Differences Between Men and Women - Femininity and Masculinity - Lecture Notes, Study notes of Sociology

Download Differences Between Men and Women - Femininity and Masculinity - Lecture Notes and more Study notes Sociology in PDF only on Docsity! How different are women and men? Tutorial Facilitation Report docsity.com In this report, I intend to run through this topic by starting with a brief outline, from the lectures, then moving on to the overarching themes and questions that I found in my further reading and preparation for my presentation. Finally, for this section, I will note the major questions outlined in the course guide. The second phase of this report will take my further reading on this topic into account, more directly, looking at Fausto-Sterling (2002), Kennelly, Ivy et al. (2001), and Risman (2001). Finally, I will try to discuss the major points that came up in the discussion of this topic during the tutorial. Within the discussion of this topic, there is a major importance in distinguishing between the terms ‘Sex’ and ‘Gender’, which are often used interchangeably in everyday life, but in social sciences they are not. The term ‘Sex’ refers to both ‘Sexual acts, desires or practices’, and ‘Sexual Dimorphism’. Sexual dimorphism pertains to the biological sex category assigned to a person, those being male (XY) or female (XX). The biological sex category is also defined by physical, anatomical, genital, genetic, chromosomal and hormonal differences. Sex categories are often considered fixed and unambiguous, giving them a strict dimorphism. A traditional view of the term ‘Gender’ is the social and cultural interpretation of the aforementioned biological sex. Through the notions of masculinity and femininity appropriate roles, behaviours and attributes are respectively assigned to those categorised as male and female. This also raises the question as to whether gender is mapped on to biological sex. The central debate in this topic is whether sex is the biological and genetic foundation from which gender distinctions materialise or whether gender distinctions lead us to perceive two sexes. These two issues harp back to the question of what extent sexual dimorphism is a ‘Natural’ fact. This also shows for difficult it is to address this topic without mentioning the social construction of gender and sex. There is also the issue of whether the significance of sex differences depends on social and political conditions; the example used was that muscular strength has become less important in technologically advanced societies. However, ‘Meta Analysis’ carried out by Eagley questioned the very concept of ‘Sex Differences’. Eagley started to find there were more similarities than differences, and proposed that most sex differences theorists are setting out to find differences, and so, are not open to the results they find. The ‘one-sex model’, which traditionally emphasised the similarities, has now switched to a ‘two-sex model’ that emphasised the differences. I will now move on to my own overarching themes and questions from this topic area. To begin, could it be that gender should be mapped onto a similar 5 stage grouping, as sex is, or is this still largely inadequate. This also brings up the point of whether even a 5 stage grouping for sex is wide enough in itself, “Indeed, I would argue further that sex is a vast, infinitely malleable continuum that defies the constraints of even five categories” (Fausto-Sterling, 2002:469). “The treatment of intersexuality in this century provides a clear example of what the French historian Michel Foucault has called biopower. The knowledge developed in biochemistry, embryology, docsity.com from Young’s work, of Francies Benton, who was a hermaphrodite, but “Had not worried over his condition, did not wish to be changed, and was enjoying life” (Young cited in Fausto-Sterling, 2002:470) This was also re-iterated by another case, of a hermaphrodite named Emma, who had a succession of marriages to men, although also had a string of girlfriends between and during these marriages. S/he found little or no sexual pleasure from being with a man, although did find this when s/he had intercourse with a woman. However, this did not stop him/her manipulating his/her circumstances to his/her own gains, as can be seen from the extract below; upon the suggestion that surgery would be able to make him/her a man, Emma replied: “Would you have to remove that vagina? I don’t know about that because that’s my meal ticket. If you did that, I would have to quit my husband and go to work, so I think I’ll keep it and stay as I am” (Young cited in Fausto-Sterling, 2002:470) The second part of my readings encompasses two readings from the American Sociological Review, one by Kennelly, Ivy et al. (2001) titled ‘What is Gender?’, the second is by Risman (2001) and titled ‘Calling the Bluff of Value Free Science’. Both of these articles are direct responses to the work of Richard Udry, titled ‘Biological Limits of Gender Construction’, and both spend a significant amount of time criticising Udry’s overly biological views, as well as criticising a number of other things, including the journal in which all three works were published. This area of readings begins to infringe on the topic of social constructionism, as these articles both claim, there are a great many flaws with assuming that gender is ‘unidirectionally’ linked to sex. “What we are as material bodies is the result of all the ‘natural’ and ‘nurtured’ input working together and affecting each other interactively. Gendered behaviour and its variations are the result of genetic and hormonal input, long-term evolutionary adaptations, lifetime experiences, and involvement in ongoing social situations.” (Kennelly, Ivy et al., 2001:599) Therefore, it is very difficult to discuss this topic without mentioning the social constructionism. The first big point from both of these two articles is to question what we can truly say are examples of gendered behaviours. Kennelly, Ivy, et al. (2001) used the example that behaviours often associated with women in the US, due to their disproportionate responsibility as mothers, is ‘nurturing’, “Yet women have been active in the Ku Klux Klan, fought in wars, and killed their children” (2001:601). Risman (2001) explained that, “What is masculine for a scientist in a high-tech corporation and in an inner-city gang have little to do with one another” (2001:607). These examples both show that what may be thought of as universal ‘gendered behaviours’ are extremely context specific, relying more on setting and circumstances than on individual ‘predispositions’ (Kennelly, Ivy et al. 2001:601). To finish this section, there is a significant point made that there is no one gender role for any given person, “The same woman might be a vicious litigator and a nurturing mother. The cut-throat financial trader might be a docsity.com tender caretaker to his dying lover” (Kennelly, Ivy et al. 2001:601). Risman (2001) goes on to propose that the notion that one person is socialized to a cross-situational ‘femininity’ or ‘masculinity’ is no longer a tenable viewpoint, as the weight empirical research to the contrary. Now I intend to look at some of the over-arching themes and questions I found in my reading for this topic, some of which have been mentioned previously. The first thing that came up was the possibility that gender would be better described as a 5 stage grouping, as Fausto-Sterling proposes sex is, rather than merely looking at it as a dichotomous existence. The next point was one of the situation with intersexuality and the social norms need for a dichotomous situation personifies the social standard of there being two genders and sexes. This also links into what I proposed early that intersexuality could be natures own homosexuality, but is generally denied by society (Fausto-Sterling, 2002:472). The final part of this report will go through discussion during the tutorial and some of the points that were brought up. It is worth noting for this section that due to time running out, we did not discuss all of the areas of interest I have outlined thus far. The first thing that was brought was that there must be a distinction made between the biological and the hormonal, as these may not be the same thing. The biological refers specifically to the outer genitalia and the hormonal refers to the balance and presence of certain hormones, as well as the effects these hormones may have on behaviour. The example given was of testosterone being linked to aggressiveness. The link was made to the social construction of gender, and that there is a hormonal effect. Whereas it was suggested this link was not present between ‘Biology’ and the social. The next major point of discussion was directed towards Fausto- Sterling’s (2002) self-confessed ‘Utopian’ hope for the place of intersexual people in society, especially in relation to whether intersex babies should be sexed at birth. This eventually moved on to the issue of intersex pre-adults and the various problems with sexing and the implications on their lives, against the problems with sexing babies wrongly. It was suggested that maybe ‘It’s better the devil you know?’, and is it the case that with the way things are in modern society, at least we know the possible areas that problems may arise. Whereas the ‘Utopian’ situation has far more and less controllable variables, such as: “What, for example, would happen to the intersexual child amid the unrelenting cruelty of the school yard? When the time came to shower in gym class, what horrors and humiliations would await the intersexual as his/her anatomy was displayed in all its non-traditional glory?” (Fausto-Sterling, 2002:472) The next area of discussion came from my over-arching theme about Foucault’s concept of ‘Biopower’. This brought up the issue as to whether it was a parental obligation to sex an intersex baby, or whether it was a medical obligation. Alternatively, is it the situation that we are in the wrong, completely, and we should follow Fausto-Sterling’s ‘Utopia’ and allow intersex pre-adults mature to a decision-making age and then allow them to make their own decision. This obviously ties in to the previous quote about the possible implications of allowing intersex children to mature. docsity.com In response to my proposing that we could map a 5-gender paradigm onto the 5-sex paradigm seems as problematic as the 5-sex paradigm itself, it was suggested this paradigm would not be possible. The basis for this assertion was that gender is too wide and too malleable a spectrum to comfortably define merely 5-genders. However, Fausto-Sterling seems to agree with my view, that in relation to sex the use of a 5-sex paradigm is useful, if not wholly accurate. From the previous discussion, it occurred to me subsequent to the tutorial that could we be looking at the issue slightly too literally. Could it be that a more Weberian viewpoint would be a lot more useful when studying gender and/or sex. What I see as a more Weberian view would say that society constructs two ‘ideal types’ (‘Femininity’ & ‘Masculinity’). Now, while we refer to these ideal types in our everyday life and our embodiment of gender, there is rarely an instance where somebody is ‘wholly masculine’ or ‘wholly feminine’. Rather than it being so black and white, the fact could be that most people are situated somewhere in the middle ground (‘grey areas’) between the two ideal types. docsity.com