Detecting BS in Health Care: Identifying Deceptive Practices in the Industry, Lecture notes of English

Download Detecting BS in Health Care: Identifying Deceptive Practices in the Industry and more Lecture notes English in PDF only on Docsity! Detecting BS in Health Care By Lawton R. Burns, PhD Mark V. Pauly, PhD Department of Health Care Management The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania NOVEMBER 2018 SPECIAL REPORT Disclosure This presentation contains no BS. Moreover, it was not composed in any facility manufacturing BS. 2 Detecting BS in Health Care The Problem In the past several months, we have observed several notable signs of deceptive, misleading, unsubstantiated, and foolish statements—what we will call “BS” — in the health care industry. These new signs include fraudulently marketed products from Theranos1 and IBM Watson,2 and a recent statement by the CEO of One Medical that his firm aims to take out 10 percent of U.S. health care spending — something no one has ever done (not even the Federal Government).3 These follow closely on the heels of other likely BS, including claims that the proposed CVS- Aetna merger will turn your local pharmacy into a neighborhood “health care hub.”4 To be sure, BS is not just a recent phenomenon. Charles Dickens’ novella, A Christmas Carol (1843), includes the memorable line by Ebenezer Scrooge, “Bah, Humbug,” as he expressed his feelings that the holiday season was a hoax. The word “humbug” is actually older English for BS. Other great English synonyms for BS are shown to the right. Each term has an interesting origin, some going back to the late Middle Ages. “Some suggest (probably incorrectly) that the root word in BS — “bull” — began as a contemptuous reference to Papal edicts or “bulls.” Most of the terms date from the 18th and 19th centuries. They all essentially mean “nonsense.” We prefer BS, because it is a lot easier to say, more frank, and conveys more Scrooge-like disdain. Moreover, BS can be found anywhere. T.S. Eliot penned an early poem entitled, “The Triumph of Bullshit.” The author Ernest Hemingway was once asked, “Is there one quality needed to be a good writer, above all others?” He replied, “Yes, a built-in, shock-proof, crap detector.” During the 1960s, author Neil Postman embraced Hemingway’s message and developed a taxonomy of B.S. that included: pomposity, fanaticism, inanity, and ignorance presented in the cloak of authority. In a lively 1969 speech to the National Council of Teachers of English entitled, “Bullshit and the Art of Crap Detection,”5 Postman said: “As I see it, the best thing that schools can do for kids is to help them learn how to distinguish useful talk from bullshit … [I] would argue that helping kids to activate their crap-detectors should take precedence over any other legitimate educational aim … Every day, in almost every way, people are exposed to more bullshit than it is healthy for them to endure …” And this is long before the advent of political strategists on cable news. 5 Detecting BS in Health Care 1 Top-Down Solutions Most proposed solutions to organizational problems are formulated by the CEO or VP of Strategic Planning, or someone else delegated to provide a vision, and then pushed down the hierarchy for others to implement – often with minimal input, guidance, or revision by those responsible for carrying out the solution. For years, we have known that such an approach usually fails. And yet this approach is pursued widely in health care. We have typically described it in terms of the disconnect between the “Front Office” (C-suite), which decides what to do and what to change, and the “Front Line” (doctors and nurses) who are supposed to carry out the plans. We know that if clinicians are not engaged, the effort is likely to fail. And yet popular efforts to foster capitation and other alternative payment models are part of the transformation top management is supposed to engineer. Plans to engage physicians have stalled as (a) most physicians do not want these payment methods, and (b) their organizations prefer to still pay them fee- for-service, however the payment to the system is calculated. Links, either logical or social, between the new incentives at the top and the needed behavior changes in those down the chain, have not yet been invented, and are left to befuddled lower-level managers and provider committees to work out as best they can. Top- down 6 Detecting BS in Health Care 2 7 Detecting BS in Health Care 2 One-size-fits-all, off-the-shelf Many of the “solutions” offered to health care providers are developed by consulting firms who use a “one size fits all,” “off the shelf” design (and slide show) that requires little customization (not all consulting firms do this, thankfully). Of course, the consultants often developed the solution in another industry and, having saturated that, look for another vertical to sell it to. Modification for any special features of the health care sector, like the need to give authority to physicians and nurses and the special risks of errors, would require specialized knowledge consultants often do not have and so are not made. Health care is often the next hapless victim of the latest model which, at best, has been found to work in some entirely different industry and sometimes has not been tested at all. Of course, consultants rarely bother to consider the maxim that “health care is different” or that “all health care is local,” so why bother to customize? And how would you make good adaptations if you tried to customize? Needless to say, if health care is different (e.g., due to the well-noted maxim of market failure), then the solutions imported from elsewhere are likely to fail. 10 Detecting BS in Health Care 4 1 1 Detecting BS in Health Care 4 Follow the Guru Top-down solutions are also abetted by the presence of a visionary Guru with a mystical revelation about what needs to be done. In overall corporate America, Michael Hammer (“restructuring and reengineering”) comes to mind. Perhaps he comes to mind to all the employees who got downsized in restructuring efforts. In health care, it may be Michael Porter or Don Berwick (although there are other aspirants for the mantle). In past years, Porter has championed value-based competition, while Berwick has popularized the Triple Aim. “Value” (quality divided by cost) is hard to compute; as the late Uwe Reinhardt observed, we don’t know what health care really costs and then we divide it into a broad “vector” of quality statistics, which either individually or taken together do not measure what patients value or how much they value it. Compounding the BS is that the workers in charge of numerator and denominator in the value equation may not naturally cooperate. This means that any effort to “improve value” requires two different solutions by different teams of people. But why worry about these details? Berwick’s Triple Aim has been endorsed by the American Hospital Association, many private insurers, and baked into the metrics for assessing ACOs. It really doesn’t matter that most people in the industry cannot accurately define what they mean by the numerator, the denominator, or the ratio, let alone identify the three aims. Most people still confuse “health” (really health status, which is what the population health angle of the Triple Aim examines) with “health care.” But according to Obi-wan, the “force is strong,” as is the lure of a Guru. ——— wom" = ,)YHYCS 12 Detecting BS in Health Care 15 Detecting BS in Health Care 6 Stage Models We are not sure exactly why, but health care consultants, executives, and policymakers are very fond of “stage models” — planned endeavors in which things build upon prior efforts in linear progression over time. Maybe it is because, by the time proponents move on to another opportunity, the organization will still be in the first or second stage and so the reckoning of whether goals will finally be achieved can be in the future. During the 1990s, consultants proposed four stages through which health markets would evolve from fragmented competition to consolidated delivery systems. During the last few years, we witnessed three stages of “meaningful use” for electronic medical records as well as four stages in the movement to value. Such stages are depicted as in the accompanying chart — with very orderly and linear change (all upward moving, of course). Proponents seem undeterred by the evidence that these models are often simplistic and wrong, just as the stage-based classic models of economic development have failed to be followed by successful economies like Singapore. Moreover, change is messy, with early results going south, not north, into the “valley of despair,” one thing not necessarily leading to another, the need sometimes to double back, and the key role of unpredictable jumps that bypass the planned route and find a shortcut. 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Growth Rate vr 0.0% $0.09 ——— wom" = ,)YHYCS 16 17 Detecting BS in Health Care 7 Excel Sheet Planning There is a common tendency by executives and consultants to express strategic plans in terms of excel sheets — all replete with many apparently precise numbers, rosy upward-sloping growth projections, and forecasted savings into the future. This approach characterizes many government forecasts of health care spending. Recall that Medicare was only supposed to cost $12 billion by 1990 (instead of the actual $110 billion), or that ACOs were going to save us big money (instead of the small potatoes now reported). Indeed, the ACA has ended up costing less than expected, but only because some states passed on Medicaid, and enrollments in subsidized exchanges have been lower than expected. Unfortunately, nearly all forecasts are wrong or only randomly right, and (really) wrong the farther out the forecast. Even worse, expressing plans in terms of excel sheets leads the “advice consumers” to have a false sense of precision and the “advice suppliers” to forget the assumptions behind the forecasts and to check critical thinking at the door. Has anyone thought about how motivating an excel sheet is to the rank-and-file? 20 Detecting BS in Health Care 9 21 Detecting BS in Health Care 9 Be Like Mike Consultants and CEOs have long encouraged companies to adopt “best practices” allegedly demonstrated by peers. This movement began in earnest with Peters and Waterman’s In Search of Excellence (1982). The belief is that if you do the same X and Y as this successful company or leader, you too can “be like Mike” (Michael Jordan). This has shown up in health care with everyone suggesting that hospitals strive to be like Kaiser or Geisinger. In 2009, President Obama encouraged hospitals to emulate the Cleveland Clinic and Mayo Clinic. Of course, no one bothered to ask whether the success of these organizations was due to local circumstances, whether it could be bottled, and whether anyone else really had the chops to do it. They did not ask whether the apparent success extended to all the goals that matter; Kaiser has experienced the same growth rate in spending as the rest of the medical sector. Nor did they ask whether any observed success (compared to the rest of health care) by Mayo or the Cleveland Clinic was sustainable — which apparently is not always the case. jh © =: . oa "S2+ =. = DERE tit Fs ul pple o= at lan Boo ee AG panular | | woos ee 2 . Enterprise af aN = 5 1 s mm =ramework #8 dll WI I[streamline == ou SCalaDIOES 22 Detecting BS in Health Care 25 Detecting BS in Health Care References 1. Michael Joyner. 2018. “Why was Theranos so believable? Medicine needs to look in the mirror,” Stat (May 24). Available online at: https://www.statnews.com/2018/05/24/ theranos-elizabeth-holmes-hype-believability/. Accessed on August 29, 2018. 2. Casey Ross and Ike Swetlitz. 2018. “IBM’s Watson supercomputer recommended ‘unsafe and incorrect’ cancer treatments, internal documents show.” Stat (July 25). Available online at: https://www.statnews.com/2018/07/25/ibm-watson- recommended-unsafe-incorrect-treatments/. Accessed on August 29, 2018, Casey Ross and Ike Swetlitz. 2017. “IBM Pitched Its Watson Supercomputer as a Revolution in Cancer Care. It’s Nowhere Close.” KQED Science (September 6). Available online at: https://www.kqed.org/futureofyou/435315/ibm-pitched-its-watson- supercomputer-as-a-revolution-in-cancer-care-its-nowhere-close. Accessed on August 29, 2018. 3. Berkeley Lovelace Jr. 2018. “CEO looking to reinvent going to the doctor says he can cut all US health costs by 10 percent.” CNBC. (August 24). Available online at: https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/24/one-medical-ceo-amir-rubin-believes-he-can- cut-us-health-costs-by-10percent.html. Accessed on August 29, 2018. 4. CVS Health. 2017. “CVS Health to Acquire Aetna,” CVS Health Press Release. December 3rd. 5. Neil Postman. 1969. “Bullshit and the Art of Crap-Detection.” Paper delivered at the National Convention for the Teachers of English. (November 28). Available online at: http://media.usm.maine.edu/~lenny/Bullshit/crap_detection.pdf. Accessed on August 31, 2018. 6. Carl Sagan. The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark. 7. John Ioannidis. 2005. “Why most published research findings are false,” PLOS Medicine (August 30). Available online at: https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/ article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124. Accessed on August 30, 2018. 8. Gordon Pennycook, James A. Cheyne, Nathaniel Barr et al. 2015. “On the reception and detection of pseudo-profound bullshit,” Judgment and Decision Making 19(6): 549-563. 9. Tess Townsend. 2017. “These University of Washington professors are teaching a course on bullshit,” Recode (February 19). Available online at: https://www.recode. net/2017/2/19/14660236/big-data-bullshit-college-course-university-washington. Accessed on August 30, 2018. 10. Jeffrey Pfeffer and Robert Sutton. 2006. Hard Facts, Dangerous Half-Truths, and Total Nonsense: Profiting from Evidence-Based Management. Harvard Business School Press. Harry Frankfurt. 2005. On Bullshit. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 11. Peter Pronovost, Dale Needham, Sean Berenholtz, et al. “An Intervention to Decrease Catheter-related Bloodstream Infections in the ICU”. New England Journal of Medicine 355(26): 2725–32. December 2006. 12. Atul Gawande. 2009. The Checklist Manifesto. New York: Henry Holt. Top 10 Buzzwords: ANSWER KEY A. Blue sky B. Push the envelope C. Synergy D. Scale E. Ramp up F. Break new ground G. Paradigm H. Leapfrog I. Transformation J. Secret Sauce COLONIAL PENN CENTER 3641 LOCUST WALK PHILADELPHIA, PA 19104 LDI.UPENN.EDU @PENNLDI