Torts II: Jamie's Lawsuit Against State, Manufacturer, and OB/GYN, Exams of Law of Torts

Download Torts II: Jamie's Lawsuit Against State, Manufacturer, and OB/GYN and more Exams Law of Torts in PDF only on Docsity! TORTS II PROFESSOR DEWOLF SUMMER 1995 August 11, 1995 SAMPLE ANSWER TO FINAL EXAM QUESTION 1 Many issues are presented in this question for resolution. To summarize, Jamie, Sam and Dorothy should consider suits against the state, the manufacturer of the door and/or locking mechanism, and possibly against Greg's estate. Claims against the State The first issue would be to determine the manner in which the state has waived sovereign immunity and permitted itself to be sued. It appears from the statute that there is a fairly limited waiver of sovereign immunity, that covers only some types of negligent acts. Section 24-10-106(c) permits suits based upon a "dangerous condition of any public building." Although there is a discussion of health care providers in § 24-10-103, there is nothing that permits a suit against the state for negligence committed by a health care provider. However, perhaps some part of the statute I haven't seen would permits such a suit. 1. Dangerous Condition. There is a waiver of liability for maintaining a dangerous condition in a public building. We would argue that the dormitory, with its inadequate locking mechanism, constituted such a danger. We could also allege that failing to provide adequate security during the holiday recess also created or maintained a dangerous condition. Since this would be a premises liability case, the plaintiff's right to recover is dependent upon her status. Given the payment of money to the university, this would be considered an invitee relationship, giving rise to the duty to use reasonable care. (Some jurisdictions don't recognize the status distinctions, requiring "reasonable care under all the circumstances." However, in this case it wouldn't make any difference, since J is owed a duty of reasonable care—with respect to the premises—in any event.) 2. Medical Malpractice. (Note the doubt expressed above about whether there is a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to such a claim.) When J was treated by the student counseling center, we could argue that she was owed a duty to be treated with reasonable care. I can't tell whether the treatment was reasonable; she was told to sever her relationship with Greg, which sounds reasonable, but perhaps other specialists would have more effective ways of treating this condition. We would need to consult experts who would be qualified to testify concerning the standard of care prevailing for that specialty under those circumstances. 3. Failure to Warn. A final theory would be that the state owed a duty to Jamie similar to the duty that the University of California was held to owe in the Tarasoff case. This is the least plausible duty pursuant to the statute, since it disclaims any duty to assume care for another's safety (§ 24-10-106.5). But it might tie into the previous case if there was knowledge of this danger to her and if she was already owed a duty of care because of the counseling treatment she received. An additional issue involving the claim against the state is the requirement that the action be filed in a timely way. There is an initial claim-filing requirement that bars the claim unless notice of the claim has been given to the state within 180 days of the time the injury occurred. That time period has already passed, but perhaps a claim has already been filed. Also, since Sam is a minor the statute may be tolled until he becomes an adult. Product Liability TORTS II, SUMMER 1995, SAMPLE ANSWER Page 2 of 5 It appears that Jamie's injuries were related to the failure to the door mechanism to close properly, and thus could give rise to a product liability claim. The first argument would be that there was some kind of manufacturing defect either in the door or in the locking mechanism. This theory seems unlikely, but the advantage would be that any manufacturing flaw would give rise to strict liability. The second possibility is that the latch or door was defectively designed so that it didn't result in reliable closing and locking. One issue would be whether the product was designed with this kind of use in mind; that is a likely possibility, since it would be anticipated that one of the functions would be for security purposes. However, we would have to show that the cost to redesign the door such that it would avoid this kind of injury would be less than the expected frequency of injury. In other words, would a reasonable person have redesigned the product? Finally, we would have to show that the change in design would have made a difference. We don't know exactly how Greg got in; if he simply waited until someone went out and then followed before the door had a chance to shut, then the defect in the door would be irrelevant. (Per the instructions, legal cause is assumed once a but-for cause is established, thus excluding—for purposes of this analysis—any argument that Greg was a superseding cause.) Potential Contractor Claim There doesn't appear to be any negligence on the part of the contractor who built the building or installed the door, but perhaps that was done in a negligent fashion. The advantage of looking for the contractor rather than the university is that we wouldn't have to worry about sovereign immunity. The downside is that a contractor who finished work more than 6 years ago may be shielded by a statute of repose that requires suits to be filed within 6 years of the time that the work was substantially complete. Claim v. OB/GYN We would also want to investigate a claim against the OB/GYN who treated Jamie during her pregnancy. Sam obviously suffers significant handicaps, and while there is no suggestion that the OB/GYN was in a position to prevent these handicaps, it's a possibility that should be explored. Even if prevention were impossible, some jurisdictions impose upon the doctor a duty to warn the pregnant mother of the possibility for such defects to occur, giving her the chance to choose to have an abortion. While Jamie appears to have made the decision herself to give birth rather than have an abortion, she may not have been fully informed of the risks that she was running. Defenses Contributory Fault. In addition to the statute of limitations we should be concerned about a defense based upon comparative fault. Union follows a 49% modified comparative fault rule; that is, the plaintiff may recover so long as her negligence is not as great as that of the defendant against whom recovery is sought. (It also appears that the calculation is made on an individual basis, rather than a group basis; thus, if Jamie were found 20% at fault and an individual defendant were found 20% at fault, she could not recover against that defendant.) Jamie might be accused of contributory negligence in opening the door without looking first to see who it was. On the other hand, a jury might find her situation quite understandable, and find the argument of contributory negligence cruel in light of what has happened to her. Similarly, her choice to continue with her pregnancy rather than have an abortion might be considered an assumption of risk, but again the jury might find that an unfair burden. However, we should expect the defendant to raise these issues.