ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST AND THE LIBERAL SPIRIT, Slides of Law

Download ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST AND THE LIBERAL SPIRIT and more Slides Law in PDF only on Docsity! THE ALFRED AND WINIFRED HOERNLC MEMORIAL LECTURE, 1970 ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST AND THE LIBERAL SPIRIT . t By D. HOBART HOUGHTON Director, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University, Grahamstown AP RR 320 . 0 1 HOU AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS ; 1 i-o*.of THE ALFRED AND WINIFRED HOERNLE MEMORIAL LECTURE, 1970 ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST AND THE LIBERAL SPIRIT By D. HOBART HOUGHTON Director, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University, Grahamstown DELIVERED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS P.O. Box 97 Johannesburg welfare of all. Slavery has had its great achievements — the pyramids of Egypt,2 temples of Athens, cotton plantations in the Southern States and some of the industrial development of the Soviet Union, particularly in Siberia; but the far greater achievements of Western Europe and North America were the result of expanding opportunities for personal gain and the incentive was self-interest, not the lash and the admoni­ tions of the slave driver. Smith's belief in "the harmonious order of nature under divine guidance", and his faith in "the invisible hand" that guides the course of events so that in the pursuit of their own self-interest men promote the common good although it was no part of their intention to do so, may have been over- optimistic. Indeed from the reports of factory conditions in Britain in the early nineteenth century, or looked at through the eyes of Jon Dos Passos or Upton Sinclair, economic advance may appear to have been based upon the law of the jungle rather than upon natural justice. Smith of course recognized that men could not live in a society without restraints; but he believed that restraint should be kept to the minimum necessary to protect others from injury. Later on, John Stuart Mill was tormented by the diffi­ culty of drawing a line between personal freedom and social restraint, and he returns to this problem time and again. "The distinction here pointed out between the part of a person's life which concerns himself, and that which con­ cerns others, many persons will refuse to admit. How (it may be asked) can any part of the conduct of a member of society be a matter of indifference to other members? No person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching at least to his near connections, and often far beyond them. If he injures his property, he does harm to those who directly or indirectly derived support from it, and diminishes, by a greater or less amount, the general resources of the community. If he 2 Herodotus states that it took 100,000 slaves thirty years to build the great pyramid. 6 deteriorates his bodily or mental faculties, he not only brings evil upon all who depended upon him for their happiness, but disqualifies himself for rendering the services which he owes to his fellow-creatures . . . Finally, if by his vices or follies a person does no direct harm to others, he is nevertheless (it may be said) injurious by his example; and ought to be compelled to control himself, for the sake of those whom the sight or knowledge of his conduct might corrupt or mislead."3 In spite of these things, however, Mill is reluctant to impose undue restraint upon the individual. More than most men, Mill was animated by the liberal spirit, and much as he feels moral disapprobation towards human frailty, his love for liberty is such that he believes that force should only be resorted to when an individual's action impinges directly upon the freedom of others. "No person should be punished simply for being drunk; but a soldier or a policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty. Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage or risk of damage, either to another individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality or law."4 Under the influence of Kant and Hegel English philosophers at the end of the last century tended to stress the fulfilment of man in and through his association with his fellows.5 The "general will" transcends the wills of the individuals. Man- in-society is the reality, and the isolated individual merely an abstraction. Thus Mill's dichotomy between the individual and society was based on a misconception. If man-in-society were the reality there could be no problem of conflict, because society's restraints were imposed to expand the life of the individual; but, from the nature of goodness (which had to be willed by the individual man), there were some things which the state could not do. The use of force was in pari materia 3 J. S. Mill: On Liberty, Everyman ed. p. 136, 137. 4 ibid., p. 138. 5 T. H. Green: Lectures on The Principles of Political Obligation. Bernard Bosanquet: Philosophical Theory of the State. 1 with the positive promotion of the good life, and the role of the state was therefore limited to creating a situation in which the individual could find a full life — in Bosanquet's termin­ ology to "the removal of hindrances to the good life". It must be remembered that Bosanquet was writing before the full development of mass media of communication which gives the state a power not only to control the actions of men, but also in some measure to control their minds through current affairs talks on radio and television and all the techniques of persuasion and "Big Brother is watching" intimidation so closely linked with "new-speak" and "new- think" in 1984.6 The removal-of-hindrances approach does not really offer a solution to Mill's problem. Is prohibition of drugs or alcohol an attempt to promote the good life positively or is it a removal of hindrances? Another approach to the relationships between the indi­ vidual and society is the distinction drawn by A. C. Pigou7 between the wants of individuals, as such, and collective wants of society. He makes the point that private and public interests do not necessarily coincide if for no other reason than that society's expectations extend over a longer time-span than those of an individual. For example, it may be to a private individual's economic advantage to cut down an indigenous forest at least cost and without regard to the regeneration of the forest, whereas society's interests are best served by an immediately less profitable exploitation of the timber which provides for regeneration. In matters such as soil conservation, protection of rivers and lakes from pollution, afforestation, factory effluent, industrial location, and even town planning, private and public interests may diverge. This being so the state may have to place restraints upon the individual following his own self-interest. Although the relationship between the individual and the state is no new problem, and was a recurrent topic in Greek philosophy, the problem has assumed a new dimension. The individual was more meaningful in a Greek city state of 6 George Orwell: 1984. 7 A. C. Pigou: The Economics of Welfare. 8 In 1939 (on the eve of the Second World War) he wrote:9 "A liberal, if the word means anything, is a lover of liberty. Unfortunately not all lovers of liberty are 'liberals'. The world is full of individuals and groups who demand liberty for themselves, but deny it to other individuals or groups." More than a century ago Newman in The Idea of a Uni­ versity suggested that the true meaning of liberal was clarified by considering its opposite, which both logically and by etymology is servile.10 The task of the liberal spirit is there­ fore to devise a society in which men may be free without making other men servile. Of course, in any organization some men must give orders and other men must obey, and the difference between a free society and a servile one depends not upon the mere giving of orders, but upon their purpose and the manner of issuing them. Men are not equal in their ability and power of leadership, and it is important that every society should be governed by the best men available. The difference between Plato's guardians, who were a dedicated class of civil servants, and the herrenvoik mentality lies not in their power, but in the spirit animating their exercise — so too the difference between the philosopher king and the tyrant. It is the persuasive influence of the liberal spirit, and the belief that human beings matter, that makes the difference between a free and a servile state. A rising standard of material well-being is an important objective of society and the removal of poverty and disease are laudable aims, but the welfare state can easily degenerate into a dispenser of bread and circuses in which boredom and lack of opportunity for individual initiative invite alcoholism and drugs and the suicide rate rises to new heights. Socrates outlined his version of the welfare state: "Will they not produce corn and wine, and clothes, and shoes, and build houses for themselves? And when they are housed, they will work, in summer, commonly stripped and barefoot, but in winter substantially clothed and shod. 9 Alfred Hoernle: South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit* 1939. 10 Quoted by R. F. Currey in Rhodes University 1904-1964 (not yet published). n They will feed on barley-meal and flour of wheat, baking and kneading them, making noble cakes and loaves; these they will serve up on a mat of reeds or on clean leaves, themselves reclining the while upon beds strewn with yew or myrtle. And they and their children will feast, drinking of the wine they have made."11 At this point Socrates is interrupted by the devastating com­ ment of Glaucon. "Yes, Socrates, he said, and if you were providing for a city of pigs, how else would you feed the beasts." The building of Cities of Pigs is an occupational hazard for economic planners whether in Athens, Western Europe or emergent Africa. Brave New World is not enough! A danger to which men of high moral principle are prone is that zeal for their objective, good though it may be, may lead its advocates to adopt coercion. It was the highest of motives (reinforced perhaps by subconscious sadism) that led to the burning of heretics at the stake to save them from damnation. If a classless society is one's goal — and as a reaction against privilege and oppression it is very understand­ able — thp use of force to promote it may be a denial of the individual's right to be different, and a step on the road ad formicam. Similarly enforced prohibition is as poor a substitute for temperance as the Immorality Act is for chastity. "Coercive liberalism" is a contradiction in terms. The liberal spirit, however, should not lead to the "permis­ sive society", as this is currently understood with its amoral attitude to human conduct. Men and women, if they are to lead meaningful lives in a free society, must be made aware of the necessity of social constraint and the wisdom that has been distilled and matured through the ages in man's faltering attempts to live in a free society. The teaching of the young should be the noblest and most important calling in any com­ munity, and teachers have the duty to use their wisdom and powers of persuasion to convince the young of the value of social norms tested by experience. If they condone self- indulgence in the name of freedom, they substitute licence for liberty. 11 Republic of Plato, Jowett ed., p. 53. 12 People have different and sincerely held notions of right and wrong. "Both read the Bible day and night, but thou read'st black where I read white."12 Each of us naturally believes our view to be correct and the other man's to be false, but the liberal spirit would require a recognition that the other man has as much right to his views as we have to ours until such time as one of us by reason has convinced the other. In a recent interview13 Barbara Castle, speaking of her father, said: "My father used to say it always cost something to turn theory into action, and say how important it was to face the cost, and pay the price. Ideals are your own and have perfect integrity so long as you do nothing about them. But once you try to act on them you are mingling acting and counter-acting upon other people. . . . Once you act, you leave the splendid simplicity of your own vision of truth and find that it has its own contradictions and ironies at the heart of it." In a multi-racial, multi-cultural society like ours in South Africa, these problems are particularly acute. Alfred Hoernle posed the following question some thirty years ago,14 and it sounds as fresh now as when he asked it: "How then is a caste society on racial lines to be avoided? What transformations of it are conceivable, con­ sistently with the ideals of the liberal spirit?" This is the answer which he gave: "There would seem to be three possibilities each of which might claim the support of liberal-minded men. . . . (1) Parallelism, which maintains the multi-racial society as the inclusive unit, but substitutes within it co-ordination of racial groups for domination of the rest by one group. . . . (2) Assimilation, which also maintains the multi-racial society, but abolishes race differences within it by the com- pletest possible fusion, or amalgamation of the races with each other. (3) Separation, which breaks up the multi-racial society 12 William Blake: The Everlasting Gospel. 13 The Observer, 28 Sept., 1969. 14 R. F. Alfred Hoernle: South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit, 1939. 13 be necessary for the state to interfere with the decisions of industrialists in the general interests of society. The liberal principle would indicate that, as far as possible, this should be done by persuasion and the offering of incentives to make it advantageous for manufacturers to do as the social interest demands. Proposals for greater decentralization of industry in South Africa would probably have met with more general acceptance had they been advocated in terms of the economic interests of the country and the need to bring industry to the concentrations of population in the reserves, and had it been less associated with the doctrine of apartheid. The new concept of separate development of the Bantu homelands is an improvement on the old state of stagnation of the "native reserves" because it is more positive and forward-looking, but nevertheless a more effective harnessing of individual self-interest might accelerate the process. The transformation of traditional agriculture, for example, requires not only the dissemination of knowledge about modern farm­ ing methods and capital for ploughing, seed and fertilizers: it also requires an effective transport system and a market for the farmer's produce untrammelled by Control Board regu­ lations with which the peasant farmer is unable to cope. More than anything else it requires that the inhibiting effects of traditional land tenure be removed so that the ambitious, industrious and progressive farmers have the opportunity to expand their operations and increase their well-being. Similarly, restrictions on the investment by white entre­ preneurs should be further relaxed. If the government supplies the capital, the white taxpayer is likely to object, but if it is provided by the entrepreneur in search of profit this is his own affair. Dr. Anton Rupert's idea of industrial partnership should be further considered.16 Separate development of the homelands is more likely to succeed the greater the emphasis placed on development and the less on separate. Another manifestation of the beneficial influence of self- interest is the growing concern that is being displayed by both distributors and manufacturers in the rapidly expanding market which sixteen million non-white consumers represent. 16 A. Rupert: A Plea for Economic Democracy, p. 14. 16 Their preferences as consumers are being scientifically studied, and the improved courtesy with which they are served (not perhaps from benevolence, but in the shopkeeper's own interest), has done much to improve race relations. Finally, there is the much more general case for the appli­ cation of the principle of intelligent self-interest for, if the four million whites in Southern Africa wish to retain an hon­ ourable place for themselves and their children, it is essential that they should enlist and retain the support of the whole population. It is in their enlightened self-interest to create a society, whether unitary or an association of lesser states, about which the majority of the people feel that it offers whites, coloured, Africans and Indians expanding horizons and a better way of life than they could find elsewhere. Towards this end the liberal spirit can do much by insisting upon the ultimate importance of individual men and women. Twelve years ago Professor B. B. Keet delivered the Hoernle Memorial Lecture17 and opened his address with the words: "Believing as I do that the colour problem is basically a moral one I have confined myself to this approach in an attempt to analyse the policy of apartheid." This lecture has been cast on a less exalted level, but it should be regarded not as an alternative to facing the basic moral issues but rather as a complement to them. 17 B. B. Keet: The Ethics of Apartheid, 1957. 17