Criminal Negligence and Intoxication: Impact on Mens Rea and Accomplice Liability, Exams of Criminal Law

Download Criminal Negligence and Intoxication: Impact on Mens Rea and Accomplice Liability and more Exams Criminal Law in PDF only on Docsity! file:///J|/Backups/WEB%20ARCHIVE/OLDSITE/Full%20Jan%2030%202008/exams/Content/law2.htm[1/22/2009 3:45:04 PM] ANSWERS - - PART I . Question 1, Part A: It is clear that Smith did not have the death of the victim as his conscious objective thus did not "intend" to cause death. It is also clear that he did not have awareness of the risk of death to his victim when he shot the gun at the rat, at least there is no evidence of awareness of such risk. Consequently, subject to the discussion in Part B below, it is unlikely that Smith could be shown to have acted "recklessly" toward his victim. Only the offense of manslaughter in the third degree is a realistic possibility. Assuming that Smith and Carter were not committing an unlawful act in shooting at the city dump, a conviction of Smith for third degree manslaughter would require proof of criminal negligence. Criminal negligence is committed through conduct which involves (i) a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death to another and (ii) a gross deviation from the standard of care of an ordinary reasonable person. To prove criminal negligence, the state need not show that the accused was aware of this risk; it is enough if he failed to perceive a risk of which he should have been aware. The evidence in this case would be sufficient to show the kind of risk needed for a finding of criminal negligence. Liability would probably turn upon whether or not the second element of criminal negligence can be proved. The conduct of Smith would surely constitute ordinary negligence and be sufficient for tort liability, since only a "deviation" from proper conduct is required for tort recovery. Although the question is a close one, most courts would probably conclude on the basis of this evidence that criminal negligence is provable; on the basis of the evidence a jury would have to decide if the devision was "gross" or "ordinary". Question 1. Part B: It is clear in all jurisdictions that voluntary intoxication is not per se a defense to a criminal charge. The law will not excuse one who commits an act while intoxicated simply because he would not have committed it while sober. Thus, Smith will not be able to raise his drinking as a general defense to the charges against him. However this does not mean that intoxication is irrelevant to an analysis of the case. The treatment of intoxication varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction: The traditional position is usually stated as follows: voluntary intoxication may be used to negate an element of specific intent but not one of general intent. The difficulty with this approach lies with the absence of a workable distinction between the two kinds of mental elements. Most commonly, a crime of specific intent is defined as one requiring an intent beyond the intent to do the act which constitutes file:///J|/Backups/WEB%20ARCHIVE/OLDSITE/Full%20Jan%2030%202008/exams/Content/law2.htm[1/22/2009 3:45:04 PM] the offense; all other offenses are defined as general intent crimes. Under this definition, perhaps none of the homicide offenses contained in the Lafferty statutes would qualify as "specific intent" crimes. Some courts might treat the "intent to kill" offenses as specific intent crimes. Since Smith will be charged only with an offense having recklessness or negligence as the mental state, the traditional approach would probably deny him any use of intoxication as a defense. The Model Code, and modern statutes patterned after it, provide for a broader application of voluntary intoxication. Evidence of such intoxication may be intoduced to negate any element of an offense which it will negate, with one exception. Since it can negate only mental states, this means in effect that intoxication can be used to disprove the mental states of intention (by demonstrating no conscious objective) and knowledge (by demonstrating no mental awareness). It could negate the mental state of recklessness (by demonstrating no awareness of risk) but for the fact that the MPC and other codes have denied intoxication this impact. Of course, voluntary intoxication cannot negate criminal negligence since it is committed through failure to perceive a risk. In a few jurisdictions, the courts have given intoxication an even more limited role. Certainly, it would not in these jurisdictions have a place in a case involving unintentional homicide. Conclusion: Since the offense most likely to be charged against Smith is manslaughter committed through criminal negligence, his voluntary intoxication could not be used to his advantage. Could it be used to the advantage of the prosecution? The answer is yes. It could be used as evidence of negligence, i.e., showing a gross deviation from reasonable conduct in shooting a gun while under the influence. Also, in a MPC jurisdiction, it might even serve to allow a finding of recklessness if it could be found that the accused was unaware of risk solely because of his voluntary intoxication. Question 1, Part C: Since Carter did not himself commit the act which caused the death of the victim, his liability (if any) would have to be under the law governing accomplices. Generally, one is guilty of accomplice liability when he either encourages the commission of an offense or aids in its commission (actus reus) and does so with an intention to promote the commission of the offense (mens rea). Strictly construed, these elements might not be provable against Carter. He did not encourage the commission of homicide; certainly, he did not have an intention to promote the commission of an offense of homicide. file:///J|/Backups/WEB%20ARCHIVE/OLDSITE/Full%20Jan%2030%202008/exams/Content/law2.htm[1/22/2009 3:45:04 PM] possibility of making a defense to the charge of homicide. Question 3, Part A: The only homicide offense possibly chargeable against Nuchols would be third degree manslaughter. It is arguable that his conduct constitutes criminal negligence, i.e., that it had a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death in it and a gross deviation from the standard of care of a reasonable man. Clearly Nuchols was not aware of this risk of death, which assures that his mens rea is negligence and not recklessness. Whether or not these elements could be proved is somewhat questionable. It may be that a court would conclude that the conduct of Nuchols did not create a sufficient risk of death for homicide liability; also, it may be that courts would conclude that there is a "deviation" from proper conduct but not a "gross deviation". A stronger argument for liability for manslaughter, however, could be made under the second part of the statute. Nuchols act of fighting with Murphy could be seen as an illegal act not amounting to a felony (i.e., assault) with death being the result of the illegal act; this is known as misdemeanor manslaughter. The difficulty of proceeding against Nuchols under this section of the statute may be that the unlawful act is not "independent" of the homicide, a concept which applies to felony murder and might be applied to this related concept. There are two other difficulties involved in proceeding against Nuchols for homicide. He may claim a defense of self-defense since his blow to Murphy's chin was in response to an attempt by Murphy to strike Nuchols. One does have a right to defend himself against an unlawful attack by another. However, it may be that Nuchols act of provocation (calling Murphy an S.O.B.) could serve to deprive him of the defense of self-defense. The specific law of the jurisdiction would be determinative. In addition, Nuchols may argue that the act of Banks was an intervening cause of the death of Murphy which serves to supercede his own actions in bringing about the death. The intervening cause in this instance would be an independent one (operating upon conditions produced by the defendant) and would be judged by the "foreseeability" standard. Probably, it could be found foreseeable since the fight occurred near the street. Question 3, Part B: Banks would be charged, if at all, under the statute creating the offense of third degree manslaughter. It is possible but not very likely that his conduct could be viewed as criminal negligence. Certainly, driving a car on a street poses a substantial risk of death to other people. The problem of proving criminal negligence against Banks would be in establishing a "gross deviation". His driving in excess of the speed limit would constitute a "deviation" from proper care but it is very unlikely that this could be viewed as a "gross deviation". However, it is clear that Banks was driving in excess of the speed limit at the time of the incident. This is an unlawful act not amounting to a felony and would be sufficient to trigger the misdemeanor-manslaughter concept. So, it is possible for Banks to be prosecuted for homicide. file:///J|/Backups/WEB%20ARCHIVE/OLDSITE/Full%20Jan%2030%202008/exams/Content/law2.htm[1/22/2009 3:45:04 PM] Perhaps the best defense which could be made for Banks would be that of lack of causation. Homicide is a result crime. It will be necessary for the prosecution to prove that Banks' unlawful act was the actual cause of the death in question. The inquiry is this: Can it be said that "but for" Banks illegal act of driving above the speed limit the death would not have occurred. It may be very difficult for the prosecution to prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt. This gives Banks a chance for acquittal. Question 4: The evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Dugan killed Barton intentionally, i.e., with death of Barton being a conscious objective of Dugan. His act of shooting the victim with a deadly weapon is sufficient standing along to support the finding but there is more evidence of intention. It is clear that Dugan had strong negative feelings about Barton; shortly before the shooting he threatened to kill him if he ever touched Joyce again. Unless Dugan can provide evidence indicating a lack of intention to kill through his own testimony, the analysis of liability will have to focus on the offenses of murder and first degree manslaughter. Under the law of Lafferty, murder is committed through an intentional killing. However, a murder offense may be mitigated to the lesser included offense of first degree manslaughter if it is shown that the defendant killed while acting under an "extreme emotional disturbance" for which there is "a reasonable excuse or explanation". The Lafferty statute is based on the Model Penal Code proposal for dealing with emotional killings. The traditional law provided mitigation on the basis of (i) adequate provocation; (ii) heat of passion; (iii) suddenness; and (iv) a killing caused by the provocation and passion. The MPC is slightly more liberal but still seeks to provide mitigation for an emotional killing that has a reasonable explanation for it. The evidence in this case provides a classic illustration of the situation in which the element of mitigation comes into play. The evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was acting under extreme emotional disturbance and it is also sufficient for a finding of reasonableness. The jury would have to decide. The defendant has the possibility of complete acquittal on the basis of self-defense. Under the traditional law, he would be relieved of liability if he (i) believed that he faced a threat of death or serious bodily injury at the hands of another; (ii) believed that he used only such force as was necessary to defend himself against the threat; and (iii) had reasonable grounds for his beliefs. He has a chance to prove this defense. His greatest difficulty may come in proving the last element. Brian was not in fact armed and to the defendant's knowledge had never owned a gun. His statement that he thought Brian was reaching in his pocket for a gun may be a little lacking in credibility. The prosecution will be able to introduce evidence showing hate by Dugan of Barton and will use this to show that Dugan may have wanted an excuse to kill Barton. The evidence will have file:///J|/Backups/WEB%20ARCHIVE/OLDSITE/Full%20Jan%2030%202008/exams/Content/law2.htm[1/22/2009 3:45:04 PM] to be submitted to a jury; the jury will have to decide if Dugan had reasonable grounds for his beliefs that he faced a deadly threat and that he did only what was necessary. NOTE: The Model Code adjusted the law of self-defense by allowing the defense on the basis of subjective beliefs. However, it provided that a defendant having the subjective beliefs necessary for the defense of self defense could possibly be convicted of lower homicide or assault offenses if he was reckless or criminally negligence in holding the beliefs. PART II. Question 1, Part A: David's chances for reversal on appeal are probably nonexistent. The reasons for this conclusion are as follows: Evidence of intoxication: Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to crime committed while intoxicated. However, in most jurisdictions it can be introduced as evidence to negate elements of mens rea, with its role varying somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The problem facing Sparks in this instance, however, is that there is no mental element which can be negated by his intoxication. The first offense (possession of intoxicating beverages with intent to sell) has a mental element, namely "intent to sell", but it is clear that Sparks' intoxication at the time of the party could not negate this element since it existed prior to his intoxication (i.e., from the time of his purchase of the alcohol with an intention to sell it at the party). The second offense (selling to a minor) is a strict liability offense; obviously, intoxication cannot negate any of its elements. Evidence of Mistake of Fact: The law does not recognize mistake of fact as a defense per se. This is illustrated best perhaps by the general refusal of most jurisdictions to recognize significance to a mistake as to the age of a statutory rape victim. Of course, a mistake of fact may have an evidentiary role in a case if it would serve to negate an element of the crime charged. For example, one who takes another's property believing it to be his own cannot be convicted of theft since the prosecution would be unable (because of the mistake of fact) to prove an intent to steal. When these well-established principles are applied to the present situation, it is clear once again that the judge corrected excluded the evidence of Sparks' belief that everyone at the party was above the age of 18 years. The crime of unlawfully selling to a minor had no mental state requirement. Thus, the mistake of fact had no relevancy to the issues. Evidence of Ianorance of the Law: There is a maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse. It is designed to avoid the situation where every person would establish his own code of file:///J|/Backups/WEB%20ARCHIVE/OLDSITE/Full%20Jan%2030%202008/exams/Content/law2.htm[1/22/2009 3:45:04 PM] commission of this offense. No accomplice liability for this offense. Carter: He is guilty of robbery and assault of the officer since he committed these offenses. But his liability for the burglary committed by Baker is subject to the same analysis as provided above for Baker. Knowledge of a plan to commit a crime is not sufficient mens rea for guilt as an accomplice. He had no lntentlon to promote the commission of the burglary. The same is true with respect to the car theft; his connection to this offense may be a little troublesome for him, but the facts do not indicate participation in this offense. Mere knowledge that it was going to be committed would not be sufficient for guilt. Dawkins: He is guilty of theft. Knowledge that he is facilitating the commission of robbery by providing the vehicle is not equal to an intention to promote the commission of that offense. His liability should be individualized and he specifically did not intend to participate in the robbery. He might be guilty of facilitating the robbery in a jurisdiction which has such an offense. Question 2, Part B: Conspiracy is used as a basis for vicarious liability in most jurisdictions. There are two propositions pertinent to the present case: (1) all conspirators are liable for offenses committed by coconspirators when those offenses were the objective of the conspirary; and (2) conspirators are liable for offenses which were not the objective of the conspiracy if they were a natural and probable consequence thereof. The extent to which conspiracy will be used to extend liability to actors involved in group activity varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The MPC probably has the most restricted rules and essentially limits accomplice liability to instances in which the offender has the underlying offense as his conscious objective, subject of course to the possibility of convicting one for result crimes on the basis of lesser mental states. The analysis of liability under this law would be as follows: Albert: Once again he would be liable for all the offenses. The burglary, robbery, and theft were the objectives of separate conspiracies with each of the principal offenders and the offenses were committed pursuant to the conspiracy. Only the assault of the police officer was not a specific objective of the conspiracy. However, it was foreseeable as a consequence of the conspiracy to commit armed robbery and would be viewed as a "natural and probable consequence" of the conspiracy. Baker: It is possible that Baker could be viewed as having joined a broad conspiracy which included commission of the robbery offense by Carter. He had awareness of the intention to commit it and it is clear that one can be a conspirator without knowing the identity or seeing face to face other conspirators. file:///J|/Backups/WEB%20ARCHIVE/OLDSITE/Full%20Jan%2030%202008/exams/Content/law2.htm[1/22/2009 3:45:04 PM] Some jurisdictions might be willing to see this as a chain conspiracy situation and, since Baker knew of the broader scope of the criminal enterprise, they might extend vicarious liability far enough to include him. However, he does have a good argument that he did not commit the offense of conspiracy to rob the liquor store since he never "agreed" to participate in that offense; of course, agreement is essential to the existence of a conspiracy. Under the MPC he would not be guilty of the offenses committed by Carter. Carter: The analysis described above would apply equally well to Carter in so far as the jewelry store burglary is concerned. A stronger argument could be made to hold Carter responsible for the automobile theft, assuming that he knew it was being planned and that it was for the purpose of providing a vehicle for the robbery. It would be easier for jurisdictions to find that he was a conspirator in a plan which included as objectives the car theft and subsequent robbery. However, the MPC would still not hold him responsible for this crime since it was not his conscious objective. Dawkins: Dawkins might find himself more involved in this criminal enterprise than he would like to be. Knowing that the vehicle he planned to steal was going to be used in a robbery might make it possible for courts to find him to be a conspirator in an endeavor which included the robbery of the liquor store. Of course, if found to be a conspirator in this broad plan he could be found guilty of the robbery and also the assault which occurred as a natural and probable consequence of it. Once again, MPC would look at his mental state with respect to each offense; his liability would probably be limited to theft. Question 3: Roberts' indictment for attempted shootina into residence: The offense of attempt is generally defined as an act toward the commission of a crime with an intention to commit that crime. The mens rea is intention, meaning that the actor must have had the underlying crime as his conscious objective. Under this law it is clear that not every act done with an intention to commit an offense will be an attempt. The actor must go beyond mere "preparation" in order to commit the offense; he must cross a line between preparation and "perpetration" in order to satisfy the act requirement. Several standards of measurements have been used to determine whether or not a person has gone far enough to commit attempt. Probably the two most common standards predating the MPC were the "physical proximity" standard (which required the actor to come dangerously close to success) and the "probable disistance" standard (which required the actor to go so far that it was probable he would have completed the offense absent outside interference). The MPC has provided another standard which has been widely adopted; it requires that the actor have taken a substantial step toward commission of the offense, with this defined to mean that his act must be strongly corroborative of his intention. All of these tests are designed to file:///J|/Backups/WEB%20ARCHIVE/OLDSITE/Full%20Jan%2030%202008/exams/Content/law2.htm[1/22/2009 3:45:04 PM] accomplish the same thing, namely, to provide some assurances that the actor has an intention to commit an offense and that his intention is a firm one. Conclusion: The prosecution may have trouble proving intent to shoot into the house. If this obstacle is overcome, a jury would have to decide if his act crossed the line between preparation and perpetration under the applicable test. Duncan's indictment for attempted murder: Had Duncan caused the death of the farmer's daughter by his act of shooting into the residence he could have been convicted of murder. His mens rea would have been extreme recklessness which manifested extreme indifference to human life. This makes it appear at first blush that his unsuccessful act might constitute attempted murder. However, there would be a serious proof problem in making a case under this indictment. As stated above, an attempt is defined to require that the actor have the underlying offense as his conscious objective. If the prosecution can prove that Duncan intended to kill the farmer or his daughter then attempted murder can be proved. But absent that proof the offense was not committed by Duncan. Of course he is guilty of the offense of shooting into an occupied residence, which in a sense is in the nature of an attempt crime. At least it is an inchoate offense designed to deal with individuals whose actions threaten injury or death. Roberts and Duncan indictment for consiracy: A conspiracy is not committed unless there is an agreement between two or more people that one or more of them will commit an offense. While an agreement need not be express and may be implied from the circumstances, it is clear that an agreement must be proved before this inchoate offense is committed. There is no evidence here of an agreement between the two actors. Roberts seems to have been acting on his own. While Duncan may have been motivated to act by Roberts attempt, it is still very difficult to see how evidence could be introduced showing an agreement between the two. PART III. Ouestion 1: The MPC definition of insanity requires that an accused suffer from a mental disease or defect which causes him to lack either (i) a substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or (ii) a substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Under the M'Naghten test the accused must also suffer a mental disease or defect. As a result of this he must either lack the capacity to know what he is doing or, if he knows what he is doing, lack to capacity to determine the wrongfulness of his conduct. In more modern versions of the M'Naghten test, the "knows what he is doing" portion of the standard has been dropped as redundant. The principal differences between the two tests are these: (1) the MPC standard has a "control" element which M'Naghten does not have (although most jurisdictions supplemented M'Naghten with irresistible impulse); (2) the MPC uses "criminality of conduct" in lieu of wrongfulness to eliminate the notion that the issue is one of ethics or morality; and (3) the use of "substantial" is designed to recognize that one can be legally insane although not extremely ill.