Fourth Amendment Rights and Police Searches: Mapp v. Ohio Case Analysis, Summaries of Criminal procedure

Download Fourth Amendment Rights and Police Searches: Mapp v. Ohio Case Analysis and more Summaries Criminal procedure in PDF only on Docsity! J. L. Ingram, Criminal procedure Crim Pro Outline Friday, January 15, 2016 3:19 PM I. Incorporation, Constitutional Sources of Criminal Procedure a. Overview of the Criminal Justice System i. Investigation ii. Arrest (there needs to be probable cause) 1. How to determine if there is probable cause a. There is enough evidence against accused b. A reasonable person believes the evidence 2. Arrests can occur by a police officer, indictment by a grand jury, or through a summons from a judge/magistrate 3. There needs to be some investigation before some sort of arrest is made pursuant to the 4th Amendment ii. Initial Judicial Appearance 1. Soon after the arrest is made, the arrested person appears before a judge (this may be in the form of an arraignment) ii. Preliminary Hearing 1. Filing of Formal Criminal Charge ii. Arraignment 1. At arraignments the defendant will be informed of the charges against him/her, bail may be set or not, and a pleading of guilty or non-guilty will be made ii. Trial iii. Sentencing iv. Appeal v. Collateral Attack b. Constitutional Amendments (Due Process and Incorporation of the Bill of Rights) i. 4th Amendment 1. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized ii. 5th Amendment 1. …; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law… ii. 6th Amendment 1. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State…to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him…and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense ii. 14th Amendment 1. …No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; not shall any ii. The exclusionary rules apply to ALL evidence obtained illegally, thus there is some retrenchment or refinement of the law b. 1995 proposed legislation is to make illegal searches and seizures only a civil suit, thus providing a civil remedy i. Need to show actual damages ii. Also, agents/officers would only be disciplined if they lacked a good faith belief that the search and seizure was constitutional 2. What justified the extension of the exclusionary rule a. Exclusion is an essential part of the right to privacy and an important constitutional privilege. An individual who has suffered an unreasonable search or seizure has a 14th Amendment right to exclusion b. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effective available way- by removing the incentive to disregard it. In other words, the rule is also a future-oriented deterrent sanction c. There is another consideration-the imperative of judicial integrity. Judges should not taint the courts by allowing the fruits of official violations of privacy to be used to convict d. Recognition of an exclusionary rule that is applicable to the states creates desirable symmetry between the federal state systems e. The right to privacy ought to be treated like other constitutional guarantees-specifically, like the due process right not to be convicted on the basis of a coerced confession. If the products of coercion are excluded confession. If the products of coercion are excluded, the product of unreasonable searches and seizures should also be excluded. b. The "Threshold" of the 4th Amendment Right to be Secure against Searches i. Exclusionary rule is the remedy of a violation of the 4th Amendment 1. Before we get to a remedy, we need to figure out what constitutes a violation of the 4th Amendment ii. The threshold question is whether the conduct of police officials constitutes a 4th Amendment search iii. The framers of the constitution in drafting the 4th Amend. were concerned with illegal searches due to what they had to go through (i.e. intrusion of the home or office, physical intrusion, and non-physical) 1. Property concept ii. Physical intrusions w/o permission or warrants enter premises, listening devices requires penetration into a private space, false friends (i.e. undercover agents, those who are friends that turn on you) 1. This is what occurred based on Olmstead 2. For false friends, courts did not find the evidence illegally obtained ii. Not all searches fall w/in the confines of the 4th Amendment 1. If searches do fall w/in the 4th Amend., warrantless searches are deemed illegal unless there is an exception ii. Cases 1. Katz v. US a. Facts: Katz was convicted of transmitting wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston in violation of a federal law. At trial, the government offered Katz's end of telephone conversations overheard by FBI agents who had attached a listening device to the outside of the public telephone booth where Katz placed his calls b. Court held: The 4th Amend. protects people, not places c. The court of appeals rejected the contention that the recordings had been obtained in violation of the 4th Amend. b/c there was no physical entrance into the area occupied d. The Supreme Court stated that the 4th Amendment protects people, not places i. Pg. 6 --> Highlighted phases in 1st paragraph ii. Pg. 6 --> Bottom of pg. highlighted phrase b. Supreme Court also stated that penetration is a non-factor c. Harlan's concurrence i. Coins the phrase: "Reasonable expectation of privacy" ii. He creates a two-part test for "reasonable expectations" that the Court majority later adopts: 1. An actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, that 2. Society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable" 2. US v. White a. This case deals w/ false friends and the court says that this practice of using under cover officials is okay b. Facts: White was convicted on two charges involving illegal narcotics. At trial, over White's objections, government informant. The government agents had overheard these conversations through a wire-tap the informant had been wearing, allowing them to hear every word in real time. The court of appeals reversed the conviction holding that the testimony was inadmissible at trial c. Issue: Whether the 4th Amendment prohibits gov't agents from testifying to what they overheard over a wire-tap worn by a gov't informant d. Court says that simultaneous transmissions is the same as writing down conversations for official use e. Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit government agents from testifying to what they heard over a wire- tap worn by an informant f. Rule of Law: The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures does not protect people from their misplaced expectations of trust and therefore there is no Fourth Amendment search and seizure when the person the defendant is speaking with is secretly a government agent or an informant wearing a wire and recording what is being said g. The court has held that police can write down notes about a conversation they have with a defendant while undercover and testify to those transactions h. For constitutional purposes, there is no distinction between immediately writing down these transactions and simultaneously recording or relaying the conversation to agents through electronic devices i. Electronic surveillance that allows agents to listen in real time is admissible provided the agent is not otherwise violating the defendant's reasonable expectations of privacy 2. Smith v. Maryland a. Facts: Smith was convicted of robbery. Over Smith's objection, a pen register tape that showed he had called the woman he had robbed was introduced at trial. Smith appealed his conviction. b. Issue: Whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dials from the privacy of his home c. Court held a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dials and evidence obtained through the use of a pen register is admissible in trial d. Rule of Law: The 4th Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures where a person exhibits a reasonable and subjective expectation of privacy e. It is public knowledge that the phone company keeps records of people's outgoing calls so when people make a call they are voluntarily making public who they call f. While Smith made the phone call in the privacy of his home, he only had a reasonable expectation that his conversation would remain private, not that the number he called would remain out of the public record i. Therefore, even if Smith believed he had an expectation of privacy in the number he dialed, this expectation was not reasonable and the use of a pen register does not constitute a search 2. California v. Ciraolo a. Facts: An officer obtained a private plane and flew over defendant's house at an altitude of 1000 ft. w/in navigable airspace. From that vantage point, the police readily identified marijuana plants growing in a plot in defendant's yard. They photographed the area w/ a standard 35mm camera and obtained a search warrant. Based on the evidence seized, the defendant was charged and convicted. b. Open fields do not give a person a reasonable expectation of privacy since anyone can use the field despite having a trespassing sign c. In order to get a search warrant, you need to have probable cause i. Requires some evidence and testimony/affidavits from officers 4. **Society has an interest in what is being searched ii. 4th Amendment 1. Probable Cause a. The facts and circumstances w/in the officers' knowledge and of which they have reasonable trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an item subject to seizure will be found in the place to be searched 2. Search Warrant a. Application b. Affidavit i. Signed by an officer who knows or believes to be true information he has personal knowledge of ii. Must be explicit for the information they are relying on that is not from another police personnel b. Warrant language/searches i. Minor inconsistencies/errors in warrant language cannot invalidate a warrant, but major errors can ii. Warrants need to be particular enough for what is being searched in order to prevent someone else from interpreting the warrant a different way or cause confusion (cannot leave it to the discretion of the magistrate or other officers to determine what should be searched for) 1. There is some flexibility when dealing w/ narcotics ii. Good Faith exception 1. When the warrant is made in error by the magistrate that is not obvious to the officer executing the warrant, then the exception applies 2. Probable Cause to Search a. Probable cause to search an area demands that there be sufficient likelihood that: i. Something that is subject to seizure by the government (contraband or fruits, instrumentalities or evidence of a crime) ii. Is presently iii. In the specific place to be searched 2. Informants a. No accountability b. Affidavit i. Signed by officers under pains and penalties of perjury (accountability) b. Hearsay: non-first hard knowledge 2. Cases a. Draper v. US i. Facts: A known informant, Hereford, told a narcotics agent that Draper had gone to Chicago by train on Sept. 6 and would be returning to Denver with three ounces of heroin on the morning of Sept 8 or 9 by train. Hereford provided a detained description of Draper and his clothing, said that he would be carrying a tan bag, and “walked real fast.” The agent saw a man meeting the description in all respects arrive on the morning train from Chicago on Sept 9. Draper was arrested and searched. Heroin was found on him. ii. The informant (known to the police) is not publicly known iii. This was before the test, but this is like the totality of the circumstances test 1. Taking all the circumstances together iv. What is the Court concerned about? 1. Unidentified informants i. Known to the police, but not to the magistrate ii. Unknown to the police 2. Hearsay information i. Information conveyed to the magistrate not based on the personal knowledge of the police ii. Reliability of the information b. Spinelli v. US i. Facts: Spinelli was convicted of traveling across state lines to conduct unlawful gambling activities. At every stage in the proceedings in the lower courts, Spinelli challenged the constitutionality of the warrant under which the FBI searched and seized the evidence necessary for his conviction. Dissatisfied with the Draper approach to hearsay-based findings of probable cause and wanting to underscore the principles stated in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108 (1964), the court granted certiorari and heard the Spinelli case ii. Issue: Whether information from an informant establishes the necessary probable cause to obtain a search warrant when the affidavit fails to contain details as to why the informant is reliable or explain how he came to the conclusions he did iii. Court held that information from an informant does not establish the necessary probable cause to obtain a search warrant when the affidavit fails iv. The court in Aguilar held that a warrant must set forth the underlying circumstances necessary for the magistrate to judge the validity of an informant's conclusions, and it must establish that the informant is credible and the information is reliable v. Court needs to go farther than Aguilar 1. An affidavit that lacks sufficient detail to explain why an informant is reliable and how he came to his conclusion does not provide the necessary probable cause to obtain a search warrant ii. Court says that only paragraph 4 is important to probable cause 1. The search warrant was not proper since the affidavit does not establish probable cause i. The FBI failed to show that its informant was trustworthy, or that he obtained his info in a reliable way, or that his conclusions were even valid ii. While FBI did corroborate some of the informant's info, it was unable to corroborate sufficient detail so as to arise to the level of probable cause ii. When an affidavit contains an informant's tip plus additional information and the tip is an essential part of the probable cause showing: 1. The neutral magistrate should first apply the two- pronged test (veracity and basis of knowledge inquiry) to the tip alone, 2. If that yields a finding of probable cause the inquiry can end, 3. If not, the magistrate should proceed to the second stage 4. In the second stage, the magistrate should evaluate the tip in light of the corroborating information also contained in the affidavit ii. Totality of Circumstances (AC) --> too broad iii. Want fact centered for magistrate can follow iv. Aguilar - Spinelli Two Prong Test for use of Hearsay 1. Informant must declare either i. That he has himself seen or perceived the fact or facts asserted (Basis of Personal Knowledge); OR ii. That information is hearsay, but there is a good reason for believing it (Veracity) 2. State own constitutions 3. Some states still follow this test (MA being one) ii. Rule of Law: An affidavit that lacks sufficient detail to explain why an informant is reliable and how he came to his conclusions does not provide the necessary probable cause to obtain a search warrant b. Illinois v. Gates i. Facts: An anonymous letter is sent to the police accusing the Gateses of selling drugs. The letter details their travels to Florida and back to Bloomingdale, Ill. where they live. The writer says their drug buys are done in Florida when Sue drives the family car there and Lance flies there a few days later and drives the car back. Sue flies back. He claimed that hearing is granted (must prove that the lie is w/in the four corners of the affidavit) 2. At the Frank's hearing, if D proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the lie is w/in the four corners of the affidavit and the case cannot be held w/o the info, then the case must be dropped b. Andreson v. Maryland i. Facts: Andresen was under investigation for his real estate settlement activities. Investigators were granted search warrants which included a list of “particularly described” documents and the phrase “together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown.” ii. Issue: Whether a warrant can be overbroad even though it contains highly specific descriptions of the items sought iii. Language of the Warrant 1. Most impt. Language: "together w/ other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this time unknown" ii. Court does not view the sentence alone, but views it as part of the whole paragraph 1. Thus, a warrant can be overbroad, but only to a certain extent ii. Context matters in whether a warrant is too broad or not iii. 3 Reasons Why to Have a Detailed/Particular Affidavit Requirement 1. Particularized description of what and where the police is searching limits privacy invasion 2. Protects possessory interest and prevents seizure of any item in the home 3. Ensures that warrants are based probable cause i. The more particular/specific a warrant is, the more the deficiencies may be apparent (allows D to attack the probable cause b. Wilson v. Arkansas i. Facts: The police obtained a warrant to search for narcotics at defendant’s home. Officers found the main door to her home open. While opening an unlocked screen door and entering the residence, they identified themselves as police officers and said they had a warrant. Once inside the home, the police seized narcotics, a gun and ammunition. They also found the defendant in the bathroom flushing marijuana down the toilet. ii. Issue: Whether the 4th Amendment requires that officers knock and announce themselves before executing a warrant to search a home iii. Court held that the "knock and announce" principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the 4th Amend. ii. Arrests iv. No knock searches may be considered unreasonable (needs to be at least 20-30 seconds), unless a no knock warrant is obtained v. Officer MUST knock and announce 1. Probable Cause to Arrest a. Probable cause to arrest a person requires that there be a certain quantum of likelihood that: i. The particular individual ii. Has committed or is committing a particular offense 2. Whren v. US a. Facts: Plainclothes officers on patrol in a high drug area in an unmarked car notice a dark truck with youthful occupants at a stop sign. The driver was looking down into the lap of the passenger at his right and the truck remained stopped at the intersection for more than 20 seconds. The truck then turned right without signaling and took off speeding. The officers stopped the truck. After noticing two large plastic bags of what appeared to crack cocaine in the defendant passenger’s hands, he was arrested b. Issue: Whether the temporary detention of a motorist who the police have probable cause to believe has committed a civil traffic violation is inconsistent w/ the 4th Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures unless a reasonable officer would have been motivated to stop the car by a desire to enforce the traffic laws c. D argues that use of a traffic violation as a pretense to stop and search/seize does not amount to probable cause d. However, the court says that it could amount to probable cause, thus the stop is reasonable under the 4th Amendment e. Court held that when there is probable cause that a traffic offense has occurred, the officer's subjective motives for detaining the motorist do not invalidate the officer's actions under the 4th Amendement f. Rule of Law: Except the inventory searches and administrative inspections, when probable cause of illegal conduct exists, an officer's true motive for searching or detaining a person does not negate the constitutionality of the search or seizure 3. US v. Watson a. Facts: A signal was given by a reliable informant that Watson had stolen credit cards and he was arrested. A search revealed that Watson had no cards on him. When asked if the inspector could look inside his car, Watson said “Go ahead.” The inspector entered the car and found two credit cards. Watson was arrested. b. Issue: Whether a warrantless arrest violates the 4th Amendment if there was probable cause to believe that the person had committed a felony c. If the arrest was invalid, then everything after the arrest is also invalid i. The arrest is being questioned here b. Arrest warrants are similar to search warrants where there is enough evidence to issue an arrest warrant i. If you commit a crime in the presence of a police officer, then an arrest warrant is not needed b. The agency that made the arrest only needs to have reasonable grounds that a crime is being committed in order to make an arrest c. Court held that a warrantless arrest does not violate the 4th Amend if there was probable cause to believe that the person had committed a felony i. Watson's arrest is valid of an arrest warrant since state statute permitted the arrest b. This case reaches the Supreme Court since there is a dispute of whether the standard needs to be reasonable grounds of probable cause c. Officers did not get a warrant b/c there was not enough time i. The concurrence states that there were exigent circumstances and the majority could have decided this way ii. However, the majority decided that history has allowed officers to make warrantless arrest under the circumstances of the case (court falls back on common law, history, and practice) b. Arrest warrants never go stale, they can last for a while (usually), while search warrants can go stale c. Felons in public places are more mobile than goods, thus warrantless arrest may take place 2. Atwater v. Lago Vista a. Facts: This is a civil action under 42 USC sec. 1983. Atwater was driving her pickup truck in Lago Vista with her two small children in the front seat. None of them was wearing a seatbelt. A police officer observed the seatbelt violation and pulled Atwater over. The officer yelled at her and said “you’re going to jail.” She was arrested. A seatbelt violation carries no jail sentence and a maximum fine of $50 b. Issue: Whether the 4th Amendment forbids a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine c. Under the Texas statute, an officer may cite or arrest, w/o a warrant, a person found committing a violation of the seatbelt laws d. Ms. Atwater filed a §1983 suit for civil rights violation i. She was arrested, booked into jail and she had to wait to be brought in front of a magistrate for an unreasonable period of time before she was allowed to be released on bond b. Court held that Ms. Atwater's arrest is constitutional i. The standard of probable cause applies to all arrests w/o the need to 'balance' the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations c. The traditional exception to the warrant requirement i. A search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest ii. A search may be made of the area w/in the control of the arrestee b. The officer had the right to stop and search the arrestee (lawful custodial arrest) i. The first thing we must consider is the officers' safety b. Court held that the search was permissible i. The authority to search an arrestee arises when the police make a custodial arrest b. Dissent i. The reason of a search must be balanced w/ the offense a person is being arrested for 1. In this case, an officer may not fear for his safety in arresting someone for the traffic stop b. Nevertheless, the majority held that it does not matter what the offense is b/c there is a chance that a person arrested for a traffic violation has a weapon and may use it against the officer c. Note 3: Constitutionality to Search a Person for a Citation i. Court in the Knowles case does not extend the holding of the Robinson case to the case in hand b. Rationale for Search Incident to Arrest Exception i. Need to disarm suspect for officers' safety ii. Need to preserve evidence for later use at trial 2. NY v. Belton a. Facts: When Belton and other occupants were stopped for speeding, the officer smelled burnt marijuana and saw an envelope with a mark associated with marijuana. The men were ordered out of the car and arrested for unlawful possession of marijuana. The officer picked up the envelope and found marijuana inside. He then searched the passenger compartment of the car where on the back seat was Belton’s jacket. The officer unzipped a pocket of the jacket and found cocaine. Belton was charged and convicted of another narcotics crime arising out of this find. b. Issue: Whether the passenger compartment of the car within the arrestee's immediate control is subject to search where an officer has instructed the occupant of a car to step out of the automobile and has placed the occupant under arrest c. The court held that the passenger area of the car is under the immediate control of a recent occupant now under arrest and is subject to lawful search by the arresting officer i. The officer's search of Belton's jacket was lawful and the cocaine evidence was properly admitted at trial b. Rule of Law: Incident to a lawful arrest, the police may search the area w/in the arrestee's immediate control c. If the passenger area can be reached by the arrestee then so can those containers in the area and therefore, containers in the passenger area are subject to search as well 2. Arizona v. Gant a. Facts: Outside Gant’s house, officers arrested two other people and charged them with drug offenses. When Gant returned home, he was immediately arrest for driving without a license and handcuffed. When other officers arrived, they locked Gant in the backseat of their vehicle and searched Gant’s car. A gun was found and a bag of cocaine was discovered in the pocket of a jacket in the backseat b. Issue: Whether police may undertake a search of an individual's vehicle when the arrestee is not w/in reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search c. This follows Belton that when policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search of the passenger compartment of that automobile d. The court held that the police may search a vehicle after a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is w/in reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe that crime-related evidence is located in the vehicle e. Police may also examine the contents of any containers found w/in the passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is w/in reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be w/in his reach f. Grant was arrested for driving w/ a suspended license, and he was securely handcuffed and placed in a squad car before officers undertook a search of his car 2. Payton v. NY a. Facts: NY detectives had probable cause to believe that Payton had murdered a gas station attendant. At 7:30 a.m. officers went to Payton’s apartment intending to arrest him without a warrant. No one responded to their knocks, so they broke into the apartment. No one was present, however, the police seized a .30 caliber shell casing found in plain view. The shell casing was admitted in evidence at Payton’s murder trial b. Issue: Whether the police can enter a suspect's home w/o a warrant to make a routine felony arrest c. The NY statutes are deemed to be invalid since the 4th Amendment trumps any state statute d. The search/entry into a private residence to make an arrest requires the police to have warrants i. W/o warrants, entering the home would be a violation of a person's 4th Amend right b. In this case, it would be better to get a search warrant instead of an arrest warrant since people move and the arrest warrant would be broad to allow any officer to arrest the person if seen c. Need to prove two things to have probable cause for a search warrant, while you need to prove only one thing to have probable cause for an arrest warrant 2. Stegald v. US a. Facts: DEA agents, armed with an arrest warrant for Lyons, went to an address where they expected to find him. The agents, with guns drawn, approached two men standing outside the house. After identifying the men, they proceeded to the house where a woman answered the door and stated that she was alone in the house. The agents guarded her while they searched the house for Lyons. Agents didn’t find Lyons but ultimately recovered 43 pounds of cocaine from the house. Steagald, one of the men outside the house, was prosecuted i. The first search was made warrantless b. The arrest warrant was made for Lyons and the police did not necessarily know if Lyons owned the house c. Police had no authority to enter and search Stegald's home to look for Lyons d. A search based on an arrest warrant does not allow the police to enter the home of a third-party to search the home e. Must have a warrant to enter the home, but cannot use the warrant to enter someone else's home f. Note 3 i. You can arrest w/o a warrant in a public place ii. If you are outside in public areas, outside the curtilage of the home, you may be arrested w/o the warrant b. In these circumstances, the third-party resident's rights are prioritized above those of the arrestee 2. Summary a. Chimel: A warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest may generally extend to the area that is considered to be in the possession or under the control of the person arrested. However, the search in Chimel went far beyond Chimel's person and the area from w/in which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him. Thus, a search incident to arrest if limited to the suspect and his "grabbing area" b. Robinson: A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the 4th Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search ii. Exigent Circumstances 1. Introduction b. Issue: Whether the warrantless search of a car made at a police station is constitutional if the officers have probable cause that the car contains evidence of a crime just committed c. As long as you have probable cause, a full search of a vehicle w/o a warrant is acceptable d. The court held that the search of the automobile was constitutional i. The police may search a car at the police station w/o a warrant if they have probable cause e. Rule of Law: A warrantless search of a car is constitutional so long as the police have probable cause that the car contains items that they are entitled to seize f. A warrantless seizure is as intrusive as a warrantless search g. The automobile exception allows officers to search the vehicle on the highway or even get towed to the station and search w/o a warrant i. There is no difference between seizing and holding a car pending a search warrant and carrying out an immediate search w/o a warrant b. The constitutional difference between houses and cars is made w/ reference to Carroll which highlights what makes a car different from a home and that probable cause is needed in order to have an immediate search i. The probable cause needed is probable cause to search (this is what you need in order to get a search warrant) 3. US v. Chadwick (Overruled by Acevado) a. Facts: Amtrak officials reasonably suspected that a man and a woman were traveling from California to Massachusetts with a trunk full of marijuana and notified the police, who in turn notified the officials in Boston. Federal officials greeted the train upon its arrival in Boston and released a police dog who indicated that there were in fact drugs in the trunk. Chadwick (defendant) arrived at the train station to pick up the trunk, and he and the two traveling with the trunk were arrested as they were placing the trunk in the back of Chadwick’s car. The trunk was brought back to the federal building where it was searched without a warrant one hour and a half after the arrests had been made b. Issue: Whether a warrantless search of a locked trunk is unreasonable where probable cause exists that the trunk contains drugs and the trunk was seized during a lawful arrest, but the police have the trunk in their control for over an hour before they search it c. The gov't had many opportunities to obtain a search warrant before opening the foot locker i. There was no emergency and the vehicle was in the control of federal agents d. The court held that the search was illegal and the evidence may suppressed i. A warrantless search of a locked trunk that is not searched until the police have exclusive control of the container is unconstitutional b. Rule of Law: The 4th Amendment protects a person's reasonable expectations of privacy and requires that the police obtain a warrant before executing a search unless a relevant exception applies c. The dissent noted that the opening of the foot locker was a search incident to arrest since it was w/in the immediate control of the suspects i. Dissent also states that the locker was in the public view and the search would be lawful if done immediately or waited (This does not make much sense) 4. California v. Acevedo (Valid law pertaining to closed containers) a. Facts: An officer received a package meant for Daza containing Marijuana from a DEA agent in Hawaii and took the package to a Fed Ex office. Daza claimed the package and took it to his apartment. Acevedo arrived at Daza’s apartment and left carrying a paper bag the size of one of the wrapped marijuana packages sent from Hawaii. He walked to a Honda, placed the bag in the trunk and started to drive away. An officer stopped the Honda, opened the trunk and the bag finding marijuana b. Issue: Whether the police must obtain a warrant to open a container in a moving vehicle where they have probable cause that the container, but not the car, contains contraband under the 4th Amendment c. This case sets the rule regarding searches of closed containers i. Court held that the 4th Amendment allows the warrantless search of a container in the car when the police have probable cause that the container contains contraband (can search the vehicle and the closed container) ii. There must be probable cause that there is contraband in the vehicle which allows officers to stop and search the vehicle if there is a closed container in the vehicle, officers have a right to search the bag w/o a warrant d. Rule of Law: The 4th Amendment permits warrantless searches of containers found in automobiles, provided the police have probable cause that the container contains contraband e. This case differs from Chadwick since Acevedo allows the search of closed containers as long as there is probable cause i. There is a limit to this search (i.e. dimensions and location of what you are looking for) ii. The police need probable cause to believe that there is contraband in the vehicle ii. Inventory Searches 1. Introduction a. Government Interests in Doing This i. Securing personal property to prevent liability ii. Public safety iii. Prevent false claims of theft 2. South Dakota v. Opperman a. Facts: After observing Opperman’s unoccupied car illegally parked overnight and during the next morning, Officer Vermillion reported the matter to police headquarters and had the car towed to the city impound lot. From outside the car, an officer noticed a watch on the dashboard and other items of personal property on the back seat. The car was then unlocked and the officer inventoried the contents of the car, including the contents of the unlocked glove compartment. He found marijuana in the glove compartment b. Issue: Whether the police may perform an inventory search of the contents of a vehicle lawfully in police possession under the 4th Amendment c. When vehicles are impounded, local police departments follow a routine practice of securing and inventorying the automobiles' contents d. Procedures developed in response to three distinct needs: i. The protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody ii. The protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property iii. The protection of the police from potential danger e. Procedures are important since the search is warrantless and the procedures ensures that the police are held in check while conducting their search i. This gives police some basis for the search if contraband is found b. The needs for the procedures do not all have to be present c. The court has previously held that inventory searches where the process is aimed at securing or protecting the car and its contents is valid d. The court in this case now holds that police may conduct an inventory search of the contents of a vehicle lawfully held in police possession i. Police may constitutionally perform an inventory search of a vehicle lawfully in police possessions 3. Illinois v. Lafayette a. Facts: The defendant was arrested for disturbing the peace and taken to the police station. He carried a purse-type shoulder bag on the trip to the station. At the booking room, he was advised to place his bag on the counter where an officer removed the contents of the bag and found amphetamine pills. He was subsequently charged with violating the controlled substances act i. The arrest made is a custodial arrest that leads to the booking which has a set procedure b. Issue: Whether an inventory search of personal effects during the booking of an arrested person violates the 4th Amendment d. The police move the equipment to find the serial # of the turn table that were out of place in the apartment i. This act is a search that leads to trying to find out if the turn table was stolen ii. Officers find that the turn tables were stolen, then seized them b. Officers did not have probable cause that the turn tables were stolen, only a reasonable suspicion c. The court held that the plain view doctrine demands that probable cause exist before an officer may search or seize a piece of evidence i. The search was reasonable under the 4th Amendment b. Rule of Law: For a warrantless search or seizure to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the plain view doctrine can only be invoked to search or seize evidence if the police have probable cause of the evidence's incriminating character ii. Consent Searches 1. Introduction a. These are the most type of searches performed by officers i. Warrant searches are the least type of searches b. The consent must be "voluntarily" given (cannot support this w/ just a signature) c. The consent to search form is prima facie evidence that consent was given (These forms are not as useful as what they used to be) i. But the form is not important, what is important is what the motivation of the consent was b. If consent is voluntarily given, then a warrant or probable cause is not needed to search various locations c. The scope of the search is designated by the consenter and if consent is given, the scope is limited by words d. How to Determine Whether the Consent is Voluntary i. Court will look at the totality of the circumstances and make a decision on that ii. Need to show lack of coercion 2. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte a. Facts: In the early morning hours the police stopped a car because it had only one headlight and its license plate light was burned out. Six men were in the vehicle. Only Alcala, a passenger, produced a license and he said the car belonged to his absent brother. When the police asked Alcala if they could search the car, he replied, “Sure, go ahead.” Under the left rear seat, the police found stolen checks b. Issue: Whether consent was "voluntarily" given c. The court held that when officers conduct a warrantless search of a subject not in custody, the prosecution can meet its burden of proving that consent to the search was freely and voluntarily given by looking at the totality of the circumstances d. The court made a narrow holding that when the subject of a search, the 4th and 14th Amendments require that prosecution demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntary under the totality of the circumstances and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied e. In this holding, the court does not want to make it more difficult for officers to conduct searches i. It is in the public's interest for law enforcement to conduct investigations 3. US v. Matlock a. Facts: Matlock was arrested for robbery while in the yard of the home where he lived with several other people. While Matlock waited in the cruiser, the police went to the front door and asked a woman there if they could search for money and a gun. The woman consent voluntarily to allow the search of the house, including the bedroom she shared with the defendant. The police found cash in a diaper bag in the closet in that bedroom b. Issue: Whether the Gov't made the requisite showing in this case c. Court held that the evidence was admissible since the Gov't sustained its burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that Mrs. Graff's voluntary consent to search the east bedroom was legally sufficient d. When you share something w/ someone else, you assume the risk that something may be discovered i. Sharing of property makes each occupant equal in rights, then consent may be given such as what occurred in this case b. The evidence Mrs. Graff was authorized to consent to a search of the bedroom are the fact that she opened the door w/ a child on her hip implying that she lived there, she was dressed in a robe, etc. c. There is no other evidence that Mrs. Griff knew she was not required to consent besides how the question is posed, "May I enter the home to search?" d. The scope of the consent given by Mrs. Graff is to search the bedroom and other areas she shared w/ Mr. Matlock 2. Georgia v. Randolph a. Facts: Janet called the police when Randolph took their son away from home. She told police that he was a cocaine user. Randolph returned while the police were still present and they quarreled. Janet then told police about drug evidence in the house. When the police asked Randolph for permission to search the house, he refused. However Janet readily gave her consent and led officers upstairs to their bedroom where the police noticed a straw with a powdery residue suspected to be cocaine. Janet then withdrew her consent and the police stopped the search, but seized the straw and left the house to obtain a search warrant. Armed with a search warrant, they seized further evidence of drug use and Randolph was indicted for possession of cocaine. The trial court denied his motion to suppress b. Issue: Whether one occupant may give law enforcement effective consent to search shared premises, as against a co-tenant who is present and states a refusal to permit the search c. The line drawn is a very fine line since the court makes the distinction that if two people who are sharing a living space and one says no and the other says yes while both are there, then the no wins i. If only one person is there and says yes while the other person was not there and says no, the yes wins b. As a co-occupant, you need to be present and assert your opinion c. According to Randolph, police would be unable to protect victims of domestic violence since one of the co-occupants would not allow the police to enter i. Police would be able to search if some kind of arrest may be made ii. This is a concern that the dissent has on the majority decision 2. Illinois v. Rodriguez a. Facts: Gail, then at her mother’s house, told police she was assaulted by Rodriguez earlier in the day. She agreed to take police to “our” apartment where she said Rodriguez was sleeping. When they arrived at the apartment, Gail unlocked the door with her key and gave officers permission to enter. In the living room they observed in plain view containers filled with white powder. They found Rodriguez asleep in the bedroom where they discovered more white powder in containers in open attaché cases. Rodriguez was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The trial court allowed his motion to suppress b. Issue: Whether the warrantless entry into a home and subsequent search is constitutional where the police reasonably believe that the person consenting to their presence has the authority to do so but the person in fact does not possess such authority c. In this case, the person who gave consent only had apparent authority and not actual authority to give consent i. She was not in a position to let the police into the apartment b. From the police perspective she has authority to consent i. However, she did not have an interest in the property b. The court held that a warrantless entry and the subsequent search are valid under the 4th Amendment provided the police reasonably believe that the person giving consent has the authority to do so, even though they may later learn no such authority exists c. According to the dissent, the search was unreasonable while the majority holds that the mistake of the police could be forgiven, thus the search was reasonable d. The court is creating legal fiction since no consent was actually given of an arrest warrant for Dunaway. Nevertheless, they picked Dunaway up from his neighbor’s house and drove him to police headquarters where he was placed in an interrogation room and questioned by the police. He eventually made incriminating statements. 2. Issue: Whether the police can seize a suspect and bring him to the police station based only on reasonable suspicion a. Whether the seizure of Dunaway was legal 2. Court held that in order to lawfully bring a suspect into formal police custody and interrogate him at the police station, the police must have probable cause a. This case is not like Terry, thus seizure was illegal 2. Rule of Law: Except in the case of temporary stops on the street where the police need only have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the police may only seize a citizen based upon probable cause 3. The detention was more like an arrest since Dunaway was taken from one place to another and placed in an interrogation room before being questioned 4. However, the dissent notes that Dunaway voluntarily went w/ the police a. But, the Detective gave an order to bring Dunaway in regardless of whether he goes voluntarily or not i. The majority sees the tactics of the police in asking Dunaway to go w/ them as coercive 2. Also, Dunaway was given Miranda warnings at the police station ii. US v. Mendenhall 1. Facts: Upon exiting her plane, Mendenhall (defendant) was approached in the airport by two plain clothes Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents who asked to see her plane ticket and identification. The agents testified that they decided to question Mendenhall because she was behaving in a way typical of people illegally transporting drugs. Mendenhall showed the police her identification and ticket which they then gave back to her. After identifying themselves as DEA agents, the agents then asked if she would come with them to their office and she complied. The agents did not brandish their weapons but at trial, one of the agents testified that at this point if she had wanted to leave, Mendenhall would have been restrained. Once at the office, the agents asked if she would consent to a search of her bag and her person. She agreed. As she was undressing, two packages of heroin that Mendenhall was hiding on her person were discovered. The district court held that the consent to search was freely and voluntarily given while the court of appeals held that consent to the search was not voluntary and the result of prior government misconduct 2. Issue: Whether a 4th Amendment has occurred where the totality of the circumstances indicate that the citizen was free to leave police custody 3. The court held that a no seizure was made since Mendenhall was free to leave a. The majority viewed the search and seizure as legal 4. Rule of Law: A 4th Amendment "seizure" occurs when a reasonable person would believe that he is not free to leave police custody 5. Justice Stewart attempts to create a doctrinal standard by stating that a person is "seized" under the 4th Amendment, only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave iv. Florida v. Bostick 1. Facts: Two officers with badges and insignia boarded a bus bound from Miami to Atlanta during a stopover in Ft. Lauderdale. Without articulable suspicion, the officers, picked out the defendant passenger and asked to inspect his ticket and identification. They returned the information as unremarkable, but asked to search the defendant’s luggage. The police advised defendant that he had a right to refuse consent. The police had guns, but did not threaten Bostick. Bostick was arrested and charged with trafficking in cocaine 2. Issue: Whether the encounter w/ the Police constituted a seizure 3. Florida Supreme Court held that the drug practice of "working the buses" is unconstitutional a. Under this view, asking questions and seeking consent to a search does not extend to buses 4. The court held that a police request for identification and consent to search private belongings does not amount to a seizure when the police inform the subject of the right to refuse consent to questioning and search a. Bostick was free to leave and not talk to the police, thus the consent and search was legal 2. Rule of Law: A police request for identification and consent to search private belongings does not amount to a seizure when the police inform the subject of the right to refuse consent to questioning and search b. Scope of Stops, Frisks and Sweeps i. Introduction 1. Reasonableness is now subject to a balancing test after Terry (no longer a probable cause standard) 2. Reasonable suspicion must be accompanied by articulable facts a. This is an objective standard b. Stop and frisks made under reasonable suspicion is not illegal 2. For Terry to apply, detention of a person must be temporary and not taken to the station or subject to arrest a. One must be free to leave in order for a seizure to not take place i. Also, a person must be able to feel like they can refuse to speak to the police ii. California v. Hodari 1. Facts: Officers patrolling in an unmarked car in a high-crime area of Oakland noticed several youths huddled around a red car parked at a curb. When the youths noticed them, they fled. Hodari ran through an alley and tossed away a small rock. A moment later, he was tackled by an officer. The rock Hodari discarded was found to be crack cocaine. Hodari was prosecuted and moved to suppress the cocaine evidence 2. Issue: Whether Hodari had been "seized" w/in the meaning of the 14th Amendment at the time he dropped the drugs 3. Based on the facts, the defense would argue that Hodari was seized before he disposed of the crack cocaine by the police showing their authority a. The defense would assert that the seizure was unreasonable 4. However, a seizure occurs only when a person submits to the authority and the police lays their hands on you 5. The court held that a 4th Amendment seizure occurs when a citizen submits to a show of police authority or is physically restrained by an officer 6. Rule of Law: A 4th Amendment seizure occurs where the police exercise physical force over a subject or where a subject submits to an officer's show of authority 7. Under these facts, there was no seizure when Hodari was running and he threw the rock cocaine away a. The seizure occurred after Hodari abandoned the rock cocaine, thus the drug is admitted into evidence 2. A seizure occurs when there is a show of authority and the suspect submits to authority (police lay hands on you) a. This is just another way a seizure occurs b. The kind of seizure that occurs (Mendenhall and Hodari) depends on the circumstances iii. Illinois v. Wardlow 1. Facts: Officers patrolling in a high crime area known for narcotics trafficking observe Wardlow standing next to a building holding an opaque bag. Wardlow looked in their direction and fled. The officers turned their car around, followed him and eventually cornered him. Officer Nolan exited the vehicle and stopped him. Nolan performed a “protective pat-down” search for weapons and felt a heavy hard object similar to the shape of a gun. He opened the bag and discovered a handgun 2. Issue: Whether unprovoked flight, while in a high crime area, amount to reasonable suspicion to justify a stop and frisk 3. The court held that the flight of a suspect in a high crime area can amount to reasonable suspicion and justify a lawful stop and frisk by the police 4. Rule of Law: A police officer may stop and frisk a citizen on the street when he has reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and may pose a threat to the officer 5. The court does not create a per se rule that any person running from the police may be stopped ii. Alabama v. White 1. Facts: An anonymous tipster said White would be leaving an address at a particular time carrying an attaché case and driving to a motel with an ounce of cocaine inside the case. The police observed White leave the building, without an attaché case, and followed her along streets that were the most direct route to the motel. They stopped her just short of the motel. An officer told White she was suspected of having cocaine in the vehicle and asked if he could look for the cocaine. White allowed the He complied and consented to a search of his two suitcases. However, since his flight was about to depart, agents decided not to search the luggage. They investigated Place’s luggage tags and were more suspicious. DEA agents at Place’s destination airport, LaGuardia, in New York were informed and those agents approached Place when he landed. They told him they believed he may be carrying narcotics. When Place refused to consent to a search of his luggage, agents took the bags to Kennedy Airport and subjected them to a sniff test by a narcotics detection dog. The dog reacted positively to one of the bags. By this time 90 minutes had passed since the seizure of Place’s luggage. Because it was late on a Friday afternoon, the agents retained the luggage until Monday when they obtained a search warrant for the bag. The discovered a large quantity of cocaine. 2. Issue: Whether the permissible scope of the detention is the same as the scope applicable to investigative detentions of the person himself when police seize luggage from a suspect's custody on less than probable cause for purposes of investigative detention 3. The court held that when police seize luggage from a suspect's custody, the limitations applicable to investigative detentions of person under Terry should define the permissible scope of an investigative detention of a person's luggage on less than probable cause (Also Rule of Law) a. The 90 min detention of the luggage was illegal even w/ the extension of Terry 2. Property independent of the person must be detained under reasonable scope and duration 3. The detention of the luggage was deemed to be a seizure 4. A pat/frisk of a car is only reasonable for the search of weapons ii. Michigan v. Long 1. Facts: Long, whose car was stuck in a ditch, began walking toward the open door of the car and the officers followed. They observed a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the car. They pat him down and found no weapons. One of the officers shined his flashlight into the car, but did not enter. His purpose was to search for other weapons. The officer then saw something protruding from under the armrest on the front seat. He lifted the armrest and saw an open pouch that appeared to contain marijuana. Long was arrested for possession of marijuana 2. Issue: Whether a state court may provide a defendant w/ broader procedural protection than is guaranteed in the Constitution 3. The court held that a state court may provide a defendant w/ broader procedural protection than is guaranteed in the Constitution as a matter of state law a. Ruling is based on independent and adequate state grounds is not reviewable by the Supreme Court 2. Rule of Law: A state court providing a defendant w/ broader procedural protection than is guaranteed in the Constitution must explicitly indicate that its ruling is based on separate, adequate, and independent state grounds ii. Minnesota v. Dickerson 1. Facts: Dickerson (defendant) was indicted for bank robbery. Dickerson moved to have statements he made during an FBI interrogation suppressed, claiming he never received proper Miranda warnings. The trial court found that Dickerson had not in fact received proper Miranda warnings. However, the court admitted the statement, claiming 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was satisfied. This statute was enacted by congress and permits statements made by a suspect during a custodial police interrogation to be admitted at trial, provided they are voluntarily made 2. Issue: Whether the holding in Miranda established a constitutional rule that cannot be superseded by an act of Congress 3. Court held that the search went too far and that Congress cannot supersede Miranda by passing legislation a. The pat/frisk extended to overly feeling for the drugs 2. Rule of Law: Congress cannot legislatively supersede a decision by the United States Supreme Court that interprets and applies the Constitution ii. Maryland v. Buie (protective sweep - only requires reasonable suspicion) 1. Facts: The police obtained an arrest warrant for Buie for an armed robbery of a restaurant and executed the warrant at Buie’s home. Upon entering the home, the officers spread out to find Buie. One officer proceeded to check the basement and, with his gun drawn, shouted down the basement stairs for anyone down there to come out. Eventually, Buie emerged and he was arrested. Another officer then went into the basement to ensure no one else was present who could pose a threat to the police. In the basement, and in plain view, the officer noticed a red running suit that matched the description of what the thief was wearing when the restaurant was robbed. At trial, Buie’s request to suppress the running suit was denied II. Issue: Whether the police may conduct a warrantless search of a premises when they have reasonable suspicion to believe that other people who may pose a threat could be hiding in the home incident to a lawful arrest III. Court held that, incident to a lawful arrest, a protective sweep of a premises is permitted provided it is supported by reasonable suspicion justified by articulable facts that others may be hiding in the building a. Very limited search (protective sweep) II. Rule of Law: Incident to an arrest, the police may conduct a protective sweep of a premises based on reasonable suspicion that other people who pose a threat are in the building, providing the search is limited to those areas where a person may be hiding X. New Jersey v. TLO a. Facts: A student discovered smoking in a school lavatory was sent to Mr. Choplick, the Asst. Vice Principal. When the student denied smoking, Choplick opened her purse and found cigarettes. In the process of searching for the cigarettes, he saw rolling papers. In his experience rolling papers are associated with the use of marijuana. He then searched the purse thoroughly, finding evidence of marijuana dealing. He turned this evidence over to the police and TLO was prosecuted and sentenced to probation b. Issue: Whether the search violated the 4th Amendment c. Court held that the search did not violate the 4th Amendment i. The school and those associated w/ the school are state agents b. The school acts like the parents of the student while in their care c. An adult on the street would not be allowed to be subject to this type of search since it is usually illegal d. The school environment is special since school officials set rules that carry out order and learning i. If the rules are broken, school officials may discipline the student b. School personnel are state agents/agents of the police i. The court places the school in the place of gov't b. Could Mr. Choplick or female teacher perform a strip search under these facts? i. Note 3: The search must not be excessively intrusive in light of age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction (in most situations no) V. Checkpoint Searches a. Michigan Dept. of Police v. Sitz i. Facts: The State Police established a sobriety checkpoint pilot program and created guidelines governing checkpoint operations. Under the guidelines, all vehicles passing through a checkpoint would be stopped and their drivers briefly examined for signs of intoxication. If an officer detects signs of intoxication, the motorist is directed to a location out of the traffic flow and investigated further. All other drivers would be permitted to resume their journey immediately. A declaratory judgment action and request for injunctive relief was filed. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s holding that the program violated the 4th Amendment ii. Issue: Whether vehicle seizures at checkpoints are "reasonable" under 4th Amendment iii. Sitz would argue that this stop is illegal since there is no reasonable suspicion that someone is driving under the influence iv. However, the Supreme Court states that the checkpoint stops are legal 1. Court balances the state interest and the private interest of the driver a. The state interest to protect the roads from drunk drivers outweighs the private interest 2. The stops are also reasonable since they are short a. The state procedure must be lawful ii. This is a suspicionless seizure which is okay since everyone is subject to the stop iii. Dissent: Boarder searches are okay, but the checkpoint stops must cease to exist 1. Boarders are easy to track and know where they are while the checkpoints are constantly moving and hard to track b. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond i. Facts: Defendant attempted to enter the U. S. from a port of entry in southern California traveling in his station wagon. A customs inspector inspected the vehicle and asked him to leave the vehicle for a second inspection station. There, another inspector inspected the gas tank by tapping on it and called in a mechanic who removed the gas tank. 37 kilos of marijuana were found in the tank. The whole process took up to 55 minutes. The search was not based on reasonable suspicion ii. Issue: Whether the search was 'routine' at a border checkpoint where there is no suspicion of wrongdoing iii. The court held that the search of the gas tank of a vehicle attempting to enter the US is 'routine' at a border checkpoint where there is no suspicion of wrongdoing iv. The border is special since each sovereign can control what goes in and out of the border v. The police are able to take the vehicle apart since it is a routine search at the border IV. Due Process and Confessions a. Introduction i. First looking at interrogations and how the 14th Amendment applies 1. The 14th Amendment applies due process to the states 2. We will also be looking at the 5th Amendment which is important since it protects people from involuntarily self-incrimination in a trial setting (No forced self-incrimination/confession) 3. Talk about 6th Amendment right to counsel b. Brown v. Mississippi i. Facts: Brown (defendant) and two other men were found guilty of murdering Reymond Stewart and were sentenced to death. The evidence against them consisted solely of their own confessions which were induced by severe beatings at the hands of the local authorities. At trial, Brown and the others objected to the admission of the confessions and testified to the torture, saying their confessions were false. Other witnesses were called to testify to first-hand knowledge of the beatings and Brown and the other men still bore many of the psychical scars of the whippings when the trial commenced. The judge submitted the case to the jury, instructing them that if they had reasonable doubt as to the veracity of the confessions, the confessions should not be considered as evidence. Brown appealed to the state supreme court and the conviction was affirmed ii. Issue: Whether convictions resting solely on confessions are induced by violence perpetrated by state actors, consistent w/ the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment iii. The court held that confessions induced by violence are not consistent w/ the Due Process Clause and such evidence is therefore inadmissible at trial 1. The court overturned convictions based on confessions obtained after Ds had been whipped until they agreed to confess to such statements as the officers dictated a. The confessions are unreliable since anyone will say/admit to anything while being beaten b. Court does not want to endorse the police in breaking the law c. Court looks at a higher calling b. Ashcraft v. Tennessee i. Facts: Ashcraft’s wife was found dead in a ditch off the road she had taken on a trip to her mother’s house. Ashcraft was taken into custody at 7:00 in the evening on a Saturday and interrogated continuously in a room at the Shelby County jail until 9:30 a.m. on Monday. Officers questioned him in relays while he sat with a light over his head. There was conflict in the evidence as to Ashcraft’s treatment and whether he ever confessed to involvement in the killing. However, according to the state, a confession was obtained that indicated that Ashcraft hired another man to kill his wife. Although Ashcraft pleaded not guilty, he and the other man, Ware, were both convicted based on the confession 1. Made a confession after being held in the room after 36 hrs ii. Court held that the confession was not voluntary, but compelled since Ashcraft did not have many breaks and was subjected to continuous questioning iii. Court stated that 36 hrs of questioning is too long, but what the court determines is too long of a time for questioning to be coercive depends on the totality of the circumstances 1. i.e. age of the suspect, whether they are not given food or bathroom breaks, not allowed to leave the room, etc. iv. The jury is not the final arbiter of whether the confession is voluntary since this is a question of law and not fact 1. Note 3: the note specifies the proper procedure for finding whether a confession is voluntary or not d. Spano v. New York i. Facts: Spano, a 25 year old junior high school graduate with a history of emotional instability was drinking in a bar when the decedent a former boxer took his money from the bar. Spano followed the victim from the bar to recover his money. A fight ensued in which the victim gave Spano a severe beating, kicking him in the head several times. Spano went home and secured a gun then walked back to a candy store where he found the victim. He fired five shots, two of which hit the victim and caused his death. A warrant was issued for his arrest for murder. Spano spoke with a friend, Bruno, who was a junior police officer and told the friend he intended to get a lawyer and turn himself in. Spano, with his attorney, surrendered the next day. The attorney advises Spano to answer no questions. Upon arrest, Spano was taken to the office of the DA and questioning began. For a time, Spano refused to answer and asked to see his attorney. His request was denied. Eventually, Bruno, his friend claimed his job was on the line if Spano did not answer their questions. Spano gave in and answered questions ii. Issue: Whether a confession is made after hours of interrogation, where the defendant has been denied his right to counsel, made voluntarily iii. The court held that the conviction cannot stand under the 14th Amendment 1. A confession made after hours of interrogation, and where the suspect has been denied his right to have an attorney present, is not made voluntarily and is inadmissible at trial ii. It would make a difference if the police were merely investigating the crime iii. The court considers that Spano did not speak English well, was tricked to confess, etc. b. Colorado v. Connelly i. Facts: On August 18, 1983, Francis Connelly (defendant) stopped a police officer and spontaneously confessed to the murder of a young girl. Connelly had a history of mental illness and had gone off his medication six months before. The officer gave Connelly the Miranda warnings, and Connelly continued the confession and led police to the crime scene. Connelly appeared competent to the officers. During a meeting with an attorney the next day, Connelly was confused and claimed voices told him to confess. Doctors found Connelly incompetent to aid his defense, but Connelly later regained competence to stand trial. Connelly moved to suppress his confession, and a psychiatrist testified that Connelly suffered from chronic schizophrenia and psychotic states that impeded his free will. The trial court suppressed the confession as involuntary. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed ii. Issue: Whether a statement made by a mentally ill person involuntarily is inadmissible even if there was no coercion by police under the Due Process Clause iii. The court held that a statement made by a mentally ill person is not involuntary for purposes of the Due Process Clause if there is no coercive behavior by police 1. No state/police action since the police did not compel Connelly to confess and they even discouraged him from doing so iv. Connelly voluntarily confessed by listening to the voices in his head, thus, according to the US Supreme Court, Connelly may have been crazy, but he could still understand his rights enough to waive them v. The US Supreme Court reinstated the charges 1. The court is not going to set aside a confession unless there is coercion initiated by state actors II. Privilege against Self-Incrimination and Confessions a. Miranda i. Introduction 1. Voluntariness must not be a result of coercion 2. Gov't put in place the Miranda warnings in order to have an easier time determining whether a confession was given voluntarily or not 3. Look at 5th Amendment w/ Miranda warnings which prevents police from taking a defendant's statement involuntarily a. Trying to prevent defendant from self-incrimination since statements can be used against them in the court 2. "Custody" is a term of art a. The rights are given once a suspect is under custody 2. Genesis of Miranda a. The Miranda warnings provide protection from police interrogations resulting in involuntary confessions 2. In later cases, the court tries to move away from Miranda, but in Dickerson the court is not walking away from it ii. Miranda and Right to Assistance of Counsel at Trial 1. Miranda v. Arizona been using intoxicants, to which McCarty responded that he consumed “two beers and smoked several joints of marijuana.” He was then placed under arrest. At the jail, McCarty was asked to give information for a Highway Patrol Alcohol Influence Report. McCarty wrote in the report, “no angel dust or PCP in the pot.” No Miranda rights had been given. He was then charged with operating under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, a misdemeanor. McCarty moved to suppress both statements citing the 5th Amendment b. Issue: Whether a motorist is subject to custodial interrogation for the purpose of the Miranda doctrine during a routine traffic stop c. Miranda applies to all crimes regardless of whether it is a misdemeanor or a felony since the police would not know what the charge would be d. The court held that a motorist is not subject to custodial interrogation for the purpose of Miranda when he is questioned during a routine traffic stop i. Williams was not in custody until he was arrested b. Rule of Law: While a person in custody who is suspected of a misdemeanor traffic offense MUST be read his Miranda warnings, a motorist temporarily detained on the side of the road after being pulled over by an officer is NOT "in custody" for the purpose of Miranda c. The standard is whether a reasonable person would believe he/she is in custody of the police d. A traffic stop is similar to a "Terry stop" since it is a temporary detainment that allows officers to ask questions to determine identity and confirm or dispel the officer's suspicions i. Persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda b. Why doesn't it matter that the trooper had decided to charge Berkemer w/ a traffic offense when he noted his difficulty standing? i. It doesn't matter since that is what he initially pulled him over for and he is still not under custody (temporary stop, not arrest) b. Does presence at the police station equate to "in custody?" i. The presence at the police station does not equate to being "in custody" since you are free to leave and the officers just want to ask questions b. The custody standard is "objective" since it is a reasonable person standard 2. J.D.B. v. North Carolina a. Facts: Thirteen year old JDB was removed from class and escorted to a school conference room where two police officers and two school administrators were present during a 30-45 minutes interrogation. No Miranda warnings were given at the beginning of the questioning and JDB was not given an opportunity to speak to this guardian. Nor was he informed that he was free to leave the room. After a warning that he may be held pending trial in juvenile detention, JDB confessed to involvement in two break-ins. Only then was JDB given his Miranda warnings. JDB provided further details and wrote a statement at the officer’s request. He was allowed to leave to catch the bus home i. Officers gave Miranda rights to J.D.B. After he confessed b. Issue: Whether the age of a child subjected to police questioning is relevant to whether the child is in custody under Miranda c. Need to figure out whether custody applies i. Would a reasonable person believe that they are not free to leave, thus in custody ii. There are two questions that are essential 1. What were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation? 2. Given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave? b. The point of giving Miranda after a suspect makes an incriminating statement is so that the suspect feels like he/she cannot recant the confession (just admit the truth) c. The due process "voluntariness inquiry" differs from a "custody analysis" required by Miranda since totality of the circumstances are not considered in the "custody analysis" i. Age needs to be considered since the law factors age in other situations such as children not being able to form contracts, cannot marry, etc. b. J.D.B. is a close case for the supreme court b/c the dissent talks about how the totality of the circumstances already applies meaning that age is already factored while majority points to how the law factors age in torts and contract c. Dissent states that Miranda overprotects since everyone is protected by Miranda i. Miranda under protects not everyone understands the extent of their rights and people just waive their rights b. The majority's conclusion that age is relevant is consistent w/ Miranda's goals 2. **If a person is in prison, that person is in custody a. However, for Miranda purposes, an inmate that is a suspect of another crime is not in custody by virtue of his confinement in prison iii. Interrogation 1. Rhode Island v. Innis a. Facts: Innis, the suspect in the shot-gun murder of a taxi driver, was arrested on the street in the early morning hours. The shot-gun was missing. Innis was given his Miranda rights on three separate occasions, but declined to speak, asking for a lawyer instead. Innis was then placed in the back seat of a police cruiser with three officers who were to drive him to the police station. They were cautioned not to question him. While on route, one officer spoke to another officer about the fact that there were handicapped children in the area, saying, “God forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves.” Another officer said, “It would be too bad if a little girl would pick up the gun, maybe kill herself.” Innis interrupted the conversation and told the officers to turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located. The cruiser returned to the scene of the arrest and Innis was again advised of his Miranda rights. He replied that he understood but wanted to get the gun out of the way because of the kids in the area of the school. He led the police to a nearby field and they found the shotgun. On appeal, the R.I. Supreme Court set aside his conviction because the police “interrogated” Innis after he had invoked his right to counsel b. Issue: Whether a suspect has been "interrogated" for the purpose of Miranda where he is in a car w/ police officers who are expressing their concern about public safety c. The court held that unless police officers reasonably should know that their comments will elicit an incriminating response from a suspect, comments made between police officers in a presence of a suspect do not constitute interrogation for the purpose of Miranda i. The suspect's incriminating response was not the product of words or actions on the part of the police that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response (there was no interrogation) b. Under Miranda, interrogation is not limited to situations where the police actually question a suspect i. Interrogation can also be subtle compulsion through words or actions on the part of the police they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response 2. Summary a. The Innis rule on interrogation is that coercion cannot be used to obtain confessions ii. Self-Incrimination Privilege and Confessions: Miranda Operational Rules 1. Introduction a. Miranda would be violated under the 14th Amendment due process i. There is a constitutional violation since it would violate the 6th Amendment right to counsel (not the Miranda right to counsel) 2. Illinois v. Perkins a. Facts: An informant told police that Lloyd Perkins (defendant) confessed to the murder of Richard Stephenson. Police then placed the informant and an undercover officer into the Montgomery County jail where Perkins was being held on unrelated charges. Perkins boasted about the killing to the informant and the undercover officer. Perkins was charged with murder i. When a suspect subject to custodial police interrogation invokes his right to have counsel present, his responses to further police questioning does not constitute a valid waiver of his rights b. Rule of Law: Where a suspect subject to custodial police interrogation invokes his right to remain silent or to have an attorney present, the interrogation must cease ii. Miranda Operational Rules and 6th Amendment Right to Counsel 1. Introduction a. Under a Miranda Right to Counsel, the police is about to conduct a "custodial interrogation" (that phrase is a term of art) i. Standard: Reasonably likely to illicit an incriminating response ii. Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel requires at minimum some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney b. 6th Amendment right to counsel attaches only once judicial proceedings have commenced i. The 6th Amendment right to counsel attaches only at the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings, and before proceedings are initiated a suspect in a criminal investigation has no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel ii. This right attaches during indictment or arraignment (each jurisdiction differs on when criminal proceedings commence) iii. Standard: Deliberate or intentional conduct to illicit an incriminating response 2. Davis v. US a. Facts: Davis was interviewed by NIS officers in connection with the death of another sailor. He was given his Miranda rights which he waived orally and in writing. About an hour and a half into the interview, Davis said, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” Upon clarification, Davis later said, “No, I’m not asking for a lawyer. No I don’t want a lawyer.” b. Issue: Whether a search conducted in objectively reasonable reliance upon binding appellate precedent that has since been overruled is subject to the exclusionary rule c. The court held that after valid Miranda waiver, officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney. If the suspect’s statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him d. If a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning e. After a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect CLEARLY requests an attorney 2. Betts v. Brady a. Facts: The defendant was indicted for robbery and was unable to employ an attorney. He asked the court at arraignment to appoint counsel for him and the court declined as it was the practice to appoint counsel for indigent defendants only in murder and rape cases. The defendant represented himself at trial and was found guilty. He was sentenced to eight years in prison b. Issue: c. Court was unable to rule that the concept of due process incorporated in the 14th Amendment obligates the states to furnish counsel in every case i. It is not essential to a fair trial ii. Lack of counsel must have resulted in particular prejudice to the defendant and here it did not d. Rule of Law: Under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, states are not required to appoint counsel for a criminal defendant unable to secure her own in all cases, provided that the trial is fundamentally fair e. **Need to look at the totality of the circumstances for a due process analysis i. For this case, you are looking at due process, not the lack of counsel 4. Gideon v. Wainwright a. Facts: The defendant was charged in Florida with breaking and entering with the intent to commit a misdemeanor, a felony offense. He was indigent and asked the court to appoint counsel for him. He was denied b. Issue: c. Court held that any person hauled into court who is too poor to hire a lawyer cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him i. The right of one charged w/ a crime to counsel is deemed fundamental and essential to a fair trial b. Rule of Law: the 14th Amendment incorporates the 6th Amendment right to counsel to the states 2. Scott v. Illinois a. Facts: Scott (defendant) was convicted of shoplifting in a bench trial and was fined $50. The maximum penalty for such an offense is a $500 fine or one year in jail, or both. Over Scott’s objection that the state was required to provide counsel for him, the intermediate appellate court and the state supreme court affirmed the conviction b. Issue: Whether the 6th and 14th Amendments require that states provide defendants counsel whenever imprisonment is an authorized penalty c. Court held that the 6th and 14th Amendments require only that indigent defendants be appointed counsel when imprisonment is actually imposed d. The 6th and 14th Amendments to the US Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the state has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense (this broadens the scope to any jail time) 6. Summary a. All states have to provide counsel to indigent defendants for any crime b. 6th Amendment comes into play when judicial proceedings have commenced i. Each jurisdiction has a different starting point for when the 6th Amendment begins and Miranda right to counsel ends ii. The court does not presume a waiver to the right of counsel 1. There needs to be a voluntary and affirmative waiver brought by the defendant ii. The 6th Amendment does not attach to the interrogation period since the Amendment states…"In all criminal prosecutions…" II. Confessions and the Right to Assistance of Counsel a. Massiah v. US i. Facts: Massiah was indicted for narcotics crimes. The retained a lawyer, pleaded not guilty and was released on bail. Federal agents surreptitiously listened to incriminating statements made by him to an informant and offered these statements against him at trial ii. Issue: Whether iii. The court held that Massiah was denied his 6th Amendment right to counsel 1. Federal agents had deliberately elicited from him incriminating statements after he had been indicted and in the absence of counsel iv. Petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel v. Rule of Law: A person who has been indicted on criminal charges has as much a constitutional right to have an attorney present during police interrogations as he does during the trial itself b. US v. Henry i. Facts: Henry was arrested and indicted for armed robbery and incarcerated at the Norfolk city jail. Nichols, an inmate in the jail who was a paid informant, told a government agent that he was housed in the same cellblock as Henry. The agent instructed him to be alert to any statements Henry made but not to ask him any questions regarding the robbery. Henry made incriminating statements to Nichols that were introduced in evidence at his trial ii. Issue: Whether the admission at trial of statements made by an accused in custody to a covert gov't informant violate the accused's 6th Amendment right to counsel ii. Issue: Whether a witness identification of a criminal suspect conducted in the absence of legal representation violates the 6th amendment right to the assistance of counsel iii. The court held that a witness identification of a criminal suspect conducted in the absence of legal representation violates the 6th Amendment right to the assistance of counsel b. Kirby v. Illinois i. Facts: The police arrested Kirby and Bean. Shard was brought to the police station where he positively identified Kirby and Bean as the men who had robbed him two days earlier. No lawyer was present in the room and neither Kirby nor Bean had asked for legal assistance, or been advised of any right to the presence of counsel. The suspects were indicted more than six weeks later and obtained counsel. At a hearing on the motion to suppress Shard’s identification testimony, it was apparent that the identification procedure was highly suggestive. However, the motion to suppress was denied. The defendants were convicted and the conviction affirmed on appeal ii. Issue: Whether police may conduct an identification outside the presence of counsel before a suspect has been charged under the 6th Amendment iii. Court held that police may conduct a lineup w/o an attorney present if the suspect has not yet been indicted or formally charged w/ a crime iv. Dissent is concerned w/ the suggestive nature of the identification process 1. Wants the application of Wade and Gilbert at an earlier stage (e.g. pre- indictment since they only occur at post-indictment) ii. The remedy available is the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause 1. It is harder to overturn a case on Due Process Grounds instead of other grounds b. US v. Ash i. Facts: Two men wearing stocking masks robbed a bank in Washington, D.C. An FBI agent showed 5 black/white mug shots of black males of similar age, height and weight, one of which was Ash, to four witnesses. All four made uncertain identifications of Ash’s picture. Ash and Bailey were indicted for the robbery. Almost three years after the crime, an FBI agent showed 5 color photos to the four witnesses, three of whom selected the picture of Ash. Based on this post- indictment identification, Ash claims that he was denied the right to counsel at a “critical stage” of the prosecution ii. Issue: Whether police may conduct a post-indictment photo lineup outside the presence of counsel under the 6th Amendment iii. The court held that police may conduct a post-indictment photo identification outside the presence of counsel iv. A stage of pretrial investigation will only be considered "critical" if the disadvantage suffered by the defendant cannot be cured by ordinary trial techniques b. **The issues found in these cases are not very important these days since states now conduct line-ups/show-ups pre-indictment instead of post-indictment II. The Due Process Clause and Identifications a. Identification Procedure Between indictment and trial i. Wade - a suspect cannot be subjected to a post-indictment identification procedure w/o the presence of counsel 1. Prosecution needs to show that the identification has to come from a different source if the identification procedure occurs post-indictment ii. The other cases from last class follow Wade and Gilbert 1. Under Stovall, the court states that the right is not retroactive meaning that it does not operate for cases already decided a. The same principal is applied from Wade and Gilbert, but the court decided that that principal does not apply to this case b. What does apply is the 14th amendment due process ii. These days, identification procedures occur during pre-indictment, thus post- indictment identification is very rare iii. The identification procedure can be challenged under the 14th Amendment due process clause b. Stovall v. Denno (pg. 963) i. Facts: Physical evidence linked Stovall to the murder of doctor and the stabbing of his wife in their Long Island home. The wife was critically injured and needed surgery to attempt to save her life. The day after the surgery, the police brought Stovall to her hospital room. Stovall was not given an opportunity to retain counsel, was handcuffed to one of five police officers in the room and was the only black man present. She identified Stovall as the assailant and later identified him in-court at trial. He was convicted and sentenced to death 1. What occurs here is what we call a show-up since there are no other suspects being presented to the victim ii. Court held that there was no violation of due process iii. The 6th amendment holding in Wade didn’t apply to Stovall since it does not apply retroactively iv. A due process violation occurred during the identification procedure since the show-up is considered to be highly suggestive since he is the only black man in handcuffs that the victim can identify 1. There is no other person the victim can compare him to like during a line- up ii. The court states that the show-up was not "unneccessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification" 1. Although the show-up was highly suggestive, the victim could not leave the hospital since she was severely injured (not knowing if she was going to live) and she could not have gone to the police station to look at a line- up 2. So the police had to bring the suspect to the hospital for the victim to identify ii. Stovall also tried to bring a 5th Amendment claim 1. But this fails since the statements given during a line-up or a show-up are not testimonial, thus are more like using a writing sample to identify someone ii. Note 2 (Pg. 966) - Foster v California 1. This is what the court deems to be an unconstitutional identification (violation of due process) a. The victim could not identify the suspect so the police had the victim see the suspect one on one and then again at a second line- up where the victim was able to identify him as someone that she recognizes and knows based on all the times that the victim saw the suspect after the first line-up b. Manson v. Brathwaite (Pg. 967) i. Facts: Undercover Trooper Glover engaged in a narcotics transaction at the door of an apartment. The man who answered the door apparently sold the drugs to Glover. Glover didn’t know the identity of the man but described him to a local police officer who left a photo of a man matching the description. Upon viewing the photo, he identified the person in the photo as the man who sold him the narcotics. Brathwaite was arrested a few months later while visiting the same apartment from which the sale to Glover had taken place. At trial the photo was admitted in evidence and Glover identified the person shown in the photo as defendant and the person in court as the seller ii. The court held that the photo was "unneccessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification" 1. The officer was only presented with one photo instead of multiple photos of different suspects ii. Court of appeals wanted to adopt a "per se" approach 1. The Per Se Rule is that when the a due process violation occurs the identification must be thrown out and a new trial should be given ii. The Supreme Court adopted the Totality of the Circumstances approach 1. This is more lenient and need to consider the following factors a. The opportunity to view b. The degree of attention c. The accuracy of the description d. The witness' level of certainty e. The time between the crime and the confrontation 2. Dissent states that none of these factors really make much difference to the identification process a. These factors cannot really be depended on even when the person who is doing the identification is a police officer b. There are a lot more issues that come in to play when an identification occurs ii. In choosing the "Totality of the Circumstances" approach the Court weighs the evidentiary interests II. Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rules a. Standing (not really an exception, more like a consideration) i. Rakas v. Illinois (pg. 1019) 1. Facts: The police spotted a car they believed was the getaway car used in a robbery. They stopped the car and ordered all the occupants out. Officers searched the vehicle and found rifle shells in the locked glove compartment and a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger seat. The defendants were charged and moved to suppress the items seized. The prosecution challenged their standing to object to the search because neither the car, the shells, nor the rifle belonged to them 1. Issue: Whether a passenger in a car belonging to someone else has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car or in items found in the car that do not belong to him b. Evidence obtained unlawfully can be admitted at trial if there is another "independent source" from which the evidence is lawfully obtained 2. While Murray argues that such a rule will encourage unlawful police conduct, what is more likely the case is that police will have the opportunity to enter a space to ensure that their suspicions are correct and by doing so they will save their own time and the court’s time by not needlessly applying for warrants. 3. An officer with probable cause is unlikely to unlawfully enter a premises for fear the evidence he uncovers will be suppressed at trial. If an officer with probable cause enters a premises without a warrant, he has an added burden of proof to meet. a. He must show that he used no information gained from the initial illegal entry when deciding to seek a warrant, and also that no information acquired from the illegal entry was included in the warrant application. 2. An officer without probable cause is unlikely to enter a premises because nothing he finds can be used to establish the probable cause needed to obtain a warrant. 3. In this case, the officers likely learned that the warehouse contained drugs when they initially entered illegally. However, they also acquired this information, and the tangible evidence, when they entered legally the second time a. Officers can make a deduction/conclusion based on surveillance information and obtain a search warrant 2. The court says that there is an independent source that is unidentified and the court is willing to accept that 3. Dissent (Justice Marshall) a. The court's holding undermines the deterrence incentive of the exclusionary rule and allows police to invade an individual's privacy before a neutral and detached magistrate determines that there is probable cause to do so b. In cases like this one, there is no evidence, except the testimony of the agents, that the second entry pursuant to the search warrant is independent from the initial illegal entry, further widening the opportunity for police misconduct 2. The independent source exception does not deter police misconduct a. This just eliminates another hoop for police to jump through 2. The independent source exception differs from the inevitable discovery exception a. The independent source exception looks at whether there were a wealth of ways a person could have discovered the information besides the illegal means b. The inevitable discovery exception looks at people taking shortcuts when you could have taken the long way out of the maze (reaching your end goal) ii. Nix v. Williams (Second part of the Christian Burial Speech Case) - pg. 1059 1. Facts: Same as Brewer v. Williams 2. Issue: Whether the evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment may be admitted if the police would have inevitably discovered it 3. Prosecution had evidence that the police were already searching for the body of the girl (police had split the area into quadrants) a. The police were already searching for the child even before Williams told the officer where the body was 2. Court held that the evidence may properly be admitted at trial, even if discovered in violation of the Fourth Amendment, if police would have inevitably discovered it a. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment may be admitted if police would have inevitably discovered it 2. The court of appeals of the 8th circuit disagrees a. Need to initially look at whether the police acted in good faith i. If there is no finding of good faith, then you cannot get to inevitable circumstances b. It seems that this court just created the good faith requirement 2. The Supreme Court states that there is no good faith requirement (no threshold requirement for inevitable discovery) a. None of the evidence would be admissible since it is seldom that police conduct is done through good faith when there is a claim that constitutional rights have been violated 2. There is some deterrence in this rule even though this is not a deterrence rule b. The Attenuation Doctrine (Fruit of the Poisonous Tree) i. Introduction 1. Fruits of the Poisonous Tree Analysis a. Court links the illegal activity to direct evidence and to indirect evidence i. Indirect evidence requires a but-for analysis ii. Wong Sun v. US (pg. 1075) 1. Facts: Narcotics agents went to Toy’s laundry and broke open the door, then followed Toy to his bedroom where they arrested him. A search of the premises uncovered no narcotics, however, Toy made a statement implicating Yee. Agents entered Yee’s house and found him in the bedroom. After a discussion, Yee gave the agents tubes containing heroin. Yee then made a statement implicating Wong Sun. Agents went to Wong Sun’s apartment and searched it, but found no narcotics. Even so, Wong Sun was arrested and several days later made statement concerning narcotics transactions. The Court of Appeals found that there was no probable cause to arrest Toy 2. Issue: Whether evidence obtained through illegal police conduct is admissible where it is far removed from the illegal police conduct 3. Court held that the evidence is admissible since it was so far removed from the illegal action so as to dissipate the taint of illegality 4. Rule of Law: While evidence obtained through illegal police conduct must be excluded at trial as it is "fruit of the poisonous tree," the connection between the illegal police conduct and a relevant piece of evidence can become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint, and such evidence may then be admissible 5. The illegal police conduct a. The police violated Sun's constitutional rights when they arrested him in his home 2. Sun's subsequent unsigned confession is admissible b/c after his unlawful arrest, Sun was released and returned voluntarily a few days later when he was interrogated by the agents 3. Therefore, the connection between his unlawful arrest and his statement had become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint of illegality 4. The drugs taken from Yee cannot be admitted into evidence against Toy a. Toy's statement to the police regarding Yee is inadmissible b/c the statement is a fruit of illegal police action i. The police had no authority to chase Toy into his home b. Therefore, the police only knew about Yee b/c of Toy's statement which derived from illegal police conduct c. Therefore, the statement is still tainted by the illegality and must be excluded at trial 2. Toy gets most or almost all of his evidence suppressed while Sun's evidence is admissible ii. Brown v. Illinois (pg. 1079) 1. Facts: Brown was about to enter his apartment when he saw a stranger in his apartment. The man said, “Don’t move, you are under arrest” The man was a police officer who had broken into Brown’s apartment, searched it , then arrested Brown, all without probable cause. Later, after receiving Miranda warnings, Brown answered police questions and gave two incrimination statements. At his murder trial both statements were received in evidence. He was found guilty 2. Issue: Whether incriminating statements made following an unlawful arrest are admissible in court if the suspect was given the Miranda warnings 3. Court held that the incriminating statements are not admissible a. Miranda warnings alone do not guarantee admissibility for statements made following an unlawful arrest 2. Rule of Law: Incriminating statements made following an unlawful arrest are only admissible if the statements, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, are sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint 3. The exclusionary rule protects 4th Amendment rights by barring admission of all evidence derived from police error or misconduct as "fruit of the poisonous tree" 4. Based on Wong Sun, statements made following an illegal arrest may be admissible if those statements are "sufficiently acts of free will to purge the primary taint." 5. Miranda warnings are aimed at safeguarding 5th Amendment rights against self-incrimination a. The warnings are not designed to deter police misconduct and violations of 4th Amendment rights