Download Torts II Exam Answers: Statute of Limitations and Product Liability and more Exams Law of Torts in PDF only on Docsity! TORTS II, SPRING 2003 EXAM ANSWERS 1. 0 2. 0 3. 0 4. 60,000 5. 0 6. 60,000 7. 0 8. 0 9. 0 10. 80,000 11. 0 12. 120,000 13. 0 14. 0 15. 40,000 16. 100,000 17. 0 18. 60,000 19. 0 20. 0 21. 40,000 22. 120,000 23. 0 24. 120,000 TORTS II 2003 EXAM MODEL ANSWERS Question 25 Model Answer 1. a) June 1, 1997. The general rule is that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the injury occurs. [Some statutes say when the tort occurs or when the cause of action accrues, but courts usually interpret both of these to mean when injury occurs.] The injury at issue here is the injury that resulted from the malpractice—the blood poisoning—and not the injury from the hunting accident itself. Paula developed blood poisoning on June 1, 1997. It is at this point that she has an injury for which should could bring a claim. b) June 1, 1998. Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations period begins to run when all the elements of the tort are present, and Paula discovered or reasonably should have discovered her injury and that Dr. Blind had a causal role in the injury. Paula had no injury from the malpractice until she developed blood poisoning on June 1, 1997. On June 1, 1997, however, she had no symptoms. She did not discover her injury and had no reason to discover her injury or Dr. Blind’s role in it until she developed symptoms and had a diagnosis from Dr. Rescue on June 1, 1998. c) June 1, 1995. A typical statute of repose in a medical malpractice case begins to run when the negligent act (the malpractice) occurs. The malpractice here was Dr. Blind’s failure to carefully read the x-rays on June 1, 1995. 2. Dr. Rescue arguably should not be permitted to testify as to Dr. Blind’s negligence because he is not a radiologist, and he is not from the same or similar community as Dr. Blind. In a malpractice action the standard of care is established by what a reasonably well-qualified professional ordinarily and customarily would have done under the same or similar circumstances. In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant failed to conform to the standard of care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the same school of medicine practiced by the defendant. Here, Dr. Blind is a radiologist, and Dr. Rescue is an internist. An internist would not normally be qualified to testify concerning the custom and practice of a radiologist. There could be an exception if (1) Dr. Rescue has, by reason of knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, knowledge of the standards applicable to radiologists, or (2) if the standard of care for reading x-rays is substantially identical for both internists and radiologists. Arguably, any medical doctor would have some knowledge of how to properly read an x-ray. Dr. Rescue might be allowed to testify that Dr. Blind’s error was so clear that any medical doctor should have discovered the bullet fragments. Dr. Rescue may also be disqualified because he is from Denver and not the rural community in which Dr. Blind practices. Many jurisdictions impose the modified locality rule holding physicians to the level of skill of physicians in the same or similar communities. Because Denver is not comparable to a rural community, Dr. Rescue would be disqualified under the modified locality rule. Dr. Rescue would also be disqualified under a strict locality rule because he is not from the same community as Dr. Blind.
