Fighting Corruption in the Philippines: Analysis of Causes and Solutions, Slides of Political Science

Download Fighting Corruption in the Philippines: Analysis of Causes and Solutions and more Slides Political Science in PDF only on Docsity! DOMESTIC POLITICS: COMBATTING CORRUPTION BY JON S.T. QUAH GROUP 2 ALEJO, ATHENA S. CAÑO, FLYNN NICOLE M. LEJANO, VERONICA A. MONSALVE, SCHELLA MAE M. Perceived extent of corruption The perceived extent of corruption in the Philippines is ascertained by examining its performance on these 3 International Indicators: (1) The World Bank’s Control of Corruption 1996-2014 The Philippines’ performance for Control of Corruption: (2) Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 1995-2015 ◦ The Philippines’ CPI scores: (3) Hong Kong-based Political and Economic Research Consultancy (PERC) 1995-2016 The Philippines’ score on the PERC survey: YEAR 1998 2006 2010 (under Benigno Aquino) 2013 PERCENTILE RANK 55.1 22.0 22.4 43.5 YEAR 1999 & 2013 2014 SCORE 3.6 38 YEAR 1997 2007 2016 SCORE 6.50 9.40 7.05 5. WEAK POLITICAL WILL > Two indicators of the weak political will of the many governments in the Philippines in combating corruption (during the past 66 years): (1) The inadequate human and financial resources allocated by the government to the OMB, the lead ACA, as reflected in its high staff population ratio and low per capita expenditure (Quah, 2009); and (2) The continued reliance by Filipino political leaders on ineffective multiple ACAs without making any improvements to enhance their effectiveness. > The proliferation of ACAs in the Philippines has led to ‘duplication, layering and turf wars’. Instead of coordinating their activities and cooperating with each other, these ACAs compete for recognition, personnel and resources because they are under- staffed and poorly funded. Their overlapping jurisdictions diffuse anti-corruption efforts, and result in ‘poor coordination in policy and programme implementation, weak management and wastage of resources’ (Oyamada, 2005 and Quimson, 2006) Reliance on ineffective multiple ACAs (The Philippines’ reliance on multiple ACAs) OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (OMB) > The OMB or Tanodbayan was originally established by President Marcos on 18 July 1979 with the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1630; was reorganised by President Corazon Aquino in May 1988. > According to Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, as well as Republic Act No. 6770 (or the ‘Ombudsman Act of 1989’), the OMB performs these five functions: 1. Investigation of anomalies and inefficiency; 2. Prosecution of graft cases in the Sandiganbayan; 3. Administrative adjudication through disciplinary control over all elective and appointed officials except for members of the Congress, Judiciary and impeachable officials; 4. Provision of public assistance by requiring public officials and employees to assist the public; and 5. Graft prevention by analysing anti-corruption measures and increasing public awareness and cooperation (OMB, 2009) > Impeachment complaints were filed thrice against Ombudsman Aniano Desierto during his seven-year term for betraying the public trust. 1996 - Desierto refused to respond to charges of forging his ex-wife’s signature on a deed of sale of conjugal property. 2001 - Desierto was accused of accepting a bribe to drop the charges against his client. 2002 - Desierto was also accused of dismissing a case against those public officials who granted a five billion pesos tax credit to a textile magnate’s companies. Even though these impeachment complaints against Desierto were dismissed by congressmen, these impeachment cases have ‘sullied the already unsavoury reputation of the Ombudsman’ (Coronel and KalawTirol, 2002) > Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez was criticised for devoting the OMB’s limited resources on investigating petty corruption instead of continuing her predecessor’s exposure of grand corruption. Consequently, the OMB was described as ‘the Street Ombudsman’ because of its emphasis on petty corruption (Newsbreak Online 2006) PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) > President Corazon Aquino established the PCGG to identify and retrieve the money stolen by the Marcos family and its cronies. > In view of its raison d’être, PCGG is not an ACA because it is not involved in investigating corruption cases or in corruption prevention and education. However, the PCGG was a target for charges of corruption, favouritism and incompetence. > The PCGG Commissioner, Quintin S. Doromal was charged for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) on 1988. Similarly, PCGG Commissioners Ramon A. Diaz and Mary Concepcion Bautista were also charged in 1989 for the same offence (Asian Institute of Strategic Studies (AISS), 2003) As the PCGG has failed to meet its objective of recovering the loot stolen by Marcos and his family after 30 years, it has certainly outlived its usefulness and should be abolished as soon as possible (Quah, 2015) INTER-AGENCY ANTI-GRAFT COORDINATING COUNCIL (IACC) > The IACC is a voluntary alliance formed by the heads of the OMB, Civil Service Commission (CSC), Commission of Audit (COA), PAGC and National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) through a Memorandum of Agreement signed on 11 June 1997. Performs three (3) functions: 1. It coordinates the activities of its members by sharing information, initiating the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of graft cases, and forming ad hoc inter-agency task forces to investigate major cases involving substantial losses of government resources. 2. It conducts inter-agency skills training programmes for the personnel of its member agencies to enhance their skills in fraud detection, investigation and prosecution of the offenders. 3. It promotes inter-agency conferences to enable the personnel of the member agencies to exchange ideas and discuss common issues and problems (Ursal, 2006) > The IACC’s role is to enhance coordination among its member agencies but, ‘in reality, it is not active’ (Oyamada, 2005) > The IACC has only met twice, and the ‘slow progress in its revitalization’ reflects the inability of its six member agencies to collaborate effectively among themselves’ (Holmes, 2007) > The IACC’s inability to coordinate the activities of the ACAs is reflected in the UNODC’s Country Review Report of the Philippines, which has identified ‘inter-agency coordination and limited resources’ as the major challenges faced by the OMB in investigating bribery and embezzlement cases (UNODC, 2012). IACC has clearly outlived its usefulness and should be disbanded without further delay.