berjalan serentak. Saya berpendapat kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh perayu termasuk dalam frasa "single transaction or series". Saya selanjutnya menolak rayuan perayu atas hukuman. KESIMPULAN [70] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang diperincikan di atas, saya menolak rayuan perayu atas sabitan dan hukuman. Keputusan HMS itu berkaitan sabitan dan hukuman disahkan. Tarikh: 26 MAC 2018 (ABU BAKAR KATAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Alor Setar Kedah Darul Aman Sahrul Tola v PP (2018) 1 LNS 731 SAHRUL TOLA v. PP HIGH COURT SABAH & SARAWAK, SANDAKAN MAIRIN IDANG @ MARTIN JC [CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.: SDK-42H-1/4-2016] 18 APRIL 2018 Case(s) referred to: Wife v. Streetham Manor Nursing Home [1935] AC 243 Tan Pek Yan v. Samuel [1964] MLJ 284 Abdul Karim Kula v. PP [2009] 10 CLJ 1; [2009] 1 LNS 1297; [2009] 10 SLJ 1 Chian Han Kiat v. Rex [1937] 1 LNS 8; [1937] MLJ 261 Sivalingam a/l Periasamy v. Periasamy & Anor [1996] 4 CLJ 545; [1995] 3 MLJ 395 Tan Thong Jin v. Public Prosecutor [2002] 3 CLJ 552; [2002] 3 MLJ 695 (CA) Public Prosecutor v. Abdul Ragman Mohamad [2005] 1 CLJ 700 Public Prosecutor v. Lin Lian Chen [1992] 4 CLJ 2086 Steven Pangiraja & Ors v. PP [2014] 4 CLJ 418 Legislation referred to: Penal code, ss. 375(g), 376(1) Evidence Act 1950, s. 133A Counsel: For the appellant - Teressa Sirri; M/s RM Jarin & Co For the respondent - DPP Mohd Faisal Md Noor; Jabatan Peguam Negara IN THE HIGH COURT OF SABAH AND SARAWAK AT SANDAKAN IN THE STATE OF SABAH [CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.: SDK-42H-1/4-2016] BETWEEN SAHRUL TOLA ... APPELLANT AND PENDAKWA RAYA (PDRM) IPD, SANDAKAN ... RESPONDENT JUDGMENT [1] I shall refer the Appellant as the Accused and the Respondent as the Prosecution. This appeal by the Accused is in respect of the decision of the Learned Session Court Judge (hereinafter shall be referred to as "the LSCJ") in convicting and sentencing the Accused to 20 years imprisonment and 5 strokes of whipping. [2] The Accused was charged for an offence under section 376(1) of the Penal Code. The Accused was not represented during the trial. [3] The facts showed as follows: of being criticized for having kept his defence 'up his sleeve', so to speak, and it being branded as a recent invention". [13] But the Accused had also raised the issue on failure to comply with section 133A of the Evidence Act 1950 (s. 133A) which I reproduced as follows: "Where, in any proceedings against any person for any offence, any child of tender years called as a witness does not in the opinion of the court understand the nature of an oath, his evidence may be received, though not given upon oath, if, in the opinion of the court, he is possessed of sufficient intelligence to justify the reception of the evidence, and understands the duty of speaking the truth; and his evidence, though not given on oath, but otherwise taken and reduced into writing in accordance with section 269 of the Criminal Procedure Code [Act 593] shall be deemed to be a deposition within the meaning of that section: Provided that, where evidence admitted by virtue of this section is given on behalf of the prosecution, the accused shall not be liable to be convicted of the offence unless that evidence is corroborated by some other material evidence in support thereof implicating him." [14] The Accused submitted that the LSCJ had erred in law by failing to make an inquiry and/or to satisfy herself that the child witnesses PW2 and PW3 possess sufficient intelligence to understand the duty of speaking the truth. [15] In rebuttal the Prosecution submitted that based on the case of Steven Pangiraja & Ors v. PP [2014] 4 CLJ 418, PW2 (victim) and her cousin, PW3 could not be considered as children of tender years therefore s. 133A does not apply to both witnesses. [16] I refer to Steven Pangiraja and the Judgment by Hamid Sultan Abu Baker JCA at paragraph [13] wherein he held that a child of 15 years old at the time of giving evidence is not a child of tender years. I reproduced paragraph [13] as follows: [13] In the instant case it was contended before us the evidence of SP3 (the victim) and SP10 (her classmate) who witnessed the victim being dragged into the car were children and the learned trial judge did not conduct a preliminary inquiry to test the competency of the witness as required under ss. 118 and 133A of the Evidence Act 1950 ('EA 1950'). We do not find any merit in this issue. Our reasons inter alia are as follows: (a) There is no requirement under the Act to conduct a preliminary inquiry though case laws requires the competency to be tested for child of tender years and not child per se. The learned judge had carefully dealt with the evidence of the child according to law, and this is reflected in many parts of the judgment. (See paras. 38, 39 and 40 at pp. 44 to 46 A/R). (b) Section 118 of the EA 1950 only comes into issue if the court considers that a child of 'tender years' gives evidence. It is difficult to fathom how SP3 and SP10 who were school going and aged 15 years at the time of giving evidence will fall within the definition of 'tender years' stated in s. 118 of the EA 1950 which reads as follows: 118. All persons shall be competent to testify unless the court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them or from giving rational answers to those questions by tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind. (c) Support for the above proposition is found in a number of Indian cases which had dealt with similar provision pari materia to s. 118 of the EA 1950. For example, in Nafar Sheikh v. Emperor [1914] ILR 41 Cal 406 Justice Mookerjee had this to say: Reliance has been placed upon the decision in Fakir v. Emperor [1907] (11) C. W. N. 51 which, it has been urged, is authority for the proposition that it is obligatory upon a Judge to test the capacity of a witness of tender years by appropriate questions and to form his opinion as to the competency of such a witness before the actual examination commences. It may be conceded that there are expressions in the judgment in the case mentioned which tend to support this broad statement, but, in my opinion, the proposition thus widely formulated is not justified by the terms of s. 118, Evidence Act. That section lays down that all persons shall be competent to testify unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the question put to them or from giving rational answers to these questions by tender years. The legislature has not prescribed an inflexible rule of universal application to the effect that before a child of tender years is questioned, the Court must by a preliminary examination test his capacity to understand and to give rational answers and must form an opinion as to the competency of the witness before the actual examination commences. In fact the case of Reg v. Whitehead (35) L.J.M.C. 186 shows that the incompetency of a witness may very well appear in the course of his examination-in-chief and that the evidence of a witness so found to be incompetent may at that stage be withdrawn from the jury. The true rule on the subject is concisely stated by Brewer, J., in Wheeler v. United States (159) U.S. 523 in these terms: "The decision of this question (whether the child witness has sufficient intelligence) rests primarily with the trial Judge, who sees the proposed witness, notices his manner, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of the obligations of an oath. As many of these matters cannot be photographed into the record, the decision of the trial Judge will not be disturbed on review unless from that which is preserved it is clear that it was erroneous." The mere circumstance that the Sessions Judge did not interrogate the witnesses before their examination began with a view to test their capacity does not, in the view I take of the true effect of S. 118, Evidence Act, invalidate the trial. But in the present case there are circumstances which, in my opinion, rendered it plainly desirable that such a course should have been pursued. (d) Section 133A of the EA 1950 also relates to 'child of tender years'. Though there are sufficient material in the judgment to satisfy that the court has taken cognisance of s. 133A, but again the evidence of SP3 and SP5 will not fall within the definition of 'Child of Tender Years' on the factual matrix of the instant case. In the instant case the learned judge has been extra cautious and was fully aware of the competency issues relating to 'sufficient intelligence', etc. [17] It was explained in paragraph [13] that an evidence given by a child aged 15 years old who is attending a school will not be treated as an evidence given by a child of tender years as long the judge in the first instance court has been extra cautious and fully aware of the competency issues relating to sufficient intelligence. In this instant case, PW2 was 16 years old when she gave evidence (refer notes of proceedings on 2.12.2015 paragraph 144 until paragraph 145 for PW2) and PW3 was 15 years old when giving her evidence (refer notes of proceedings on 2.12.2015 paragraph 658 until 659 for PW3). PW2 was then a Form 3 student when she stopped schooling (refer notes of proceeding on 2.12.2015 paragraph 165 until 169 for PW2) and PW3 was still attending school (refer notes of proceeding on 2.12.2015 paragraph 634 until 635 for PW3). [18] Having gone through the notes of proceedings, it is shown that PW2 and PW3 have the sufficient intelligence in giving evidence for this case. PW2 was able to explain the rape incident in details (refer Notes of proceeding on 2.12.2015 line 258 for PW2). I also found that PW2 and PW3 had given consistent answers to the questions asked and the witness statements did not contradict each other. [19] On the sentence, I find that the amount of imprisonment for 20 years and 5 strokes of whipping reasonable considering the full imprisonment terms is for 30 years as the rape involves a teenage girl under 16 years old without her consent. The mitigation by the Accused were that he is remorseful of his action, as a family breadwinner and having 3 children ranging from 2 until 5 years old. However, in view of rampancy of his offence, the Court should look into the public interest in passing sentence. The Court should not send the wrong message to the public giving the impression that the court is lenient and tolerate such offence of rape of young girl and more so by a relative. I do not find any mitigation that would persuade me to disturb the imprisonment of 20 years and 5 strokes of whipping that was meted by the LSCJ. [20] I have also read the Records of Appeal and submissions by both parties, I dismissed the Appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence given by the LSCJ. Dated: 18 APRIL 2018 (MAIRIN IDANG @ MARTIN) Judicial Commissioner High Court Sandakan Wong You Farr v PP (2018) 1 LNS 2108 WONG YOU FARR lwn. PP MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA, KLANG MEOR HASHIMI ABDUL HAMID PK [RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: BA-42H-03/2018] 14 DISEMBER 2018 Kes-kes yang dirujuk: Herchun Singh & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [1969] 1 LNS 52; [1969] 2 MLJ 209 Lai Kim Hon & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [1980] 1 LNS 197; [1981] 1 MLJ 84 Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. Public Prosecutor & Another Appeal [2004] 3 CLJ 737 Lee Chian Kim KP: 000810-10-0450 (umur 15 tahun) oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 376(1) Kanun Keseksaan. Pertuduhan Kedua Bahawa kamu pada Ogos 2015 jam lebih kurang 5.30 petang bertempat di tandas Restoran Hong Seng Leong No. 101, Jalan Bandar Country Homes Rawang dalam daerah Gombak di dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan telah merogol satu perempuan cina bernama Lee Chian Kim KP: 000810-10-0450 (umur 15 tahun) oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 376(1) Kanun Keseksaan. KES PIHAK PENDAKWAAN [5] Pihak pendakwaan telah memanggil seramai empat (4) orang saksi pendakwaan untuk membentangkan naratif kes pendakwaan. Mereka ialah Peh Lian Hoong (SP1: ibu mangsa), Lee Chian Kim (SP2: mangsa), Dr Nor Elyana binti Noordin (SP3: doktor pakar Obstetik dan Ginekologi, Hospital Selayang) dan Inspektor Noor Hidayu binti Aziz (SP4: pegawai penyiasat). [6] Secara ringkasnya, kes pendakwaan ialah seperti berikut. SP2 (mangsa) merupakan seorang kanak-kanak berumur 15 tahun semasa kejadian rogol. Wong You Farr (perayu) adalah majikan SP1. SP1 bekerja sebagai pelayan pelanggan di kedai milik perayu yang menjual makanan nasi campur. Ianya adalah kes pendakwaan bahawa SP2 telah dirogol oleh perayu pada bulan Julai 2015 jam lebih kurang 10.30 malam di sebuah bilik dalam rumah perayu dan juga pada bulan Ogos 2015 jam lebih kurang 5.30 petang di dalam tandas kedai perayu. [7] SP2 (mangsa) berumur 16 tahun 9 bulan semasa memberikan keterangan di mahkamah pada 22/5/2017 dan HMS yang bijaksana telah mendapati SP2 memahami maksud sumpah dan bercakap benar dan telah membenarkan SP2 memberi keterangan secara bersumpah. Semasa memberi keterangan di mahkamah, SP2 bukanlah seorang kanak-kanak dalam usia mentah bagi maksud seksyen 133A Akta Keterangan 1950. PEMBELAAN PERAYU [8] Perayu (SD1) apabila dipanggil membela diri telah memilih untuk memberi keterangan bersumpah dalam Bahasa Cina dialek kantonis. Dalam keterangannya, perayu menafikan telah merogol SP2 di rumah perayu dan juga dalam tandas di kedai perayu. Perayu juga menafikan ada membawa SP2 balik ke rumah perayu dan juga menafikan ada membawa SP2 masuk ke dalam tandas di kedai perayu. Selanjutnya, perayu mengatakan sejak 2013, akibat strok, kemaluan perayu tidak boleh naik dan perayu tidak dapat mengadakan hubungan seks. [9] Perayu telah memanggil Ong Giek Lee, isteri perayu (SD2) sebagai saksi pihak pembelaan. Dalam keterangannya, SD2 menafikan perayu ada membawa SP2 balik ke rumah perayu dan juga tidak pernah nampak perayu masuk ke tandas kedai bersama SP2. SD2 juga mengatakan bahawa sejak 2013 perayu tidak boleh mengadakan hubungan seks dengan SD2 kerana perayu makan ubat terlalu banyak. KEWAJIPAN MAHKAMAH ATASAN YANG MENDENGAR RAYUAN [10] Mahkamah atasan yang mendengar suatu rayuan tersebut mempunyai kewajipan undang-undang untuk menilai dan menguji keterangan pihak pendakwaan dan juga pembelaan dengan menyeluruh bagi memastikan sabitan yang dikenakan adalah selamat. Selanjutnya mahkamah atasan tersebut boleh mengubah dan menggantikan dapatan hakim bicara sekiranya dapat ditunjukkan bahawa dapatan hakim bicara ternyata salah atau tidak berasaskan keterangan yang dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan. [11] Prinsip undang-undang mantap ini telah diperjelaskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Herchun Singh & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [1969] 1 LNS 52; [1969] 2 MLJ 209 di m.s. 211 seperti berikut: "This view of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witness must be given proper weight and consideration. An appellate court should be slow in disturbing such finding of fact arrived at by the judge, who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witness, unless there are substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing with the finding: see Sheo Swarup v. King-Emperor AIR [1934] PC 227." [12] Prinsip yang sama juga telah diperjelaskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Lai Kim Hon & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [1980] 1 LNS 197; [1981] 1 MLJ 84, di m.s. 93 seperti berikut: "The principle of law governing appeals in criminal cases on questions of fact is well established, in that the Appeal Court will not interfere unless the balance of evidence is grossly against the conviction especially upon a finding of a specific fact involving the evaluation of the evidence of a witness founded on the credibility of such witness." [13] Selanjutnya, atas prinsip yang sama, Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. Public Prosecutor & Another Appeal [2004] 3 CLJ 737 di m.s. 752 telah menyatakan seperti berikut: "Clearly, an appellate court does not and should not put a brake and not going any further the moment it sees that the trial judge says that that is his finding of facts. It should go further and examine the evidence and the circumstances under which that finding is made to see whether, to borrow the words of HT Ong (CJ Malaya) in Herchun Singh 's case (supra) "there are substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing with the finding. " Otherwise, no judgment would ever be reversed on question of fact and the provision of s. 87 CJA 1964 that an appeal may lie not only on a question of law but also on a question of fact or on a question of mixed fact and law would be meaningless." [14] Prinsip yang sama juga telah diberi penekanan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Lee Ah Seng & Anor v. PP [2007] 5 CLJ 1,di m.s. 15, seperti berikut: "The approach to be taken by an appellate court when dealing with a trial court's assessment of credibility of witness is well-established by high authorities. The credibility of a witness is primarily for the trial judge. An appellate court should always be slow in disturbing such finding of fact arrived at by the judge who had audio-visual advantage of the witness, unless there are substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing with the finding. Discrepancies will always be found in the evidence of a witness but what a judge has to determine is whether they are minor or material discrepancies. It would be wrong to say just because a witness may have contradicted in his evidence or even told lies on one or two points, his evidence should be totally rejected. In the final analysis it is for the trial judge to determine which part of the evidence of a witness he is to accept and which to reject (see Herchun Singh & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [1969] 1 LNS 52; [1969] 2 MLJ 209 FC; Dato' Mokhtar Hashim & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1983] 2 CLJ 10; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 101 FC; Lai Kim Hon & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [1980] 1 LNS 197; [1981] 1 MLJ 84 FC; Che Omar bin Mohd Akhir v. Public Prosecutor [1999] 2 CLJ 780 CA). It is not the function of an appellate court to make primary findings of facts (see Public Prosecutor v. Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457; [2005] 6 MLJ 393; [2005] 6 AMR 203)." [15] Selanjutnya dalam kes Tan Kim Ho & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [2009] 3 CLJ 236, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menyentuh prinsip yang sama dan di m.s. 252, telah menyatakan seperti berikut: "It is an established principle of law that when dealing with finding of facts, the trial judge is more often than not, in a better position to decide. The appellate court must be reluctant to interfere with such findings, unless the facts obviously disclose the courts below had clearly and wrongly evaluated the facts." [16] Berdasarkan prinsip undang-undang yang mantap yang dinyatakan di atas serta isu-isu yang dibangkitkan oleh pihak perayu, mahkamah ini telah menilai semula keterangan pihak pendakwaan dan juga pembelaan untuk memastikan sama ada keputusan HMS yang bijaksana (hakim bicara) itu betul dan wajar, mengambil kira fakta dan keadaan kes. ANALISIS DAN DAPATAN MAHKAMAH INI [17] Peguam bela perayu dan Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR) yang bijaksana dalam hujahan bertulis dan lisan masing-masing telah menyentuh beberapa isu semasa pendengaran rayuan ini. PIHAK PENDAKWAAN TELAH MEMBUKTIKAN KES PRIMA FACIE TERHADAP PERAYU DI AKHIR KES PENDAKWAAN [18] Beban pembuktian di akhir kes pendakwaan adalah di pihak pendakwaan yang mesti membuktikan suatu kes prima facie sepertimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 180 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Maksud pembuktian suatu kes prima facie telah diperjelaskan dalam kes Looi Kow Chai & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [2003] 1 CLJ 734, Balachandran v. Public Prosecutor [2005] 1 CLJ 85; [2004] 1 LNS 517; [2005] 2 MLJ 301 dan Public Prosecutor v. Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457; [2005] 6 MLJ 393. [19] Dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar (supra ), Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menjelaskan tindakan yang perlu diambil oleh mahkamah bicara di akhir kes pendakwaan adalah seperti berikut: "For the guidance of the courts below, we summarise as follows the steps that should be taken by a trial court at the close of the prosecution's case: (i) the close of the prosecution's case, subject the evidence led by the prosecution in its totality to a maximum evaluation. Carefully scrutinise the credibility of each of the prosecution's witnesses. Take into account all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. If the evidence admits of two or more inferences, then draw the inference that For the purpose of any rule of law or practice requiring evidence to be corroborated, or regulating the manner in which uncorroborated evidence is to be treated, a statement rendered admissible as evidence by this Act shall not be treated as corroboration of evidence given by the maker of the statement. It is our judgment that the view expressed by the High Court in Aziz Muhamad Din v. PP (supra ) on this issue of s. 157 of the Act being excluded by virtue of s. 73A(7) of the Act is erroneous. Section 73A(7) of the Act only applies to a civil case. This is explicitly stated both in the marginal note of s. 73A of the Act which says "Admissibility of documentary evidence in civil cases, etc" and in the commencement of sub-sections (1) and (2) of s. 73A of the Act which specially declare that these provisions are for those "in any civil proceedings..." It is therefore our view that since s. 157 of the Act is not excluded from application in a criminal case by s. 73A of the Act, s. 157 remains applicable in criminal proceedings." [25] Dalam buku Ratanlal and Dhirajlal's Law of Crimes 27th Edition di m.s. 1695 - 1969 mengenai keterangan mangsa rogol penulis telah menyatakan seperti berikut: "Evidence of prosecutrix - It is no doubt true that in law the conviction of an accused on the basis of the testimony of the prosecutrix alone is permissible, but that is in a case where the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence and appears to be natural and truthful. In the matter of rape, the statement of prosecutrix must be given primary consideration, but, the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and there can be no presumption that a prosecutrix would always tell the entire story truthfully. It is now a well settled principle of law that conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it inspires confidence. In a case of rape, particularly when the victims are illiterate, uneducated, their statements have to be accepted in toto without further corroboration. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The main evidence in all such cases is that of the victim herself. The prosecutrix of a sex offence is a victim of a crime. The woman who is not victim of sexual assault is not accomplice to crime. Her evidence cannot be tested with suspicion as that if an accomplice. The evidence of prosecutrix is similar to evidence of injured complainant or witness. The testimony of prosecutrix, if found to be reliable by itself may be sufficient to convict the culprit and no corroboration of her evidence is necessary. In prosecution of rape, the law does not require corroboration." [26] Mahkamah ini mendapati SP2 telah mula memberikan keterangan di mahkamah pada 22/5/2017 di hadapan Puan Zarifah binti Zainal Abidin, HMS sebelum beliau bertukar. Mengikut nota prosiding, SP2 berumur 16 tahun semasa memberi keterangan di mahkamah dan mempunyai kad OKU iaitu ketidakupayaan penglihatan. SP2 telah memberi keterangan bersumpah dalam Bahasa Cina dialek kantonis. Semasa diuji oleh HMS yang bijaksana mengenai keupayaan SP2 memberi keterangan di mahkamah, SP2 telah memberi jawapan yang baik dan meyakinkan di mana SP2 mengetahui beliau dipanggil ke mahkamah sebagai saksi kes rogol, SP2 memahami keperluan bercakap benar kerana kes ini kes rogol dan SP2 juga memahami boleh dikenakan tindakan jika tidak bercakap benar di mahkamah [lihat m.s. 74 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]. [27] Selanjutnya, kronologi keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan khasnya SP2 yang telah memberi keterangan di hadapan HMS yang bijaksana semasa perbicaraan kes adalah seperti berikut: i) 20/4/2017 Pemeriksaan utama, pemeriksaan balas dan pemeriksaan semula SP1 (ibu mangsa) di hadapan Puan Zarifah binti Zainal Abidin, HMS [lihat m.s. 55 - 73 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; ii) 22/5/2017 Sambung pemeriksaan utama SP1 dan pemeriksaan utama SP2 (mangsa) di hadapan Puan Zarifah binti Zainal Abidin, HMS [lihat m.s. 74 - 87 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; iii) 15/6/2017 Sambung pemeriksaan utama SP2 di hadapan Puan Zarifah binti Zainal Abidin, HMS [lihat m.s. 87 - 89 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; iv) 16/8/2017 Kes di hadapan Puan Iriane Isabelo, HMS. Puan Zarifah binti Zainal Abidin telah bertukar. Perbicaraan kes tidak diteruskan [lihat m.s. 89 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; v) 18/9/2017 Kes di hadapan Puan Rasyihah binti Ghazali, HMS. Perbicaraan kes tidak diteruskan [lihat m.s. 90 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; vi) 20/11/2017 Kes di hadapan Puan Syafeera binti Mohd Said, HMS yang baru. Sambung perbicaraan dengan keterangan SP3 (Dr Nor Elyana binti Noordin) [lihat m.s. 91 - 103 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]. SP2 tidak dapat hadir untuk sambung pemeriksaan utama [lihat m.s. 91 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; vii) 21/11/2017 Sambung perbicaraan di hadapan Puan Syafeera binti Mohd Said, HMS. Sambung pemeriksaan utama SP2 dan pemeriksaan balas SP2 [lihat m.s.104 - 134 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; viii) 6/12/2107 Sambung perbicaraan di hadapan Puan Syafeeera binti Mohd Said, HMS. Pemeriksaan semula SP2 dan pemeriksaan utama, pemeriksaan balas dan pemeriksaan semula SP4 (Insp. Noor Hidayu binti Aziz) [lihat m.s. 135 - 159 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; ix) 4/1/2018 Keputusan di akhir kes pendakwaan di hadapan Puan Syafeera binti Mohd Said, HMS. Pihak pendakwaan telah membuktikan kes prima facie bagi kedua-dua pertuduhan dan perayu dipanggil membela diri bagi kedua-dua pertuduhan [lihat m.s. 161 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]. Perayu (SD1) yang dipanggil membela diri telah memberi keterangan secara bersumpah. Pemeriksaan utama perayu dan pemeriksaan utama SD2 [lihat m.s. 163 - 172 dan 173 - 183 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; x) 10/1/2018 Pemeriksaan balas perayu (SD1) di hadapan Puan Syafeera binti Mohd Said, HMS [lihat m.s. 184 - 191 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; xi) 22/1/2018 Sambung pemeriksaan balas dan pemeriksaan semula perayu (SD1). Pemeriksaan balas dan pemeriksaan semula SD2 di hadapan Puan Syafeera binti Mohd Said, HMS [lihat m.s.192 - 207 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; dan xii) 5/3/2018 Keputusan di akhir kes pembelaan di hadapan Puan Syafeera bin Mohd Said, HMS dan hukuman yang dijatuhkan terhadap perayu [lihat m.s. 209 - 216 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]. [28] Selanjutnya, keterangan material saksi-saksi pendakwaan yang telah dibuat penilaian maksima oleh HMS yang bijaksana adalah seperti mana yang dinyatakan dalam alasan penghakiman di m.s. 12 - 46 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1(a). Kes pendakwaan banyak bergantung kepada keterangan SP2 (mangsa). Secara ringkasnya, keterangan SP2 (mangsa) adalah seperti berikut: A) Kejadian rogol yang berlaku dalam rumah perayu i) SP2 merupakan anak keenam daripada tujuh orang adik beradik dan bersekolah setakat darjah enam. SP2 mempunyai kad OKU (masalah mata) dan bekerja di kedai perayu sebagai pelayan pelanggan mengambil pesanan dan menghantar makanan dan minuman di kedai kepunyaan perayu dari jam 4.00 petang sehingga 10.00 malam pada setiap hari kecuali hari Khamis (hari rehat); ii) SP2 telah bekerja di kedai perayu yang SP2 panggil sebagai kedai Hong Seng Hong dan SP2 mengatakan tidak tahu mengeja kedai tersebut dan apabila ditunjukkan gambar eksibit P2A hingga D, SP2 telah camkan sebagai kedai perayu di mana SP2 bekerja; iii) menurut SP2, beliau telah mula bekerja di kedai perayu dari bulan Julai 2015 sehingga April 2016 kerana diminta oleh isteri perayu (SD2) dan ibu SP2 juga pada masa yang sama, berniaga di kedai perayu; iv) sepanjang memberikan keterangan di mahkamah, SP2 telah merujuk perayu dalam Bahasa Cina dialek kantonis sebagai "Laupan" dan diterjemahkan oleh jurubahasa cina sebagai "Bos"; v) SP2 memberikan keterangan bahawa beliau telah dirogol oleh perayu di sebuah bilik dalam rumah perayu pada jam lebih kurang 10 malam selepas 3 hari bekerja dengan perayu dalam bulan Julai 2015; vi) pada malam kejadian, selepas waktu kerja sebelum perayu menghantar SP2 balik ke perayu ke dalam kemaluan SP2 [lihat m.s. 108 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; x) menurut SP2, pada hari tersebut perayu juga telah menghantar SP2 pulang ke rumah dan SP2 tidak memberitahu sesiapa kerana takut dan perayu telah memberi SP2 sebanyak RM50.00 supaya jangan cerita kepada sesiapa [lihat m.s.108 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; xi) menurut SP2, perayu telah banyak kali memasukkan kemaluan perayu ke dalam kemaluan SP2 di dalam tandas tersebut [lihat m.s. 108 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; xii) menurut SP2, beliau tidak pernah melakukan hubungan seks dengan orang lain [lihat m.s. 132 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; xiii) SP2 menafikan beliau ada memasukkan objek ke dalam kemaluannya [lihat m.s. 134 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; dan xiv) SP2 menafikan kejadian rogol adalah rekaan beliau semata-mata [lihat m.s. 134 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a). C) Keterangan lanjut SP2 mengenai kejadian rogol i) SP2 cam perayu yang telah merogolnya [lihat m.s. 79 - 80 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; ii) menurut SP2, beliau telah memberitahu ibunya (SP1) pada pagi 4 April (tahun tidak ingat) bahawa beliau telah dirogol kerana SP2 takut telah hamil [lihat m.s. 110 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; iii) menurut SP2, satu laporan polis telah dibuat oleh SP2 berkenaan telah dirogol oleh perayu dan SP2 mengesahkan laporan polis yang dibuat oleh SP2 pada 4 April 2016 apabila ditunjukkan ekshibit P6 [lihat m.s. 112 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; iv) SP2 mengatakan kejadian rogol di tandas kedai perayu tidak dinyatakan dalam laporan polis kerana terlupa tetapi telah memberitahu polis selepas itu [lihat m.s. 129 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; v) SP2 menafikan kejadian rogol dalam tandas kedai perayu adalah rekaan SP2 semata-mata [lihat m.s. 129 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; vi) SP2 menafikan kelewatan membuat report polis kerana kejadian rogol tidak berlaku [lihat m.s. 130 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]; vii) SP2 tidak bersetuju dengan cadangan peguam bela perayu bahawa sebenarnya kejadian rogol tidak berlaku [lihat m.s. 130 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a); dan viii) menurut SP2, beliau telah dibawa oleh pihak polis ke hospital untuk pemeriksaan bahagian bawah dan ada memberitahu doktor bahawa beliau telah dirogol [lihat m.s. 131 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]. [29] Berdasarkan peruntukan seksyen 157 Akta Keterangan 1950, mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan dapatan HMS yang bijaksana bahawa keterangan SP2 adalah konsisten dan telah disokong oleh keterangan SP1 iaitu ibu SP2. Sebagai seorang kanak-kanak yang di bawah umur, SP2 berada di bawah jagaan dan tanggungjawab SP1. Secara ringkasnya, keterangan SP1 (ibu SP2) di mahkamah adalah seperti berikut: i) menurut SP1, pada 4 April 2016, SP2 telah memberitahu SP1 beliau telah tidak datang haid beberapa bulan dan meminta SP1 membelikan test kit untuk pregnancy test kerana menurut SP2, beliau telah dirogol oleh perayu sebanyak 23 kali pada bulan Julai (tak pasti tahun bila); ii) menurut SP1, SP2 berasa sangat sedih semasa memberitahu SP1 bahawa SP2 telah dirogol oleh perayu; iii) menurut SP1, beliau bertanyakan kepada SP2 kenapa tidak memberitahunya sebelum ini dan SP2 memberitahu bahawa perayu telah memberinya RM50.00 dan suruh jangan beritahu SP1; iv) menurut SP1, isteri perayu merayu kepada SP1 untuk membenarkan SP2 bekerja di kedai perayu kerana orang gajinya sudah balik dan SP2 telah bekerja di kedai perayu sejak bulan Julai 2015; v) menurut SP1, SP2 ada memberitahu SP1 bahawa sekiranya perayu yang membawa SP2 ke tempat kerja, perayu akan membawa SP2 ke rumah perayu dahulu; vi) menurut SP1, lokasi rumah SP1, kedai perayu dan rumah perayu kesemuanya berdekatan dan berada di kawasan Bandar Country Homes; dan vii) menurut SP1, laporan polis SP2 telah dibuat pada jam 10.00 malam pada 4 April 2016 dan selepas itu, SP2 telah dibawa ke Hospital Selayang untuk pemeriksaan perubatan dan doktor telah memberitahu ada kecederaan pada kemaluan SP2. [30] Selanjutnya, keterangan pegawai perubatan (SP3) yang telah menjalankan pemeriksaan ke atas SP2 juga telah didapati oleh HMS yang bijaksana dan dipersetujui oleh mahkamah ini menyokong keterangan SP2. Secara ringkasnya, SP3 (Dr. Nor Elyana binti Noordin, Doktor Pakar Obstretik & Ginekologi, Hospital Selayang) telah memberikan keterangan seperti berikut: i) SP3 telah memeriksa SP2 pada 6 April 2016 dan telah menyediakan laporan perubatan (ekshibit P5); ii) menurut SP3, SP2 telah memberitahu SP3 bahawa perayu (majikannya) telah merogol SP2 lebih kurang 20 kali pada Julai 2015 sehingga 30 Mac 2016; iii) hasil pemeriksaan SP3 ke atas SP2 mendapati selaput dara (hymen) SP2 telah koyak dan koyakan tersebut adalah koyakan lama dari jam 12 hingga jam 9; iv) menurut SP3, selaput dara SP2 sudah tiada pada bahagian jam 12 hingga jam 9; v) SP3 membuat kesimpulan itu adalah koyakan lama sebab tiada kesan pendarahan dan tisu selaput dara telah pulih; vi) menurut SP3, untuk sesuatu pembaikan luka paling cepat mengambil masa tujuh hari untuk pulih dan oleh itu, selepas tujuh hari adalah koyakan lama sebab sudah pulih; vii) menurut SP3, apa-apa kemasukan objek boleh menyebabkan koyakan pada selaput dara SP2; dan viii) SP3 tidak bersetuju dengan cadangan peguam bela perayu bahawa selaput dara boleh koyak jika mengangkat benda berat. [31] Dalam buku Ratanlal and Dhirajlal's Law of Crimes 27th Edition mengenai keterangan sokongan pegawai perubatan, penulis di m.s. 1693 telah menyatakan seperti berikut: "Injury on female organ - Modi in his well known work "Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology", states: "Thus to constitute the offence of rape it is not necessary that there should be complete penetration of penis with emission of semen and rupture of hymen. Partial penetration of the penis within the labia majora or the vulva or pudenda with or without emission of semen or even an attempt at penetration is quite sufficient for the purpose of the law. It is, therefore, quite possible to commit legally the offence of rape without producing any injury to the genitals or leaving any seminal stains. In such a case medical officer should mention the negative facts in his report, but should not give his opinion that no rape had been committed. Rape is crime and not a medical condition. Rape is a legal term and not a diagnosis to be made by the medical officer treating the victim. The only statement that can be made by the medical officer is that there is evidence of recent sexual activity. Whether the rape has occurred or not is a legal conclusion, not a medical one." [32] Selanjutnya, mahkamah ini juga bersetuju dengan dapatan HMS yang bijaksana bahawa keterangan SP4 (pegawai penyiasat) yang menjalankan siasatan mengenai kes rogol ini juga telah menyokong keterangan SP2. Secara ringkasnya, keterangan SP4 adalah seperti berikut: i) menurut SP4, SP2 telah membuat aduan bahawa SP2 telah dirogol oleh perayu di dua tempat kejadian iaitu di rumah perayu dan dalam tandas di kedai perayu; ii) menurut SP4, SP2 telah dirogol oleh perayu di bilik tidur utama di rumah perayu pada waktu malam ketika tiada siapa di rumah perayu dan perayu telah memberi wang kepada SP2 sebanyak RM50.00 supaya tidak memberitahu sesiapa; iii) menurut SP4, SP2 memberitahu di kedai pula, SP2 telah dirogol oleh perayu di dalam tandas; iv) menurut SP4, SP2 telah meminta SP1(ibu SP2) membelikan ujian kehamilan kerana SP2 lewat datang bulan (haid) dan apabila SP1 mendesak SP2 memberitahu perkara sebenar, SP2 memberitahu SP1 bahawa SP2 telah dirogol oleh perayu; v) dalam siasatan SP4, SP2 hanya memberitahu SP1 selepas didesak kerana perayu ada menyimpan gambar bogel SP2 semasa melakukan hubungan seks di rumah perayu; vi) SP4 mengatakan dalam siasatannya, pekerja perayu yang lain tidak nampak SP2 dan perayu masuk ke dalam tandas dan tidak nampak kejadian rogol dan tidak mendengar SP2 SP2 telah menghisap kemaluan perayu. Menurut SP2, beliau berada dalam posisi duduk di atas mangkuk tandas dan perayu dalam keadaan berdiri menghadap ke arah SP2. Kemudian, perayu telah memasukkan kemaluan perayu ke dalam kemaluan SP2. [37] Selanjutnya, mengenai inti pati ketiga bagi kedua-dua pertuduhan terhadap perayu, ianya tetap merupakan suatu kesalahan rogol sama ada kemasukan kemaluan perayu ke dalam kemaluan SP2 berlaku dengan kerelaan atau tanpa kerelaan SP2 sekiranya SP2 berumur di bawah 16 tahun semasa kejadian. HMS yang bijaksana telah merujuk kepada Sijil Kelahiran SP2 (ekshibit P1) yang membuktikan SP2 telah dilahirkan pada 10/8/2000. Kesalahan rogol di rumah perayu telah berlaku pada bulan Julai 2015 dan berdasarkan ekshibit P1, SP2 berumur 14 tahun 11 bulan ketika itu. Manakala kesalahan rogol dalam tandas di kedai perayu berlaku pada bulan Ogos 2015 dan berdasarkan ekshibit P1, SP2 berumur 15 tahun ketika itu. Dalam kedua-dua kejadian rogol tersebut, pihak pendakwaan telah membuktikan bahawa SP2 berumur di bawah 16 tahun semasa kedua-dua kejadian. [38] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan dapatan HMS yang bijaksana (hakim bicara), setelah penilaian maksima dibuat kepada keterangan kes pendakwaan di akhir kes pendakwaan, pihak pendakwaan telah membuktikan suatu kes prima facie terhadap perayu dan oleh itu perayu telah dipanggil untuk membela diri bagi kedua-dua pertuduhan tersebut. Sehubungan itu, Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar (supra ), di m.s. 399 telah memperjelaskan tugas hakim bicara di akhir kes pendakwaan seperti berikut: "What is required of a subordinate court and the High Court under the amended sections is to call for the defence when it is satisfied that a prima facie case has been made out at the close of the prosecution case. This requires the court to undertake a maximum evaluation of the prosecution evidence when deciding whether to call on the accused to enter upon his or her defence. It involves an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses called by the prosecution and the drawing of inferences admitted by the prosecution evidence. Thus, if the prosecution evidence admits of two or more inferences, one of which is in the accused's favour, then it is the duty of the court to draw the inference that is favourable to the accused. See Tai Chai Keh v. Public Prosecutor [1948-49] MLJ Supp 105: Public Prosecutor v. Kasmin bin Soeb [1974] 1 MLJ 230. If the court, upon a maximum evaluation of the evidence placed before it at the close of the prosecution case, comes to the conclusion that a prima facie case has not been made out, it should acquit the accused. If, on the other hand, the court after conducting a maximum evaluation of the evidence comes to the conclusion that a prima facie case has been made out, it must call for the defence." PEMBELAAN PERAYU TELAH DIPERTIMBANGKAN OLEH HMS DENGAN SEWAJARNYA [39] Perayu telah memilih untuk memberi keterangan bersumpah dalam Bahasa Cina dialek kantonis. Selain perayu (SD1) yang memberi keterangan, isteri perayu (SD2) juga telah memberi keterangan sebagai saksi pembelaan. Dalam pembelaannya, perayu tidak menafikan SP2 telah diambil bekerja di kedai perayu oleh SD2 dan juga tidak menafikan bahawa SP2 bekerja dari jam 4.00 petang sehingga 10 - 10.30 malam dan adakalanya sehingga jam 11.00 malam sehingga kedai ditutup. Selanjutnya, perayu menafikan telah merogol SP2 di rumah perayu dan juga menafikan telah merogol SP2 di dalam tandas di kedai perayu. Sebagai pembelaannya, perayu juga mengatakan mengalami masalah kemaluan tidak naik (mati pucuk) sejak tahun 2012 (kena strok) dan adalah mustahil perayu telah merogol SP2 dan adalah didapati SD2 memberi keterangan yang menyokong keterangan perayu. Oleh yang demikian, adalah pembelaan perayu bahawa adalah mustahil kemaluan perayu boleh tegang dan keras dan boleh dimasukkan ke dalam kemaluan SP2 dan dapat mengeluarkan air mani menurut keterangan SP2. [40] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan dapatan HMS yang bijaksana bahawa keterangan perayu yang menafikan telah merogol SP2 di rumah perayu dan di dalam tandas kedai perayu adalah pembelaan penafian semata-mata dan tidak dapat menyangkal keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan dan tidak menimbulkan apa-apa keraguan munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan dapatan HMS yang bijaksana yang telah mendapati keterangan SP2 adalah konsisten dan begitu meyakinkan (unusually convincing) sepanjang perbicaraan kes dan telah membuktikan bahawa SP2 telah dirogol oleh perayu di rumah perayu dan juga di dalam tandas kedai perayu. Tambahan pula, keterangan SP1, SP3 dan SP4 telah menyokong keterangan SP2 bagi maksud seksyen 157 Akta Keterangan 1950 dan keterangan SP2 juga telah disokong oleh laporan polis SP2 (ekshibit P6) dan juga laporan perubatan (ekshibit P5). [41] Perayu juga mengemukakan keterangan bahawa perayu mengalami masalah kemaluan yang tidak naik (mati pucuk) sejak tahun 2012 dan adalah mustahil untuk perayu merogol SP2 pada tahun 2015. Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan dapatan HMS yang bijaksana bahawa pembelaan perayu adalah penafian semata-mata dan mengenai isu mati pucuk, ianya merupakan suatu pembelaan yang difikirkan kemudian (afterthought ) oleh perayu serta tidak mempunyai sebarang merit. Keterangan perayu dan SD2 sahaja adalah tidak memadai untuk membuktikan keadaan mati pucuk yang dialami oleh perayu tanpa disokong oleh keterangan perubatan atau doktor yang merawat perayu. Tambahan pula, perayu telah gagal untuk mengemukakan atau mengajukan soalan mengenai isu mati pucuk kepada saksi pendakwaan semasa kes pendakwaan. Adalah didapati bahawa SP2 (mangsa) dan SP1, SP3 dan SP4 tidak diperiksa balas mengenai isu mati pucuk oleh peguam bela perayu semasa kes pendakwaan. Pihak pembelaan sepatutnya mengemukakan isu mati pucuk ini semasa kes pendakwaan kepada saksi-saksi pendakwaan dan bukan menimbulkan isu mati pucuk semasa kes pembelaan. [42] Selanjutnya, mengenai pembelaan perayu, Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Ahmadi Moin v. PP [2017] 1 LNS 303 telah memperjelaskan seperti berikut: "We found that the learned trial judge had duly considered all the evidence adduced before concluding that the defence of the appellant were mere denial and an afterthought. It is the duty of the defence to put its case to the prosecution's witnesses as might be in a position to admit or deny it to enable the prosecution to check on whether an accused's version of the facts is true of false, and thus avoid the adverse comment, that the defence is a recent invention, bare denial or an afterthought (Alcontara a/l Ambross Anthony v. PP [1996] 1 CLJ 705)." [43] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan dapatan HMS yang bijaksana bahawa pembelaan perayu merupakan penafian semata-semata atau suatu yang difikirkan kemudian (afterthought ) dan bukan merupakan penafian yang disertakan dengan penjelasan yang munasabah sepertimana yang diperjelaskan dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Leong Heo Cheang [1990] 2 CLJ (Rep) 738. Dalam kes ini, Mahkamah Tinggi di m.s. 744 telah memperjelaskan seperti berikut: "I must now confront the issue of critical substance at the close of the case for the defence. Had it been proved by the prosecution that at the time and place mentioned in the charge the accused was caught red-handed carrying the sling bag containing the heroin? If so, in the absence of any acceptable explanation, he would be a trafficker within the meaning of s. 2 of the Dangerous Drugs. Act. It was submitted by the learned Deputy that the defence of the accused was a bare denial and therefore insufficient to rebut the presumptions under s. 37(d) (as to knowledge) and (g) (as to trafficking) of the Act. In my view, it was not quite correct to describe the defence of the accused as a bare denial; it was a denial coupled with an explanation. Nevertheless, it was true to say that there was an acute conflict of evidence between Sidek's version as to the circumstances under which the accused was arrested and that of the accused." [44] Semasa pendengaran rayuan ini, peguam bela perayu juga telah menghujahkan bahawa pertukaran HMS yang membicarakan kes ini telah mendatangkan ketidakadilan kepada perayu. Menurut peguam bela perayu, HMS yang baru (Puan Syafeera binti Mohd Said) yang memutuskan pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan suatu kes prima facie bagi kedua-dua pertuduhan terhadap perayu tidak mendengar sebahagian besar keterangan SP2 (mangsa). Manakala, menurut peguam bela, sebahagian besar keterangan SP2 telah didengar oleh HMS yang terdahulu (Puan Zarifah binti Zainal Abidin) sebelum beliau bertukar. Atas alasan ini, peguam bela perayu menghujahkan berlaku ketidakadilan dalam prosiding kes dan mewajarkan rayuan perayu dibenarkan atau sekurang-kurangnya, perbicaraan semula diadakan di bawah seksyen 261(b) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. [45] Sebaliknya, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR) bagi pihak perayu menghujahkan bahawa pertukaran HMS adalah suatu perkara biasa pentadbiran dan perbicaraan kes boleh diteruskan oleh HMS yang baru yang mengambil alih kes tersebut. Lagi pula mengikut TPR, sistem CRT telah disediakan untuk membantu HMS yang baru mengambil alih suatu kes yang disambung bicara. HMS yang baru boleh mendengar keterangan SP2 dan juga melihat SP2 memberi keterangan. Dengan hormatnya, mahkamah ini tidak dapat bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam bela perayu dan sebaliknya bersetuju dengan hujahan TPR mengenai isu ini. Mahkamah ini mendapati Puan Syafeera binti Mohd Said, (HMS) yang baru telah mengambil alih sambung perbicaraan kes mulai 20/11/2017 (mendengar keterangan SP3) dan seterusnya telah mendengar SP2 menyambung pemeriksaan utama pada 21/11/2017 sehingga selesai keterangan SP2 pada 6/12/2017 [lihat m.s. 90 -138 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a)]. Beliau juga telah mendengar keterangan SP4 sehingga selesai dan juga mendengar hujahan pihak-pihak di akhir kes pendakwaan. Mahkamah ini juga berpendapat tidak berlaku apa-apa ketidakadilan atau prejudis yang material kepada perayu. Selanjutnya, perayu telah diberikan perbicaraan yang adil dan saksama. [46] Dalam dapatan mahkamah ini, keputusan di akhir kes pendakwaan yang telah dibuat oleh Puan Syafeera binti Mohd Said (HMS) pada 4/1/2018 adalah teratur dan tidak menyebabkan apa-apa ketidakadilan kepada perayu. Di m.s. 161 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2(a), beliau telah memutuskan seperti berikut: "Setelah mendengar dan meneliti keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan bersama ekshibit- ekshibit yang dikemukakan dan setelah meneliti hujahan pembelaan dan pendakwaan, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kes prima PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ... RESPONDENT GROUNDS OF DECISION [1] On 31 July 2018, the appellant was convicted of statutory rape by the Sessions Court in Sarikei which meted out a term of imprisonment for 5 years. [2] He had been charged with committing rape on a minor under the age of 16 in May 2016, between the hours of 2 to 4 a.m., at the jetty at Kampung Baru Ismail Igan (later amended to read "Kampung Baru Dagang Igan"), in the District of Matu, Sarawak. [3] The appeal is against conviction and sentence. [4]Section 375(g) of the Penal Code provides that, save for the exceptions thereinafter provided, a man is said to commit rape when he has sexual intercourse with a woman, with or without her consent, when she is under 16 years of age. [5] Section 376(1) as it now stands, after the amendment came into force on 1 September 2017, provides that whoever commits rape shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 20 years and shall also be punished with whipping. The punishment is heavier if the rape is carried out in the circumstances set out under section 376(2) which does not apply in this case. [6] Previously, the punishment prescribed under section 376(1) was "imprisonment for a term of not less than five years and not more than twenty years, and shall also be liable to whipping". Since the rape in this case was committed in May 2016, the previous punishment provision applies. [7] As the minimal sentence was imposed, it may be taken that the appeal is only against conviction. Indeed, learned counsel for the appellant conceded during the course of oral submissions and clarification that the appeal against sentence is abandoned. [8] The learned trial judge made findings of fact, inter alia, that the appellant and PW3 had sexual intercourse at around 4.00 a.m. on a day in May 2016, in a hut at the jetty at Kampung Baru Dagang Igan; and two days before the incident, the accused came to know PW3 at a grocery store in their kampung, helped her to reload her handphone with a RM10.00 reload value, took her handphone number and contacted her 2 days later and invited her to have sexual intercourse in the hut at the said jetty. APPROACH TO BE TAKEN IN HEARING THE APPEAL [9] It is a well-entrenched principle that the decision of the lower court will not be disturbed unless there is manifest error in law or on the facts, or a misapplication of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice. See PP v. Shari Mohd Shariff [2005] 5 CLJ 439. [10] In PP v. Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457, 475, the Federal Court held: - "Now, it settled law that it is no part of the function of an appellate court in a criminal case – or indeed any case – to make its own findings of fact. That is a function exclusively reserved by the law to the trial court. The reason is obvious. An appellate court is necessarily fettered because it lacks the audio-visual advantage enjoyed by the trial court." [11] The conviction is attacked on several grounds: the lack of positive identification by the victim/complainant (PW3), lack of corroboration, failure of the learned trial judge to comply with section 133A of the Evidence Act 1950, uncertainty in the age of PW3, the lack of a physical examination and medical report, and the DNA test of PW3's child indicated that the appellant is not the father. IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE [12] There is no merit to the contention that the accused was not positively identified or identified in the dock. PW2, Sjn Noor Azura, recorded the statement of PW3 (together with one Insp Anuar) after she had lodged a police report at the Dalat Police Station, complaining that she had been raped by her adopted father and her adopted elder brother. While giving her statement, the complainant related to PW2 how she got to know the appellant, how the incident came about, details of the incident, where it took place, and so on. [13] PW2 then went to the scene of the incident together with PW3 and several police personnel, including Insp Anuar. [14] When asked to explain what then happened at the scene of incident, PW2 testified "(w)hen we arrived at Kampung Baru Dagang Igan, the complainant pointed (at) the suspect who was coincidentally at the road side of Kampung Baru Dagang Igan at that time". See NOP, page 27, Q&A 49. PW2 subsequently identified the appellant in the dock. See NOP, page 30, Q&A 63 – 64. [15] PW3 testified that she went in a car with PW2, Insp Anuar and a few police personnel to Kampung Baru Dagang Igan, as she was asked to point out the location of the appellant's house (NOP, page 69). PW3 saw the appellant by the road side and in her examination-in- chief, testified: "I informed Inspector Anuar that the Accused was the one who was walking on the road side". [16] Further, the identification of the appellant by PW3 on the night of the incident was not based on a fleeting glance. The appellant, who was already known to PW3, was waiting for her outside the hut with a torchlight. She was able to describe in graphic detail the sexual acts including the intercourse which took place over a 20 minute period. [17] Furthermore, PW3 had identified the appellant vide exhibit P1(6), a photograph in which he featured. See NOP, page 76, Q&A 152 – 153. Record of Appeal, Volume 3, page 6. Although the photograph is only one-dimensional, it tied in with the other strands of evidence whereby the identity of the appellant was referred to. There is no reasonable doubt that the person who had sexual intercourse with PW3 in May 2016 at the hut by the jetty in Kampung Baru Dagang Igan was the appellant. As the learned DPP orally submitted, the learned Sessions Court Judge had the opportunity of satisfying himself that the person in the exhibit photograph, P1(6), was the same person in the dock. [18] The appellant himself testified that he knew PW3 as Binah. He testified that he had met her at 4.00 a.m. in 2017 at Jambatan Kampung Baru Dagang where his boat was berthed, although he could not remember the month and he denied having sexual intercourse with her. See NOP, pages 91 – 99. [19] The appellant did not claim mistaken identity but instead suggested that he was framed, when he testified that "Binah said, "if you refused (sic) to give me money, I will make sure you will be responsibled to (sic) what happen to me in future. I will blame you for everything". See NOP, page 93, Q&A11. [20] So, there can be no issue of mistaken identity or a failure to appreciate the identification evidence on the part of the learned trial judge. AGE OF THE COMPLAINANT [21] Neither is there any merit in the appellant's contention that there is a discrepancy in PW2's evidence when she gave the age of PW3 as 14 and also 15. [22] Given that PW3's date of birth is 16 July 2001 (as is evident from the particulars of her MyKad which was shown and recorded in the notes of proceedings when she took the stand – NOP, page 52), she was 14 years old when the appellant had sexual intercourse with her in May 2016. [23] PW3 was 15 years and 11 months old when she met PW2 on 11 July 2017, as PW2 correctly testified. See NOP, page 22, Q&A 18 and 19. [24] There was thus no discrepancy as to PW2's evidence on the age of PW3. [25] PW3's evidence that she was 15 years old when she first met the appellant in May 2016, is but a small discrepancy which is immaterial. She would have turned 15, a couple of months after she first met the appellant in May 2016. [26] Importantly, she was under the threshold age of 16 at the time the offence was committed by the appellant. EVIDENCE OF PW3 AS A CHILD WITNESS [27] Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the proper procedure for the reception of the evidence of a child witness is as follows: - "(1) Before the child witness take (sic) an oath, the Judge had (sic) to conduct inquiry (sic) to determine whether the child understands the nature of the oath and is competent to testify before giving evidence; (2) After the Judge satisfied (sic) that the child witness understands the nature of the oath and is competent to testify before giving evidence, the oath is to be administered to the child after the inquiry." [28] In that regard, the complaint is three-fold: the learned trial judge ought to have conducted the inquiry himself as to whether PW3 understood the nature of the oath, PW3 took the oath before any inquiry was conducted, and it was not recorded in the grounds of decision that PW3 is a competent witness. A The suspect was brought to Daro police station. Q55 When Inspector Anuar was asking the suspect all of these questions, where were you? A I was standing outside the police car, near to the suspect." [38] PW2's testimony ties in with PW3's examination-in-chief testimony (although PW3 did not hear the appellant's admission) as follows:- "Q118 Where were you when the police arrest the Accused? A I was still inside the police car. Q119 How about Sergeant Azura? A She also went out from the police car. Q120 What did she do after she went out from the police car? A What I can remember, she was standing in front of the Accused and they had conversation. I don't know the content of their conversation. Q121 Why you did not know the content of their conversation? A Because when Sergeant Azura went out from the police car, she closed the door of the car and I was inside the police car." PHYSICAL EXAMINATION AND DNA TEST [39] Next, learned counsel for the appellant argues that the physical examination conducted on PW3 by the doctor at the Sibu Hospital did not reveal any penetration. Learned counsel for the appellant also argues that there are reasonable doubts about the conviction as the DNA test shows that the appellant is not the father of PW3's child. [40] The arguments raised are to be given short shrift. It was not the prosecution's case that the act of sexual intercourse was against the will of PW3 (who in fact testified that the act was consensual – NOP, page 64, Q&A 74), and there was penetration which caused injury or that her hymen was torn. The prosecution's case against the appellant was based on statutory rape. [41] As for the DNA test argument, the issue of paternity is not at stake. It is an off-target last salvo from a sinking ship. In any case, according to PW3, the appellant had used a condom. NOP, pages 61 – 62, Q&A 65 – 66; page 64, Q&A 79. In addition, PW3 had sexual intercourse with 10 other individuals including her adopted father and adopted elder brother who were mentioned in the police report marked as exhibit P3. See NOP, page 11, page 21, Q&A 6; Record of Appeal, Volume 3, page 9. [42] From the grounds of judgment furnished by the court below and the evidence, it cannot be said that the trial court had fundamentally misdirected itself. The appeal is dismissed. The conviction and sentence are affirmed. Date of Decision: 13 DECEMBER 2018 Grounds of Decision: 18 DECEMBER 2018 (LIM HOCK LENG) Judicial Commissioner High Court Sibu Marwan Malabon v PP (2018) 1 LNS 1684 MARWAN MALABON v. PP HIGH COURT SABAH & SARAWAK, KOTA KINABALU NURCHAYA HAJI ARSHAD J [CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: BKI-42-4/7-2017] 26 JANUARY 2018 Case(s) referred to: R v. Ball (Kenneth John) [1951] 35 Cr. App R 164 PP v. Teh Ah Ching [1976] 1 LNS 116 Bhandulananda Jayalatike v. PP [1981] 1 LNS 139 PP v. Jafa Bin Daud [1981] 1 LNS 28; [1981] 1 MLJ 315 Noor Afizal Azizan v. PP [2012] 6 CLJ 370; [2012] 6 MLJ 172 Legislation referred to: Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 293, 294, 316 Penal Code, s. 376(2) Counsel: For the appellant - DPP Hafizah Zahidah Haji Abdullah, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya; Bahagian Pendakwaan Jabatan Peguam Negara Sabah For the respondent - Arthur Borine; M/s Arthur Borine & Partner MALAYSIA IN HIGH COURT IN SABAH AND SARAWAK AT KOTA KINABALU [CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: BKI-42-4/7-2017] BETWEEN MARWAN BIN MALABON ... APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ... RESPONDENT (KENINGAU SESSIONS COURT CRIMINAL CASE NO. KGU-62JS-7/7-2016) BETWEEN PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ... PROSECUTION AND MARWAN BIN MALABON ... ACCUSED GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT A) Introduction: [1] This is an appeal to the Court of Appeal against my sentence that was delivered on 26.1.2018. In essence, the notice of appeal filed to High Court was received on 28.7.2017. The appeal is against sentence that was imposed by the Learned Sessions Court Judge (LSCJ). [2] During the appeal at High Court, I have decided on the appeal of the Appellant and I have allowed the appeal. The sentence of 15 years imprisonment and 1 stroke of whipping is reduced to 5 years and maintaining the 1 stroke of whipping. [3] Dissatisfied, a notice of appeal to Court of Appeal filed by the Prosecution dated on 6.2.2018 and filed on 13.2.2018. B) Brief Facts: [4] The Accused was charged under section 376(2) of Penal Code. Accused plead guilty and the Accused was represented by a counsel when his plea was taken. The LSCJ had made her deliberation and the Accused was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment and 1 stroke of whipping. Charge against the Accused is as follows: " Bahawa kamu pada 30.11.2014 jam diantara 5 petang hingga 7 malam, bertempat disebuah pondok di Jalan Intake Nabawan, didalam daerah Nabawan, dinegeri Sabah, telah merogol perempuan bernama Airen Bin Shari, umur 14 tahun 4 bulan. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan kesalahan yang boleh dihukum dibawah seksyen 376(2) Kanun Keseksaan" C) Pertinent Facts [5] On 1.12.2014, at about 4 pm, a police report was lodged by the complainant (victim) stating that on 30.11.2014 she was raped by the Accused at a pondok sawah area in Jalan Intake Nabawan when she was drunk and in the state of half consciousness. [6] Investigation from the police shows that on the same day at about 1 pm, the complainant and her two friends, Mardelina and Santie went to Astaka Padang Bandaran Pekan Nabawan (NURCHAYA HAJI ARSHAD) Judge Kota Kinabalu High Court Criminal, Sabah Assam Gom v PP (2018) 1 LNS 1660 ASSAN GOM v. PP HIGH COURT SABAH & SARAWAK, MIRI DEAN WAYNE DALY JC [CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: MYY-42H-5/12-2017] 31 JANUARY 2018 Case(s) referred to: PP v. Ling Leh Hoe [2015] 4 CLJ 869, CA Muhammad Hafizan Pauzi v. PP [2017] 1 LNS 1579 PP v. Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 1 LNS 102; [1976] 2 MLJ 256 Tan Sri Abdul Rahim Noor v. PP [2001] 4 CLJ 9; [2001] 1 MLJ 193 Peilis Sarni v. PP [2014] 6 CLJ 670, CA Riduan Masmud v. PP & Another Case [2015] 1 LNS 449 Legislation referred to: Penal Code, s. 376 (1) Criminal Procedure Code, s. 289 Counsel: For the appellant - In person - Unrepresented For the respondent - DPP Mohd Fuad Abdul Aziz; Jabatan Peguam Negara MALAYSIA IN THE HIGH COURT IN SABAH AND SARAWAK AT MIRI [CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: MYY-42H-5/12-2017] BETWEEN ASSAN GOM ... APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ... RESPONDENT [From the Miri Sessions Court Criminal Case No.: MYY-62JS-5/4- 2017] BETWEEN PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ... COMPLAINANT AND ASSAN GOM ... ACCUSED GROUNDS OF SENTENCING INTRODUCTION [1] This is the Accused/Appellant's appeal against sentence passed by the learned Sessions Court Judge ("SCJ") on 17 November 2017. He was convicted on an amended charge of rape under Section 376(1) of the Penal Code after he pleaded guilty to the same. He was thereafter sentenced to an imprisonment term of twelve (12) years with effect from the date of arrest (1 April 2017) and three (3) strokes of whippings. THE CHARGE [2] The amended charge which was preferred against the Appellan/Accused read: "BAHAWA KAMU PADA 31.03.2017 ANTARA JAM 0030 HRS HINGGA 0300HRS BERTEMPAT DI KAWASAN SEMAK, DI TEPI JALAN KUALA BARAM, DI DALAM DAERAH MIR/, DI DALAM NEGERI SARAWAK, TELAH MEROGOL SEORANG PEREMPUAN BERNAMA HILDA JANUN ANAK MATTEW, UMUR: 29 TAHUN, DAN DENGAN ITU, KAMU TELAH MELAKUKAN SUATU KESALAHAN YANG BOLEH DIHUKUM DI BAWAH SEKSYEN 376(1)KANUN KESEKSAAN." BRIEF FACTS [3] The facts of case in support of the charge read: "Pada 30.3.2017 jam lebih kurang 0300 hours pengadu telah dibawa ke kawasan semak Jalan Kuala Baram Miri dengan menaiki kereta milik suami pengadu yang dipandu oleh seorang bomoh (lelaki) yang kami kenali dengan nama Hassan @ Raja Mukun untuk mengubat pengadu yang dikatakan telah diganggu oleh makhluk halus dan punca pengadu dan suami belum mendapat zuriat. Bagi membuang makhluk tersebut Hassan @ Raja Mukun mengarahkan pengadu untuk membuka seluar dan terus merogol pengadu dalam kereta tersebut. Sebelum kejadian suami pengadu bernama Sutin anak Nuri dinasihatkan oleh Hassan @ Raja Mukun supaya tidak mengikut kami berdua ke situ dan hanya dibenarkan menunggu di rumah Hassan @ Raja Mukun. Semasa kejadian pengadu hanya mengikut kata- kata dia sahaja dan tidak mampu berbuat apa-apa seolah-olah telah dipukau. Oleh sebab yang demikian pengadu buat laporan untuk tindakan lanjut pihak polis. Hasil Siasatan 1 Hasil siasatan, dalam kejadian ini pengadu telah berjumpa dengan tertuduh kerana percaya tertuduh pengamal perubatan tradisional dan boleh mengubati pengadu. Tertuduh mengatakan perbuatan memasukkan kemaluannya ke dalam kemaluan pengadu adalah bagi menyedut lender mistik yang berada di dalam kemaluan pengadu. Lendermistik tersebut menyebabkan pengadu tidak boleh mengandung. Pengadu yang percaya dengan kata-kata tertuduh tidak menghalang perbuatan tertuduh ke atas dirinya. Siasatan lanjut melalui pemeriksaan pegawai perubatan Hospital Miri mendapati terdapat kesan koyakan lama pada selaput dara mangsa iaitu pada jam 4 dan 8 di selaput dara mangsa. Mangsa telah melakukan hubungan seks dengan tertuduh semasa umurnya 29 tahun 5 bulan dan pengadu tidak faham dan keliru dengan persetujuan yang diberikan ke atas tertuduh untuk melakukan hubungan seks dengannya. Pengadu beranggapan perbuatan tertuduh memasukkan kemaluannya ke dalam kemaluan pengadu adalah bagi mengubati penyakitnya." THE LAW [4] It is trite that that the appellate court would be slow to disturb the sentence imposed by the court below. The appellate court may only do so if the presiding officer had made a wrong decision as to the proper factual basis for the sentence, or if the presiding officer had not appreciated the facts presented to him. The appellate court may also interfere if the sentence passed was premised on wrong principle or if it was manifestly excessive or inadequate. (See PP v. Ling Leh Hoe [2015] 4 CLJ 869, CA) SUBMISSIONS [5] The Accused/Appellant had brought along a letter with him for the hearing of the appeal. It was prepared by his cellmate. Since, he could not read, the letter was read out in open court by the court interpreter. The Accused/Appellant maintained that his appeal was only against sentence. [6] The Accused/Appellant's submission in regard sentence briefly summarised his plea in mitigation in the court below. His mitigation is reproduced below: "I pray for leniency. I am 59 years old. This is my first offence. I am remorseful for the offence. I pray for the court to give me a chance to turn to a new leaf. I promise also that I will not commit the same offence in future. I have a daughter aged 7 years old, her name is Anna and before I was arrested she was staying with me. After he mother left both of us while she was still an infant. For all this while she was living with me for finance and support. We are from a poor family. I have not met or seen my daughter after I was arrested. I also did lodge a police report pertaining to the matter but until now I have no news about her whereabouts. In passing sentence, I pray that the Hon court to take into consideration from the date of my arrest. I also suffer from asthma and sometimes I suffer back pain and YH Judicial Commissioner High Court, Miri Decision delivered on: 31 JANUARY 2018 (Notice: This copy of the Court's Grounds of Sentencing is subject to editorial revision) Stanley Layang Nyadang v Deputy Public Prosecutor (2018) 1 LNS 1661 STANLEY LAYANG NYADANG v. DEPUTY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT SABAH & SARAWAK, MIRI DEAN WAYNE DALY JC [CASE NO: MYY-42H-4/11-2017] 31 JANUARY 2018 Case(s) referred to: Tukiran v. PP [1955] 1 LNS 166; [1955] MLJ 24 Nor Afizal Bin Azizan v. PP [2012] 6 CLJ 370; [2012] 6 MLJ 171 Jayanathan v. PP [1973] 2 MLJ 68 Abdullah Ang Swee Kang v. PP [1987] CLJ Rep 209; [1987] 2 CLJ 405; [1988] 1 MLJ 167 Legislation referred to: Child Act 2001, s. 83 (2) Penal Code, s. 376 (2) (e) Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 293, 294 Counsel: For the appellant - Sam Laya; M/s Sam & Co For the respondent - DPP Mohd Fuad Abdul Aziz; Jabatan Peguam Negara MALAYSIA IN THE HIGH COURT IN SABAH AND SARAWAK AT MIRI [CASE NO:MYY-42H-4/11-2017] BETWEEN STANLEY LAYANG NYADANG ... APPELLANT AND DEPUTY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ... RESPONDENT [From the Miri Sessions Court Criminal Case No.:MYY-62JS-6/4-2017] BETWEEN DEPUTY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ... COMPLAINANT AND STANLEY LAYANG ANAK NYADANG ... ACCUSED GROUNDS OF SENTENCING THE APPEAL [1] This is the Appellant's appeal against the sentence passed by the learned Sessions Court Judge ("SCJ") on 21 November 2017 whereby he was sentenced to an imprisonment term of fifteen (15) years with effect from the said date after he pleaded guilty to a charge of rape of a minor under Section 376(2)(e) of the Penal Code. SUBMISSIONS [2] Mr. Sam Laya, learned counsel for the Appellant had at the outset of this appeal sought to rely on the mitigation made in the Court below. [3] It was submitted in the court below that the Appellant herein was only 16 years of age when he committed the offence. If the case had been filed in the year 2013, the Appellant would have been considered a child offender and subject to the provisions of the Child Act 2001. Instead, the prosecution filed this case in April 2017 which was 4 years after the commission of the offence [4] In any event, since the accused was 20 years old when he was charged, he was still considered a youthful offender under section 293 of the Criminal Procedure Code. [5] The Appellant had also pleaded guilty at the first instance and he had saved the court precious time by preventing a lengthy prosecution which would have incurred some costs in securing witnesses especially the doctor that had examinetl the victim. [6] Further, it was submitted that the Appellant was very remorseful for what had happened and he promised not to repeat the same offence again in the future. [7] This case had exposed him to the media attention and subjected him to ridicule by his friends and relatives. The Appellant was working in a brick factory in Brunei and helping his father, who was working overseas to provide for his mother and his other siblings in the absence his father. [8] Learned counsel then submitted that it was undesirable for the Appellant to be imprisoned because he was a youthful offender at the time when the offence was committed. He further submitted that the Appellant being a youthful offender should have been dealt with pursuant to Section 294 of Criminal Procedure Code. After all, the sentence of imprisonment provided for in Section 376 of the Penal Code is not mandatory. It does not override section 294 of the Criminal Procedure Code. [9] The Appellant therefore submitted that an order of a bond of good behaviour as per the welfare report was more appropriate in the circumstances of the case. In support of his submissions learned counsel cited the authorities of Tukiran v. PP [1955] 1 LNS 166; [1955] MLJ 24, Nor Afizal Bin Azizan v. PP [2012] 6 CLJ 370; [2012] 6 MLJ 171 and Jayanathan v. PP [1973] 2 MLJ 68. [10] The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor, Mohd Fuad Bin Abdul Aziz, on the other hand urged the court to revisit the social report. He submitted that the Probation Officer of the Welfare Department, Miri did not recommend for the Appellant to be sent to prison. The same officer also did not recommend for him to be released on bond or bound over for good behaviour either. [11] Nevertheless, the learned Deputy further submitted that, the facts of those cases relied upon by learned counsel differ from the present in that, the age of the victim was 8 years 1 month old at the time of incident. The Appellant was 16 years of age then. Since the victim in this case was much younger than those in the cited cases, he urged this Court not to disturb the findings of the Court below. [12] The court had enquired of the learned Deputy as to why the Appellant was only charged in 2017 whereas the offence was committed in 2013. Not only would the Appellant's age be a factor then, the punishment which would have been meted out then would have been different given the fact that Section 376 then had a minimum imprisonment term of five (5) years and the maximum being thirty (30) years. An accused person then shall also be liable to whipping, unlike mandatory whipping after the amendments. [13] The learned Deputy was not sure why that was so. Having checked on the matter, he informed the court that the report was lodged later. He later corrected that fact after noticing that the report was in fact lodged on 20 November 2013. He then informed the court that the Appellant was arrested on 20 November 2017. [14] The instruction to prosecute was given in 2014 but the accused was not in court at that time. The accused could not be located. He further informed that the Appellant came by himself to the police station on the 10 April 2017. That was when the prosecution charged the accused in Court. High Court, Miri Decision delivered: 31 JANUARY 2018 (Notice: This copy of the Court's Grounds of Sentencing is subject to editorial revision) Yosini Mohamed v PP (2018) 1 LNS 2218 YOSINI MOHAMED lwn. PP MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA, JOHOR BAHRU MAT GHANI ABDULLAH PK [RAYUAN JENAYAH NO. JA-42JSKS-02-11/2017 & JA-42JSKH-(03-05)11/2017] 26 APRIL 2018 Kes-kes yang dirujuk: KS Saravanan Krishnan v. PP [2016] 1 LNS 1037 Usman Jumasan v. PP Court Of Appeal, Putrajaya [2016] 1 LNS 1457 Inggeris R v. Billam [1986] 1 All ER 985 Rohaizat Bin Abd Ani v. PP [2016] 1 LNS 1775 Bachik Abdul Rahman v. PP [2004] 2 CLJ 572 PP v. Tia Ah Leng [2000] 5 CLJ 614 Tan Lay Chen v. PP [2000] 4 CLJ 492 Loh Hock Seng & Anor v. PP [1979] 1 LNS 48; [1980] 2 MLJ 13 PP v. Oo Leng Swee & Ors [1981] 1 LNS 109; [1981] 1 MLJ 247 Sim Gek Yong v. PP [1995] 1 SLR 537 PP v. Govindnan Chinden Nair [1998] 2 CLJ 370 PP v. Low Kok Wai [1988] 2 CLJ 105; [1988] 2 CLJ (Rep) 268 PP v. Shari Mohd Shariff [2005] 5 CLJ 439 Bachik Abdul Rahman v. PP [2004] 2 CLJ 572 KS Saravanan Krishnan v. PP [2016] 1 LNS 1037 Amran Mohd Jin v. PP [2007] 2 CLJ 545 Bachik bin Abdul Rahman v. Public Prosecutor [2004] 2 CLJ 572 Perundangan yang dirujuk: Kanun Keseksaan, ss. 354, 376, 376A, 376B(1), 377B Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, s. 292(1) Kaunsel: Bagi pihak perayu (YBGK) - Nor Helmi A Halim Bagi pihak responden - TPR Noorfazlin Hamdan DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM [RAYUAN JENAYAH NO. JA-42JSKS-02-11/2017 & JA-42JSKH-(03-05)11/2017] ANTARA YOSINI BIN MOHAMED (NO. K/P: 670912-01-6199) ... PERAYU DAN PENDAKWARAYA ... RESPONDEN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN [1] Alasan Ini adalah gabungan bagi 4 kes rayuan terhadap hukuman oleh Perayu ke atas keputusan yang telah diberikan oleh Puan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen (HMS) Kota Tinggi di mana beliau telah mensabitkan dan menjatuhkan hukuman keseluruhannya berjumlah 75 tahun dan 8 sebatan rotan ke atas Perayu bagi 5 kesalahan seksual terhadap anak kandungnya sendiri. PERTUDUHAN [2] Perayu telah dituduh di bawah empat kes yang berbeza bagi kelima-lima pertuduhan tersebut. Bagi mudah memahami berkenaan pertuduhan-pertuduhan dan hukuman di dalam ke empat empat kes ini diperturunkan seperti berikut:- JA-42JSKS-02-11/2017 (JH-62JSK-4-10/2017) "Bahawa kamu dalam bulan Mei 2011, jam lebih kurang 4.00 petang di alamat rumah bernombor 34, Jalan SS6, Taman Sri Saujana, di dalam daerah Kota Tinggi, di dalam negeri Johor dengan sengaja telah melakukan persetubuhan yang bertentangan dengan aturan tabii iaitu dengan memasukkan zakar kamu ke dalam mulut XXX dan No K/P: XXX, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 377B Kanun Keseksaan." [3] Bagi Kesalahan ini Perayu dihukum Penjara 15 tahun dan 2 sebatan rotan dan dia merayu agar hukuman dikurangkan. JA-42JSKH-03-11/2017 (JH-62JSK-5-10/2017) "Bahawa kamu dalam bulan Mac 2012, jam lebih kurang 2.00 petang di alamat rumah bernombor 34, Jalan SS. 6, Taman Sri Saujana, di dalam daerah Kota Tinggi, di dalam negeri Johor telah melakukan persetubuhan dengan XXX dan No K/P: XXX yang mana oleh kerana perhubungan kamu dengannya adalah tidak dibenarkan di bawah undang-undang atau hukum agama yang terpakai kepada kamu untuk berkahwin dengannya dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 376B(1) Kanun Keseksaan" [4] Bagi kesalahan ini Perayu dihukum penjara 25 tahun dan 3 sebatan rotan. Perayu merayu supaya dikurangkan hukuman dan hukuman berjalan serentak dengan kes rayuan JA- 42JSKS-02-11/2017. JA-42JSKH-04-11/2017 (JH-62JSK-6-10/2017) Pertuduhan Pertama "Bahawa kamu dalam bulan Oktober 2014, jam lebih kurang 5.00 petang di alam rumah bernombor 15, Blok 1, Felda Air Tawar 3, di dalam daerah Kota Tinggi di dalam Negeri Johor telah menggunakan kekerasan jenayah kepada XXX dan No K/P: XXX, dengan maksud untuk mencabul kehormatannya dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 354 Kanun Keseksaan" Pertuduhan Kedua "Bahawa kamu dalam bulan November 2014, jam lebih kurang 12.00 malam di alamat rumah bernombor 15 Blok 1, Felda Air Tawar 3, di dalam daerah Kota Tinggi, di dalam negeri Johor telah melakukan persetubuhan dengan XXX dan No K/P: XXX, yang mana oleh kerana perhubungan kamu dengannya adalah tidak dibenarkan di bawah undang-undang atau hukum agama yang terpakai kepada kamu untuk berkahwin dengannya dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 376B(1) Kanun Keseksaan." [5] Bagi kesalahan pertama Perayu dihukum penjara 6 tahun dan kesalahan kedua dihukum penjara 28 tahun dan 3 sebatan rotan. Hukuman berjalan berasingan. Perayu merayu supaya dengan fakta dan keadaan yang dibuktikan. (Rujuk kes: Bhandulananda Jayatilake v. Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 LNS 139,; PP v. Dato' Waad Mansor [2005] 1 CLJ 421)." [17] Prinsip yang sama juga dirujuk sebagai panduan di dalam kes Usman Jumasan v. PP Court Of Appeal, Putrajaya [2016] 1 LNS 1457 seperti berikut: "[10] The basic principles governing the role of an appellate court in an appeal against sentence are well settled. In exercising its jurisdiction to review sentence an appellate court does not alter a sentence on the mere ground that if it had been trying the case it might have passed a somewhat different sentence. It is only when a sentence appears to be wrong in law or is manifestly excessive or inadequate having regard to the facts and circumstances that an appellate court will interfere (Public Prosecutor v. Lee Seng Seh [1966] 1 LNS 142; [1966] 1 MLJ 266)." [18] Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini sehaluan pandangan dengan hujahan Puan TPR bahawa keputusan sabitan dan hukuman oleh mahkamah peringkat bawahan adalah tidak wajar diganggu. Mahkamah ini adalah agak keberatan dalam mengganggu hukuman yang dijatuhkan oleh mahkamah bawahan melainkan terdapat kesilapan dan dalam keputusan atau sabitan tersebut serta bercanggah dengan undang-undang sedia ada. Sama Ada hukuman HMS terlalu berlebihan [19] Peguam Perayu menegaskan bahawa hukuman HMS terlalu berlebihan dan beliau tidak mengambil kira pengakuan salah perayu. Apabila merujuk alasan penghakiman oleh HMS, Mahkamah ini mendapati beliau telah mempertimbangkan faktor pengakuan salah sebelum menjatuhkan hukuman atas Perayu, namun memutuskan pengakuan salah Perayu tidak dapat membawa apa-apa kesan dan makna dalam kes ini kerana telah mengambil kira faktor-faktor berikut: (i)Prinsip Kepentingan awam; (ii)Graviti/keseriusan jenayah yang dilakukan; (iii)Peningkatan kadar jenayah seksual yang makin berleluasa; [20] Berdasarkan di dalam fakta kes ini, mangsa adalah anaknya sendiri dan telah diperlakukan jenayah seksual sejak usia 11 tahun hingga 15 tahun dan tiada keadilan undang- undang jika hukuman ringan diberikan kepada Perayu sedangkan selama 5 tahun mangsa mengalami trauma dan terseksa secara seksual sepanjang tempoh itu dan sehinggalah ke hari ini. [21] Mahkamah ini akui hukuman yang dikenakan secara total hukuman penjara 75 tahun dan 8 sebatan rotan agak berat akan tetapi hukuman ini yang tidaklah bagitu berlebihan (manifestly excessive) jika dibandingkan dengan kesalahannya serta kesan yang dialami oleh mangsa sepanjang hayatnya. Tiada siapa yang boleh menggantikan kehormatan mangsa akibat perbuatan terkutuk Perayu. [22] Benarlah seperti dihujahkan oleh Puan TPR bahawa apabila seseorang Tertuduh mempunyai kecenderungan mempunyai sikap atau tabiat seksual yang tinggi maka hukuman penjara maksimum adalah amat wajar kerana untuk mengelakkan risiko bahaya tertuduh berada dalam kelompok masyarat umum terutama terhadap mangsa. Prinsip ini dizahirkan di dalam kes Inggeris R v. Billam [1986] 1 All ER 985 di mana Lord Lane, the learned Chief Justice of England telah mempertimbangkan isu keperluan hukuman penjara sepanjang hayat bagi kes-kes rogol dengan menyatakan: "the variable factors in cases of rape are so numerous that it is difficult to lay down guidelines as to the proper length of sentence in terms of years." Where the offender represented a more than ordinary danger, a sentence of 15 years or more may be appropriate. Yet again, the learned Chief Justice had continued, and I quote: "Where the defendant's behaviour has manifested perverted or psychopathic tendencies or gross personality disorder and where he is likely, if at large, to remain a danger to women for an indefinite time, a life sentence will not be inappropriate". [23] Puan HMS dengan wajarnya juga telah mengambil kira niat Parlimen yang meminda hukuman bagi kesalahan sumbang mahram di dalam pertimbangan apabila menjatuhkan hukuman terhadap Perayu. Beliau telah merujuk kepada Penyata Rasmi Parlimen bertarikh 21/10/2013, Menteri di Jabatan Perdana Menteri, Puan Hajah Nancy binti Shukri telah menyatakan seperti berikut: "Hal keadaan yang baru tersebut mengambil kira keadaan semasa dan impak kejadian kepada mangsa rogol. Hukuman bagi kesalahan di bawah seksyen 376B iaitu sumbang mahram, 377CA rogol menggunakan objek, 377E menghasut kanak-kanak melakukan perbuatan kelucahan yang melampau juga telah dinaikkan bagi membuktikan keseriusan kerajaan memerangi jenayah seksual yang keji ini. Had minimum hukuman telah dimasukkan dalam ketiga-tiga seksyen tersebut bagi mengelakkan hukuman yang ringan diberikan." [24] Disini adalah jelas bahawa kesalahan sumbang mahram adalah suatu kesalahan yang amat serius sehingga hukuman penjara bagi kesalahan tersebut telah dipinda; di mana hukuman maksimum penjara telah dinaikkan dari 20 tahun kepada 30 tahun melalui pindaan no. A1536/2017 yang mula berkuat kuasa pada 1/9/2017. [25] Mahkamah sehaluan pandangan sepenuhnya dengan ulasan Puan HMS bahawa kes-kes sumbang mahram merupakan kesalahan yang amat keji dan terkutuk dan amat dipandang serius oleh segenap masyarakat. Perbuatan Perayu melakukan cabul dan sumbang mahram ke atas anaknya boleh disifatkan seperti 'haruan makan anak' yang menjadi perhatian serius masyarakat umum yang mana bertentangan bukan sahaja undang-undang, malahan ditegah oleh agama. [26] Keadaan ini juga diluahkan di dalam kes Rohaizat Bin Abd Ani v. PP [2016] 1 LNS 1775: "The punishment of the offence reflects Parliament's concern over the rise in the number of cases involving with rape. The courts being enforcers of the law must carry this object into effect and not defeat the object by imposing unreasonably lenient sentences. There are only annoying and does not serve as a deterrent. It is counterproductive and gives the wrong signal to the public. As has often been said the public will lose confidence in the courts is evildoers are not dealt with properly. The courts must therefore consistently send a clear signal to those who think of committing crimes. It is only through the sentences passed by the courts that the message will get through to public". Pengakuan Salah Perayu [27] Di dalam keadaan lazimya harapan Mahkamah terhadap kes-kes yang mengaku salah adalah suatu dorongan ke arah pengakuan sedemikian. Akan tetapi isu yang berbangkit di sini ialah sejauh mana harus diberi pertimbangan di dalam keadaan pengakuan salah sedemikian. Memang tidak dipertikaikan bahawa salah satu prinsip dalam penghukuman adalah bahawa seseorang yang disabitkan harus diberi diskaun kerana mengaku bersalah. Iaitu dengan mengurangkan sepertiga dari hukuman yang sepatutnya dijatuhkan adalah satu kebiasaan. Ini bagaimanapun bukanlah satu kaedah yang ketat dan Mahkamah boleh, dalam melaksanakan budibicaranya, menolak dari memberi sebarang diskaun. Ini bergantung kepada keseriusan sesuatu kesalahan atau wujudnya sabitan lampau boleh memadamkan kesan keringanan sesuatu pengakuan bersalah; begitu juga, kepentingan awam, ketiadaan pembelaan yang kuat serta ketiadaan faktor-faktor keringanan. (rujuk kes Bachik Abdul Rahman v. PP [2004] 2 CLJ 572). [28] Selain itu harus diingatkan juga bahawa tiada peraturan bahawa pengakuan salah secara otomatik seseorang tertuduh itu berhak kepada hukuman yang lebih ringan atau diskaun, (rujuk PP v. Tia Ah Leng [2000] 5 CLJ 614). Akan tetapi hakim bicara hendaklah memberi alasan kenapa beliau enggan menuruti amalan pengakuan salah sebagai faktor peringanan hukuman. (lihat juga Tan Lay Chen v. PP [2000] 4 CLJ 492). Di dalam kes hadapan kita sekarang ini, Puan HMS telah mempertimbang semua perkara sebelum memutuskan bahawa pengakuan bersalah tertuduh tidak boleh menjadi satu faktor keringanan. Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan pendirian ini dan, dengan demikian, Mahkamah ini tidak akan mengganggu dan mengurangkan hukuman-hukuman yang telah dijatuhkan oleh Puan HMS yang bijaksana. [29] Pertimbangan kepentingan awam di dalam keadaan kes semasa adalah jauh lebih penting daripada pertimbangan pengakuan bersalah Perayau (Rujuk Loh Hock Seng & Anor v. PP [1979] 1 LNS 48; [1980] 2 MLJ 13; PP v. Oo Leng Swee & Ors [1981] 1 LNS 109; [1981] 1 MLJ 247). Apabila kepentingan menuntut hukuman berat bagi sesuatu keadaan kes itu maka kesan kepada pengakuan salah hendak diketepikan dan pada masa ini ianya tidak lagi boleh dikira sebagai suatu faktor mitigasi berbanding pembelaan yang ada bagi tertuduh. (lihat Sim Gek Yong v. PP [1995] 1 SLR 537; PP v. Govindnan Chinden Nair [1998] 2 CLJ 370)., PP v. Low Kok Wai [1988] 2 CLJ 105; [1988] 2 CLJ (Rep) 268. Adakah Hukuman Penjara Perayu Wajar Digantikan Kepada Hukuman Berjalan Serentak( Concurrent) Untuk Semua Pertuduhan? [30]Seksyen 292(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (Semakan 1999) Akta 593 memberi budibicara kepada mahkamah untuk sama ada memerintahkan sesuatu hukuman penjara itu berjalan serentak atau berturut-turut. Seksyen tersebut memperuntukkan bahawa "(1) When a person who is an escaped convict or is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced to imprisonment, such imprisonment shall commence either immediately or at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, as the Court awarding the sentence may direct". [31] Di dalam kes PP v. Shari Mohd Shariff [2005] 5 CLJ 439, Hakim Low Hop Bing (pada masa itu) di dalam penghakimannya dengan merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan, Bachik Abdul Rahman v. PP [2004] 2 CLJ 572 telah memperincikan keadaan di mana sesuatu prinsip hukuman penjara adalah kes berjalan secara "consecutive " atau berasingan. Ini dapati dilihat di dalam kes Kes AMRAN MOHD JIN v. PP [2007] 2 CLJ 545, YA HMT Jeffery Tan telah menolak rayuan perayu yang telah mengaku salah dan mengekalkan hukuman penjara 18 tahun berjalan berasingan atas kesalahan seksyen 376 KK dan S. 376A KK di mana mangsa adalah anaknya sendiri. YA telah merujuk kes Bachik bin Abdul Rahman v. Public Prosecutor [2004] 2 CLJ 572 dalam mempertimbangkan prinsip hukuman serentak atau berasingan serta akhirya memutuskan:- "(1) The court below had assessed the sentences in accordance with established judicial principles. The plea of guilt, the plea in mitigation, the gravity of the offence, the public interest and the facts of the case were all properly considered. The individual sentences were not inappropriate in the light of the facts and circumstances. Although the court below had not considered the totality principle, the criminal behaviour of the appellant as a whole justified the cumulative effect of the consecutive sentences. (para 9) [2] "According to the facts of the case, the appellant first raped the victim when she was 10. Then the appellant habitually raped the victim whenever he was alone in the house with the victim. Then the appellant blithely continued his abominable act for something like six years.... Undoubtedly, the consecutive sentences would have a crushing effect on the appellant. But public interest must override the personal circumstances of the appellant. Public interest would not permit any reduction of the sentences". [36] Apabila dikaitkan dengan kes di hadapan kita sekarang ini, secara jelas kejadian- kejadian jenayah tersebut dilakukan pada tarikh-tarikh dan tahun yang berbeza iaitu pada Mei 2011, Mac 2012, Oktober 2014, November 2014 dan bulan Februari 2015. Oleh itu, keputusan HMS adalah tepat dalam memerintah agar hukuman berjalan secara berasingan. [37] Perayu semasa membuat rayuan di hadapan Puan HMS, melalui Peguambelanya telah merayu agar suatu hukum ringan dijatuhkan memandangkan Perayu telah berusia 50 tahun dan hanya bekerja sebagai kelindan lori serta masih belum menerima gaji kerana baru mula bekerja 2 minggu. Perayu yang merupakan seorang pemegang kad OKU (OKU pendengaran). Peguambela menyatakan Perayu telah insaf dan tidak mampu untuk menanggung semua hukuman dalam usia 50 tahun tersebut. Perayu juga mempunyai 6 orang anak dan baru sahaja bercerai dengan isterinya pada 17/10/2017. Pengakuan salah Perayu telah menjimatkan masa Mahkamah dan pihak pendakwaan dan memohon supaya Mahkamah mengambil kira pengakuan salah Perayu dan telah memohon untuk hukuman penjara berjalan serentak. KESIMPULAN [38] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa hukuman penjara yang dijatuhkan atas Perayu oleh Puan HMS yang bijaksana masih lagi dalam lingkungan hukuman yang menurut undang-undang dan tidak terlalu melampau jika dibandingkan dengan kesalahan yang dilakukan oeh perayu yang bernafsu haiwan. [39] Oleh itu kesemua rayuan Perayu terhadap hukuman ditolak dan hukuman penjara dan sebatan yang dijatuhkan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen ke atas Perayu dikekalkan. Bertarikh: 26 APRIL 2018 (MAT GHANI ABDULLAH) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Johor Bahru Mohd Al Khusaini Zakaria v PP (2018) 1 LNS 417) MOHD AL KHUSAINI ZAKARIA lwn. PP MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA, ALOR SETAR ABU BAKAR KATAR PK [RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: 42S-06-02/2017] 26 MAC 2018 Kes-kes yang dirujuk: Public Prosecutor v. Vijaya Raj [1980] 1 LNS 188 PP lwn. Mohamad Malek Ridhzuan Che Hassan [2013] 8 CLJ 359 Rabidin bin Satir v. Public Prosecutor [2017] 1 LNS 1166; [2017] MLJU 1162 Razi bin Amnin v. Public Prosecutor [2010] 7 CLJ 771; [2010] 7 MLJ 756 Othman Ahmad v. PP [2008] 10 CLJ 356 Ahmad Faizal Ali Aulad Ali & Ors v. PP [2009] 9 CLJ 745 PP v. Abdul Rahman Mohamad [2005] 1 CLJ 700 Public Prosecutor v. Mohd Ridzwan bin Mohd Borhan [2003] 1 LNS 589; [2004] 5 MLJ 300 Public Prosecutor v. Hassan bin Shamsuddin [1981] 2 MLJ i Din v. PP [1964] 1 LNS 33; [1964] MLJ 30 PP v. Mardai [1949] 1 LNS 65; [1950] MLJ 33 Zainal Ibrahim v. PP [2010] 3 CLJ 1018 Sidek bin Ludan v. PP [1995] 1 LNS 219; [1995] 3 MLJ 175 Abd Rahim Bin Abd Rahaman v. Pendakwa Raya [2010] 8 CLJ 519; [2010] MLJU 681 Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v. Pendakwa Raya and another criminal appeal [2015] 2 CLJ 145; [2015] MLJU 34 Public Prosecutor v. Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 1 LNS 102; [1976] 2 MLJ 256 Bhandulananda Jayatilake v. Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 LNS 139; [1982] 1 MLJ 8 Perundangan yang dirujuk: Kanun Keseksaan, ss. 376 (1), 377A, 377B Kaunsel: Bagi pihak perayu - Rosman Azwan Osman; T/n Ummi Zakaria & Partners Bagi pihak responden - Zabidah Ahmad, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya; Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Kedah DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI ALOR SETAR DALAM NEGERI KEDAH DARUL AMAN, MALAYSIA [RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: 42S-06-02/2017] ANTARA MOHD AL KHUSAINI ZAKARIA ... PERAYU DAN PENDAKWA RAYA ... RESPONDEN (DALAM PERKARA MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI ALOR SETAR DALAM NEGERI KEDAH DARUL AMAN, MALAYSIA KES TANGKAP NO: 62JS-15-12/2015) ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA DAN MOHD AL KHUSAINI ZAKARIA PENGHAKIMAN PENGENALAN [1] Ini merupakan rayuan oleh perayu terhadap keputusan saya yang mengesahkan sabitan dan hukuman yang melibatkan pertuduhan bagi kesalahan di bawah s. 376(1) Kanun