Urban Bias & Economic Interests: Urban Manufacturing & Rural Agriculture in Tuscany, Exams of Italian Language

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2003 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0002-9602/2003/10805-0004$10.00 Economic Interests and Sectoral Relations: The Undevelopment of Capitalism in Fifteenth-Century Tuscany1 Rebecca Jean Emigh University of California, Los Angeles Many preconditions for a rapid transition to industrial capitalism existed in Tuscany in the late medieval/early modern period, in- cluding relatively efficient agricultural production; a well-developed, commercial manufacturing sector; the absence of a powerful feudal nobility and feudal obligations; a large, precocious urban economy; and the development of a territorial state. No such transition oc- curred, however. Previous explanations for this are inadequate, be- cause they discount the strength of the Tuscany economy or down- play the presence of these preconditions. To explain the Tuscan outcome, this article draws on sectoral theories (agriculture vs. man- ufacturing) from the neoclassical and Marxist literature. Since these theories often give the wrong prediction, because they are based on formal attributes of actors, the author combines them with a We- berian conceptualization of substantively specific economic interests. The medieval and Renaissance splendor of northern Italian cities stands in stark contrast to their later economic decline. This is perhaps most obvious in Florence, a great medieval power and the birthplace of the Renaissance later relegated to a relatively minor historical role. There is considerable contemporary interest in resolving this paradox (Aymard 1982; Cipolla 1975; Cohen 1980, 1983; Epstein 1991; Holton 1983; Lach- mann 1990) and well-reasoned calls for theories of transitions to capitalism to account for this case (Epstein 1991; Lachmann 1990). This article ad- dresses this paradox. It develops sectoral theories (which explain the in- teraction between rural agricultural sector and the urban manufacturing 1 This work was facilitated by a UCLA Faculty Senate Grant. I would like to thank John Evans, Vilma Ortiz, Iván Szelényi, Bruce Western, and the AJS reviewers for their comments. Direct correspondence to Rebecca Jean Emigh, Department of So- ciology, 264 Haines Hall, Box 951551, Los Angeles, California 90095-1551. E-mail: emigh@bigstar.sscnet.ucla.edu American Journal of Sociology 1076 sector) by replacing microlevel economic interests based on formal at- tributes of actors (which undergird most current sectoral theories) with a Weberian conceptualization of economic interests based on substantive, historically specific attributes. This expanded theory is developed in the context of explaining Tuscan history. Cities are alternatively the villains or heroes of the economy. Does urban air lead to freedom, as Weber suggested, or is the Marxist interpretation of cities as integral parts of feudal economies correct? The same sort of debate continues unabated in the contemporary literature: Are cities sites of modernization, technological innovation, and economic development or do they inevitably lead to “urban bias” (Lipton 1977) or “overurban- ization” (Gugler 1982), thereby stifling overall economic growth? The de- bate itself, of course, illustrates that cities can have both positive and negative effects on economic growth, but it underspecifies these divergent outcomes. This article extends the understanding of the relation between cities and economic growth by reexamining historical transition debates; that is, the sociological debate over the “transition from feudalism to capitalism” and the role that cities played in it. TUSCANY AS A NEGATIVE CASE The anomalous economic development of Tuscany, in particular, and of northern Italy, in general, is a puzzle for theories of transitions to capi- talism. Its historical trajectory is paradoxical because many of the pre- conditions for a rapid transition to full-scale, industrial capitalism existed in the late Middle Ages, including relatively efficient agricultural pro- duction, a well-developed commercial manufacturing sector, the absence of a powerful feudal nobility and feudal obligations, and a large, preco- cious urban economy. However, these preconditions did not produce a rapid transition to capitalism. Tuscan economic development is, therefore, an example of a “negative case,” where the expected outcome did not occur (Emigh 1997a). It can be used in conjunction with “negative case methodology” to develop the content of sociological theory. Negative case methodology focuses on a single case, one in which the empirical outcome does not match the theoretical prediction. The historical details of this case are compared to a theoretical explanation that embodies knowledge of numerous cases. Because the evidence and the theory are not easily reconciled, the content of the theory must be expanded to resolve the anomaly, leading to an empirical explanation of the case and an expansion of the theory’s range of explanatory power. This methodology leads to theoretical development under two conditions: first, the negation—the gap between the expected outcome and the theoretical explanation—must be Fifteenth-Century Tuscany 1079 powerful Florentines adopted market restrictions that prevented agricul- tural innovation and investment, thus preventing the growth of a domestic market, preventing specialization, and reinforcing peasant subsistence ag- riculture. He suggests, then, that the preconditions necessary for further development (relatively unrestricted markets) were not present. Epstein’s argument goes quite far in explaining the Tuscan case. He presents a balanced view that emphasizes the strength of the urban economy and notes the lack of rural autonomy (Epstein 1991, pp. 40–42, 45). But it is not clear that market restrictions were the culprit or that they had the hypothesized effect. Of course, such restrictions did exist, but they were not unusual for that time, nor particularly excessive in comparison, for example, to England (Hopcroft and Emigh 2000). Most importantly, these restrictions did not inhibit agricultural investment and innovations that increased agricultural productivity. Such improvements did not increase productivity merely by increasing the intensity of labor (Emigh 1999b, pp. 472–73). Therefore, Epstein’s attempt to explain the case by arguing that the preconditions for such a transition did not exist (lack of an un- restricted market, lack of a productive agricultural sector) is not entirely successful. However, negative case methodology is again useful here be- cause the evidence suggests that such preconditions did in fact exist but that they did not produce the predicted outcome. Tuscany is also a negative case from the Weberian perspective. Weber (1978, pp. 1266–1339) argued that medieval cities, such as Florence, were important precursors to capitalist development but could not sustain a full-scale transition to capitalism, because they did not create a national market, which was possible only with the rise of a modern, bureaucratic nation-state (for similar interpretations see Anderson [1974, pp. 143–72], Collins [1997, p. 845, fig. 1], Tilly [1990], Wallerstein [1974, p. 148]). Of course, modern Italy was not a unified state until 1861, but arguing that the late unification of Italy was responsible for Tuscan economic devel- opment simply assumes that Italy was the only possible viable political unit. In fact, Tuscany was becoming a regional state during the early modern period (Becker 1968; Benadusi 1996; Ertman 1997, p. 10; Litch- field 1986; Stern 1994). In contrast, the medieval Florentine commune was not a territorial state. Like many northern Italian regions, Tuscany developed out of a city-state with a high capital concentration (Tilly 1990) that was a major center for international trade, finance, and manufacturing. It was com- posed of several corporate groups only loosely held together by the Flor- entine government, which itself was composed of multiple judicial and executive bodies, most of which were composed of Florentines who held office for relatively short terms of several months. The government was not sovereign; many individuals fell outside of its jurisdiction (including American Journal of Sociology 1080 the few remaining feudal lords). Florence was surrounded by smaller, though still powerful cities, whose shifting alliances created instability (Stern 1994, pp. 2–3). Beginning in the 1340s, however, perhaps spurred by the economic downturn, the Florentine government gradually, though unevenly, con- solidated its jurisdiction throughout the surrounding territories and es- tablished uniform laws and taxation. Such actions diminished the powers of the guilds and the magnates (Stern 1994, pp. 3–4). Between 1385 and 1421, Florence militarily conquered the nearby cities and territories of Arezzo, Pisa, Cortona, and Livorno and incorporated them into its own region (Stern 1994, p. 5). Throughout the 14th and 15th centuries, Florence extended its hold over Tuscany by implementing fiscal and administrative reforms designed to secure more effective control (Becker 1968; Benadusi 1996, pp. 1–13; Chittolini 1979, pp. 293–352; Stern 1994). It dismantled local governments and administrative units in the surrounding country- side and subjected them to Florentine law and administration (Stern 1994, pp. 1–19). Formal citizenship rights were extended to some non- Florentines in the 16th century (Cochrane 1973, p. 65). Weber (1978, p. 1321) noted that Tuscan government tended to eliminate the exploitation of the countryside by the urban population. After a period of several decades of foreign invasions at the end of the 15th century and a period of French and Spanish rule, Tuscany became an independent entity, though allied with Spain. Ertman (1997, p. 10) calls Tuscany a “patri- monial absolutist” state (like France; a case usually cited to note the correlation between state formation and the transition to capitalism). Thus, although Tuscany was clearly not a modern nation-state during the Renaissance, its level of development was certainly comparable to, or even more advanced than, other states of this time. Lachmann (2000, pp. 45–92) evaluated Weber’s other argument for Florence, that the economy was based on politically oriented, not eco- nomically oriented, capitalism. In Economy and Society and the General Economic History, Weber (1978, p. 1321; [1927] 1981, pp. 259–60, 326–27) focused on the political, organizational, and political determinants of the Tuscan “failure,” while in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capi- talism, he argued that Florentine merchants did not exhibit Protestants’ ethical orientation (Weber 1958, pp. 74–76, 194–98). As Lachmann (2000, p. 45) argues, however, Weber cannot explain why such conditions would have created both the rise and fall of Florence. Thus, Weber’s argument about politically oriented capitalism is incomplete. Another critique of Weber’s application of the Protestant ethic to Tus- cany posits that religious preconditions—either organizational or ethical factors that served purposes similar to the Protestant ethic—did exist in Florence and, therefore, their absence cannot explain delayed transition Fifteenth-Century Tuscany 1081 to capitalism there. For example, Nuccio (1984) argues that Florentine merchants thought profits were sacred, thereby linking religious values and economic activities. Similarly, Collins’s analysis (1986, pp. 45–76) implies that religious institutions provided preconditions for the rise of capitalism in northern Italy. Finally, Cohen (1980) claimed that capitalist rationality developed in pre-Reformation Italy and, therefore, the effect of the Protestant ethic on capitalist development must have been small. To recapitulate, Lachmann’s analytical criticism casts doubt on Weber’s thesis that a missing Protestant ethic was responsible for delayed transition to capitalism in Tuscany, while Nuccio, Collins, and Cohen provide some empirical evidence to the same effect.4 Drawing on elite theory, Lachmann (1990, p. 409; 2000, pp. 89–92) argued that the transition to capitalism did not occur because once a single elite gained control of Florence, they failed to transform economic relations, drawing instead on their political power to maintain economic advantage. Citing land as Florentines’ “favorite investment,” Lachmann (2000, p. 86) argues that sharecropping was an unproductive, exploitative tenurial form.5 Like Epstein, Lachmann explains well many dimensions of the Tuscan case. He emphasizes urban power and correctly notes urban elites’ important economic role. However, contrary to Lachmann’s ar- gument, Florentines did control Tuscany through economic, market mech- anisms. Their investments were primarily, in fact, driven by economic incentives (Emigh 1997b, 1999b). Furthermore, during the 15th century, sharecropping increased agricultural productivity and was a capitalist form of land tenure (Emigh 1999b, 2000a). Thus, it was precisely Flor- entine elites’ investments that transformed agricultural production during this period of time. 4 This matter, however, is hardly settled. Holton (1983) disagreed with Cohen’s (1980, 1983) analysis. I believe their debate ended largely in a draw, primarily because they, like Collins, Nuccio, and Weber, were drawing extensively on secondary sources and a limited number of published primary sources. This issue is not resolvable without extensive archival research directed explicitly toward it. In particular, it might be possible to use writings of merchants, as does Nuccio (but to draw on a larger number of manuscript sources), as evidence for the extent of their business orientation and then to match these writings to documents about their possessions and profits. Such detailed archival work is clearly beyond the scope of this article. 5 Lachmann also cites evidence about the decline of urban manufacturing. I agree with his summary of the standard explanation of Tuscan decline: that Florentines lost their competitive advantage with respect to the English wool trade because of high Flor- entine labor costs. Despite this overall trend, however, much historical research em- phasizes the strengths of the Tuscan economy, not its failures. Epstein (1991), Hoshino (1980), Malanima (1988), and Sella (1969) all suggest that Florentine cloth production remained quite strong (see review in Brown 1989a, 1989b). As in the case of the evaluation of the “Protestant ethic” (see note 4 above), much more research with primary source material would be needed to adjudicate this point. American Journal of Sociology 1084 prescriptions, suggesting that investment in one sector or the other would automatically lead to industrialization. Of course, many factors influence industrialization, as well as alter the effect of investment on agricultural productivity and the transfer of surplus. Sectoral theories can be useful because they point to agricultural investment and transfer of surplus as key components in industrialization and because they show that other social processes impinge upon these components. Two related theories, based on sectoral analysis, urban bias and comparative advantage, illus- trate this point. Comparative advantage suggests that countries may benefit by spe- cializing in the production of goods and services they produce efficiently. If countries are well endowed agriculturally, and this sector is very prof- itable, they have a comparative advantage in it. Under these conditions, further investment in already productive agriculture may prevent indus- trialization, by shifting resources away from manufacturing (Matsuyama 1992). In such cases, Preobrazhensky was probably correct, especially when agriculture produced a large surplus. A similar outcome occurs under the opposite conditions: when the possibilities of agricultural pro- duction are very limited, it is relatively inexpensive to import food, and the opportunities for manufacturing are great, comparative advantage suggests that investment in manufacturing is a good strategy, since ag- riculture may simply never be productive enough to produce a surplus. Food importation may be a better long-run solution.7 Thus, comparative advantage suggests reasons why, under some conditions, agricultural in- vestment actually prevents the transfer of surplus from agriculture to manufacturing. The urban bias literature, in a way, considers the opposite problem, suggesting why too much surplus may be transferred to the urban sector. The term “urban bias,” first espoused by Lipton (1977), suggests that policies of taxation, investment, or pricing disproportionately benefit ur- ban residents at the expense of rural ones (Bates 1981; Bradshaw 1985, p. 76; 1987, p. 225; London and Smith 1988, p. 45). Urban members of different classes have more in common with each other than they do with rural inhabitants, so align against them. This alliance creates an urban concentration of power that harms rural, and in the long run, more wide- spread economic development. In the short run, policies and other market restrictions are implemented that keep urban dwellers happy with low taxes and low food prices. These policies transfer surplus from agriculture to manufacturing, but they generally do so in such a way that harms 7 These cases, however, are not necessarily at odds with sectoral theory. They simply require that a country’s “rural sector” be located outside of that country. Under these conditions, the rural sector is entirely autonomous. Fifteenth-Century Tuscany 1085 rural regions, decreases overall productivity, and slows economic growth (Bradshaw 1985; London and Smith 1988). In the long run, such policies create havoc because they lead to the underproduction of food, the over- population of the urban regions, and the underpopulation of rural regions. While Lipton (1977) focuses on the indicators or effects of urban bias, Bates (1981) and Mitra (1977) focus on social relations that produce dif- ferent balances of urban and rural power, making either urban or rural inhabitants more influential or creating urban/rural alliances. Urban bias is, in a way, similar to the Marxist argument that cities can be surplus extractors, except that it abandons the Marxist class dynamic (Bates 1981; Lipton 1977). In the Marxist formulation of transitions to capitalism (e.g., Merrington 1975), cities essentially coalesce into regions of power that extract a surplus from rural regions without developing productive relations (i.e., they remain feudal and do not introduce capi- talist, fixed-term tenurial relations). Thus, cities transfer surplus from the agricultural sector but without investing in agriculture or increasing ag- ricultural productivity. Urban centers may in the short run exist primarily by importing food from distant regions and/or external markets, but the long-run possibilities of this strategy of transferring surplus are prohibitive because of the costs of food transportation (especially in inland regions before modern transportation). An important conclusion from this research on urban bias is that rural agricultural interests may be ignored by urban residents, especially when the latter are powerful and the representatives of the former are not. This view provides an important counterbalance to the neoclassical literature, which focuses on the importance of prices (“getting prices right”) as im- personal mechanisms that coordinate the economy. In practice, decisions are shaped primarily by power relations and economic interests. Thus, factors that reduce or prevent urban bias essentially enable the represen- tation of rural interests, through an alliance between rural and urban actors, including the existence of pro-rural urban actors, urban-centered agribusinesses whose primary economic interests lie with increasing ag- ricultural production, or well-established democratic regimes allowing for political representation of the entire rural population (Varshney 1993). Where rural actors are powerless, they will have little impact and rural interests will not be represented. The term “rural autonomy” is a useful way to capture this point and is analogous to the idea of state autonomy (Evans 1995, p. 45). For rural autonomy to exist, some actors must be free to pursue the rural interests of agriculture separately from other social interests, in particular urban interests. While Weber, for example, drew attention to the necessity of urban autonomy in creating the preconditions for the rise of market econ- omy, it is clear that at least some degree of rural autonomy may be a American Journal of Sociology 1086 crucial necessity for agricultural development. It is also possible that rural autonomy has an effect independent from the deleterious policies asso- ciated with urban bias. Indirectly, comparative advantage also points to the role of interests. This theory is underpinned by the idea that individuals choose in which sector to invest based on the possibilities for profits. If the agricultural sector is large, its representatives are powerful, and it is very profitable, individuals in that sector will want to make more investments in agri- culture, not manufacturing. It is, therefore, unlikely that any transfer of surplus away from agriculture will occur. Thus, sectoral theories provide useful ways to examine the role of cities in economic development, by pointing to the interaction between agri- culture and manufacturing. Sectoral theories arise out of a number of theoretical contexts, most notably the economics literature, from Smith and Marx. As noted above, however, Weber’s theory of the limits of urban growth is similar to a sectoral analysis. Of course, the most familiar sec- toral theories, from Marxist and neoclassical theory, were actively devel- oped and promoted as necessary and sufficient solutions to create eco- nomic growth in undeveloped countries. While all but the most dogmatic would today reject such monocausal models as outdated, underlying them, as well as their more sophisticated outgrowths, are well-developed models of urban and rural relations. I apply this insight to explain the Tuscan historical trajectory and to expand upon theories of transitions to capitalism. Using a historical ex- ample, such as Tuscany, is also useful because the literature on urban bias and overurbanization usually assumes that this phenomenon is more pro- nounced in contemporary contexts than in historical ones. The Tuscan case shows, however, that sectoral differences were also important his- torically. In particular, I examine the two central dynamics: investment in agriculture and intersectoral transfers. Economic interests and sectoral differences.—One crucial problem remains. As I noted above, sectoral relations are shaped by historically specific urban and rural economic interests. Both the Marxist and the neoclassical arguments, though, are based on interests that are derived from the formal attributes of actors, such as class position, urban or rural residence, or rational self-interest. Neoclassical economics begins with assumptions about utility maximization; Marxist arguments generally de- rive interests from class relations; that is, the relations of production. Thus, the actors themselves are interchangeable. These arguments miss the his- torically specific attributes of actors’ interests that shape sectoral relations. As I reviewed them above, both the Marxist theory and the neoinstitu- tionalist theory fail to explain important dimensions of economic change in Tuscany. Fifteenth-Century Tuscany 1089 pp. 8–9). Thus, both agricultural and manufacturing investments were driven by capitalist interests. These Florentine rural investments shaped agriculture (Cherubini 1967; Pinto 1982, pp. 207–23). Florentines purchased land in rural regions and consolidated small, scattered plots into larger farms, providing capital inputs for the farms, cash loans, and livestock (Brown 1989a, p. 103; Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985, pp. 117–19; Imberciadori 1951; Jones 1956, pp. 194–96; 1968, pp. 224–28). Consolidation could require extensive amounts of investment, especially when landlords built outlying dwellings so tenants could move out of nucleated villages (Herlihy and Klapisch- Zuber 1985, p. 117; Jones 1968, p. 228). As a result of consolidation, by the 15th century the land in many rural communities was owned primarily by wealthy landlords (Jones 1968, pp. 230–31). Migration to Florence seems to have been concentrated among the wealthiest and the poorest rural inhabitants (Herlihy 1968, pp. 266–68; Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985, pp. 112–15). Because many wealthy migrants owned rural prop- erties, migration to Florence increased absentee landlordism and concen- trated Florentine ownership of rural properties. Landlords also invested in agriculture by loaning working capital to tenants. They customarily made loans to both share-term and fixed-term tenants when the tenants took possession of the farms (Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985, p. 119). These loans, made by small and large land- owners, were virtually inseparable conditions of share-tenancy (Jones 1968, p. 225; Pinto 1980, p. 307). Loans included cash, cattle and other livestock, seed, grain, farm implements, clothes, shoes, and food (Jones 1954, p. 177; 1968, p. 225; Kotel’nikova 1974, pp. 20, 22; Mazzi and Raveggi 1983, pp. 28, 291–99; Piccinni 1982, pp. 56–59). These inputs could increase productivity, especially when smallholders had been work- ing their plots without benefit of animals or the capital investments usually associated with consolidated farms (Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985, p. 50). Historians discuss the extent and effect of these investments in a forum called the “return to the land debate” (e.g. Cipolla 1949, 1970; Goldthwaite 1968, pp. 246–51; 1980, pp. 49–50; Herlihy 1981; Herlihy and Klapisch- Zuber 1978, p. 254; Jones 1969, pp. 34–38; 1978; Romano 1974). Some historians argue that Florentines were merely purchasing land in rural regions as a retreat from urban business activities and, therefore, making few investments, while others suggest that Florentines’ rural and urban activities were both driven by incentives for profit. Herlihy (1981) provides the best direct evidence for this debate, and he found little to suggest that Florentines withdrew from business ventures when they invested in land. In 1427, the upper 2%–3% of the city’s wealthiest families had no more invested in real estate than in business (Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1978, American Journal of Sociology 1090 p. 254). Florentines apparently followed Giovanni Rucellai’s advice that agricultural investments diversified portfolios, increasing along with in- vestments in other business ventures. Thus, Herlihy (1981) argued that when the Tuscan economy was expanding, Florentines invested in both manufacturing and agriculture; when the economy was contracting, they invested in neither. Although sharecropping is often considered to be an unproductive form of land tenure, both from a theoretical standpoint (see review in Emigh 2000a) and in the Tuscan context (Epstein 1991; Giorgetti 1974; Romano 1974), the neoclassical reinterpretation of sharecropping suggests that yields, income, and productivity vary little by land tenure (Byres 1983; Cheung 1969; Morooka and Hayami 1989; Otsuka and Hayami 1988; Pertev 1986; Reid 1973). In fact, detailed analyses comparing yields from sharecropped and owner-worked farms in several Tuscan parishes illus- trate that Florentine investments and innovations increased agricultural productivity on shareholdings. Increases in productivity were not only the result of increasing the labor intensity of agricultural production but also increased the productivity of labor (Emigh 1999b, pp. 470–75). Share- cropping was more efficient because landlords made capital improvements to their properties, provided working capital to tenants in the form of cash and livestock, changed cropping patterns, and cultivated beans that increased the fertility of the soil. In other locations, the introduction of sharecropping was also associated with novel cropping patterns, including a mixed agriculture of wine, olives, mulberry trees, and grain (Brown 1989a, 1989b) that also increased agricultural income and productivity. Furthermore, analyses of leases from locations throughout rural Tus- cany indicate that sharecropping was systematically associated with Flor- entine investment. These analyses, which compare investment in fixed- term and share-term leases, show that, contrary to the Marxist expectation that fixed-term leasing provided the optimal conditions for investment, it was share-term leasing that was more often accompanied by investment in Tuscany (Emigh 1998b, p. 362). The vast majority of leases to share tenants who worked the land stipulated landlords’ inputs, while only a minority of fixed-term leases provided such inputs. Thus, in contrast to the historical literature, which suggests that share- cropping was an inefficient, unproductive feudal form of agricultural pro- duction, the bulk of the evidence suggests that, at least in the 15th century, it was accompanied by investment and could support increased produc- tivity. If on aggregate, sharecropping did not support a transition to cap- italism, it must have been for reasons other than lack of investment or its inability to increase agricultural production. This evidence addresses the first aspect of sectoral theories; the necessity of increased agricultural production created by agricultural investment. In this context, it took the Fifteenth-Century Tuscany 1091 form of private, Florentine investment in rural farms, driven by urban, not rural needs. It is notable that there was little rural investment in agriculture. Sectoral Transfers Florentine investment in agriculture was, then, an intersectoral transfer from the urban to the rural sector. Sectoral theories point out that transfers must occur in the opposite direction—that resources, in fact, must be transferred to the urban manufacturing sector for industrialization to oc- cur. Theories of urban bias also point out that the concentration of urban power can, in essence, divert too much surplus from rural to urban regions. Tuscany is, in fact, a likely setting for urban bias, given the preponderance of urban power (Aymard 1982; Epstein 1991; Lachmann 2000). This sec- tion examines these intersectoral transfers, from rural to urban regions. Tuscany’s political economy was principally characterized by the pre- eminence of Florence, both politically and economically. In the medieval and early modern period, Florence was a center for banking and cloth production. In comparison to the city, the countryside was relatively un- developed. Although urban growth stimulated agricultural change, the gap between urban and rural development never closed. Florentine ad- vantage was maintained because urban manufacturing, which primarily produced luxury goods, yielded higher profits than agriculture (Gold- thwaite 1968, pp. 246–51; Jones 1969, pp. 35–38; Martines 1963, pp. 35–37). In 1427, for example, Florentines comprised 14% of the Tuscan population but held 65% of the total taxable wealth (Epstein 1991, p. 31; Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985, pp. 94–100). In turn, differential power relations stemming from differences in profits and wealth maintained Florentine control, including restrictions on trade in agricultural com- modities, such as limitations on markets and requisitioning of grain (Brit- nell 1991, p. 32; Epstein 1991, p. 33; Herlihy 1958; Pinto 1978b, 1978a; Polica 1980, p. 670). These restrictions gave Florentines control of the terms of agricultural production. Other laws upheld the landlords’ po- sition vis-à-vis their tenants (Jones 1956, pp. 195–96; 1968, p. 225). Flo- rentines were also powerful because there were no rural centers of power. Seigneurial power was particularly weak in rural Tuscany and was van- quished at a relatively early point in time (Epstein 1991, p. 31). While market restrictions imposed on agriculture clearly show that Florentines were more powerful than rural Tuscans, and may have had negative consequences, their effects should not be overdrawn. As illus- trated above, they did not, in fact, prevent investment in agriculture or preclude increased productivity. Though the officials in charge of grain supplies tried to regulate the price of grain and secure the transport of American Journal of Sociology 1094 four rural quarters of the Florentine contado (Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985, pp. 117–18). The distribution of share-term and fixed-term leasing was a response to urban landlords’ need to supervise and manage their properties. Where both landlords and tenants were rural inhabitants living in close proximity to each other, the supervision of wage labor and management of fixed- term lessees were relatively unproblematic. Such was not the case in Tuscany. Florentine landlords were not members of a rural landowning class, so they lived relatively far from their farms. They could not easily prevent damage to their properties or force tenants to work hard or care- fully. Landlords used fixed-term and share-term leasing to lower these transaction costs of land management and labor supervision. Share-term leases incorporated some incentives for tenants to work hard because they received a share of the yield. Thus, sharecropping lowered the total costs of land management and labor supervision as distance from Florence and, therefore, distance from the site of landlords’ principal business activities increased, as the size of farms increased, and when crops required exten- sive capital outlays that could be easily damaged by mismanagement. When tenants and landowners were Florentine and lived close to each other, the landlord could more easily assure that the holding was not being misused, land management costs were lower, and fixed-term leasing was more likely. Farms typically included vineyards and olive trees, which increased the sum of labor supervision costs and land management costs and therefore increased the use of sharecropping as a way to lower total transaction costs. In addition, share-term leases were used on large prop- erties where transaction costs were higher. Similarly, landlords may have given long-term leases to fixed-term lessees to provide incentives for them to undertake expensive tasks of land management. Given that fixed-term lessees were often Florentine and leased nearby land, landlords could more easily supervise long-term leases (Emigh 1998b, p. 360). In sum, share- term and fixed-term leasing were used to lower total transaction costs that were associated with urban, absentee landlordism (Emigh 1997b; see also Ackerberg and Botticini 2000; Galassi 1992). Some authors interpreted the detailed prescriptions for working the land and maintaining the properties that were common to both share- term and fixed-term leases as feudal labor services (Jones 1968; Ko- tel’nikova 1974). It is more likely that they, like the use of fixed terms or share terms, were an aspect of landlords’ management and supervisory practices. Therefore, contrary to arguments that Tuscan sharecropping was a feudal form of land tenure that did not substantially change pro- ductive relations (Cipolla 1970; Giorgetti 1974; Lachmann 1990; Jones 1978; Romano 1974), I argue that sharecropping, driven by the capitalist elements of the economy, fundamentally changed rural regions. Fifteenth-Century Tuscany 1095 Florentines’ economic interests are also clear in their choice of lessees. Landlords who wanted to invest in agriculture leased their property di- rectly to share-term or fixed-term worker tenants and provided inputs for their farms (Emigh 1998b, pp. 361–63). Share-term leases and, to a lesser extent, fixed-term leases to worker tenants were accompanied by les- sors’—most likely landlords’—investment. Landlords often hired man- agers to supervise directly their worker-tenants when they made capital investments and provided inputs (Jones 1968, p. 222; 1969, p. 37). Thus, the lessors who provided inputs for the farms were probably landlords, making investments to increase productivity on the farms and leasing directly to share-term or fixed-term worker tenants. In contrast, when landlords leased property to middle tenants, it seems that neither landlords nor middle tenants made investments. Rentiers, content with whatever rent or produce the farm would provide, apparently frequently leased their property to middle tenants, without making investments. When mid- dle tenants were urban merchants, they were probably uninterested in making investments to rural properties that were not their own (Emigh 1998b, pp. 363–65). The farms were not their primary source of income or their principal business activity. Leasing a farm and subletting it to worker tenants may simply have provided a small profit or secured a fresh food supply for urban dwellers who owned no rural property of their own (Kotel’nikova 1985, pp. 752–58). Fixed-term middle tenants were relatively common in 15th-century Tus- cany (Emigh 1998b). Landlords, however, invested in properties leased to fixed-term and share-term worker tenants, not to middle tenants. By mak- ing such contracts, Florentines increased agricultural productivity and income. However, agriculture was not the primary source of income for Florentine landlords and tenants. Florentines’ urban businesses dimin- ished the amount of time they could devote to agriculture. Although Flo- rentines responded to financial opportunities and invested in agricultural holdings, they were not compelled to do so, because they had other sources of income from urban activities. In addition, Florentines held agricultural property to diversify their investment portfolios: profits were lower in agriculture than in urban manufacturing, but they were less risky. Though landlords invested in agriculture, given this financial strategy, they were unlikely to make risky or expensive investments and technological in- novations. Tuscan patterns of investment in agriculture occurred not be- cause landlords and tenants were inherently risk averse, lacked entre- preneurial skill, or were disengaged from the market. On the contrary, Florentine investment was shaped by the risk diversification strategies of protocapitalist merchants. In fact, both urban and rural ventures of ur- banites were shaped by the same profit motive. In Tuscany, the urban and rural economy were tied together tightly. American Journal of Sociology 1096 Wages and prices of grain were strongly linked. Wages were high; there was relatively little difference between urban and rural wages because urban manufacturing used many rural inhabitants (Goldthwaite 1975, pp. 15–18; Malanima 1982; see review in Brown 1989a, pp. 110–11). Urban demand for food fueled investment in agriculture. Increases in agricultural productivity, therefore, were highly dependent upon continued urban in- puts and on the strength of the Florentine economy. As Herlihy (1981) argued, when the economy was strong Florentines invested in both land and commerce, when the economy was weak they invested in neither. The urban and rural population trends given above also suggest this link between the two sectors. Agricultural productivity was thus tied both to urban demand for food and to urban investment. Both may have declined along with the loss of Tuscany’s relative European power in the early modern period. Rural interests.—Urban interests influenced the use of sharecropping, but rural interests were not irrelevant. Florentines used agriculture to balance their investment portfolios, and sharecropping lowered transac- tion costs, making absentee landlordism profitable. There was a second condition that allowed sharecropping to spread in the 15th century, a relative reduction in the power differential between landlords and tenants. The strength of the urban economy meant that Florentine landlords were generally more powerful than their rural tenants and usually controlled the terms of agriculture. However, rural depopulation after the 1350s gave tenants some bargaining power and diminished the overall influence of the landlords, even though it did not erase the fundamental power dif- ferential between them. Sharecropping often appears as a capitalist form under these conditions of declining landlords’ power; landlords’ invest- ments are small but important concessions to attract tenants (Emigh 1997b, 2000a; Wells 1996, p. 232). Thus, the spread of sharecropping, was, at least partially, influenced by rural interests. Rural residents almost certainly preferred to own property. In regions of smallholding, inhabitants bought, sold, and leased land to their ad- vantage depending on their entrepreneurial skill and their families’ needs (Emigh 2001, pp. 503–8). Where smallholders owned insufficient land to support a family, however, there were relatively few reasons for them to prefer share-term to fixed-term leasing, because the two types of leases were quite similar. Share-term and fixed-term leases to worker tenants contained similar elements, including cash loans, provisions for livestock, seed, and other supplies, stipulations to work and live on the property and provide labor services, and regulations to prevent misuse of the prop- erty (Emigh 1998b, pp. 361–63; Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985, p. 50; Jones 1954, pp. 176–77; 1956, pp. 194–95; 1968, p. 223; Kotel’nikova 1974, pp. 20–21; Piccinni 1985, p. 152; Pinto 1980, pp. 300–306). Urban and Fifteenth-Century Tuscany 1099 had the necessary capital. Florentines were simply much wealthier than rural inhabitants, and they, not rural inhabitants, had the capital to make investments that increased agricultural productivity (Emigh 1999b, pp. 472–74). Therefore, Tuscan sharecropping was controlled by Florentines and their managers. Thus, under the conditions of a more powerful urban economy, the links between the urban and the rural sector reduced, practically to zero, rural autonomy. It is also quite possible that sharecropping drew labor toward it, again preventing the decline in the size of the rural sector. It would seem, then, that the urban and rural sector would have contracted and shrunk together, as Herlihy (1981) suggested and as the population trends presented above indicate. This dynamic was the opposite of the inverse relationship between the rural and urban sector necessary for industrialization to continue, in which the rural sector contracted as the urban sector expanded. THE DOMESTIC MARKET I illustrate the consequences of these economic interests, in combination with intersectoral transfers, by examining the domestic market. As noted above, sectoral theories predict that one consequence of investment in agriculture and the transfer of surplus is the creation of a domestic market; that is, local demand for commodities. This outcome, however, did not occur: there was no such domestic market in Tuscany (Epstein 1991, p. 41). To explain this phenomenon, Epstein (1991, p. 41) draws on something like a sectoral theory. He argues that urban exploitation prevented in- vestment and, thus, no transformation of agriculture occurred that would have increased productivity. Consequently, rural income was also too low to support a domestic market for manufactured goods. As I argued above, however, the spread of sharecropping increased productivity, which in turn probably increased the income of sharecroppers. So, while Epstein correctly notes the lack of a domestic market, his explanation is inade- quate. In essence, his neoinstitutionalist argument suggests that a pre- condition for sectoral change (investment in agriculture) was missing and as a result no domestic market was created. Instead, I argue that the preconditions were present for the creation of a domestic market, yet such an outcome did not occur. Preconditions do not translate directly to outcomes, because sectoral theories are indeter- minate without historically specific urban and rural interests. When in- dividual-level interests are explained either by Marxist or neoclassical economic theories (based on formal properties of possession of the means of production or utility maximization), they miss Tuscany’s historically American Journal of Sociology 1100 specific economic interests: urban and rural inhabitants owned land for different reasons and acted differently vis-à-vis their rural properties. The incorporation of these economic interests into the sectoral theory explains the outcome, because they assured that intersectoral transfers removed rural inhabitants from and destroyed outlying market structures, replacing them with Florentine markets within which rural inhabitants could not compete. Intersectoral transfers, driven by the growth of the Florentine market, actually destroyed rural markets, thereby undermining the struc- tural basis for a domestic market. Tuscan smallholding regions were characterized by what Polanyi ([1944] 1957a, pp. 43–55; 1957b, p. 250) called “local markets.” Though the econ- omy was principally integrated by reciprocity, subsistence production or- ganized by households, there were local, well-developed markets for land, labor, and capital. Partible inheritance, dowries, and local markets were mutually reinforcing. These practices divided the land into relatively small pieces, which were frequently bought and sold to adjust for the size of a family, to recombine pieces of land split apart by inheritance, to dispose of land at inconvenient locations, and to pay off debts. Though such markets were not primarily capitalist markets, coordinated by impersonal exchange based on price and profit, they were well developed and well functioning. They offered enterprising local inhabitants concrete ways to increase income (Emigh 2000b, 2001). As Florentine capitalist markets expanded, they simultaneously spread through and destroyed these local markets, essentially creating a capitalist market that excluded rural inhabitants. This occurred because peasants were actively engaged in markets (not because they were disengaged from them). Within any particular region, the wealthier (or more enterprising) local inhabitants were more successful. Once Florentines entered local markets, however, they completely dominated them, because Florentines were much wealthier than local inhabitants and could generally outbid them. Florentines bought land from local inhabitants, who generally still sold land for the same reasons but were rarely able to purchase land. Thus, in regions of sharecropping, rural residents progressively lost their land (Emigh 1999a) and, therefore, their primary basis for engaging in markets. Consequently, local market structures, which might have de- veloped into capitalist domestic markets, were largely eliminated. As noted above, Florentines consolidated land in rural regions. They did so through multiple methods, by converting customary or feudal ten- ures or by purchasing land from smallholders (Jones 1968, pp. 225–28). Polica (1980) also argued that Florentines, as well as rural moneylenders, seized land after essentially forcing rural inhabitants to become excessively indebted. Of course, this undoubtedly occurred, but rural inhabitants did not lose land primarily because of forced sales through debt (Emigh 2000a, Fifteenth-Century Tuscany 1101 p. 40). At least equally important were rural inhabitants’ interests in selling their land as participants in markets. Florentines’ control of sharecropping also undercut the creation of a rural, domestic market in several other ways. First, the mixed agriculture (including grain, olives, and grapes) practiced on most sharecropped ten- ancies made the peasants virtually self-sufficient (Brown 1989a, p. 111; Epstein 1991, p. 39). The crop mix was not solely a result of urban control because smallholders also used it, but Florentine capital outlays may have expanded viticulture and olive production. Second, landlords may have matched the sizes of farms and families, limiting the amount of surplus the rural tenants could accumulate. Some landlords were certainly cog- nizant of their tenants’ domestic arrangements (Emigh 1998a, pp. 57–58). Finally, it was probably Florentines who marketed the surplus agricultural produce. The most enterprising urban landlords, who raised agricultural productivity through their involvement in the production process and their investments in agriculture, were also likely to sell their crops on the market themselves (e.g. Emigh 1998a, pp. 54–55). This practice would have undermined rural inhabitants’ participation in local commodity markets. Thus, urban control of sharecropping—especially when it was a pro- tocapitalist response by urban merchants to Florentine market condi- tions—actually limited rural inhabitants’ involvement in markets, by re- ducing their needs and opportunities to buy and sell land and agricultural commodities on markets. Sometimes, the intensification of market activ- ities turns local markets into capitalist ones. In Tuscany, however, the intensification of capitalist markets undermined local markets, inhibiting the growth of a widespread, domestic market. Sectoral theories suggest that given agricultural investment, increased productivity, and intersectoral transfers to the manufacturing sector, a strong domestic market should have emerged. Such an argument, how- ever, presumes neoclassical assumptions about interchangeable actors. In Tuscany, rural inhabitants had interests in engaging in markets and, in fact, did so. They were, however, much less powerful than Florentines and thus, when urbanites entered local markets because of their economic interests in expanding sharecropping, rural residents could realize only half of their interests. They could still sell land, but they could rarely buy it. Thus, the spread of the Florentine capitalist market eliminated local markets that could have supported a domestic market, not because pre- conditions specified by the sectoral theory were absent but because of the interaction between sectoral relations and economic interests. These findings illustrate the importance of rural autonomy, discussed above. Instead of Florentines’ being passive, uninvolved, rentier land- lords, it is much more likely that they were too involved in agriculture, American Journal of Sociology 1104 intersectoral relations: investment in agriculture and the transfer of sur- plus to the manufacturing sector without squeezing agriculture. Such pre- conditions, however, did not produce a transition to capitalism. Thus, without a reconceptualization of economic interests, it is impossible to understand this outcome. Both the Marxist and neoclassical theories link micro-, individual-level interests to macrolevel change. But, because they are rooted in formal properties of microlevel individual incentives, they miss the impact of historically specific economic interests. Marxist analyses based on the formal relationship to the means of production miss how urban and rural landlords’ involvement in agriculture differed because of their different economic interests, though they both owned land. Sim- ilarly, neoclassical analyses that focus on the effects of abstract mecha- nisms such as prices miss the power configurations that predetermine their effects. Furthermore, theories based on formal properties of utility max- imization miss the different incentives for agricultural investment based on the economic interests entailed in urban or rural residence. Florentines’ economic interests as urban merchants were not interchangeable with rural ones. Florentines and rural inhabitants would not have made the same investments in agriculture because they had different economic in- terests, even if both were attempting to maximize profits. Thus, I reconceptualize these individual-level interests using Weber, who defined economic interests as deriving from the possession of goods and opportunities for income. Such interests are historically specific; unlike interests given by formal properties, they yield no prediction outside of a historical context. Empirically, I explain the Tuscan case by showing how opportunities for income and the possession of goods were linked to sectoral differences. Urban inhabitants had opportunities for income from both manufacturing and agriculture, while rural residents had only the latter. Furthermore, urban residents had the capital—“possessed the goods”—to invest in agriculture to make it productive; rural residents did not. The urban bias literature shows, in a somewhat different way, that economic interests and, in particular, their intersection with power rela- tions are important in explaining sectoral patterns (Bates 1981; Lipton 1977; Mitra 1977). This literature shows that urban power can crystallize to squeeze rural regions, prevent investment, and decrease rural income, or decrease agricultural productivity. Urbanites, acting in their own in- terest, can implement price restrictions, policies of taxation, or market restrictions that prevent rural development. Where rural inhabitants are relatively powerless, they have little autonomy, and they cannot act in their own interest. The empirical evidence from Tuscany illustrates a different aspect of the importance of rural autonomy. There is no doubt that Tuscany exhibited some of the effects of “urban bias,” and it is, of Fifteenth-Century Tuscany 1105 course, possible that they had some detrimental effect, as Epstein (1991) argues. Nevertheless, they did not prevent investment or increased pro- ductivity. The lack of rural autonomy also had important effects. The review of Tuscan history illustrated that the rural sector was not at all autonomous but was tied to the urban sector. Although this was not necessarily detrimental in the short run for agricultural investment, pro- ductivity, or even peasants’ incomes, in the long run it meant that the agricultural sector grew or declined along with the urban economy, not independently of it. Thus, even when urban predominance does not pre- vent agricultural development, it may eliminate rural autonomy. As is noted in the literature on urban bias, where urban interests are very strong and coalesce, rural interests may be ignored. While the historical evidence suggests that sharecropping may have partially coincided with rural in- terests, as Lachmann (2000) correctly explains, Florentine elites primarily directed rural development. So the Tuscan case reinforces the importance of rural autonomy, precisely because when it was not present there was no rapid movement toward industrial capitalism, even in the presence of numerous preconditions that might produce such a transition. In fact, this outcome occurred even when the effects of urban bias (such as market restrictions) on agricultural productivity were not particularly deleterious. The causes of the lack of a domestic market illustrate this point about rural autonomy. The Florentine market spread through and simulta- neously destroyed rural local markets. Rural inhabitants could not par- ticipate as equals with Florentines in capitalist markets, even when they had been active players in local markets, because Florentines were much more powerful and wealthier. Rural autonomy was therefore undermined by the spread of the Florentine market, as rural inhabitants’ abilities to participate in local markets were eliminated. In one sense, then, Weber was correct about Tuscany. A bureaucratic, national state can extend the privileges of urban residents to rural in- habitants (e.g., citizenship, access to markets, and opportunities for po- litical participation). Formal rights, however, do not guarantee the equal- ization of power between the urban and rural sector or their equal market participation. By the time the territorial state developed in Tuscany, urban residents were already much more powerful than rural inhabitants and centers of rural power had been largely eliminated. Florentines’ superior economic position could not be eliminated because their economic ad- vantages in markets for land and labor allowed them to dominate rural regions. While such domination was not always detrimental, it moved the economy along a different direction than it would have taken if rural economic interests had been represented. The comparison with England is striking (Hopcroft and Emigh 2000). The English gentry became a rural elite with a strong political presence American Journal of Sociology 1106 (Brenner 1985a, 1985b). These powerful rural inhabitants could press their economic interests; furthermore, they were completely dependent upon agriculture because they did not have opportunities for income from urban manufacturing. Thus, they created an agricultural sector that was auton- omous from the urban sector, not tied to it, as in Tuscany. Rural economic growth was independent from urban growth. The explanation based on sectoral differences is, in fact, more robust than an explanation based on differences in land tenure. Although Marxist treatments focus on agrarian capitalist middle tenants as the force behind increased productivity in English agriculture (Brenner 1985a, 1985b), others argue that smallhold- ing, not fixed-term leasing, increased agricultural productivity (Allen 1992; Hopcroft 1994). In either case, it was more important that rural inhabi- tants, dependent upon agricultural income, had the ability to pursue their economic interests. This article employs negative case methodology to expand the context of sociological theory. As I argued above, Tuscan economic development is an example of a negative case because the expected outcome, a rapid transition to modern, industrial capitalism, did not occur. Although pre- vious explanations try to resolve the Tuscan case by arguing that one of the preconditions for the emergence of capitalism did not exist, this article incorporates sectoral differences into theories of transitions to capitalism to explain this case and to expand the content of sociological theory. In fact, even when neoclassical and Marxist sectoral theories are applied to the Tuscan case, they predict the incorrect outcome (that agricultural investment and the transfer of surplus should have produced a transition to capitalism). Thus, a Weberian theory of economic interests was added to the sectoral theories. This explanation shows that even when actors act as capitalists and pursue their economic interests that are determined by their dependence upon the market, the transition to capitalism may not occur when the difference in power between urban and rural residents eliminates rural autonomy and prevents rural inhabitants from pursuing their own economic interests. This case is an important reminder that capitalism is not a naturally unfolding dynamic or an inevitable outcome. In this case, in fact, the capitalist dynamic underlying Florentines’ in- vestment in agriculture was the culprit of the eventual undevelopment of capitalism. In the Lakatosian spirit of negative case theory, previous explanations of Tuscan economic development were not “disproved.” Instead, the el- ements of sectoral theories from the strongest explanations of Tuscan development given by Epstein, Aymard, and Lachmann were examined. 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