Criminal Law Case Digest, Lecture notes of Criminal Law

Download Criminal Law Case Digest and more Lecture notes Criminal Law in PDF only on Docsity! CRIMINAL LAW 2018 Cases DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 1 CRIMINAL LAW (2018 Cases) BY: DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 CHERIE ANNE R. BUZON Officer-In-Charge ATTY. LEAN JEFF M. MAGSOMBOL Adviser ATTY. NILO T. DIVINA Dean DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 4 CRIMINAL LAW I. REVISED PENAL CODE -BOOK I A. General principles 1. Mala in se vs. mala prohibita 2. Applicability and effectivity of the RPC a. Generality b. Territoriality c. Prospectivity 3. Pro reo principle HILARIO B. ALILING, Petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 230991, SECOND DIVISION, June 11, 2018, Caguioa, J. The inconsistency in the statements of the prosecution witnesses on material points significantly erodes the credibility of their testimonies, juxtaposed against the forthright and consistent testimonies of the defense witnesses. With the probative value of the prosecution witnesses' testimony greatly diminished, the alibi of the accused is given credence. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to overcome the burden of proving the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acquittal, therefore, is in order. FACTS: Private complainant Jerry Tumbagan y Marasigan (private complainant) testified that at around 10:00 pm, when he was about to board his motorcycle, he was shot at the back and when he looked back, he recognized accused Hilario Aliling (accused) as the one firing. Jesus Marasigan y Camson, uncle of private complainant, testified that he saw the latter ride his motorcycle and then suddenly, accused Hilario Aliling arrived and fired twice at the private complainant. For the defense, on the other hand, accused testified that on April 18, 2010, they were campaigning for a certain Apacible. According to the accused, they finished campaigning at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day and waited for the start of the miting de avance. They left the miting de avance at around 12:00 midnight and proceeded to the house of Annie, their coordinator, at Barangay Matingain and arrived there at around 1:00 o'clock in the morning. Thereafter, he took his motorcycle and went home. The accused arrived at his house at around 1:30 o'clock. His testimony was corroborated by Adrian Carl Atienza who testified that on April 18, 2010, from 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 1:00 o'clock of the following day, he was with the accused, together with several others, at Barangay Masalisi, and Michael Perez Bathan who testified that he heard gunshots and saw private complainant run and fall to the ground but did not see the accused when the shooting happened and instead saw an unidentified gunman. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 5 The RTC convicted the accused for frustrated murder. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. the RTC and CA did not give credence to the defense's testimonial evidence based on the alleged inconsistencies of the witnesses' statements especially with regard to his testimony when he stated that he used his motorcycle on the day of the incident but then on cross-examination, he stated that he left his motorcycle at the house of their coordinator. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of frustrated murder. (NO) RULING: In criminal prosecutions, a person who stands charged of a crime enjoys the presumption of innocence, as enshrined in the Bill of Rights. He is designated as the accused precisely because the allegations against him have to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Positive testimony is generally given more weight than the defenses of denial and alibi which are held to be inherently weak defenses because they can be easily fabricated. However, the defenses of denial and alibi should not be so easily dismissed by the Court as untrue. While, indeed, the defense of denial or alibi can be easily fabricated, the same can be said of untruthful accusations, in that they can be as easily concocted. In alibi, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was committed, but that it was likewise physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time thereof. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. In the instant case, the RTC and CA did not give credence to the defense's testimonial evidence based on the alleged inconsistencies of the witnesses' statements. However, the Court found that the accused’s alibi was straightforward, credible, and corroborated by an impartial witness. Furthermore, there was eyewitness testimony to the effect that the accused was not the gunman. Moreover, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are contradictory on a material point. Marasigan claimed that the gunshots were successively fired. However, the private complainant testified that there was a pause between the shots. At first glance, it would seem that the succession of the gunshots is not a material point. However, the manner of execution of the crime is of prime significance especially in the testimony of private complainant, the victim himself, as he testified that the pause between shots supposedly gave him the opportunity to turn his head and see the culprit after he was shot for the first time in the back. However, this testimony is contradicted by Marasigan who testified that the shots were successive. Notably, the testimony of Marasigan as to the continuous succession of shots is corroborated by the testimony of defense witness Bathan, who also testified that the shots were fired one after another.Furthermore, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay which he identified and authenticated before the RTC, private complainant attested that the accused had a companion that night at the basketball court. However, during his cross-examination, he denied his statement. The inconsistency in the statements of the prosecution witnesses on material points significantly erodes the credibility of their testimonies, juxtaposed against the forthright and consistent testimonies of the defense witnesses. With the probative value of the prosecution witnesses' DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 6 testimony greatly diminished, the alibi of the accused is given credence. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to overcome the burden of proving the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acquittal, therefore, is in order. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- MICHAEL DELIMAN and ALLAN DELIMA, Accused-Appellants. G.R. No. 222645, THIRD DIVISION, June 27, 2018, MARTIRES, J. For evident premeditation to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the following elements must be present: (a) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (b) overt act or acts indicating that the accused clung to one's determination; and (c) lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow accused to reflect upon the consequences of one's acts. FACTS: Accused-appellants Michael Delima and Allan Michael, together with their co-accused, were charged with murder after conniving and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with a bladed and pointed weapon, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation, attacked, assaulted and stabbed Ramel Mercedes Congreso, which led to his death instantaneously. The RTC found Michael and Allan guilty for murder and the CA affirmed the decision of the lower court despite inconsistencies on the part of the testimonies of the witnesses. ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. (NO) RULING: The Supreme Court held that the appeal is partly meritorious, but Michael and Allan Delima were found guilty of homicide, and not of murder. Killing is tantamount to murder only when qualifying circumstances are present. Accused-appellants argue that even if they are found responsible for Ramel's death, they could not be found guilty of murder because there was no proof of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the following elements must be present: (a) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (b) overt act or acts indicating that the accused clung to one's determination; and (c) lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow accused to reflect upon the consequences of one's acts. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 9 The trial court found Hesson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery. CA affirmed the trial court's conviction with modification only as to the damages awarded. Hesson argues that he should only be convicted of committing an impossible crime. Allegedly, he cannot be held liable for Murder because it was legally impossible for him to kill Fernando as the latter was already dead when he stabbed him. ISSUE: Whether the crime committed was not murder but an impossible crime. (NO) RULING: Hesson is liable for Murder, not for an impossible crime. The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. The third element, inherent impossibility of accomplishing the crime, was explained more clearly by the Court in the case of Intod v. Court of Appeals: To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category. On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. The victim's fact of death before he was stabbed by Hesson was not sufficiently established by the defense. While Sario testified that he thought Fernando was already dead after he was hacked by Junello because the former was already lying on the ground motionless, this statement cannot sufficiently support the conclusion that, indeed, Fernando was already dead when Hesson stabbed him. Sario's opinion of Femando's death was arrived at by merely looking at the latter's body. No other act was done to ascertain this, such as checking of Fernando's pulse, heartbeat or breathing. More importantly, even assuming that it was Junello who killed Fernando and that the latter was already dead when he was stabbed by Hesson, Hesson is still liable for murder because of the clear presence of conspiracy between Hesson and Junello. As such, Junello's acts are likewise, legally, Hesson's acts. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 10 d. Stages of execution CARLOS JAY ADLAWAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. G.R. No. 197645, THIRD DIVISION, April 18, 2018, MARTIRES, J. In criminal cases for frustrated homicide, the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim. In this case, intent to kill was sufficiently shown not only by the testimonies of Georgia, the victim herself, and Fred, the eyewitness, but also by the established fact that Georgia sustained multiple deep hack wounds on her head, neck, and abdomen, among other parts of her body. FACTS: Carlos Jay Adlawan, accused and petitioner herein, was charged in two separate informations with Frustrated Homicide and Attempted Robbery. The victim, Adlawan’s stepmother, Georgia, arrived home on the day of the incident and heard the petitioner talking with the Adlawans' houseboy, in the backyard. The petitioner asked Cornelio in a loud voice "unsa na?" ("what now?"). Georgia proceeded to the backyard to ask Cornelio what the conversation was about. On her way to the yard, she met the petitioner who proceeded to his room on the second floor.While Georgia was talking to Cornelio, the petitioner came back and angrily asked Georgia "asa ang kwarta?" ("where is the money?"). She replied saying, "unsa, wa mo kahibalo nga na ospital inyong amahan?" ("why, don't you know that your father is in the hospital?").Apparently, earlier that day, Georgia instructed her secretary withdraw P100,000.00 from the bank to pay for the hospital bills of Alfonso.Thereafter, the petitioner furiously told her "mura kag kinsa!" ("as if you are somebody!"), and started hacking her using a katana, hitting her on the left portion of the neck and on the stomach. Georgia parried the blows using her hands.Georgia ran towards the garage in front of the house, but petitioner pursued her and continued his attack, hitting her shoulders and her back until she fell down. Sensing that petitioner would finish her off, she summoned all her strength, kicked his leg, and then grabbed and squeezed his sex organ. The medical certificaterevealed that Georgia sustained multiple deep hack wounds on her head, neck, and abdomen, among other parts of her body. The petitioner, however, argues that the prosecution witnesses failed to establish intent to kill, and the injuries were not so serious as to cause her death. The RTC acquitted him of Attempted Robbery, but found him guilty of Frustrated Homicide. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for Frustrated Homicide (YES) RULING: In criminal cases for frustrated homicide, the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim. In this case, intent to kill was sufficiently shown not only by the testimonies of Georgia, DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 11 the victim herself, and Fred, the eyewitness, but also by the established fact that Georgia sustained multiple deep hack wounds on her head, neck, and abdomen, among other parts of her body. The gravity of these wounds was clearly shown by the photographs presented by the prosecution, and the medical certificate. Dr. Kangleon even testified that Georgia could have died if no medical attention was given to her. That petitioner intended to kill Georgia, and that the injuries she sustained were fatal and would have caused her death if not for the timely medical intervention, were therefore established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. e. Continuing crimes f. Complex crimes and composite crimes 2. Circumstances affecting criminal liability a. Justifying circumstances PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, -versus- PFC ENRIQUE REYES, Appellant. G.R. No. 224498, FIRST DIVISION, January 11, 2018, TIJAM, J. Granting Enrique’s allegations were true, neither the "looming" threat perceived nor the remarks overheard satisfies the requirement of an actual, menacing, sudden and unexpected danger to accused- appellant's life. To constitute imminent unlawful aggression, the attack must be at the point of happening and must not be imaginary or consist in a mere threatening attitude. There is treachery when the offender, in committing any of the crimes against persons, employs means or methods which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. FACTS: At around 7 am of August 13, 1990, Enrique Reyes (Enrique) fired his armalite rifle upwards. Danilo Estrella (Danilo) was then walking towards his house after tending to his fighting cock, and was three steps away from his residence when Enrique fired at him from behind using an armalite rifle, which caused him to fall on the ground. Enrique approach Danilo and took the .38 caliber tucked in Danilo’s waist and fired the same upwards thrice. Afterwards, he placed the gun on Danilo’s right hand. When the police arrived, Enrique surrendered himself with the firearms he used. Danilo was later on declared dead due to multiple gunshot wounds. Enrique invoked self-defense. On the day of the incident, he heard Danilo and his comrades planning on killing someone. Fearing for his family’s safety, Enrique prepared his armalite and called for assistance from the police. After sometime, Celia, a neighbor of the parties, was on her way to Enrique's house and saw a man holding a gun approaching Enrique from behind. When Celia shouted "Ricky," Enrique turned towards Celia and saw Danilo holding a gun in the act of shooting him. Enrique drew and fired his Armalite rifle, hitting Danilo who fell on the ground. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 14 Panerio's assertion that Elesio, then drunk, boxed him and attempted to stab him is unsubstantiated by any convincing proof. Moreover, Panerio's account on how many times he stabbed the victim is miserably inconsistent with the post-mortem findings on the deceased.Of the 11 stab and puncture wounds, at least seven are deemed fatal. The large number of wounds sustained by the victim negates any claim of self-defense. The crime committed is homicide; treachery was not established Although the guilt of Panerio and Orteza for the death of Elesio is unquestioned, the Court is of the view that the Panerio may only be convicted of homicide, not murder. The prosecution failed to prove that the crime was committed with treachery or with any other qualifying circumstance. Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in its execution, tending directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.For treachery to be appreciated, the concurrence of two conditions must be established: first, the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and second, the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. The testimony of Olivar clears the fact that he only witnessed the incident when Elesio was already being stabbed by Panerio and Orteza. He did not witness how the incident started and he had no idea what moved the two accused to stab Elesio to death. All that could be gleaned from Olivar's account was that Panerio and Orteza were both under the influence of alcohol; and that they stabbed Elesio, presumably when they met him on the road. SDH TEC In this regard, it has been held that even where all indicia tend to support the conclusion that the attack was sudden and unexpected, yet no precise data on this point exists, treachery cannot be taken into account. Thus, when the witness did not see how the attack was carried out and cannot testify on how it began, the trial court cannot presume from the circumstances of the case that there was treachery. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee -versus- ARSENIO ENDAYA, JR. y PEREZ, accused-appellant. GR No. 225745, THIRD DIVISION, February 28, 2018, MARTIRES, J. It is elementary that unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial consideration in self-defense. Absent this element, there could be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. In this case, the fact that the victims suffered multiple stab wounds which caused their death negates Arsenio’s claim of self-defense. If at all, these stab wounds demonstrate a criminal mind to end the life of the victims. FACTS: Arsenio Endaya, Jr. was charged with parricide committed against his wife Jocelyn Quita-Endaya and with murder committed against his mother-in-law, Marietta Bukal-Quita. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 15 Witness Jennifer de Torres narrated that while watching television, he heard Jocelyn, his mother, shouting for help from their house. He immediately rushed to Jocelyn’s aid and he saw Arsenio stabbing her twice with a bladed weapon. After arming himself with a bolo, Jennifer ran out of their house and again saw Arsenio stab Mariette a once. When Arsenio saw Jennifer, the former fled. The two victims were pronounced dead on arrival. Arsenio admitted the killing but he invoked self-defense. He alleged that he had an argument with Jocelyn where Jennifer suddenly arrived and hacked him several times on different parts of his body. To defend himself, Arsenio got hold of a knife and tried to stab Jennifer more than once. But because it was dark that time, he mistakenly stabbed Jocelyn instead. He tried to leave the premises, but Marietta blocked his way. Again, he mistakenly stabbed Marietta instead of Jennifer because according to him, his eyes were oozing with blood. ISSUE: Whether or not the justifying circumstance of self-defense may be appreciated in favor of Arsenio. (NO) RULING: It is elementary that unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial consideration in self-defense. Absent this element, there could be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. In this case, the fact that the victims suffered multiple stab wounds which caused their death negates Arsenio’s claim of self- defense. If at all, these stab wounds demonstrate a criminal mind to end the life of the victims. Contrary to his claims, his minor injuries suggest that they may have been inflicted by Jocelyn and Marietta who resisted the attacks of their ruthless assailant. Thus, his claim that he was hacked by Jennifer several times is unmeritorious considering the absence of wounds on several parts of his body matching his allegation. Assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of De Torres and/or any of the two victims, he failed to sufficiently explain how the victims ended up with four stab wounds each, nor to establish that the means employed by him to repel the alleged unlawful aggression was reasonable and necessary. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- RESURRECION JUANILLO MANZANO, JR. AND REZOR JUANILLO MANZANO, ACCUSED, REZOR JUANILLO MANZANO, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 217974, THIRD DIVISION, March 05, 2018, MARTIRES, J. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 16 It is vigorously underscored that the pith and soul of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is the presence of unlawful aggression; thus, the absence of this requisite readily converts the claim of self- defense into nothingness even with the existence of the other elements because the two other essential elements of self-defense would have no factual and legal bases without any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel. FACTS: The accused-appellant and his elder brother Resurrecion Manzano were charged with murder before the RTC of San Jose, Antique. The murder was coupled with qualifying circumstance of treachery and abuse of superior strength. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty during the arraignment and raised the justifying circumstance of self-defense. There were two versions of the story. The version of the defense provided that about 9:30 p.m. on 19 March 2010, while the accused-appellant was home sitting by the window, he saw Lucio Silava (Lucio) throwing stones at his house. Accused-appellant was sure that this person is indeed Lucio. The accused-appellant immediately went out to inquire from Lucio why he was throwing stones at his house but Lucio threw a stone at him that hit his right knee and caused him to fall down. Lucio rushed towards the accused-appellant to stab him with a knife but was unsuccessful as they grappled for its possession. It was at that instance that the accused-appellant called out to Resurrecion, who was home that time, to run away so that he would not be involved. Because Lucio was very drunk, the accused-appellant was able to take hold of the knife, but blacked out and started stabbing Lucio. Thereafter, the accused-appellant ran away and proceeded to the house of Reno Manzano (Reno), an elder brother, at Barangay San Angel, San Jose, Antique, where he also met Resurrecion. The following day, the accused-appellant surrendered to the police authorities. Here is the version of the prosecution: at about 9:00 p.m. on 19 March 2010, the spouses Lucio and Victoria were inside their store fronting the accused-appellant's house. Lucio was having his dinner at the kitchen inside the store while Victoria was watching the store when the accused-appellant and Resurrecion called out from the gate saying that they would buy cigarettes. Because the gate leading to the store was already closed, Lucio told the accused-appellant and Resurrecion to come in. Resurrecion told Victoria that he will buy cigarettes. The accused-appellant entered the store and proceeded to where Lucio was having dinner. Resurrecion then changed his mind about buying cigarettes and proceeded towards the kitchen. Thereafter, Victoria heard Lucio ask, "What wrong have I committed?" Victoria rushed to the kitchen and there saw Lucio bloodied and leaning on the door, while the accused-appellant and Resurrecion were stabbing him.Victoria went out of the store shouting for help. When she went back inside, she saw Lucio run outside the store but still within the fenced premises, and the accused-appellant and Resurrecion were going after him. From where she stood, Victoria saw Resurrecion hold Lucio's hands while the accused-appellant, who was positioned behind Lucio, held Lucio's body with one arm while with his other hand stabbed Lucio's back. When Resurrecion released his grip on Lucio, the latter fell face down but the accused-appellant and Resurrecion continued to stab him. The accused-appellant and Resurrecion thereafter ran towards the direction of the farm. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 19 grandmother and one other person who heard the commotion, went back to the house where they found the victim lying on the ground. When they checked his pulse, they determined he was dead. The incident was reported to the police. Ronillo admitted that he stabbed his father, but maintained that he merely acted in self-defense. According to him, they were having a drinking spree, however, drunken, he went home ahead and slept. He then woke up to the beatings inflicted by his drunken father. Lopez Sr., took a hard object and struck it on his son’s head. The accused, overcome with passion and his judgment obfuscated, struck back with a knife, stabbing his father. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid act of self-defense on the part of the accused (NO) RULING: Self-defense is appreciated as a justifying circumstance only if the following requisites were present: (1) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person making the defense; (2) there was reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; (3) there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming the defense. At the heart of the claim for self-defense is the element of unlawful aggression, which is the condition sine qua non for upholding the same as a justifying circumstance. The test of the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful. Ronillo’s plea of self-defense was belied by physical evidence. No injury of any kind or gravity was found on the person of Ronillo when he was brought to the hospital for medical examination. Even granting arguendo that Ronillo suffered injuries, such injuries were surely not serious or severe as it was not even detected. The superficiality of the injuries was not an indication that appellant’s life and limb were in actual peril. The Court is conviced that Lopez Sr., was by no means the unlawful aggressor. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, -versus- LEONARDO B. SIEGA, Accused- appellant. G.R. No. 213273, SECOND DIVISION, June 27, 2018, CAGUIOA, J. An accused, who pleads self-defense, has the burden of proving, with clear and convincing evidence, that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 20 victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. Of these three, unlawful aggression is most important and indispensable. Unlawful aggression refers to "an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person." Without unlawful aggression, the justifying circumstance of self-defense has no leg to stand on and cannot be appreciated. However, as duly pointed out by the RTC and CA, Siega's account of events is belied by the straightforward and credible testimony of Alingasa that Bitoy did not carry any weapon at that time. This was corroborated by the fact that no weapon was recovered from the victim. Moreover, even if the Court were to believe Siega's version of the events, still, no unlawful aggression can be deduced, because there was clearly no imminent danger on the person of Siega as would justify his killing of Bitoy. Unlawful aggression is predicated on an actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger — not merely a threatening or intimidating action. Bitoy's supposed act of holding a weapon from his waist does not pose any actual, sudden or imminent danger to the life and limb of Siega. FACTS: On October 16, 2005, at around 4:00 p.m., Siega was about to enter his house when he heard a sound coming from the feeder road facing his residence. When Siega turned to the source of the noise, he saw Pacenciano Bitoy (Bitoy), rushing towards him and shouting at him to get out of his house so that they could end their grudge against each other. As Bitoy was nearing him, Siega saw the former attempting to draw the bolo that was wrapped on his waist. Scared by Bitoy's actions, Siega immediately grabbed unto the bolo that was then beside him and hacked Bitoy. Siega inflicted several injuries on Bitoy, before the latter retreated and ran away. Siega then went inside his house, changed his clothes and surrendered to the authorities. On the other hand, the prosecution alleged that at about 4:30 p.m. of October 16, 2005, Bitoy and his friend Alingasa were walking along the feeder road of Sitio Lubong Sapa on their way home to Sitio Jagna. As they were nearing the Purok Center of Sitio Lubong Sapa, just near the house of Siega, the latter armed with a bolo suddenly approached them and asked "kinsay mopalag" or who would dare challenge me. Bitoy replied that no one would dare challenge him. Seemingly satisfied with Bitoy's response, Siega walked towards the direction of the Purok Center; while Bitoy and Alingasa continued to walk towards Sitio Jagna. Bitoy then intimated to Alingasa that it was a good thing that he had nothing on Siega then. Suddenly, Siega turned back, asked Bitoy whether he was the tough guy of Jagna, and stabbed the latter with a long bolo on the left part of his chest. Surprised by the incident, Bitoy tried to flee but Siega ran after him and continued his assault. Alingasa saw Siega continue to hack Bitoy even if the latter was already lying on the ground. Alingasa ran away and proceeded to the direction of Sitio Jagna. He hurried to the wife of Bitoy and told her the fate that befell her husband. Due to the severity of his wounds, Bitoy died that afternoon. RTC ruled against the accused. CA affirmed. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 21 Whether the CA erred in upholding Siega’s conviction for the crime of Murder. (NO) RULING: An accused, who pleads self-defense, has the burden of proving, with clear and convincing evidence, that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. Of these three, unlawful aggression is most important and indispensable. Unlawful aggression refers to "an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person." Without unlawful aggression, the justifying circumstance of self-defense has no leg to stand on and cannot be appreciated. In this case, records disclose that Siega failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, Bitoy. Thus, his claim of self-defense must necessarily fail. In his version of the incident, Siega claimed that Bitoy came rushing to his house armed with a bolo. When Bitoy attempted to draw his weapon, Siega picked up a sharp pointed bolo and stabbed Bitoy several times. However, as duly pointed out by the RTC and CA, Siega's account of events is belied by the straightforward and credible testimony of Alingasa that Bitoy did not carry any weapon at that time. This was corroborated by the fact that no weapon was recovered from the victim. Moreover, even if the Court were to believe Siega's version of the events, still, no unlawful aggression can be deduced, because there was clearly no imminent danger on the person of Siega as would justify his killing of Bitoy. Unlawful aggression is predicated on an actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger — not merely a threatening or intimidating action. Bitoy's supposed act of holding a weapon from his waist does not pose any actual, sudden or imminent danger to the life and limb of Siega. In fact, in People v. Escarlos, the Court ruled that the mere drawing of a knife by the victim does not constitute unlawful aggression as the peril sought to be avoided by the accused is uncertain, premature and speculative: On the matter of treachery as a qualifying circumstance of Murder, the courts a quo correctly ruled that treachery attended the killing of Bitoy. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack against an unarmed and unsuspecting victim, who has no chance of defending himself. Here, a credible eyewitness testified that Siega, armed with a bolo, stabbed Bitoy on the chest several times, while the latter was merely conversing with Alingasa. That the attack was frontal does not rule out the existence of treachery; because it was so sudden and unexpected that Bitoy, unarmed and had no chance to defend himself, was felled down by Siega's repeated hacking blows. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 24 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- RODOLFO OLARBE y BALIHANGO, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 227421, THIRD DIVISION, July 23, 2018, BERSAMIN,J. For a person to exonerate himself on the ground of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code, he must establish the following facts: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. Olarbe also invoked the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger. In both of these circumstances, the indispensable requisite for either is unlawful aggression mounted by the victim against the accused or the stranger. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court and appellate court, all elements of self-defense is present in this case. There is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim as proven by the following facts. The Supreme Court finds that Arca committed continuous and persistent unlawful aggression against Olarbe and his common-law spouse that lasted from the moment he forcibly barged into the house and brandished his gun until he assaulted Olarbe’s common-law spouse with a bolo. Reasonable necessity of the means employed is still present even if Arca sustained several wounds. To rule out reasonable necessity on the basis of the number of wounds would be unfair to Olarbe since the rule of reasonable necessity is not ironclad in its application but is dependent upon the established circumstances of each particular case. The absence of any showing that Olarbe had provoked Arca, or that he had been induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive had been equally proven by the defense. FACTS: On the night of the incident, Rodolfo Olarbe (Olarbe) and his wife were sleeping in their house in Luisiana, Laguna. Suddenly, they were awakened by the sound of a gunshot and shouting from Romeo Arca (Arca) who appeared to be drunk. He was holding a rifle when he entered the house and aimed the gun at them. Olarbe immediately grabbed the gun from him and they grappled for its possession. Olarbe managed to wrest the gun away from Arca. In the midst of the confusion, Olarbe was able to shoot Arca causing the latter to lean sidewards. Nevertheless, Arca managed to get his bolo from his waist and continued to attack them. Olarbe grabbed the bolo and successfully acquired the bolo by struggling for its possession. He instantly hacked Arca causing his death. After the incident, accused voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities. Olarbe was charged with the crime of murder. He raised the justifying circumstances of self- defense and defense of stranger but these pleas were denied by the RTC of Laguna which convicted him guilty of the crime charged. It held that the initial unlawful aggression by Arca had ceased when Olarbe shot him in the head and caused him to lean sideward. It disbelieved Olarbe’s insistence that Arca had still been able to grab his bolo and assault Olarbe’s common-law spouse. The Court of DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 25 Appeals affirmed the conviction of Olarbe finding that the factual findings of the RTC were consistent with the evidence on record and accorded with human experience. ISSUE: Whether or not it was erroneous to reject Olarbe’s pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger (YES) RULING: For a person to exonerate himself on the ground of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code, he must establish the following facts: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. Olarbe also invoked the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger. In both of these circumstances, the indispensable requisite for either is unlawful aggression mounted by the victim against the accused or the stranger. Without such unlawful aggression, the accused is not entitled to the justifying circumstance. Contrary to the findings of the trial court and the appellate court, the rejection of Olarbe’s plea was unwarranted. The RTC and the CA’s decision were all based on speculation. First, there was no credible showing that the shot to the head had rendered Arca too weak to draw the bolo and to carry on with his aggression in the manner described by Olarba. Second, the State did not demonstrate that the shot from the gun fired at close range sufficed to disable Arca from further attacking with his bolo. Third, nothing in the record indicated Arca’s physical condition at the time of the incident. And finally, to rule out any further aggression by Arca with his bolo after the shot in the head considering the fact that Arca would have enough adrenaline to continue with the assault is also speculative. The Supreme Court finds that Arca committed continuous and persistent unlawful aggression against Olarbe and his common-law spouse that lasted from the moment he forcibly barged into the house and brandished his gun until he assaulted Olarbe’s common-law spouse with a bolo. Since the assault was not merely a threatening fact, Olarbe was justified in believing that he and his common-law spouse’s lives to be in extreme danger from Arca. Going to the other requisites of self-defense, Olarbe was able to prove both. Reasonable necessity of the means employed is still present even if Arca sustained several wounds however, these wounds were only lacerations whose nature and extent were not explained. The lack of explanations has denied the Court the means to fairly adjudge the reasonableness of the means adopted by Olarbe to repel the unlawful aggression. To rule out reasonable necessity on the basis of the number of wounds would be unfair to Olarbe since the rule of reasonable necessity is not ironclad in its application but is dependent upon the established circumstances of each particular case.The absence of any showing that Olarbe had provoked Arca, or that he had been induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive had been equally proven by the defense. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 26 b. Exempting circumstances PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- ROLAND MIRAÑA Y ALCARAZ, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 219113, THIRD DIVISION, April 25, 2018, MARTIRES, J. For the defense of insanity to prosper, it must be proven that the accused was completely deprived of intelligence, which must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous to the commission of the offense with which he is charged. Taken against the standard of clear and convincing evidence, the proof proffered by the defense fails to pass muster. Imelda and Mercy testified that accused-appellant believed that the victim was a witch and that in the days prior to the incident, accused-appellant was behaving oddly, such as smiling to himself and calling a chicken late at night. Their testimonies, however, fail to shed light on accused-appellant's mental condition immediately before, during, and immediately after he committed the crime. Moreover, those mentioned unusual behaviors are not proof of a complete absence of intelligence, because not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity. In addition, Dr. Escuadera testified she conducted a psychiatric interview with accused-appellant on 21 July 2009, and that her findings, showed she deemed accused-appellant fit for trial; and that accused appellant had a history of mental illness, which she identified as schizophrenia.More importantly, Dr. Escuadera's testimony on accused-appellant's previous mental illness does not specifically pertain to the time of the commission of the crime. Even her medical report on accused-appellant's mental status, for the purpose of determining his fitness to stand trial, is bereft of any indication that he was completely deprived of intelligence or discernment at the time he mortally hacked the victim. Accused-appellant's actuations immediately after the incident also negate a complete absence of intelligence or discernment when he killed the victim. As testified to by PO3 Corono, accused-appellant approached the police officers when they arrived at the crime scene, told them that he was responsible for hacking the victim, pointed to the bolo he used, and indicated that he had already washed the weapon.The foresight to wash the bolo after killing the victim and, thereafter, the consciousness to decide to confess to the authorities what he had done upon their arrival, suggest that accused-appellant was capable of discernment during the time of the incident. FACTS: Dominga Agnas Vda. de Globo (the victim) was a 73-year-old widow lived on her own but prior to her death, she frequently slept at the house of Alberto Miraña (Alberto) because accused-appellant had been harassing her, such as by throwing stones at her. The victim believed that accused-appellant was threatening her because she once reprimanded him after she caught him stealing fruits from her property. Alberto once found the victim in his house trembling while praying. She told Alberto that she was scared because accused-appellant had chased her with a bolo. Alberto and her brother both advised her not to go home yet and report the incident to the barangay but she refused. She then went home to await the call of her son, who was working abroad. Between 6 o'clock to 6:30 in the morning of 17 June 2008, Armando Orce (Armando), the victim's neighbor, was at the coconut plantation near his house when he heard a woman cry out followed by DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 29 crime charged. Note that the proof of an accused's insanity must "relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged." Here, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. As correctly observed by the CA, Dr. Domingo's report could not positively and certainly conclude that appellant's state of imbecility afflicted him at the time he raped AAA. Furthermore, appellant's actions at the moment of the rape reveal that appellant was aware of what he was committing, and that what he was doing was wrong. Appellant, as convincingly testified to by AAA dragged AAA into a secluded spot, thereby isolating himself and AAA to facilitate the commission of his lust. When AAA tried to call for help, appellant covered her mouth, ensuring that they would not be disturbed. Such precautions make it difficult to believe that appellant was in such a state that he could not discern what was right from wrong, or that he was completely deprived of intelligence or will. FACTS AAA testified that 'around 4 p.m.' of 30 June 2010 she was strolling in Intramuros when somebody dragged her into a break or opening in a wall. She recognized her assailant as the appellant, whom she calls Roy and who lived a block away from her family's house. After dragging her into the opening, appellant allegedly removed her clothes. AAA shouted but appellant covered her mouth and removed his own shorts and briefs. Then he pulled her hair and made her sit on his lap, facing him. With her legs spread apart, appellant tried to insert his penis into her vagina. Appellant also held her by the waist and kissed her lips. There was no full penetration; she testified that he only 'dipped' his penis into her organ. Appellant then sensed that someone saw them and he stood up and put on his clothes. A security guard then arrived and handcuffed the appellant. AAA's mother, BBB, presented a Certificate of Live Birth showing that her daughter was born on 13 May 2001. The defense, on the other hand, prayed for the RTC to refer appellant for psychiatric examination to determine his mental status and level of comprehension which the RTC granted. Subsequently, Dr. Grace Domingo from the National Center for Mental Health testified on the appellant's mental status. She stated that appellant had undergone a battery of tests and examinations, and concluded that the results showed appellant to be suffering from imbecility, or moderate mental retardation. She clarified that while this was irreversible, appellant can be taught. On cross, she testified that the finding of imbecility only covered the mental status of the appellant at the time he underwent mental evaluation, and not necessarily at the time of the offense, meaning that, at the time of the rape, appellant probably knew what he was doing and the consequences thereof. The RTC convicted accused guilty of the crime of Statutory Rape since AAA was only nine years old at the time of the rape incident. The RTC found unavailing appellant’s defense of imbecility as there was no clear and competent proof that he had no control over his mental faculties immediately prior to or during the perpetration of the crime. CA affirmed the conviction. ISSUE Whether or not accused should be exempted from criminal liability due to insanity as he was suffering from moderate mental retardation as bolstered by the medical report. (NO) DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 30 RULING The prosecution satisfactorily established the elements of the crime of statutory rape, namely: "(1) the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (2) the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, regardless of whether there was force, threat, or intimidation or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse." As the law presumes absence of free consent when the victim is below the age of 12, it is not necessary to prove force, intimidation or consent as they are not elements of statutory rape. It was established by the evidence on record, specifically AAA's Birth Certificate, that AAA was only nine years old at the time she was raped by her assailant. We, thus, rule that appellant's claim of absence of evidence of force and intimidation does not militate against the finding of rape. The Court, further, cannot appreciate the exempting circumstance of insanity in favor of appellant. Paragraph 1, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code provides that an imbecile or insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted during a lucid interval. "It requires a complete deprivation of rationality in committing the act, i.e., that the accused be deprived of reason, that there be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete absence of the power to discern."The law presumes that every person is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden to prove that he was completely deprived of reason when he committed the crime charged. Note that the proof of an accused's insanity must "relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged." Here, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. As correctly observed by the CA, Dr. Domingo's report could not positively and certainly conclude that appellant's state of imbecility afflicted him at the time he raped AAA. Moreover, we agree with the CA's observation, affirming the findings of the trial court, that the actions of appellant negated complete destruction of intelligence at the time the rape was committed. Furthermore, appellant's actions at the moment of the rape reveal that appellant was aware of what he was committing, and that what he was doing was wrong. Appellant, as convincingly testified to by AAA dragged AAA into a secluded spot, thereby isolating himself and AAA to facilitate the commission of his lust. When AAA tried to call for help, appellant covered her mouth, ensuring that they would not be disturbed. Such precautions make it difficult to believe that appellant was in such a state that he could not discern what was right from wrong, or that he was completely deprived of intelligence or will. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JESSIE HALOC Y CODON, Accused- Appellant. G.R. No. 227312, FIRST DIVISION, September 5, 2018, BERSAMIN, J. Insanity is one of the recognized exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. In his attempt to escape criminal responsibility, the accused-appellant submits that he was entitled to the benefit of the exempting circumstance of insanity. He alleges that he was insane at the time of his lethal assaults, and, therefore, he should not be criminally responsible for the death and injuries he had inflicted. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 31 Strictly speaking, a person acting under any of the exempting circumstances commits a crime but cannot be held criminally liable therefor. The exemption from punishment stems from the complete absence of intelligence or free will in performing the act. The defense of insanity is thus in the nature of a confession or avoidance. The accused who asserts it is, in effect, admitting to the commission of the crime. Hence, the burden of proof shifts to him, and his side must then prove his insanity with clear and convincing evidence. The defense of insanity rests on the test of cognition on the part of the accused. Insanity, to be exempting, requires the complete deprivation of intelligence, not only of the will, in committing the criminal act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused must be so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent. He must be deprived of reason, and must be shown to have acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will. Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct inconsistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his improvident bargains. Based on the foregoing, the accused-appellant did not establish the exempting circumstance of insanity. His mental condition at the time of the commission of the felonies he was charged with and found guilty of was not shown to be so severe that it had completely deprived him of reason or intelligence when he committed the felonies charged. Based on the records, he had been administered medication to cure his mental illness, but there was no showing that he suffered from complete deprivation of intelligence. On the contrary, the medical professionals presented during the trial conceded that he had been treated only to control his mental condition. There was also no showing that the accused-appellant's actions manifested his insanity immediately after the hacking incidents. His own sister, Araceli Haloc-Ayo, declared that he had recognized her and had surrendered the bolo to her after his deadly assault. Clearly, he had not been totally deprived of the capacity of cognition. FACTS: Jessie Haloc y Codon, then fifty-one (51) years old, was apprehended by barangay officials after he hacked Allan de la Cruz, nine (9) years and his brother Arnel, four (4) years old, inside the de la Cruz's yard at Barangay Union, Gubat, Sorsogon on June 22, 2008 at around 12 noon. Arnel died as a result of the hacking blow to his neck, while Allan sustained injuries on his upper arm. According to the Joint Inquest Memorandum, the accused, who was armed with a 24-inch bolo, went to the dela Cruzes' and attempted to strike the victims' father, Ambrosio who was able to escape. Unfortunately, Ambrosio's five (5) sons were following him. Jessie took his ire on Ambrosio's children, hacking Allan on the arm and taking Arnel and cutting his neck, severing the jugular veins and nearly decapitating his head resulting to Arnel's immediate death. The accused-appellant, assisted by the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) did not submit any counter- affidavit. On June 22, 2008, an Information was filed charging accused-appellant of Attempted Murder for attacking, assaulting and hacking one ALLAN DE LA CRUZ, a 9 year old minor, hitting the victim on his right arm, thus accused commences the commission of Murder directly by overt acts DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 34 Based on the foregoing, the accused-appellant did not establish the exempting circumstance of insanity. His mental condition at the time of the commission of the felonies he was charged with and found guilty of was not shown to be so severe that it had completely deprived him of reason or intelligence when he committed the felonies charged. Based on the records, he had been administered medication to cure his mental illness, but there was no showing that he suffered from complete deprivation of intelligence. On the contrary, the medical professionals presented during the trial conceded that he had been treated only to control his mental condition. There was also no showing that the accused-appellant's actions manifested his insanity immediately after the hacking incidents. His own sister, Araceli Haloc-Ayo, declared that he had recognized her and had surrendered the bolo to her after his deadly assault. Clearly, he had not been totally deprived of the capacity of cognition. The accused-appellant was subjected to medical tests after the hacking incidents. According to Dr. Imelda Escuadra, the psychiatrist of the Don Susano Memorial Mental Hospital in Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur, the medications previously prescribed to him were medicines administered to a patient suffering psychosis. She did not categorically state, however, that he had been psychotic. Nonetheless, even if we were to deduce from her testimony that he had been suffering some form of psychosis, there was still no testimony to the effect that such psychosis had totally deprived him of intelligence or reason. In view of all the foregoing, the accused-appellant's actions and actuations prior to, simultaneously with and in the aftermath of the lethal assaults did not support his defense of insanity. This, coupled with the presumption of law in favor of sanity, now warrants the affirmance of his convictions, for he had not been legally insane when he committed the felonies. Neither should his mental condition be considered as a mitigating circumstance. As we have noted, the Defense presented no evidence to show that his condition had diminished the exercise of his will power. SC affirms the decision of CA finding accused Jessie Haloc y Codon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Attempted Murder and Murder without accepting insanity as an exempting nor mitigating circumstance. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- CARPIO MARZAN y LUTAN, Accused- Appellant. G.R. No. 207397, FIRST DIVISION, September 24, 2018, Del Castillo, J. It is settled that the moral and legal presumption is always in favor of soundness of mind; that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person. Accused-appellant's abnormal behavior immediately before the stabbing incident and at the time of the incident, while suggestive of an aberrant behavior, cannot be equated with a total deprivation of will or an absence of the power to discern. On the contrary, accused was even sane enough to help his mother stand up after falling on the ground and seated her in front of a house and surrender himself and his bolo to the responding policemen. Two conditions must necessarily occur before treachery or alevosia may be properly appreciated, namely: (l) the employment of means, methods, or manner of execution that would insure the offender's safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, who has, thus, no opportunity for self- DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 35 defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods, or manner of execution. Here, as correctly found by the RTC and the CA, both requisites were present. The sudden attack on the victim who was then at home, bedridden, recuperating from sickness, completely unaware of any danger and unable to defend himself constituted treachery because the accused-appellant was ensured that the victim would not be in any position to ward off or evade his blows, or strike back at him. The consideration of any mitigating circumstance in accused-appellant's favor would be superfluous because, although the imposable penalty under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death, the prohibition to impose the death penalty pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 rendered reclusion perpetua as the only penalty for murder, which penalty, being indivisible, could not be graduated in consideration of any modifying circumstances FACTS: The prosecution presented Bernardo, Erlinda Cabiltes (Erlinda), Lolita Rombaoa (Lolita), and Dr. Valentin Lumibao (Dr. Lumibao) who testified as to the guilt of the accused-appellant. It was alleged that Erlinda saw accused-appellant enter the house of her bedridden father, Apolonio, while uttering “agda kalaban ko” (I have an enemy). Not long after, Erlinda heard her father screaming “apay Aping!” (Why Aping?) and “uston Aping!” (enough, Aping!). Thereafter, Erlinda saw accused-appellant emerge from her father’s house with a blood-stained shirt holding a bladed weapon dripping with blood. Lolita also saw accused-appellant come out of Apolonio’s house holding the same blood-drenched weapon. Bernardo tried to placate accused-appellant but, unfortunately, was struck in the stomach by the latter. Dr. Lumibao declared accused-appellant’s cause of death as hypovolemic shock resulting from the stab wounds. The defense claimed that accused-appellant was insane at the time of the incident. To prove it, the defense presented his wife Isabel Marzan (Isabel) who testified that her husband had behavioral problems and suffering from a mental condition. She said that her husband would often appear to be nervous and tulala. As regards the stabbing incident, Isabel recounted that, on that fateful day, she saw her husband going back and forth mumbling something. She, together with her mother-in-law and brother-in-law Eduardo Marzan, tried to calm accused-appellant but the latter suddenly ran towards Apolonio's house while holding a bolo and uttering the words, "kesa ako ang maunahan nila, unahan ko na sila". According to Isabel, accused-appellant, after stabbing his brothers Apolonio and Bernardo, just sat down and remained tulala until the police arrived and handcuffed him. The RTC found accused-appellant, whose conviction the CA affirmed albeit with modification as regards the fact that the RTC failed to consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding the accused-appellant’s plea of insanity; (NO) 2. Whether or not the CA erred in taking into account the qualifying circumstance of treachery; (NO) and 3. Whether or not the CA erred in failing to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. (NO) RULING: 1. It is settled that the moral and legal presumption is always in favor of soundness of mind; that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person. Otherwise stated, the DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 36 law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously. Therefore, whoever invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its existence. Even assuming that the testimony of the wife is true, accused-appellant's abnormal behavior immediately before the stabbing incident and at the time of the incident, while suggestive of an aberrant behavior, cannot be equated with a total deprivation of will or an absence of the power to discern. On the contrary, accused was even sane enough to help his mother stand up after falling on the ground and seated her in front of a house and surrender himself and his bolo to the responding policemen. 2. Two conditions must necessarily occur before treachery or alevosia may be properly appreciated, namely: (l) the employment of means, methods, or manner of execution that would insure the offender's safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, who has, thus, no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods, or manner of execution. The essence therefore of treachery is the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack on an unsuspecting victim thereby depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor. Here, as correctly found by the RTC and the CA, both requisites were present. The sudden attack on the victim who was then at home, bedridden, recuperating from sickness, completely unaware of any danger and unable to defend himself constituted treachery because the accused-appellant was ensured that the victim would not be in any position to ward off or evade his blows, or strike back at him. Evidently, the attack was executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate. There is thus no doubt that treachery attended the killing. 3. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, voluntary surrender should not be appreciated. There was no showing that accused-appellant unconditionally and voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities either because he acknowledged his guilt or because he wished to save them the trouble and expense in looking for and capturing him. Accused-appellant was just nonchalantly sitting at the curb when the police force responded and handcuffed him. In any case, as the Court ruled in People v. Lota, "the consideration of any mitigating circumstance in accused-appellant's favor would be superfluous because, although the imposable penalty under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death, the prohibition to impose the death penalty pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 rendered reclusion perpetua as the only penalty for murder, which penalty, being indivisible, could not be graduated in consideration of any modifying circumstances." In fine, there being no modifying circumstance, the proper penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- JUNIE (OR DIONEY) SALVADOR, SR. Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 223566, THIRD DIVISION, June 27, 2018, MARTIRES, J. For purposes of exemption from criminal liability, mere behavioral oddities cannot support a finding of insanity unless the totality of such behavior indubitably shows a total absence of reason, discernment, or free will at the time the crime was committed. Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act, i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. The legal teaching consistently maintained in our jurisprudence is that the plea of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance. Hence, if the accused is found to be sane at the DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 39 The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses who testified clearly, spontaneously and in a straightforward manner that appellant perpetrated the crime against the victim. It also noted that the victim's killing was attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery, since the victim was given no opportunity to defend himself with the attack having been sudden and unsuspected, and evident premeditation, which was manifested by appellant's act of bringing a pointed metal in attending the hearing. The CA, in turn, affirmed the factual findings of the RTC. The CA rejected appellant's claim of self-defense. It found that appellant was unable to discharge his burden of proving unlawful aggression, as his "version of the events was uncorroborated, and his testimony was found to be less credible by the RTC. Self- defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself." In addition, the CA held that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of murder beyond reasonable doubt. Aggrieved, appellant filed the present appeal. ISSUES: 1. Whether the prosecution was able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, considering that "the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were replete with inconsistencies and contradictions in material points directly going to their perception and recollection of the stabbing incident." (YES) 2. Whether the victim's stabbing was attended by treachery. (YES) RULING: In resolving issues involving the credibility of witnesses, the Court adheres to the well-settled rule that "appellate courts accord the highest respect to the assessment made by the trial court because of the trial judge's unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination." Thus, in Reyes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that inconsistencies or contradictions in the testimony of the victim do not affect the veracity of the testimony if inconsistencies do not pertain to material points. In this case, the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses pertained to minor details and collateral matters which did not affect the substance of their declarations and the veracity of their statements. As for the issue on the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court agrees with the CA's conclusion that the attack was executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate. "There is treachery when the offender employs means, methods or forms in the execution of any of the crimes against persons that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." In this case, appellant, coming from behind the victim, suddenly held the latter's neck using his left hand, and with his right hand, stabbed the victim three to four times using a yellowish pointed metal. Clearly, the attack was attended by treachery, considering that: a) the means of execution of the attack gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and b) said means of execution was deliberately adopted by appellant. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 40 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- OSCAR MAT-AN y ESCAD, Accused- Appellant. G.R. No. 215720, THIRD DIVISION, February 21, 2018, MARTIRES, J. The crime committed against Minda is murder qualified by abuse of superior strength. In a plethora of cases, the Court consistently held that the circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present when a man, armed with a deadly weapon, attacks an unarmed and defenseless which is applicable in this case: Oscar was about 5’10 tall armed with a knife whereas Minda was only 4’11 in height, was already 61 years old, and was carrying a child. The Court also concurs that Oscar can be held guilty of slight physical injuries with respect to Anthonette considering that the prosecution failed to prove that there was an intent to kill and the injuries suffered by Anthonette were only superficial. FACTS: Norma Gulayan (Norma) testified that she was selling halo-halo beside Minda Basaay’s (Minda) store in Baguio City. Minda, a 61 year old woman, was inside her store cradling her 18-month-old granddaughter, Anthonette, in a blanket when Oscar Mat-An (Oscar) entered the store in which an argument between the two ensued. Oscar, the husband of Minda’s daughter, was asking Minda why her daughter was not answering her calls but Minda responded by telling Oscar to return once he was sober. After which, Norma heard Minda moaning and immediately ran inside the store where she saw Oscar stab Minda twice. Norma pulled him out of the store and away from Minda. Sheyanne Mat-An, Oscar’s daughter, also took the witness stand and stated that Norma told them that Minda was stabbed by their father. Upon hearing this, they immediately went to Minda’s store where they saw the bloody body of Minda and Anthonette, who was underneath Minda’s body, appearing to be injured. Sheyanne ran to the roadside where she saw her father was being held by her neighbors. Afterwards, Oscar was brought to the police station. Minda subsequently died. A post-mortem examination conducted revealed that Minda sustained four stab wounds, three of which were fatal while one was superficial. As regards Anthonette, a medico-legal certificate revealed that she sustained a superficial stab wound in the nape area. Oscar was charged with the crimes of attempted homicide for the acts he committed against Anthonette and murder for killing Minda. The information states that the killing was attended by the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. The RTC of Baguio City convicted Oscar of the crimes charged holding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Oscar had committed the crime. It also appreciated the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength noting that Oscar was about 5’10 tall armed with a knife whereas Minda was only 4’11 in height, was already 61 years old, and was carrying a child. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that evident premeditation could not be appreciated to qualify the killing of Minda to murder as the prosecution failed to establish with certainty the time when Oscar decided to commit the felony and that he clung to his determination to kill Minda could not be inferred. Nevertheless, it ruled that the abuse of superior strength attended the killing due to the evident disparity of strengths between the two as noted by the RTC. It also ruled that Oscar could not be held liable for attempted DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 41 homicide because there was no evidence that he had the intent to kill Anthonette. It only convicted Oscar for slight physical injuries as the medico-legal results showed that Anthonette only suffered superficial injuries. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in finding Oscar guilty for the death of Minda and injuries sustained by Anthonette. (NO) RULING: Oscar assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses claiming that there were discrepancies in the testimonies of Norma and Sheyanne but this argument deserves no merit as it is established in our criminal jurisprudence that when the issue is one of credibilities of witnesses, the appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during trial. Unless there is a showing that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which may affect the result of the case or misapprehension of facts, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses will be upheld. In this case, no cogent reason exists which would justify the reversal of the trial court’s assessment on the credibility of the witnesses since the inconsistencies were only on minor details which do not undermine the integrity of a prosecution witness. The Supreme Court also concurs that the crime committed against Minda is murder qualified by abuse of superior strength. In a plethora of cases, the Court consistently held that the circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present when a man, armed with a deadly weapon, attacks an unarmed and defenseless which is applicable in this case. The Court also concurs that Oscar can be held guilty of slight physical injuries with respect to Anthonette considering that the prosecution failed to prove that there was an intent to kill and the injuries suffered by Anthonette were only superficial. Oscar also disputes that the trial and appellate courts erred in not appreciating the alternative circumstance of intoxication to mitigate his liability but he failed to clearly establish his state of intoxication was unintentional and not habitual to mitigate his liability. He also failed to present sufficient evidence that would show that he was in a state of intoxication as would blur his reason. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, -versus- MANUEL CORPUZ, accused- appellant. GR No. 215320, THIRD DIVISION, February 28, 2018, MARTIRES, J. An attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself.There is also abuse of such superiority when the victim is old and weak, while the accused is stronger because of his relatively younger age.Here, the two victims were defenseless old women – Romana at 74 years old, and Leonila at 65 years old. In DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 44 (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. Reggie has no chance to defend himself because the accused-appellant surreptitiously sneaked behind him and gave him a headlock which restrained his movement. Reggie tried to escape from the accused-appellant, however, he failed because when he stumbled, the latter was able to catch up with him. Reggie, who was then bleeding, was no longer able to protect himself from further stabbing by the accused-appellant. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- RANDY GAJILA y SALAZAR, Accused- Appellant. G.R. No. 227502, FIRST DIVISION, July 23, 2018, DEL CASTILLO,J. When the accused invoked self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted from the prosecution to the defense. The accused must prove the following requisites of self-defense: first, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; second, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and third, lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The fact that appellant tried to flee the scene of the crime immediately after the stabbing incident and the location, nature, and seriousness of the wounds sustained by the victim are inconsistent with a plea of self defense since they were all aimed at the major organs of the victim’s body negate any assertion that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The victim’s killing was attended by treachery considering that the victim was stabbed by victim from behind,appellant was holding the victim by the neck with his left arm when he delivered the first stabbing blow; and the attack was so sudden and unexpected that the victim was unable to defend himself. The totality of these circumstances clearly shows that the means of execution of the attack gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and said means of execution was deliberately adopted by the appellant. FACTS: Randy Gajila (Appellant) worked as a butcher in one of the stalls in Quinta Market along Quiapo, Manila. One night, he arrived at the market, apparently drunk and because of his condition, he was told to just lie down on a bench near the stall. Moments later, appellant stood up and approached Gerry Alcantara, his co-worker who was also employed as a butcher, from behind then used his left hand to hold the victim in place by the neck then stabbed the victim at the back. The victim turned around but he was stabbed for the second time. Appellant would have succeeded in stabbing the victim again but was only prevented. He immediately fled the scene but was eventually subdued by civilians and barangay tanods at the market. Unfortunately, the victim died at the hospital DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 45 the following day. According to the Medico-Legal report, the cause of death was the stab wound sustained by the victim at the back. In his defense, appellant raised the justifying circumstance of self- defense. Appellant was charged with the crime of murder with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength. The Regional Trial Court of Manila found appellant guilty of the crime charged and held that the victim’s killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery holding that by attacking the victim at a time when his attention was drawn to his work of weighing the meat on the scale, he gave the victim no chance to prepare his defense on the attack but the trial court ruled that the attendant circumstances of evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, and nighttime were not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals agreed with the findings of the RTC. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the appellant was able to sufficiently prove the justifying circumstance of self- defense (NO) (2) Whether or not the victim’s stabbing was attended by treachery (YES) RULING: (1) When the accused invoked self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted from the prosecution to the defense. The accused must prove the following requisites of self-defense: first, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; second, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and third, lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving that the unlawful aggression originated from the victim. The fact that appellant tried to flee the scene of the crime immediately after the stabbing incident and the location, nature, and seriousness of the wounds sustained by the victim are inconsistent with a plea of self defense since they were all aimed at the major organs of the victim’s body. Furthermore, the absence of any physical evidence showing that appellant sustained some injury from having been allegedly attacked by the victim does not prove and absence of any showing that appellant had suffered physical injuries negate the claim that there was aggression on the part of the victim. (2) The victim’s killing was attended by treachery considering that the victim was stabbed by victim from behind,appellant was holding the victim by the neck with his left arm when he delivered the first stabbing blow; and the attack was so sudden and unexpected that the victim was unable to defend himself. The totality of these circumstances clearly shows that the means of execution of the attack gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and said means of execution was deliberately adopted by the appellant. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 46 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- ALBERTO PETALINO alias “LANIT”, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 213222, FIRST DIVISION, September 24, 2018, Bersamin, J. For treachery to be appreciated, therefore, the Prosecution must establish the attendance of the following essential elements, namely: (1) that the means of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or herself, or to retaliate; and (2) that the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted, that is, the means, method or form of execution must be shown to be deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offender. To start with, the acts constituting treachery were not sufficiently averred in the information, which pertinently stated that "accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident premeditation, with a decided [purpose] to kill .... stab, hit and wound Johnny Nalangay with the said knife... causing upon the latter injuries on vital parts of his body which caused his death.” It failed to state that the accused- appellant had deliberately adopted means of execution that denied to the victim the opportunity to defend himself, or to retaliate; or that the accused-appellant had consciously and deliberately adopted the mode of attach to ensure himself from any risk from the defense that the victim might make. The fact alone that the attack mounted by the accused-appellant against the victim was sudden and unexpected, and did not afford the latter any opportunity to undertake any form or manner of defense or evasion did not necessarily justify a finding that treachery was attendant without any showing that the accused-appellant had consciously and deliberately adopted such mode of attack in order to insure the killing of the victim without any risk to himself arising from the defense that the latter could possibly adopt. That showing was not made herein. For one, the stabbing was committed when the victim was walking together with Bariquit, whose presence even indicated that the victim had not been completely helpless. Also, Bariquit's testimony indicated that the encounter between the victim and the accused- appellant had been only casual because the latter did not purposely seek out the victim. FACTS: Eyewitness Franklin Bariquit (Bariquit) walked behind the victim when the two passed through a narrow alley towards Iznart St. While they were walking, Bariquit saw a person, whom he later identified as accused Alberto Petalino alias “Lanit”, walking towards them from the opposite direction. When accused had passed the victim, he suddenly turned towards him, grabbed his hair and without warning, stabbed the victim in the back. The victim tried to run away, but he fell down after running a distance. Thereafter, the accused and Bariquit confronted each other, the latter kicked the accused causing him to fall down and to drop his knife. Bariquit then ran away and proceeded to PO's Marketing which was located near the Bank of the Philippine Islands. After sensing that the accused was no longer chasing him, he went back to the alley where he last saw the victim. There, Bariquit found the victim lying on the ground, face down and bloodied all over. The victim managed to utter some words but became unconscious when he was taken to St. Paul's Hospital where he eventually died. The RTC and the CA found the accused-appellant guilty of murder, appreciating the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. ISSUE: DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 49 The RTC did not discuss its finding of conspiracy; it merely held that "both accused acted in concert towards a common criminal goal." Conspiracy was not also discussed by the CA. On the subject, the appellate court only said that "the Oscar and Roel acted in concert in killing the victim." These pronouncements do not sufficiently establish that there was a conspiracy between Oscar and Roel in the stabbing of the victim. The records are also wanting of any indication of conspiracy. To determine if Oscar conspired with Roel, the Court must examine the overt acts of accused-appellant before, during, and after the stabbing incident and the totality of the circumstances. The inception and location of the stabbing incident must also be considered. Due to the conflicting testimonies of the witness, the Court finally ruled that it was Roel who stabbed Genelito in the back and not Oscar. As it was not Oscar who delivered the fatal blow it was incumbent upon the prosecution to establish the existence of conspiracy.The act of Oscar in merely hugging the victim does not establish conspiracy in the intent to kill. It was not proven that he acted in concert with Roel or that he even knew of Roel's intention to stab Genelito. It was not established that Oscar was hugging Genelito deliberately to enable Roel to stab him as he had no knowledge of Roel's intention. In People v. Jesalva, the Court ruled: It is not sufficient, however, that the attack be joint and simultaneous for simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will or unity of action and purpose which are the bases of the responsibility of the assailants. It is necessary that the assailants be animated by one and the same purpose. Furthermore, after the stabbing incident, Oscar did not flee and abandon the supposed victim, unlike Roel who immediately escaped and remains at-large. While non-flight is not necessarily an indication of innocence, this Court has recognized that taken together with other circumstances, it may bolster the innocence of the accused. There is nothing on record which indicates that Oscar knew that Roel was going to stab Genelito. Notably, it was not Oscar, but his wife Lea, who called for help as she witnessed the altercation between Genelito and her husband. In addition, the stabbing incident was done in the heat of the moment; it was not premeditated or planned. Absent any evidence to create the moral certainty required to convict accused-appellant Oscar, the Court cannot uphold the RTC and CA's finding of guilt. Oscar's guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus - HERMIE PARIS y NICOLAS, Accused, RONEL FERNANDEZ y DELA VEGA, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 218130, FIRST DIVISION, February 14, 2018, DEL CASTILLO, J. Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." FACTS: DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 50 In an Information, appellant Ronel Fernandez (Fernandez) and accused Hermie Paris (Paris) were charged in conspiracy with each other of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. According to the prosecution, at around midnight in the warehouse of Anna Leizel Trading and Construction Supply, Fernandez, who was a stay-in worker, opened the gate, and let Paris and his unnamed companions enter the warehouse. Paris and one of his companions broke into the office of Anna Leizel Abagat (Anna) and got assorted pieces of jewelry worth the sum of P128,000.00 and cash amounting to P700,000.00, all owned by Anna. However, before going, to said office, Paris and his companion went to Reymark Salvador’s room, who was also a stay-in worker, and was stabbed to death. Later on, Fernandez admitted the crime and made his Extra-Judicial Confession in the presence of his lawyer, Atty. Francisco. Thereafter, the RTC found Fernandez and Paris guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, which the CA affirmed. Dissatisfied with the judgment, Fernandez elevated the case to the Court. In his defense, Fernandez contends that his extrajudicial confession cannot be used against him since the same was inadmissible. At the police station, Fernandez claimed that he was forced to admit his participation in the crime. He further claims that there was insufficient circumstantial evidence against him and that the prosecution failed to establish conspiracy. Fernandez insists that the RTC erroneously convicted him since the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. ISSUE: Whether Fernandez was guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. (YES) RULING: Fernandez was not assisted by counsel at all times during his custodial investigation. Moreover, the Court agrees with the CA that his lawyer, Atty. Francisco, was not an independent counsel, being a legal consultant in the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Binmaley. Also, the Court finds that Atty. Francisco was not vigilant in protecting the rights of Fernandez during the course of the custodial investigation. Given these circumstances, Fernandez's extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of Fernandez' extrajudicial confession, his conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide can still be obtained on the basis of circumstantial evidence. "To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the accused. Jurisprudence requires that the circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime." The following pieces of circumstantial evidence, as testified by Fernandez himself, established his guilt for the crime of robbery with homicide: first: Fernandez and Paris were acquaintances even prior to the incident; second: Fernandez opened the gate of Anna Leizel Trading without first checking who was knocking outside thereby allowing Paris and his companions to freely enter the premises; third: Paris and his companions purposely proceeded directly to the room occupied by the victim Salvador; fourth: Paris and his companions did not harm Fernandez despite the latter having already recognized or seen their faces; instead, they went looking for Salvador who was then asleep and killed him; fifth: it was Fernandez who directed Paris and his companions to the office of Anna; sixth: Fernandez did not offer any resistance nor attempted to help Salvador; and, seventh: Fernandez did not do anything after seeing Paris and his companions leave Anna's office carrying a DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 51 bag; interestingly, he waited for more than three hours before informing his employers about the incident. To the Court’s mind, these pieces of circumstantial evidence lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that Fernandez and Paris conspired to rob Anna Leizel Trading making them the authors of the crime to the exclusion of all others. Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." In this case, considering the abundance of circumstantial evidence against Fernandez and Paris, the Court finds that Fernandez and Paris conspired to rob Anna. Time and again, the Court has ruled that when there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Thus, "when homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same." In the present case, both Fernandez and Paris were coconspirators who are guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, -versus- BENITO LABABO ALIAS "BEN," WENEFREDO LABABO, JUNIOR LABABO (AL), and FFF, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 234651, THIRD DIVISION, June 6, 2018, VELASCO, JR., J. Article 8 of the RPC provides that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three requisites: (1) two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) the agreement concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) the execution of the felony was decided upon. Once conspiracy is established, the act of one becomes the act of all. Here, it was established that Wenefredo and FFF were present at the scene of the crime, both wielding a bolo. However, it was also established that their alleged participation thereat did not go beyond being present and holding said weapons. As a matter of fact, both the victims only sustained gunshot wounds. While it is true that mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, without actively participating in the conduct thereof, is insufficient to prove that the accused conspired to commit the crime, Wenefredo and FFF's act of standing near the victims and Benito, while wielding bolos, does not partake of this nature. Their overt act of staying in close proximity while Benito executes the crime served no other purpose than to lend moral support by ensuring that no one could interfere and prevent the successful perpetration thereof. Their presence thereat has no doubt, encouraged Benito and increased the odds against the victims, especially since they were all wielding lethal weapons. FACTS: Accused-appellants Benito, Wenefredo, Junior, and FFF, all surnamed "Lababo," were charged in an Information for the crime of Murder. Additionally, Benito and Wenefredo were likewise indicted with the crime of Frustrated Murder. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 54 In the case at bar, although Cariat did not personally have sexual intercourse with AAA, his acts together with Pal and Cutacte clearly demonstrated a common design to have carnal knowledge of AAA. Cariat helped Magbanta, Pal, and Cutacte in restraining AAA and in dragging her to a secluded grassy area. He also pointed a knife at AAA while Magbanta inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. Cariat concurred in the criminal design to rape AAA. Since there was conspiracy, the act of one was the act of all making them equally guilty of the crime of rape against AAA. FACTS: AAA testified that her neighbors Jonathan Pal and Thaniel Magbanta invited her to celebrate Pal’s birthday. After joining their drinking spree, AAA later on felt dizzy and intoxicated. She testified that Magbanta punched her stomach and Pal, Magbanta, Tatan Cutacte, and appellant Ron Cariat dragged her to a grassy and secluded area near Pal’s house. AAA cried for help but no one heard her. Magbanta punched her again and warned her not to resist or else he would kill her. She added that appellant Ron Cariat held her legs and pointed a knife at her while Pal and Cutacte acted as a lookout. Magbante laid on top of her and forcibly inserted his penis inside his vagina. Cariat, Pal and Cutacte were all laughing as they watched Magbanta rape AAA. The RTC found Ron Cariat guilty of the crime of rape. The prosecution through AAA’s testimony was able to establish conspiracy among the four accused to commit the crime of rape. While it was Magbanta who had sexual intercourse with AAA, appellant Ron Cariat held her legs which allowed Magbanta to consummate the rape. This constituted direct participation in the commission of the crime. The CA affirmed the RTC’s judgement. ISSUE: Whether or not appellant Ron Cariat was guilty of the crime of rape. (YES) RULING: Under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force, threat, or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under twelve years of age or was demented. In this case, the testimony of AAA established that Magbanta had sexual intercourse with her with the assistance of Cariat, Pal, and Cutacte. She testified that Cariat held her legs, pointed a knife at her and helped his co-accused drag her to a secluded grassy area which allowed Magbanta to consummate the rape. These show that Magbanta had sexual intercourse with AAA against her will through force, threat, and intimidation with the assistance of Cariat and the other accused. Conspiracy was established in this case. There is conspiracy "when the acts of the accused demonstrate a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose." In the case at bar, although Cariat did not personally have sexual intercourse with AAA, his acts together with Pal and Cutacte clearly demonstrated a common design to have carnal knowledge of AAA. Cariat helped Magbanta, Pal, and Cutacte in restraining AAA and in dragging her to a secluded DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 55 grassy area. He also pointed a knife at AAA while Magbanta inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. Cariat concurred in the criminal design to rape AAA. Since there was conspiracy, the act of one was the act of all making them equally guilty of the crime of rape against AAA. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- YYY, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 224626, THIRD DIVISION, June 27, 2018, MARTIRES, J. A medico-legal report is not indispensable in rape cases as it is merely corroborative in nature. Thus, even without it, an accused may still be convicted on the sole basis of the testimony of the victim. As such, the credibility of the witness should be assessed independently regardless of the presence or absence of a medico-legal report. Trial courts are expected to scrutinize the victim's testimony with great caution, with or without a medico-legal report to corroborate the same. FACTS: YYY was charged with rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code committed against his half- sister, AAA, who decided to file a case against YYY after she discovered that he was also raping her younger sister. AAA positively identified YYY as her abuser and had categorically and clearly narrated how he had forced himself upon her. It disregarded YYY's defense of denial and alibi in view of AAA's positive identification of him was able YYY pleaded not guilty and set up a defense of denial and alibi. The RTC found YYY guilty of three counts of rape defined and penalized under Art. 335 of the RPC because all incidents occurred prior to the passage of R.A. No. 8353. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo erred in convicting YYY based on the testimony of AAA despite lack of evidence that would corroborate the claims. (NO) RULING: The Supreme Court held that the appeal has no merit and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision with modification on damages. YYY's attempt at exoneration rests heavily on his challenge of AAA's credibility as a witness. He argues that the medical findings do not necessarily support her claims that she was raped on three separate dates. As such, YYY surmises the trial court should have been more circumspect in assessing AAA's testimony. He bewails that a deeper scrutiny of AAA's testimony becomes more imperative considering that it appears to be perfect, raising the possibility that she was rehearsed. YYY highlights that the incident occurred almost nine (9) years prior to her testimony in court. Finally, he believes that AAA's actions are contrary to human experience and negate her allegations that there was force and intimidation during the rape incidents. A medico-legal report is not indispensable in rape cases as it is merely corroborative in nature. Thus, even without it, an accused may still be convicted on the sole basis of the testimony of the victim. As such, the credibility of the witness should be assessed independently regardless of the presence or DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 56 absence of a medico-legal report. Trial courts are expected to scrutinize the victim's testimony with great caution, with or without a medico-legal report to corroborate the same. In the present case, YYY does not point to any inconsistency in AAA's testimony to discredit her. Rather, he perceives that her testimony was immaculate, such that it was in all likelihood rehearsed. The Court held that it is axiomatic that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies and conclusions drawn therefrom are accorded the highest respect by appellate courts considering that their revisory power and authority are generally limited to the bare and cold records of the case. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, the lower court’s assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witness while testifying and detect if they are lying. After an assiduous review of the records, the Court finds no reason to depart from the assessment by the trial court of AAA's testimony. She was straightforward and categorical in narrating YYY's dastardly deeds and never wavered in identifying him as her abuser. AAA's testimony alone sufficed in establishing the elements of rape: (1) accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) it was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation; (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus- PEDRO RUPAL, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 222497, THIRD DIVISION, June 27, 2018, MARTIRES, J. For a charge of rape under Art. 266-A(1) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 to prosper, it must be proved that: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented. The gravamen of rape under Art. 266-A (1) is carnal knowledge of "a woman against her will or without her consent." In this case where it was alleged to have been committed by force, threat or intimidation, "it is imperative for the prosecution to establish that the element of voluntariness on the part of the victim be absolutely lacking. The prosecution must prove that force or intimidation was actually employed by accused upon his victim to achieve his end. Failure to do so is fatal to its cause." FACTS: Accused-appellant Pedro Rupal was found guilty of Rape as defined and penalized under Article 266- A of the Revised Penal Code against AAA, a minor. Rupal pleaded not guilty and set up denial and alibi as his defense. The RTC held that AAA's testimony was straightforward and believable, coming from a child who had neither reason to tell a lie nor motive to falsely charge accused-appellant. While the RTC took note of the fact that there were only the medical certificate and the testimony of the physician to corroborate AAA's testimony, these, however, did not weaken the case since she was able to sufficiently prove that Rupal raped her. The RTC also stressed that jurisprudence provides that great weight is given to the testimony of a child who was a rape victim. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 59 FACTS: According to the witnesses Philip Bedrero and Grace Bedrero, on 7 March 2012, at around 6:30 P.M., Ronelo and Philip were arguing in front of the Philip's house about George, the latter's nephew, for supposedly wrecking the former's bike. After the argument, both parties parted ways and returned to their homes. At around 8:30 P.M. of the same day, Ronelo, this time armed with a bolo, stood in front of Philip's house demanding the latter to come out so he could kill him. Unfazed, Philip went outside to have a word with Ronelo. George's father, Gilberto, decided to come out of his house and tried to pacify Ronelo telling him that they would fix his bike the next day. Suddenly, Rommel and Rolando rushed towards Gilberto and, without warning, Rommel struck Gilberto on the head with a small ax which made the latter fall. As Gilberto lay prostrate, Ronelo hacked him in the stomach while Rolando beat him with a piece of wood and stabbed him with a bolo. Philip tried to help Gilberto, but Rommel swung his ax at him injuring his upper lip causing him to retreat to his house. Thereafter, Grace ran towards Gilberto, but Ronelo ordered her to leave forcing her to step away. They continued to assault Gilberto by hacking him in the chest and striking his face with a piece of wood. Rommel and Rolando urged him to finish Gilberto. Gilberto was brought to the hospital, where Philip was also being treated for his wounds. Unfortunately, Gilberto died after several hours of treatment. Gilberto died of asphyxia by manual strangulation and a stab wound in the chest.At the hospital, Philip also saw Ronelo. He notified police that the latter was one of those who attacked Gilberto; consequently, Ronelo was brought to the police station. On the other hand, Rommel was brought to the precinct after he was identified at the crime scene as one of the suspects — Rolando eluded arrest and is still at-large. The accused were charged with murder. The RTC found the accused guilty of murder. It highlighted the prosecution witnesses' categorical identification of Rommel and Ronelo as the ones who assaulted Gilberto and described their respective participation in the death of the victim. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling in toto. ISSUE: Whether or not Rommel is guilty of the crime of Murder. (YES) RULING: Based on Philip and Grace's testimony, all the elements of the crime of murder were proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz.: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed the victim; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstance in Article248, i.e., treachery or alevosia; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide. Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Its elements are: (1) employment of means, method or manner of execution which will ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of the victim; and (2) DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 60 deliberate adoption of such means, method or manner of execution. In other words, the means of attack, consciously adopted by the assailant, rendered the victim defenseless. In the present case, it is apparent that Gilberto was completely defenseless at the time of the attack because he was surprised by Rommel with a blow to the head causing him to fall to the ground. Rommel and co-accused continued to attack him causing him multiple injuries, including the fatal ones. Further, Rommel and his co-accused consciously adopted the means of attack because they were already armed when they proceeded to the crime scene. Further, both Philip and Grace categorically and consistently identified Rommel as one of those who attacked Gilberto. Their narrations are so interwoven that when taken together, Gilberto's demise at the hands of Rommel and his co-accused is clearly illustrated.According to Philip, he witnessed how Rommel and his co-accused commenced their assault on Gilberto. He, however, fled the scene when Rommel attacked him after he tried to help Gilberto.On the other hand, Grace witnessed how Rommel and his co-accused continued to maul Gilberto after he was already lying on the ground.Philip and Grace's testimony corroborate each other on material points. Rommel and his co-accused are equally guilty of murder as conspirators. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. There is an implied conspiracy when two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, are in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. In other words, there must be unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective. In this case, Rommel and his co-accused clearly acted with a common purpose to kill Gilberto as manifested by their coordinated actions. Accused-appellant initiated the assault and assisted his co-accused in accomplishing their goal. Even if there is no direct evidence to establish who among the culprits inflicted the mortal blow, they are all guilty of murder as conspirators because their mutual purpose impelled them to execute their harmonized attack on Gilberto. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOHN CARLO SALGA and RUEL "TAWING" NAMALATA, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 233334, July 23, 2018, THIRD DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, therefore, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. The records bear out that only Constancio saw Ruel, but such sighting of Ruel was after the robbery when he was already driving the green motorcycle with John and another person on board. This was not the overt act necessary to make Ruel a part of the conspiracy. The mere fact that the accused were seen together immediately after the commission of a felony does not necessarily prove the existence of a conspiracy between them. The Prosecution must show that the DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 61 accused performed overt acts showing unanimity of design or concert of action; otherwise, each is liable only for the consequences of his own acts. FACTS: Joan Camille Zulita testified that on February 14, 2010, around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, she was watching television when she noticed that three persons entered their gate. Joan was shocked and could not move out of fear because the two persons who went towards her were armed. Afterwards, the man who told her to keep quiet and who was later identified as appellant Salga asked her about the location of the vault. She contended that Salga and his companion brought the vault to the sala where they successfully opened it and took all the money inside. At that time, when the robbers left her inside the bedroom, she hurriedly hid under the bed. While hiding under the bed, she affirmed that she heard a gunshot from outside. When she sensed that the armed men had already left, she went out of her hiding place and went to the living room, where she saw the vault already emptied of its content. The armed men took cash amounting to P34,000.00 from the vault and her Samsung E590 cellphone worth P6,000.00.Subsequently, Joan Camille went to look for their househelp Catalina Arcega, but could not find the latter. When she and her children went back to their house, Jackel found Catalina Arcega in the garden, seriously injured with a wound on her head. Catalina Arcega was still conscious when she was brought to a nearby hospital. Unfortunately, she died the following day. Constancio Hinlo, Jr. as inside the office of the Civilian Volunteer Organization when he and his fellow civilian volunteers received a call informing them that the house of Josephine Zulita was robbed. He averred that he responded to the call and walked towards Zulita's house. While on his way, he saw a green motorcycle with three riders. He affirmed that he recognized the driver of the motorcycle as appellant Ruel Namalata (Namalata). He also recognized Salga, who was riding at the back of Namalata with a black backpack. A third rider was at the back of Salga, but he could not identify him. He disclosed that he knew Namalata and Salga because they were his drinking buddies RTC convicted Ruel and John of robbery with homicide on the basis of the testimonies of Joan Zulita (Joan) and Constancio Hinlo, Jr. (Constancio). In the CA, Ruel argued that Constancio was the only one who had implicated him based on having seen him driving a motorcycle with John and an unidentified person on board; and that Constancio's testimony did not suffice to support his conviction for robbery with homicide due to its being contrary to human experience. CA affirmed the conviction of Ruel and John ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of Ruel beyond reasonable doubt has been established(NO) RULING: The Court cannot concur with the CA's conclusion against Ruel. The circumstances listed by the CA were insufficient to produce the conviction of Ruel. The lower courts and the Prosecution gave too much weight and emphasis to the fact that Constancio had seen Ruel speeding away on the motorcycle with John and another person on board. The scene, to a detached observer, was certainly far from unequivocal, for it was openly susceptible to various interpretations, including some that would not implicate Ruel in the commission of the robbery with homicide. For one, there is the possibility that Ruel only happened to pass by, and that John and the DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 64 standard operating procedure to provide medical attention to suspects. When appellant was brought to the hospital, the victim Alde positively identified appellant as one of those who stabbed him. Alde underwent emergency surgery due to the stab wounds inflicted on him. He was then referred for further surgery. Unfortunately, twenty minutes after the operation, while in the recovery room, Alde went into cardiac arrest and succumbed to death. Accused, on the other hand, maintained that he was not in the place of incident and denied that he was with alias JR when the stabbing incident happened. Pilpa further denied that he had participation in the killing of the victim and stressed that he was not familiar with the identities of the witnesses presented by the prosecution. Further, the accused clarified in court that he had no motive to attack or kill the victim as he did not even personally know Dave Alde. RTC convicted Pilpa of the crime of Murder. The RTC found that the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses Leonila, Evangeline and Carolina deserved to be given greater evidentiary weight over the general denial by Pilpa that he was not at the place of the incident at the time it took place. The RTC held that Pilpa was liable - although it was only the certain "JR" who was able to inflict stab wounds on the victim - because there was conspiracy among the assailants of Alde.10 As conspiracy was present, the RTC ruled that all of the assailants were liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime perpetrated in furtherance of such conspiracy. The RTC also found that treachery attended the killing of Alde, hence Pilpa was liable for Murder instead of Homicide. The RTC reasoned that "[t]he attack made by Pilpa and his group to the victim was so swift and unexpected affording the hapless and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or defend himself." CA affirmed. CA held that conspiracy may be deduced from the conspirators' conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and community of interests - and that the facts of the present case reveal such concerted action to achieve the purpose of killing Alde. The CA further held that treachery was present despite the fatal assault being a frontal attack, because the said attack was sudden and unexpected and the victim was unarmed. ISSUE: Whether conspiracy exists among assailants of Alde. (YES) RULING: It is well-established that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is the unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime. There is conspiracy if at the time of the commission of the offense, the acts of two or more accused show that they were animated by the same criminal purpose and were united in their execution, or where the acts of the malefactors indicate a concurrence of sentiments, a joint purpose and a concerted action. It is true that the elements of conspiracy must be proved by the same kind of proof — proof beyond reasonable doubt — necessary to establish the physical acts constituting the crime itself. However, DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 65 this is not to say that direct proof of such conspiracy is always required. The existence of conspiracy need not, at all times, be established by direct evidence; nor is it necessary to prove prior agreement between the accused to commit the crime charged. Indeed, conspiracy is very rarely proved by direct evidence of an explicit agreement to commit the crime. Thus, the rule is well-settled that conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, where such conduct reasonably shows community of criminal purpose or design. In the present case, both the RTC and CA correctly inferred from the collective acts of the assailants that conspiracy exists despite the absence of direct evidence to the effect. As the prosecution correctly argued: “The conduct of appellant and "JR" in approaching the group of Alde, stabbing him and running after him, indubitably shows that they had agreed to kill him. After the incident, appellant was also found to be in "JR"s home. It is contrary to human experience and logic to be present at the home of a friend who had just stabbed another without being aware of such occurrence as appellant alleges. xxx The fact that appellant was unable to actually stab Alde, not by his own volition but due to the parry of Alde's companion "Choy", does not preclude the existence of conspiracy. Conspiracy can rightly be inferred and proven by the acts of stabbing committed by both appellant and "JR" jointly and concertedly. The existence of conspiracy renders appellant as a co-principal even if he failed to actually stab Alde. xxx Appellant's lame attempt to refute the existence of conspiracy relying on the cases of People vs. Jorge and People vs. Iligan, et. al. is misplaced because in those cases, the persons involved did not take part in the actual stabbing. In this case, appellant himself took part in the stabbing. Furthermore, appellant's assertion that such crime was already consummated by "JR" and therefore appellant can no longer be liable for conspiracy is untenable and without basis. The fact that "JR" was able to stab Alde first does not mean that appellant who stabbed him next can be exculpated from conspiracy. Otherwise, every conspiracy charge may be thwarted by the mere fact that one of the conspirators beat the others to the act.” C. Penalties 1. Penalties that may be imposed and retroactive effect of penal laws IN RE: CORRECTION/ADJUSTMENT OF PENALTY PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10951, IN RELATION TO HERNAN, Petitioner -versus – SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent G.R. No. 240347, EN BANC, August 14, 2018, TIJAM, J. The determination of whether the petitioner is entitled to immediate release in accordance with R.A. No. 10951, would necessarily involve ascertaining, among others, the actual length of time actually served and whether good conduct time allowance should actually be allowed, and thus should be DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 66 better undertaken by the trial court, which is relatively more equipped to make findings of both fact and law. FACTS: Petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code for pretending to be a lawyer, a certain "Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling" that will help private complainants to facilitate the release of their friend from jail for P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. Despite receipt of the said amount, however, the prisoner was never released and worse, he died in jail. Petitioner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, for the crime of Estafa, and he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum. Per his Prison Record, petitioner already has two (2) years, seven (7) months, and six (6) days time served with earned good conduct time allowance as of June 6, 2018. Meanwhile, R.A. No. 10951 was promulgated on August 29, 2017, which provides under Article 315, paragraph 3 that estafa, involving an amount of over P40,000.00 but not exceeding P1,200,000.00 shall be punishable by arresto mayor in the maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. Applying, thus, the Indeterminate Sentence Law and invoking our ruling in Hernan, allowing for the re-opening of an already terminated case and the recall of an Entry of Judgment for purposes of modifying/reducing the penalty to be served, petitioner comes before this Court averring that he is entitled to have his sentence modified in accordance with R.A. No. 10951 and be released immediately from confinement in view of the aforesaid circumstances. ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for. (YES) RULING: While the petitioner correctly invoked R.A. No. 10951 for the modification of his sentence, in the recent case of In Re: Correction/Adjustment of Penalty pursuant to R.A. No. 10951 in Relation to Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, this Court, however, ruled that the determination of whether the petitioner is entitled to immediate release would necessarily involve ascertaining, among others, the actual length of time actually served and whether good conduct time allowance should actually be allowed, and thus should be better undertaken by the trial court, which is relatively more equipped to make findings of both fact and law. In the said case, the Court also had the occasion to issue Guidelines considering the anticipated influx of similar petitions, in the interest of justice and efficiency. Wherefore, the petition was granted and the case was remanded to the RTC for the determination of: (1) the proper penalty in accordance with Republic Act No. 10951; and (2) whether petitioner Samuel is entitled to immediate release on account of full service of his sentence. 2. Classification DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 69 thus be remanded to the court of origin to effect appellant's confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility, following the Court's pronouncement in People v. Sarcia. FACTS: Accused-appellants Benito, Wenefredo, Junior, and FFF, all surnamed "Lababo," were charged in an Information for the crime of Murder. Additionally, Benito and Wenefredo were likewise indicted with the crime of Frustrated Murder. On October 27, 2007, at around 3:00 in the afternoon, BBB, his wife CCC, and their son AAA, alighted from a motorcycle in front of Benito's house, some fifty meters away from their residence, and proceeded directly to go to their house. A few minutes later, CCC heard a gunshot accompanied by a child's scream emanating from near Benito's house. When she went outside to check, she saw her husband and son lying on the ground, wounded. Within close proximity is Benito holding a 29-inch gun locally known as "bardog" together with Wenefredo, FFF, and Junior, all armed with bolos. Jesus Caparal corroborated these accounts, saying that he was nearby when the incident occurred and that after hearing gunshots, he proceeded to his house. On the way there, he saw Benito holding a "bardog," with the three each holding a bolo, while AAA and BBB were lying on the ground. He reported the incident to the Barangay Tanod. When the victims were brought to the hospital, AAA was declared dead on arrival. BBB survived the gunshot wounds but was confined at the hospital for one month. DDD, CCC's adopted daughter, reported the incident to the police authorities of Northern Samar. RTC found accused appellants guilty of murder. Benito and Wenefredo were also found guilty for the crime of frustrated murder. According to the trial court, despite the fact that there was no eyewitness to the actual commission of the crime, the combination of the circumstantial evidence points out to accused-appellants as the perpetrators and conspirators. CA affirmed. Anent the theory that the accused appellants conspired to kill the victims, the CA held that the pieces of circumstantial evidence establish a common criminal design — that is, to harm and kill the victims. The appellate court added that although the victims only sustained gunshot wounds from Benito's bardog, and not from the bolos held by the three, the fact that they stayed together while wielding said bladed weapons are enough to demonstrate their common evil intent to threaten, harm, and eventually assault the victims. With respect to the penalties and damages imposed, the CA affirmed the penalty meted upon Benito and Wenefredo. But for FFF, the appellate court noted that he was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime thus, being a minor, Article 68 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, which states that the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen, but always in the proper period, shall apply to him. After following said provision and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the CA held, the range of penalty for FFF is prision mayor in any of its period, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. The CA thus modified the RTC's ruling by imposing upon FFF for his commission of the crime of murder the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. ISSUE: DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 70 Whether the penalty imposed to FFF by CA is correct. (YES) RULING: CA correctly took into account FFF's minority, he being 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, in reducing the period of imprisonment to be served by him. Being of said age, FFF is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68 (2) of the RPC which provides that the penalty to be imposed upon a person under 18 but above 15 shall be the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, but always in the proper period. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. However, pursuant to RA No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua. Applying Article 68 (2), the imposable penalty must be reduced by one degree, i.e., from reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, reclusion temporal should be reduced by one degree, prision mayor, which has a range of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from the full range of prision mayor. Furthermore, there being no modifying circumstances attendant to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be imposed in its medium period which is 14 years, eight months, and one day to 17 years and four months. In addition, FFF, being a minor at the time of the commission of the offense, should benefit from a suspended sentence pursuant to Section 38 of RA 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006. Said provision reads: SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. As for the penalties imposed on Benito and Wenefredo anent their conviction for Murder and Frustrated Murder, there is no reason to disturb the RTC and CA's ruling thereon. It is well to recall that Section 38 of the law applies regardless of the imposable penalty, since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense. We, therefore, should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 71 Furthermore, the age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of judgment of conviction is immaterial. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. The promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. FFF may thus be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, which provides that "[a] child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD." The case shall thus be remanded to the court of origin to effect appellant's confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility, following the Court's pronouncement in People v. Sarcia. D. Extinction of criminal liability SHIRLEY T. LIM, MARY T. LIM-LEON and JIMMY T. LIM, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. G.R. No. 226590, SECOND DIVISION, April 23, 2018, REYES, JR., J. If the offense is falsification of a public document, the period for prescription commences on the date of registration of the forged or falsified document. Since the registration of the documentary requirements for transfer of title, including the falsified Secretary’s Certificate, was made on March 29, 2000, this is the proper reckoning point from which the prescription of the crime began to run. From this date, there was a constructive notice of falsification to the entire world, including Lucy. Considering that the complaint could not have been filed earlier than its date of execution, prescription already set in by March 29, 2010, or approximately five months before the execution of the complaint on September 21, 2010. Their criminal liability was already extinguished. FACTS: The petitioners were charged with falsification of a public document. They are siblings whom are officers of Pentel Merchandising Co., (Pentel), established by their father Quintin C. Lim. Quintin died on September 6, 1996. One of the stockholders of Pentel, Lucy Lim, alleged that the petitioners falsified the Secretary’s Certificate dated February 29, 2000. This Board Resolution authorized Jimmy Lim, one of the petitioners, to dispose the parcel of land covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) registered under Pentel’s name. Jimmy was able to enter into a Deed of Absolute Sale on March 21, 2000, conveying the subject properties to Spouses Lee. According to Lucy, the Secretary’s Certificate, dated February 29, 2000, bearing the sais board resolution, was falsified because it was made to appear that Quintin signed it, despite having already died on September 16, 1996 -- or more than three years from the time of its execution. They were found guilty by the Regional Trial Court DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 74 act on the case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended party, and (2) when the private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court. In this case, Cu filed an ordinary appeal with the CA. This is already an indication that what she was seeking was the reversal of the entire decision of the RTC, in both its criminal and civil aspects. Cu should have filed a special civil action for certiorari had she intended to merely preserve her interest in the civil aspect of the case. Moreover, based on the records, the prosecution failed to prove its case not only in its criminal aspect but also in its civil aspect where the required proof needed is only a preponderance of evidence. "Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term 'greater weight of the evidence' or 'greater weight of the credible evidence.' Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto." Cu’s testimony alone does not constitute preponderant evidence to establish Ventura’s liability to her. Apart from the dishonored check, Cu failed to adduce any other evidence to prove that Ventura has still an unpaid obligation to her. Unsubstantiated evidence is not equivalent to proof under the Rules. II. REVISED PENAL CODE - BOOK II A. Crimes against National Security and Laws of Nations PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, -versus- MAXIMO DELA PEÑA, accused- appellant. G.R. No. 219581, FIRST DIVISION, January 31, 2018, DEL CASTILLO, J. The Information categorically alleged that the incident happened along the river bank of Brgy. San Roque, Municipality of Villareal, Province of Samar. Under Section 2 (a) of PD 532, "Philippine waters" is defined as follows: [A]ll bodies of water, such as but not limited to, seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting each of the Islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth, length or dimension, and all other waters belonging to the Philippines by historic or legal title, including territorial sea, the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. From this definition, it is clear that a river is considered part of Philippine waters. FACTS: On September 24, 2005, at around 1:00 a.m., Julita Nacoboan, together with her husband and son, were about to board their pump boat loaded with 13 sacks of copra. As the Nacoboan's pump boat DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 75 was about to depart, a smaller boat suddenly blocked its path. Three armed men then immediately boarded the pump boat. One of the armed men pointed a firearm at Jose and ordered him to proceed to the aft or the rear side of the boat. Julita identified him as the appellant. Another armed person grabbed Julita's bag and took the following items: 1) P1,000.00 Cash; 2) Earrings; 3) Cellular phone; and 4) Necklace. When they arrived at the small island, the appellant unloaded the 13 sacks of copra.The appellant and his armed companions then brought the pump boat to another island where its engine, propeller tube, and tools were taken and loaded on appellant's boat. Consequently, the Nacoboan's boat was left without an engine and they had to paddle to safety. The following day, Julita went to the police authorities in Villareal, Samar to report the incident. Appellant was charged with the crime of piracy defined under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 532. RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of piracy under PD 532. CA affirmed appellant's conviction. ISSUE: Whether appellant is guilty of piracy. (YES) RULING: Section 2 (d) of PD 532 defines piracy as follows: Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters,shall be considered as piracy Appellant maintains that the Information did not state that the vessel in question was in Philippine waters and that its cargo, equipment, or personal belongings of the passengers or complement were seized. The Court disagrees. The Information categorically alleged that the incident happened along the river bank of Brgy. San Roque, Municipality of Villareal, Province of Samar. Under Section 2 (a) of PD 532, "Philippine waters" is defined as follows: All bodies of water, such as but not limited to, seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting each of the Islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth, length or dimension, and all other waters belonging to the Philippines by historic or legal title, including territorial sea, the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. From this definition, it is clear that a river is considered part of Philippine waters. The Information also clearly alleged that the vessel's cargo, equipment, and personal belongings of the passengers were taken by the appellant and his armed companions. The Information also stated DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 76 that the vessel's equipment which consisted of the engine, propeller tube, and tools were taken and carried away by the appellant. Furthermore, the Information also stated that the personal belongings of the passengers consisting of two watches, jewelry, cellphone, and cash money were taken by the appellant and his armed companions. From the foregoing, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to establish that the victims' pump boat was in Philippine waters when appellant and his armed companions boarded the same and seized its cargo, equipment, and the personal belongings of the passengers. B. Crimes against the Fundamental Law of the State C. Crimes against Public Order PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, -versus- HERMINIO VIBAL, JR. y UAYAN, ARNOLD DAVID y CRUZ, CIPRIANO REFREA, JR. y ALMEDA, RICARDO H. PINEDA, EDWIN R. BARQUEROS, and DANIEL YASON, Accused, HERMINIO VIBAL, JR. y UAYAN, and ARNOLD DAVID y CRUZ, Accused-appellant G.R. No. 229678, SECOND DIVISION, June 20, 2018, PERALTA, J. Experience dictates that precisely because of the startling acts of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can recall with a high degree of reliability the identities of the criminals and how at any given time the crime has been committed by them. It is important to note that PO3 Almendras identified Vibal and David as the gunmen without any presumptions or suggestions from the police or the court at the trial. Further, as an actual victim, PO3 Almedras is naturally interested in vindicating the outrageous wrong done to his person. His natural interest in securing the conviction of the perpetrators would strongly deter him from implicating persons other than the real culprits. FACTS: The prosecution alleged that the police officers were assigned as security escorts of the Mayor. Mayor Arcillas was then solemnizing marriages at the 2nd floor of the Municipal City Hall of Sta. Rosa City. The ceremony ended at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning. The Mayor then proceeded to the Office of the Commission on Audit (COA) located at the same floor. While they were going out of the room where the ceremony was conducted, PO3 Almendras noticed that they were being followed by two (2) young kids. After spending a moment in the COA office, the group then proceeded to the Office of the Mayor. On their way to said Office, gunshots were fired on them. PO3 Almendras was not able to pull out his gun since there was a rapid fire coming from their front and back. He, PO2 Rivera and the Mayor sustained gunshots wounds. The three (3) fell to the ground. While on the floor, PO3 Almendras heard three (3) more gunshots before he felt dizzy. Thereafter, PO3 Almendras and Mayor Arcillas were brought to the hospital. The autopsy revealed that Mayor Arcillas sustained three (3) gunshot wounds, the fatal of which are the 2 gunshots in his head. PO2 Rivera, on the other hand, sustained two (2) gunshot wounds, on the DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 79 commission of the crime, does not extinguish the accused's criminal liability or relieve the accused from the penalty prescribed by the law. At best, such acts of reimbursement may only affect the offender's civil liability, and may be credited in his favor as a mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender. FACTS: Petitioner Manuel Venezuela (Venezuela) was charged of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended. Venezuela was the Municipal Mayor of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan from 1986 to June 30, 1998. In the course of the investigation of the Commission on Audit, the Audit Team (AT) discovered a shortage of Php2,872,808.00 on the joint accounts of Pacita Costes (Costes), then Municipal Treasurer, and Venezuela, as well as illegal cash advances. Consequently, the AT issued three demand letters to Venezuela, ordering him to liquidate his cash advances. An audit report was thereafter submitted by the Team, which Venezuela denied the truth of the contents thereof. Venezuela avers that he had fully liquidated his cash advances to Costes and that he presented receipts proving his payments. On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Ombudsman, counter that the fact of payment was not proven, and even if established, would not exonerate him from the crime. Also, the receipts were issued to different persons, in different amounts and for different purposes. Moreover, during the period shown in the official receipts presented by Venezuela, Costes, the alleged issuer of the receipts, was no longer holding office at the Municipal Treasurer's Office. The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision convicting Venezuela of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds. The Sandiganbayan held that the prosecution proved all the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish Venezuela's guilt beyond reasonable doubt (NO) RULING: The elements of malversation are (i) that the offender is a public officer, (ii) that he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office, (iii) that those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable, and (iv) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. In the case at bar, all the elements for the crime were sufficiently proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Venezuela was a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan from 1997 to 1998, the period relevant to the time of the crime charged. Likewise, during Venezuela's tenure as the municipal mayor, he incurred unliquidated cash advances amounting to Php2,872,808.00. These unliquidated cash advances constituted funds belonging to the Municipality of Pozorrubio, and earmarked for use by the said municipality. Finally, anent the last element for the crime of malversation of public funds, Venezuela failed to return the amount of Php2,572,808.00, upon demand. His failure or inability to return the shortage upon demand created a prima facie evidence that the funds were put to his personal use, which Venezuela failed to overturn. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 80 On the claim of Venezuela of full payment of the unliquidated cash advances, the Court held that payment or reimbursement is not a defense in malversation. The payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of, or compromise on the amounts or funds malversed or misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not extinguish the accused's criminal liability or relieve the accused from the penalty prescribed by the law. At best, such acts of reimbursement may only affect the offender's civil liability, and may be credited in his favor as a mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender. Nevertheless, the Court observed that Venezuela did not fully prove his defense of payment. Lastly, the Court maintained that demand is not necessary in malversation. Demand merely raises a prima facie presumption that the missing funds have been put to personal use. The demand itself, however, is not an element of, and is not indispensable to constitute malversation. G. Crimes against Persons PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, -versus- JESUS EMPUESTO y SOCATRE, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 218245, THIRD DIVISION, January 17, 2018, MARTIRES, J. For a charge of rape under Article 266-A (1) of RA 8353 to prosper, it must be proved that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman (2) through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented. What is decisive in a charge of rape is the complainant's positive identification of the accused as the malefactor. In this case, AAA was able to positively identify Socatre as the person who surreptitiously entered her house. Because the room where AAA and her children were sleeping was lighted, she was able to distinctly see Socatre armed with a bolo and standing beside the mosquito net. FACTS: In an Information, accused-appellantJesus Empuesto y Socatre (Socatre) was charged with rape. The prosecution tried to prove its case through the testimony of private complainant AAA, BBB, Rebecca Bantilan, and Dr. Jaime Gregorio L. Salarda. On 1 July 2005, Socatre went to Rebecca's house to invite her husband to attend the Parents-Teachers Association (PTA) meeting. Rebecca's husband is the brother of AAA's husband. Because Rebecca's husband was plowing the field at that time, he asked Rebecca to come with Socatre instead. At about 2:30 p.m., when Rebecca and Socatre were already in front of AAA's house on their way to attend the PTA meeting, Socatre called out to ask AAA, "Marehan, is padrehan still in Cebu?" to which AAA answered in the affirmative. On 3 July 2005, at about 1:00 a.m., Socatre stealthily entered AAA's house through a hole on the floor which was made of bamboo slats and elevated from the ground. While she and her children were sleeping, AAA heard a noise coming through the floor. Because the light was on, AAA saw that it was Socatre who entered the house. Armed with a bolo, Socatre switched off the light. He poked his bolo at AAA and told her not to make any noise, otherwise, he would kill her and her children. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 81 Because AAA's youngest child was crying, Socatre told AAA to breastfeed her child. Then, Socatre removed AAA’s panty and forcefully inserted his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, Socatre left while AAA just cried out of fear. AAA saw a black female panty on the floor which she believed belonged to Socatre because whenever she washed clothes at the river she would usually see him there taking a bath and wearing a black panty. That same morning, AAA went to her parents-in-law and narrated to them what happened. Thereafter, she went to the police and submitted herself to a medical examination. The RTC found Socatre guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape. The CA affirmed the RTC decision with modifications as to the award of damages. ISSUE: Whether the court a quo erred in pronouncing the guilt of Socatre despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (NO) RULING: For a charge of rape under Article 266-A (1) of RA 8353 to prosper, it must be proved that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman (2) through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented. What is decisive in a charge of rape is the complainant's positive identification of the accused as the malefactor. Records will confirm that AAA was able to positively identify Socatre as the person who surreptitiously entered her house. She knew Socatre because they were neighbors. Her husband was the godfather of Socatre's eldest son, thus, he called her "marehan." Because the room where AAA and her children were sleeping was lighted, she was able to distinctly see Socatre armed with a bolo. She saw Socatre turn off the light and get inside the mosquito net. Indeed, even if Socatre turned off the light, she was sure that it was he who got inside the mosquito net because she clearly recognized his voice when he threatened her; when he told her that he needed only her; when he ordered her to remove her panty; and when he instructed her to breastfeed her youngest child. AAA testified that because she was immobilized by fear, Socatre was the one who removed her panty. Socatre then positioned himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. Undeniably, all the elements of rape had been clearly and effectively proven by the prosecution and convinced the SC to sustain the findings of the trial court. The SC found Jesus Empuesto y Socatre guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape under Art. 266-A 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 84 It must be remembered that if courts were to convict based on the lone testimony of the victim, her testimony must be clear, straightforward, convincing, and consistent with human experience. The courts must set a high standard in evaluating the credibility of the testimony of a victim who is not a minor and is mentally capable. Second, the SC also find it dubious how AAA was able to identify Amarela considering that the whole incident allegedly happened in a dark place. In fact, she had testified that the place was not illuminated and that she did not see Amarela's face. Indeed, the first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt. Third, her claim that she was forcibly brought under a makeshift stage, stripped naked, and then raped seems unrealistic and beyond human experience. Fourth, the challenge to AAA's credibility is further supported by the medical findings of the medico- legal officer. The medico-legal certificate would reflect that AAA had no pertinent physical injuries. As to Racho's case, the SC noted that AAA testified only once for both criminal cases. This means that both Amarela and Racho were convicted based on her lone testimony. Since the SC doubted AAA's account on how she was raped by Amarela, the SC had to consider her testimony against Racho under the same light. The prosecution has the primordial duty to present its case with clarity and persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion. The prosecution in this case miserably failed to present a clear story of what transpired. Henceforth, the SC was constrained to reverse the RTC and the CA rulings due to the presence of lingering doubts which are inconsistent with the requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt as quantum of evidence to convict an accused in a criminal case. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, -versus- NOEL BEJIM y ROMERO, accused- appellant. G.R. No. 208835, FIRST DIVISION, January 19, 2018, DEL CASTILLO, J. Carnal knowledge is "the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a woman." There must be proof that his penis touched the labias of the victims or slid into their female organs and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, to produce a conviction of rape by sexual intercourse. The testimonies of "AAA" and "BBB" show that the evidence adduced by the prosecution did not conclusively establish the element of carnal knowledge. In Criminal Case Nos. 07-CR-6765, 07-CR-6766, and 07-CR-6767, there is no categorical proof of entrance of Romero’s male organ into the labia of the pudendum of "AAA." Neither is there evidence to show that Romero made an attempt to penetrate "AAA's" vagina. The prosecution's evidence lacks definite details regarding penile penetration. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 85 FACTS: Romero was charged before the RTC with seven counts of statutory rape under seven separate Informations. The cases were consolidated and tried jointly. Criminal Case No. 07-CR-6765 "AAA" first met Romero who was the helper of her cousin "CCC's" father at "CCC's" house when she went there to play. In the first week of October 2001 while at "CCC's" house, Romero made "AAA" lie on a sofa. He undressed her, applied cooking oil on her vagina and on his penis, and then rubbed his penis against her vagina. He then pulled "CCC" to the sofa and again placed cooking oil on his penis and on "CCC's" vagina. Romero warned "AAA" and "CCC" not to tell anyone of what transpired otherwise he would kill them and their families. Criminal Case No. 07-CR-6766 Sometime in the second or third week of October 2001, while "AAA" and "CCC" were playing at the latter's house, Romero again pulled them to a sofa. "AAA" and "CCC" tried to run away but Romero caught them at the living room. He forced "AAA" to lie on the sofa and applied cooking oil on his penis and her vagina. Romero rubbed his penis on "AAA's" vagina. She felt pain. Thereafter, Romero likewise pulled "CCC" to the sofa and rubbed his penis against her vagina. After threatening them, Romero wore his pants and went out of the house. Criminal Case No. 07-CR-6767 "BBB" is also a cousin of "CCC" and "AAA." In the first week of September 2001 while she and "CCC" were inside the latter's house, Romero suddenly pulled them to the sofa. Romero laid "CCC" on the sofa, applied cooking oil on her vagina and his penis, and tried to insert his penis into "CCC's" vagina. Thereafter, Romero turned to "BBB." He made her lie on the sofa and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. Unsuccessful, he just rubbed his penis against her vagina. "BBB'' felt pain. Romero immediately ran away upon seeing the arrival of "BBB's" cousins. "BBB" told her cousins that they were sexually molested by Romero but warned them not to tell anybody. Criminal Case No. 07-CR-6768 In the first week of September 2001, while “CCC” and "BBB" were playing inside their house, Romero made “CCC” lie on the sofa and put cooking oil on his penis and on her vagina. "BBB" saw Romero’s penis penetrating "CCC's" vagina. When Romero saw "CCC's" two sisters he went out of the house. Criminal Case No. 07-CR-6769 In the second week of October 2001, appellant laid "CCC" on the kitchen table, put cooking oil on his penis and her vagina and tried to penetrate it but was unsuccessful. Criminal Case No. 07-CR-6770 DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 86 In the last week of October 2001, while "CCC" was sleeping in her sister's bedroom, Romero came and mounted her and tried to insert his penis but he failed, albeit she felt his big penis. "CCC" did not tell her father of what happened because of Romero’s threat. Criminal Case No. 07-CR-6771 Sometime in the first week of October 2001 and while inside "CCC's" house, Romero laid "CCC" on the sofa, put cooking oil on her vagina and his penis. He tried to insert his penis into her vagina but failed. Thereafter, Romero went outside. The RTC found Romero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven counts of rape. The CA affirmed with modifications the RTC Consolidated Judgment. ISSUE: Whether the court a quo gravely erred in finding Romero guilty of the crime of rape despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (YES – in Criminal Case Nos. 07-CR-6765, 07-CR-6766, 07-CR-6767, and 07-CR-6769) (NO – in Criminal Case Nos. 07-CR-6768 and 07-CR-6771) RULING: Criminal Case Nos. 07-CR-6765, 07-CR-6766, and 07-CR-6767 Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman with the use of force, threat or intimidation or when she is under 12 years of age or is demented. Where the victim is below 12 years old, the only subject of inquiry is whether "carnal knowledge" took place. Carnal knowledge is "the act of a man having sexual intercourse with a woman." There must be proof that his penis touched the labias of the victims or slid into their female organs and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, to produce a conviction of rape by sexual intercourse. The testimonies of "AAA" and "BBB" show that the evidence adduced by the prosecution did not conclusively establish the element of carnal knowledge. In Criminal Case Nos. 07-CR-6765, 07-CR- 6766, and 07-CR-6767, there is no categorical proof of entrance of Romero’s male organ into the labia of the pudendum of "AAA." Neither is there evidence to show that Romero made an attempt to penetrate "AAA's" vagina. The prosecution's evidence lacks definite details regarding penile penetration. On the contrary, "AAA" and "BBB" stated that Romero merely "brushed or rubbed" his penis on their respective private organs. While "BBB" testified that Romero tried to insert his penis into her vagina, she nevertheless failed to state for the record that there was the slightest penetration into it. What is clear on record is that Romero merely brushed it. Indeed, the grazing of the victims' private organ caused pain, but it cannot be presumed that carnal knowledge indeed took place by reason thereof. As the Court held in People v. Brioso, "the Court is loath to convict an accused for rape solely on the basis of the pain experienced by the victim as a result of efforts to insert the penis into the vagina." Significantly, from their own declaration following the public prosecutor's questioning, they suffered pains not because of Romero’s attempt to insert his penis but because of the grazing of their vagina. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 89 Both elements of treachery are doubtlessly attendant here. Even in the short span of time that Celestina turned her back to switch on the stove, accused-appellant already managed to start his deplorable deed. This is a sign of his conscious choice to employ the specific means and methods to kill Glaiza, and not the product of some sudden emotional response. There is also no proof to show that he and Glaiza were engaged in a heated discussion immediately prior to the incident. Further, Glaiza was attacked in the back, with accused-appellant holding her hair to prevent her from moving. The second element of treachery is likewise undoubtedly present. The time and place, and manner of attack were deliberately chosen. The time of the attack was a time in which people usually prepare their supper and households are buzzing with activity. Accused-appellant's mode of attack, of suddenly entering the house and going straight to where Glaiza was is also clearly indicative of his nefarious plan to attack when Glaiza was not in a position to defend herself. With this finding that treachery is present, the conclusion that the circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed therein necessarily follows. Notably, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling need not be "deliberately and purposely intended" by an accused for it to be appreciated. Rather, it aggravates the felony when the crime was committed in the residence of the offended party and the latter did not give any provocation. It is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy accorded to the human abode. As pointed out earlier, Glaiza was only preparing dinner in the sanctity of her home when the attack happened. Clearly, there was no provocation that would exempt this case from being aggravated by the circumstance of dwelling. Therefore, the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant should be that for an aggravated crime, which is death in this case. However, pursuant to R.A. 9346, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed, with no eligibility for parole. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,-versus- EDWIN DAGSA y BANTAS,accused- appellant. G.R. No. 219889, SECOND DIVISION, January 29, 2018, PERALTA, J. Under the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and affirmed by settled jurisprudence, even though the crime charged against the accused was for rape through carnal knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without violating any of his constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime of rape.||| The CA found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610, which defines and penalizes acts of lasciviousness committed against a child|. The essential elements of this provision are: 1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 90 2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. 3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age As to the first element, witnesses positively testified that accused-appellant fondled AAA's vagina. The second element requires that the lascivious conduct be committed on a child who is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. Anent the third element, there is no dispute that AAA was four years old at the time of the commission of the crime.||| FACTS: The victim, AAA, a young girl who was then four (4) years old, was walking home with two of her classmates|||when accused-appellant|.blocked their path and told AAA's classmates to go ahead as he would be giving AAA a candy. AAA's classmates left her and, after walking a little farther, they looked back and saw accused-appellant remove AAA's panty and proceeded to fondle her vagina||| The following day, while BBB was giving AAA a bath, the latter refused that her vagina be washed claiming that it was painful. Upon her mother's inquiry, AAA replied that accused-appellant played with her vagina and inserted his penis in it. BBB immediately went to talk to AAA's classmates about the incident whereby the said classmates relayed to her what they saw. They then proceeded to the police station to report the incident. AAA's classmates gave their statements, but AAA was not able to give hers as she was too shy. A criminal complaint for rape was eventually filed against accused- appellant. RTC held that ccused is guilty as charged, while the CA modified the conviction to Acts of Lasciviousness. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in finding accused-appellant not liable for rape. (NO) RULING: The CA did not commit error in finding accused-appellant not liable for rape. Pertinent portions of the CA Decision, which the Court quotes with approval, are as follows: Here, the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish that Edwin had carnal knowledge of AAA. Michael's testimony did not show that Edwin had carnal knowledge with AAA. He only testified that he saw Edwin holding AAA's vagina. Clearly, Michael and Jomie's testimonies failed to prove that Edwin inserted his penis [into] AAA's vagina. What they saw was only his act of fondling AAA's private part which is not rape. BBB's testimony that AAA admitted to her that she was sexually molested by Edwin cannot be treated as part of the res gestae. To be admissible as part of theres gestae, a statement must be spontaneous, made during a startling occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, and must relate to the circumstance of such occurrence. Here, AAA did not immediately tell BBB of the alleged rape. It was only the next day that she told her mother of the incident after DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 91 she was asked what was wrong. Verily, the declaration was not voluntarily and spontaneously made as to preclude the idea of deliberate design. Nonetheless, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Under the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and affirmed by settled jurisprudence, even though the crime charged against the accused was for rape through carnal knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without violating any of his constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime of rape.||| The CA found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610, which defines and penalizes acts of lasciviousness committed against a child|. The essential elements of this provision are: 1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. 2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. 3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age As to the first element, Records show that the prosecution duly established this element when the witnesses positively testified that accused-appellant fondled AAA's vagina sometime in October 2004.||| The second element requires that the lascivious conduct be committed on a child who is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. In the case of Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, this Court explained that the phrase, "other sexual abuse" in the above provision covers not only a child who is abused for profit, but also one who engages in lascivious conduct through the coercion or intimidation by an adult.||| As in the present case, it is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. This is especially true in the case of young, innocent and immature girls, like AAA, who could not be expected to act with equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel Anent the third element, there is no dispute that AAA was four years old at the time of the commission of the crime.||| Thus, on the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that the CA correctly found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, -versus- EMILIANO DE CHAVEZ, accused- appellant. G.R. No. 218427, FIRST DVISION, January 31, 2018, DEL CASTILLO, J. Inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the testimony of a rape victim is not unusual considering that the painful experience is oftentimes not remembered in detail. The Court has consistently ruled that there is sufficient basis to conclude the existence of carnal knowledge when the testimony of a rape victim is DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 94 the mall, Dalimoos saw Cirbeto suddenly pull a knife from the right side of his back, hold Casipit's shirt with his left hand, and stab him with the knife using his right hand. Cirbeto was able to stab Casipit once before the latter managed to run away. However, Cirbeto ran after Casipit and caught up to him. Thereafter, the former held the latter's shirt again, pulled him to the ground, and stabbed him repeatedly, resulting in the latter's death. Casipit sustained five (5) stab wounds caused by a bladed weapon. Consequently, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Murder attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and abused of superior strength. RTC ruled that Cirbeto attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, which it inferred from the act of accused-appellant in bringing with him a knife and waiting for the perfect moment to kill Casipit. CA affirmed the decision of RTC. CA found that Casipit was caught off-guard when he was stabbed by accused-appellant, which act reeks of treachery. CA likewise sustained the RTC's finding that evident premeditation was present in this case, as the same may be inferred from the outward act of Cirbeto in bringing a knife with him. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed accused-appellant’s conviction for the crime of Murder. (YES) RULING: To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following elements must be established: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. In this case, the prosecution was able to establish a confluence of the foregoing elements, considering the following: (1) the victim Casipit was killed; (2) accused-appellant was positively identified as the one who killed him; (3) Casipit's killing was attended by treachery, a qualifying circumstance; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide. Treachery was correctly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance in this case. Treachery is the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tends directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. The evidence in this case clearly shows that the attack against Casipit was sudden, deliberate, and unexpected. He was completely unaware of any threat to his life as he was merely walking with accused-appellant on the date and time in question. However, the Court is of a different view with respect to the purported presence of evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to be considered as a qualifying or an aggravating circumstance, the prosecution must prove: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (c) a DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 95 sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. In this case, nothing has been offered to establish when and how he planned and prepared for the same, nor was there a showing that sufficient time had lapsed between his determination and execution. The Court stresses the importance of the requirement in evident premeditation with respect to the sufficiency of time between the resolution to carry out the criminal intent and the criminal act, affording such opportunity to coolly and serenely think and deliberate on the meaning and the consequences of what accused-appellant had planned to do, where the interval should be long enough for the conscience and better judgment to overcome the evil desire and scheme. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, -versus- ROMULO BANDOQUILLO y OPALDA, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 218913, FIRST DVISION, February 7, 2018, DEL CASTILLO, J As held in People v. Ortoa full penetration is not necessary for rape to be consummated: x x x In any case, for rape to be consummated, full penetration is not necessary. Penile invasion necessarily entails contact with the labia. It suffices that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum of the female organ. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape. Note that when the offended party is a young and immature girl between the age of 12 to 16, as in this case, courts are inclined to give credence to her version of the incident, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the public humiliation to which she would be exposed by court trial if her accusation were untrue. FACTS: "AAA," then only 14 years of age, was sleeping inside her room in their house when she was suddenly awakened by her father, herein appellant, who forcibly undressed her, touched her breasts and kissed her neck. "AAA" begged appellant not to continue with what he was doing. Appellant, however, disregarded his daughter's pleas and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of "AAA.” Immediately thereafter, "AAA" contacted her mother, "ZZZ," who was then residing in Manila, and disclosed what had happened to her. "ZZZ" quickly travelled back to Sorsogon. Thereafter, "AAA" and "ZZZ" reported the incident to DSWD and the local authorities. "AAA" was then physically examined. Based on her Medical Certificate "AAA" had healed lacerations as well as hematoma on the outer part of her vaginal canal. RTC found appellant guilty of the crime rape under Article 266-A. CA affirmed the assailed the decision of the RTC with the following modification: a.) it convicted appellant of qualified rape. ISSUE: Whether “AAA’s” testimony is credible, given the inconsistency in her testimony as regards the consummation of the crime. (YES) DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FCL 96 RULING: The alleged inconsistency in "AAA's" testimony, i.e., that "AAA" had earlier testified that appellant's penis was only able to enter the labia of her sexual organ but later stated that appellant was able to insert his penis into her vagina, is more apparent than real. There is no real inconsistency in "AAA's" narration of the rape incident: first, appellant's penis touched the labia of "AAA's" sexual organ; second, appellant tried to push his penis into "AAA's" sexual organ, and "AAA" felt pain and tried to resist; and third, appellant was not able to fully penetrate "AAA's" vagina because her little brother, who was sleeping outside her room, woke up and called out to their father. As held in People v. Ortoa full penetration is not necessary for rape to be consummated: x x x In any case, for rape to be consummated, full penetration is not necessary. Penile invasion necessarily entails contact with the labia. It suffices that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum of the female organ. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape. Note that when the offended party is a young and immature girl between the age of 12 to 16, as in this case, courts are inclined to give credence to her version of the incident, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the public humiliation to which she would be exposed by court trial if her accusation were untrue. Given these circumstances, appellant is guilty of the crime qualified rape under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, where the rape victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, -versus - JOMAR SISRACON y RUPISAN, MARK VALDERAMA y RUPISAN, ROBERTO CORTEZ y BADILLA, LUIS PADUA y MITRA and ADONIS MOTIL y GOLONDRINA, Accused-Appellants. G.R. No. 226494, SECOND DIVISION, February 14, 2018, PERALTA, J. The elements of rape committed under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are: (a) that the offender, who must be a man, had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (b) that such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation. In this case, all the elements of the crime of rape have been properly established by the prosecution and aptly appreciated by the RTC and the CA. FACTS: In nine (9) Informations, the appellants were charged of the crime of Qualified Rape as defined and penalized under Art. 266-A, par. 1 in relation to Art. 266-B, 2nd par. of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 8353 and in further relation of Sec. 5 of R.A. 8369. AAA, the victim who was then 15 yrs. old, testified that after the appellants intoxicated her, appellant Jomar Sisracon (Jomar) went on top of her and, against her will, inserted his penis in her vagina. After having carnal knowledge with AAA, Jomar told the others "sino ang susunod"? Thus, another man of heavier weight went on top of AAA and inserted his penis in her vagina. AAA identified that it was Jomar who carried him to another room and placed her in a "papag" because she heard him say, "dito