Droney v Droney - Law - Case Study, Study Guides, Projects, Research of Law

Download Droney v Droney - Law - Case Study and more Study Guides, Projects, Research Law in PDF only on Docsity! MARY ANN DRONEY v. JOHN H. DRONEY No. 539, SEPTEMBER TERM, 1994 COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND 102 Md. App. 672; 651 A.2d 415; 1995 Md. App. LEXIS 1 January 3, 1995, Filed PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] APPEAL FROM THE Circuit Court for Baltimore County. John Grason Turnbull, II, JUDGE. DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant wife challenged a ruling from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (Maryland), which held that she committed a contempt of court by failing to transfer a mobile home to appellee husband as part of a divorce settlement. Because the mobile home's character was transformed by the actions of the parties in affixing it to the realty, the trial court considered it a fixture and part of the real property to be transferred. OVERVIEW: Reviewing the contempt charge against appellant wife for failing to transfer a mobile home to appellee husband as part of a divorce settlement, the court found that the trial court's order after the first contempt hearing resolved uncertainty in the divorce judgment's meaning and unequivocally directed appellant to transfer the home, and her refusal to obey the trial court's directive led to its order after a second contempt hearing. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's contempt ruling, and its factual analysis supported its finding that the home was a fixture, so the trial court was not clearly erroneous. The court found that the mobile home was no longer movable because many alterations and improvements were made to it. The court found that the trial court reasonably inferred that the parties' agreement contemplated a residence exchange, with appellant receiving the home and land the parties occupied before the divorce, and appellee receiving the mobile home and land. The trial court was found to have clear statutory authority to merge the parties' agreement into a divorce judgment and to enforce it with contempt. The judgment was affirmed. OUTCOME: The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, which held appellant wife in contempt of court when she refused to transfer a mobile home to appellee husband as part of their divorce settlement. The trial court had clear statutory authority to merge the terms of the parties' agreement into a judgment of divorce and to enforce its terms with contempt. There was no error or abuse of discretion. CORE TERMS: contempt, mobile home, fixture, real estate, real property, real estate, divorce, realty, moot, absolute divorce, personal property, sentence, motor vehicle, ownership, wheels, bail, contempt proceeding, failure to pay, personalty, trailer, affixed, block, common law, bail pending appeal, criminal contempts, warrantless searches, deed, bolts, Md Rule P5, Law Code LexisNexis® Headnotes Hide Headnotes Civil Procedure > Appeals > Dismissals of Appeals > Involuntary Dismissals Civil Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > Time Limitations HN1 Md. R. App. Review, Ct. App., & Ct. Spec. App. 8-202(a) requires parties to note any appeals within 30 days of the entry of judgment; the failure to note appeals in a timely manner can be grounds for dismissing an appeal under Md. R. App. Review, Ct. App., & Ct. Spec. App. 8- 602(a)(3). A court may dismiss an appeal if the issues to be considered are moot. Md. R. App. Review, Ct. App., & Ct. Spec. App. 8-602(a)(10). Civil Procedure > Justiciability > Mootness > General Overview Civil Procedure > Dismissals > Involuntary Dismissals > General Overview HN2 A question is moot if, at the time it is before a court, there is no longer an existing controversy between the parties, so that there is no longer any effective remedy which a court can provide. With contempt, however, even if a purge cannot be undone, and a party held in contempt cannot be made whole, a party remains entitled to seek exoneration. A party wrongfully held in contempt has the right to have the records cleared of the contempt finding, even if in all likelihood no one else will ever know of it. Civil Procedure > Remedies > Bonds > General Overview Criminal Law & Procedure > Bail > Release Pending Appeal & Sentencing Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > General Overview HN3 An alleged contemnor has the same right to bail while awaiting an appeal as an accused in a criminal proceeding, as established under Md. R. Crim. Causes 4-349. Once a party is purged of contempt, effectuating release, the establishment of bail after that is pointless. Civil Procedure > Sanctions > Contempt > Civil Contempt Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > Miscellaneous Offenses > Contempt > Elements Criminal Law & Procedure > Criminal Offenses > Miscellaneous Offenses > Contempt > Proceedings > Court's Power to Punish HN4 The contempt power is a tool available to a court to compel a person to act or not to act in a specified manner. Contempts are classified as civil or criminal and at least in theory either of these may be direct or constructive. A civil contempt proceeding is intended to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to a suit and to compel obedience to orders and decrees primarily made to benefit such parties. These proceedings are generally remedial in nature and are intended to coerce future compliance. A penalty in a civil contempt must provide for purging. The penalty imposed in a criminal contempt is punishment for past misconduct which may not necessarily be capable of remedy. Such a penalty does not require a purging provision but may be merely punitive. To these factors must be added the degree of proof required to establish a contempt: a civil contempt need be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence, while a criminal contempt must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Abuse of Discretion Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Clearly Erroneous Review HN5 The decision of whether to hold a party in contempt is vested in a trial court. Md. R. 1. A court only reverses such a decision upon a showing that a finding of fact upon which the contempt is being imposed is clearly erroneous or that a court is abusing its discretion in finding particular behavior to be contemptuous. In a review of contempt proceedings, a court does not weigh the evidence, but merely assess its sufficiency. Before a party may be held in contempt of a court order, an order must be sufficiently definite, certain, and specific in its terms so that a party may the agreement of the parties," ordered the parties, inter alia, to transfer to each other the interests each had in certain real estate. It provided as follows: * * * 2. It is further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that Mary Ann Droney shall deed all of her right, title and interest in and to all real estate owned by the parties in Garrett County, Maryland. . . . 3. That John H. Droney shall deed unto Mary Ann Droney all of his right, title and interest in and to a parcel of real estate located in Baltimore County, Maryland . . . . 4. That both John H. Droney and Mary Ann Droney are herewith denied alimony, past, present and future pursuant to their expressed waivers thereof as expressed in open court on June 12, 1990. [*677] 5. That both John H. Droney and Mary Ann Droney are herewith denied any marital award pursuant to their expressed waivers [***4] thereof as expressed in open court on June 12, 1990. 6. That judgment is granted in favor of John H. Droney against Mary Ann Droney in the amount of $ 1,000.00. Said payment shall be paid by Mary Ann Droney unto John H. Droney immediately. (Emphasis added). On November 15, 1991, Ms. Droney signed over to Mr. Droney a deed for the Property. Mr. Droney's subsequent attempt to transfer the Property to a third party led to his discovery that the home did not fully belong to him. When Mr. Droney sought to close out his outstanding loan and the vendee attempted to secure a mortgage on the Property, the lending banks determined that the "mobile" home remained designated as a vehicle and was still titled in the MVA records in the names of both Mr. and Ms. Droney; only the land itself had been transferred by Ms. Droney. The banks insisted that Mr. Droney separately transfer his interest in the home to the vendee, to be sure that title to the Property was clear. Mr. Droney then asked Ms. Droney to transfer title to the home to him, based on his understanding of their divorce agreement, but she refused. Because of Ms. Droney's refusal to transfer title to the home, as well as her [***5] failure to pay the $ 1,000, Mr. Droney filed a Petition for Contempt on February 26, 1992. At the contempt hearing on November 18, 1992 (Judge John G. Turnbull, presiding), Ms. Droney argued that the Judgment only obligated her to transfer her interest in the "real estate," and that the mobile home was a motor vehicle, not "real estate." There, as here, she contended that the certificate of title for the home, as well as the recorded security interest, conclusively demonstrated that the home was a "vehicle," and could not be considered part of the "real estate" that she had agreed to transfer. She also alleged that she was not in contempt for failure to pay the judgment because she did not have [**418] the funds to do so. Notwithstanding Ms. Droney's [*678] arguments, the court found Ms. Droney in contempt of court for failing to comply fully with the terms of the Judgment. It did not, however, impose a sentence. On December 3, 1992, the court issued an Order (the "1992 Order"), in which the court found Ms. Droney in contempt of the Judgment as to both paragraphs 2 and 6. Nevertheless, the court declined to impose a sentence. The court said: [The] sentence on the contempt is suspended generally [***6] provided that the Defendant, Mary Ann Droney, on or before December 18, 1992 does the following: a. Properly execute an assignment of the ownership of her interest in a 1987 Champion Trailer . . . located at 192 East Cumberland Road, Oakland, Garrett County, Maryland, said trailer being specifically found by this Court to be "real estate" within the meaning of paragraph two of the aforementioned Judgment of Absolute Divorce dated January 22, 1991. [b.] Pay to the Plaintiff, John H. Droney, the $ 1,000.00 ordered in paragraph six of the aforementioned Judgment of Absolute Divorce dated January 22, 1991. [c.] Pay to the Plaintiff, John H. Droney, the sum of $ 500.00 toward counsel fees incurred in this contempt proceeding . . . . [d.] Pay to the Plaintiff, John H. Droney, the $ 25.00 in open costs in this contempt proceeding. (Emphasis added). On December 7, 1992, Ms. Droney noted an appeal of the 1992 Order. However, this Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the 1992 Order was not final because it did not impose any penalty. Consequently, it was not appealable. Droney v. Droney, No. 1926, slip. op. at 3-4 (Ct. Sp. App. Sept. 22, 1993) [***7] (citing Mitchell v. Mitchell, 61 Md. App. 535, 544-48, 487 A.2d 680 (1985)). Accordingly, we declined to consider whether the home was, indeed, "real estate." Meanwhile, on January 10, 1993, Mr. Droney filed a Petition for Further Contempt and Execution of Previously Suspended [*679] Sentence. Also, on April 19, 1993, Mr. Droney filed a Request for Garnishment of Property Other Than Wages, asking for garnishment of the $ 1,525 owed to Mr. Droney under the 1992 Order. On June 18, 1993, the trial court issued the writ, which was subsequently satisfied. 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 Ms. Droney does not presently contest the debt of $ 1,525 or any part of the garnishment. - - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - On March 9 and 10, 1994, Judge Turnbull heard Mr. Droney's Petition for Further Contempt. Again, Ms. Droney argued that she could not be in contempt as the Judgment did not order her to transfer anything other than "real estate," and a vehicle could not constitute real estate. Rejecting her argument, the court found as follows: It's [***8] obvious from the Judgment of Absolute Divorce . . . that it was the intent of the parties that Mrs. Droney get [the real estate located in] Baltimore County, Maryland, together with all the improvements thereon, which happens to be a house. It's also obvious from the other paragraph that Mr. Droney was to get the real estate located in Garrett County, Maryland, together with everything that there was on that particular property. I am absolutely convinced that neither the parties nor the attorneys at the time had any inkling whatsoever that there was some convoluted title floating around for what was once for the purpose of transporting a modular home or a movable home. It is apparent . . . that this house has been affixed to this property and is exactly that, it is a house that is affixed to this real estate and it has become part of the real estate and should be transferred as part of the real estate. Frankly, I don't think, if the circumstances were somewhat different, any court would have problems whatsoever with a bill to quiet title on the property and that would satisfy the title companies in this particular case. For [Ms. Droney] to come back at this point in time and [***9] say: "Oh, I forgot, this is part mine and it's personal property," is absolutely ludicrous. [*680] This time, after again finding Ms. Droney in contempt, the court sentenced Ms. Droney [**419] to two years of incarceration, suspending all but one year (the "1994 Order"). The court, however, allowed Ms. Droney to purge the contempt by executing the necessary documents to effectuate transfer of title of the home to Mr. Droney. Soon after being taken from the courtroom by the sheriff, Ms. Droney signed the documents, thereby purging the contempt. Ms. Droney now appeals from the 1994 Order. Issues Presented Ms. Droney presentes five questions for our consideration, which we have re-worded slightly: 1. Did the court err in granting the Petition for Contempt to enforce a disposition of property, where the Court of Appeals has held this could not be done? 2. Did the court err in determining that the trailer home was real property, when it is titled and its transfer is controlled by the Department of Transportation? 3. Did the court err in construing the Judgment of Absolute Divorce, according to its opinion as to the intent of the parties, where the language of the Judgment [***10] is plain and unambiguous? 4. Did the court err in ordering the transfer of ownership of personal property, when transfer is prohibited by Family Law Article, Section 8-202(a)(3)? 5. Did the court err in sentencing the appellant to one year for contempt, and denying her bail, when Md. Rule P5 specifically provides for bail pending appeal? In addition, Mr. Droney asks whether Ms. Droney has timely appealed and whether the issues are now moot. We hold that the issue of bail is moot. Although Ms. Droney's remaining issues are appealable and not moot, we conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed below, we shall affirm. [*681] Discussion I. As Mr. Droney's questions of timeliness and mootness are threshold considerations, we shall address them first. HN1 Maryland Rule 8-202(a) requires parties to note any appeals within 30 days of the entry of judgment; the failure to note appeals in a timely manner can be grounds for dismissing an appeal under Rule 8-602(a)(3). Additionally, this Court may dismiss an appeal if the issues to be considered have become moot. Rule 8-602(a)(10); see also, Potts v. Governor, 255 Md. 445, 449, 258 A.2d 180 (1969); [***11] Washington Homes v. Baggett, 23 Md. App. 167, 171, 326 A.2d 206 (1974), cert. denied, (1975). Mr. Droney contends that Ms. Droney has only contested the finding of contempt as to the 1992 Order, but has not specifically challenged the 1994 Order. Additionally, he argues that if Ms. Droney wanted to appeal the "real estate" issue, she should have noted her appeal immediately following the entry of the Judgment. Yet at the time the Judgment was entered, the parties believed they were in agreement. The court had not yet been asked to interpret the Judgment, nor had the court issued an order based on the Judgment. Thus, no issue even existed until the 1992 Order had been entered. Moreover, we previously held that Ms. Droney could not appeal from the 1992 Order, as it was not final. Only after the court imposed a sentence for the contempt did the 30-day clock begin to run under Rule 8- 202(a). Therefore, the contention as to timeliness is without merit. Mr. Droney also insists that when Ms. Droney purged herself of the contempt she rendered all issues moot. HN2 "A question is moot if, at the time it [***12] is before the court, there is no longer an existing controversy between the parties, so that there is no longer any effective remedy which the court can provide." Att'y Gen. v. Anne Arundel Co. Sch. Bus Contractors Ass'n., 286 Md. 324, 327, 407 A.2d 749 (1979); see also, News American Div. v. State, 294 Md. 30, 38-39, 447 A.2d 1264 (1982). With contempt, however, even if the purge [*682] cannot be undone, and thus the party held in contempt cannot be made "whole," the party remains entitled to seek exoneration. Jones v. State, 61 Md. App. 94, 96, 484 A.2d 1050 (1984) (defendant, who had served the entire contempt sentence, remained entitled to exoneration by [**420] having contempt finding set aside). See also, Williams v. Williams, 63 Md. App. 220, 225-26, 492 A.2d 649, aff'd, 305 Md. 1, 501 A.2d 432 (1985) (party wrongfully held in contempt has the right to have the records cleared of the contempt finding, even if in all likelihood no one else would ever know of it). [***13] Even if Ms. Droney cannot recover her interest in the home, she still may be entitled to a vacation of the contempt finding. Accordingly, the issues pertaining to the contempt itself, which further involve the question of whether Ms. Droney complied with the Judgment, are not moot. In contrast, we do not agree with Ms. Droney that the issue of bail pending appeal is properly before us. Rule P5 gives HN3 an alleged contemnor the same right to bail while awaiting an appeal as an accused in a criminal proceeding, as established under Rule 4-349. Once Ms. Droney purged herself of the contempt--thus effectuating her release--the establishment of a bail thereafter would have been pointless. Consequently, "there is no longer any effective remedy which the court can provide," Sch. Bus Contractors Ass'n., 286 Md. at 327, and the bail issue is thus moot. Even if the issue were not moot, we have repeatedly held, in the context of Rule 4-349, that the denial of bail pending appeal may by attacked only collaterally, by filing a petition for adaptation of the land to the use of the home, the record also showed that the Droneys built a deck entirely surrounding the house and planted shrubs around the house. Mr. Droney testified that any attempt to remove the home would "wreck" it. In short, the home was not moving anywhere. With respect to the intent factor, no evidence was presented by the parties to show that they ever intended to sever the mobile home from the land. Although the Judgment does not [*687] expressly mention the mobile home, it is relevant as to intent because it reflects the parties' agreement. Maryland has long followed the rule that the interpretation of the terms of a consent judgment [***22] will be governed by ordinary contract principles, as consent judgments are a product of negotiation and agreement. Ramsey, Inc. v. Davis, 66 Md. App. 717, 727- 28, 505 A.2d 899 (1986). In Roged, Inc. v. Paglee, 280 Md. 248, 254, 372 A.2d 1059 (1977), the Court explained the approach HN10 a trial court should take in interpreting a consent judgment: It is well settled that Maryland follows the objective test in the interpretation of contracts, and that the application of this test means that where the language is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction, and it must be presumed that the parties meant what they expressed: not what the parties intended the contract to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it meant. Id., at 254 (citations omitted; emphasis added). See also, Shanty Town Assocs. v. Dep't of the Environment, 92 Md. App. 103, 112, 607 A.2d 66 (1992) (citing Paglee), cert. denied, 328 Md. 94, 612 A.2d 1316 (1993). [***23] Analyzing the Judgment in the context of the facts, a reasonable person, in the position of the parties when the Judgment was entered, would have thought that the agreement, as reflected by the Judgment, contemplated an exchange of interests in the two properties, including the homes on the properties. Ms. Droney received from Mr. Droney the Baltimore County land and the home situated on it, which had been the residence they shared prior to the divorce. The court reasonably inferred that the intent of the parties' agreement contemplated an exchange of residences. 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 Indeed, a contrary interpretation would require the "reasonable person" to conclude that the parties intended the ownership status of the Property to remain in legal limbo. - - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [*688] Several other jurisdictions have considered the issue now before us. See, e.g., Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260, 267 (N.C. App.), cert. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (N.C. 1985) (HN11 both at common [***24] law and by statute, buildings, including mobile homes, placed upon real property become a part of the real property; and "the burden of proof is on the party claiming the house is personal property to show that it retained that character."). In those cases where the home in question was no longer readily transportable, the courts [**423] have held that the mobile home in question became a fixture of real property. See, e.g., Solomon v. Gentry, 388 So.2d 52, 53- 54 (Fla. App. 1980) (home on blocks, with wheels removed and utility lines attached); C.I.T. Fin. Svces. v. Premier Corp., 747 P.2d 934, 937-38 (Okla. 1987) (home on cement footing, attached with metal skirting, bolts, and steel straps, as well as utility lines). On the other hand, when the facts indicated that the home remained readily movable, other courts have found the mobile home to have been personal property. Estate of Schulz v. Flora, 180 Pa. Super. 237, 120 A.2d 178 (Pa. Super. Ct.), aff'd, 180 Pa. Super. 243, 120 A.2d 181 (Pa.), aff'd after remand, 392 Pa, 117, 139 A.2d 560 (Pa. 1956), [***25] cert. denied, (1957) (homeowner, who actually moved trailer through several states, cannot say trailer is so fixed to land as to be realty); Cooper's Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Simmons, 94 Wash. 2d 321, 617 P.2d 415, 418 (Wash. 1980) (homeowner, who tried to sell mobile home without land, cannot say home is so attached to land as to be realty). The analysis in C.I.T. Fin. Svces. v. Premier Corp., 747 P.2d 934 (Okla. 1987), is particularly instructive. There, as here, the "double-wide" mobile home in question had been placed on footings made from poured cement, attached with metal skirting, bolts, and steel straps, the wheels had been removed, and utility lines hooked up. After reviewing the common law of fixtures, and noting that most states use similar common law rules, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reviewed several similar cases in other jurisdictions: The Seventh Circuit in considering a case similar to this one stated: Physical attachment did occur by means of cinder blocks and a 'c' clamp while connections for electricity, sewage, [*689] and natural gas were provided [***26] as well. George v. Commercial Credit Corp., 440 F.2d 551, [554] (7th Cir. 1971). The court, interpreting Wisconsin law, held that a mobile home affixed to real estate was a fixture. In Fink Wemco Corp., 4 B.R. 741, 29 U.C.C. Rep. 1431 (Br. Ct. W.D.N.Y. 1980), the court found the mobile home to be a fixture, applying the same . . . test applicable in Oklahoma and the Seventh Circuit. Other states that have considered the question have applied the same rationale in determining a mobile home to be a fixture. Commercial Tp. v. Block 136, Lot 2, [179 N.J. Super. 307, 431 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1981)2]; Hartford National Bank & Trust Co. v. Godin, [137 Vt. 39, 398 A.2d 286 (Vt. 1979)]. In Hartford the court found specific evidence of how the mobile home became a fixture. Clear intent to make it part of the realty was evidenced by a concrete block foundation, attached steps, a connected septic system, and encasement of the foundation in aluminum foundation siding . . . . Id. [398 A.2d at 287]. On [***27] the other hand, in In Re Gray, 40 B.R. 429, 434 (W.D.Okl. 1984) the Bankruptcy Court . . . found a mobile home to be personalty because: The debtors in the instant case do not own the land on which the mobile home rests . . . . Nor was there any demonstrable fixation to the realty. There was no additional construction which would hinder future mobility. There was no permanent foundation. . . . In fact, not even the wheels were removed. 747 P.2d at 936-37. The Oklahoma Supreme Court had no difficulty in concluding from these cases that the mobile home before it was a fixture. Applying these cases here, we note that at each of the contempt hearings the court had before it evidence of the manner in which the home was attached to the land and the context of the exchange of properties. The evidence supported the court's findings that what once was a "mobile" home--an item of personalty--had become real property. We [*690] see no error in these findings. 3 Accordingly, [**424] the court correctly directed Ms. Droney to transfer the home in its 1992 Order; the court's finding of contempt in the 1994 Order, based on Ms. Droney's failure [***28] to comply, was not an abuse of discretion. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 In addition, our decision finds logical support in the area of lawful warrantless searches of vehicles under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985), the Supreme Court held that the mobile home in question was sufficiently mobile that it fell within the "automobile exception" to the prohibition on warrantless searches, even if it was being used primarily as a residence and not as a means of transportation. Id. at 393. The Court suggested, however, that the same home, on blocks and connected to utility lines in a mobile home park, would not have been subject to a warrantless search, because the critical element of mobility would be lacking. Id. at 394 n.3. See also, Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 398-99, 545 A.2d 1281 (1988) (interpreting Carney, defendant's bus, which had been converted into lodging, was subject to warrantless search as it had all of its tires fully inflated, had all its windows intact, had all its lights in apparently functional condition, and was near a road). - - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***29] III. Ms. Droney contends that even if the court did not err in finding that the term "real estate" encompassed the home, the court lacked the statutory authority to order her to transfer her interest in property, either as part of a divorce decree or in the enforcement thereof. HN12 Under Md. Fam. Law Code Ann., § 8-202(a) (1991), the court may determine ownership of disputed property when the court grants an absolute divorce, but the statute expressly denies the court the power to transfer property, other than money, as part of an award. See also, Kline v. Kline, 93 Md. App. 696, 703, 614 A.2d 984 (1992). At the same time, the court can merge the terms of a deed, agreement, or settlement made between the parties during the divorce as a part of the divorce decree. Md. Fam. Law Code Ann., § 8-105(a); Goldberg v. Goldberg, 290 Md. 204, 210 n.6, 428 A.2d 469 (1981). Once the terms are so merged, the court has the power to enforce those terms using the contempt power. Md. Fam. Law Code Ann., § 8-105(a); [*691] Md. Rule 2-648; Mendelson v. Mendelson, 75 Md. App. 486, 497-98, 541 A.2d 1331 (1988). [***30] Ms. Droney relies on the case of McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 469 A.2d 1256 (1984) for the proposition that contempt may not be used to enforce a "property disposition award." In McAlear, the divorced wife sought to have her ex-husband held in contempt for his failure to pay the monetary award specified in the judgment of absolute divorce. The Court held that, unlike alimony, a monetary award in a divorce case constitutes a "debt," and as the Maryland Constitution, Art. III, § 38 forbids incarceration for the failure to pay a debt, contempt was not an available method of enforcement. Id. at 349-52. Ms. Droney's reliance on McAlear is inapposite. The Court did not consider Fam. Law, § 105(a), and we find nothing in McAlear that approaches the question of whether a court may use contempt to enforce the lawful terms of its own orders. Given the clear statutory authority to merge the terms of an agreement into a judgment of divorce and to enforce such terms with contempt, the court did not err in seeking to enforce the terms of the Judgment by ordering Ms. Droney to transfer her [***31] ownership of the Property to Mr. Droney. AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.