Classical Marxist Theory: Emancipatory Change and Universal Basic Income - Prof. Erik O. W, Study notes of Introduction to Sociology

Download Classical Marxist Theory: Emancipatory Change and Universal Basic Income - Prof. Erik O. W and more Study notes Introduction to Sociology in PDF only on Docsity! Sociology 298 Lecture 12 Envisioning Real Utopias March 22, 2002 I. The Theoretical Context: Classical Marxist vision of emancipatory change Recall the central theses about emancipatory alternatives to capitalism within classical Marxism: Thesis 9. The revolutionary transformation thesis. Since capitalism becomes increasingly unsustainable (thesis 7) while the class forces arrayed against capitalism become increasingly numerous and capable of challenging capitalism (thesis 8), eventually the social forces arrayed against capitalism will be sufficiently strong and capitalism itself sufficiently weak that capitalism can be overthrown. Thesis 9.1: The necessity of rupture thesis: the destruction of capitalism must be ruptural rather than incremental (i.e. that the destruction takes place in a temporally- condensed historical episode) Thesis 9.2: Revolutionary violence thesis: Because of the institutional power of the defenders of capitalism, any radical rupture with capitalist social relations requires violent overthrow of the state rather than democratic capture. Thesis 10. The transition to socialism thesis: Given the ultimate non-sustainability of capitalism (thesis 7), and the interests and capacities of the social actors arrayed against capitalism (thesis 8), in the aftermath of the destruction of capitalism through intensified class struggle (thesis 9), socialism, defined as a society in which the working class collectively controls the system of production) is its most likely successor (or in an even stronger version of the thesis: its inevitable successor). Perhaps the central problem for the Marxist tradition as a coherent, distinctive tradition of critical social theory is to reformulate a theory of emancipatory social change in light of the general skepticism in the adequacy of these theses. One possibility, of course, is abandon the attempt at a real social theory of emancipation as such. What we would have is an elaboration of moral ideals – of the principle of social justice and human flourishing – and a critique of existing institutions in terms of the ways they block those principles, but no real theory of the historical production of an alternative. In any given, concrete context of social change and social struggle we would still be able to ask the question, “which options best advance these principles.” But we would not attempt to theorize system-level alternatives. In a way this is the stance taken by many feminists: in any given context there is an answer to the question, “Which social change among the alternatives that are possible now is most consistent with the aspirations of women’s liberation?” Very little attention is given to the system-level transformation problem, except in gestures. Lecture 12. Envisioning Real Utopias 2 Critics of capitalism in the Marxist tradition have been very reluctant to give up the system- level critique. This may, in part, be just nostalgic, radical stubborness, and unwillingness to scale back one’s political and theoretical aspirations. But I also feel that the institutions of capitalism are so powerful, naturalized, and – to use a word we will decipher later – hegemonic, that it is worth continuing to pose the problem of system-level alternatives and the conditions for their realization. That is, basically, the aspiration of what I call “envisioning real utopias.” II. Viability & Achievability In thinking about alternatives to existing social institutions – whether we think of this as system- level alternatives or alternatives to particular institutional complexes – it is useful, I think, to distinguish between the analysis of the viability of an alternative and the analysis of its achievability. Achievability refers to the concrete political possibilities of forging political coalitions that (a) would adopt the alternative as part of a political project, and (b) have sufficient strength to be able to institute the alternative. Viability refers to the effective functioning of the alternative once instituted: its sustainability, the problem of its unintended consequences, and so on. Classical Marxism focused almost exclusively on achievability: that was the guts of the theory of revolutionary socialism: it was achievable because capitalism would become nonviable and there were sufficiently powerful social forces to implement socialism. My work on envisioning real utopias focuses more on viability, not achievability. This is not because the problem of the strength of potential political coalitions that might adopt a proposal as a project is unimportant, but because I feel that one of the ways of facilitating the formation of coalition is to have clear, compelling ideas of viable alternatives. III. The context of emancipatory change 1. strongly-integrated totalities vs loosely-coupled systems The idea of radical transformation of an entire social order is pretty mind-boggling, and in one sense it is surprising that anyone takes this idea seriously. This is what Frederick Hayak calls the “fatal conceit” of radical intellectuals: that they are smart enough and can control the unintended consequences of social change well enough that they could put into practice such schemes for massive societal change. In his view, society is far too complex a system and unintended consequences are fundamentally uncontrollable. A project of totalizing social change therefore is a Pandora’s box, perhaps a frankenstein: embarking on such a project necessarily unleashes uncontrollable unintended consequences, and the effort to control them generates catastrophe. The collectivization campaigns in the USSR in the 1930s or the Great Leap Forward in China are horrifying 20th century examples. Hayak’s critique should be taken seriously, not dismissed out of hand. But it is premised on a particular conception of the project of radical societal transformation, a conception grounded in Lecture 12. Envisioning Real Utopias 5 (2) generates greater egalitarianism within labor markets. If workers are more able to refuse employment, wages for crummy work are likely to increase relative to wages for highly enjoyable work. The wage structure in labor markets, therefore, will begin to more systematically reflect the relative disutility of different kinds of labor rather than simply the relative scarcity of different kinds of labor power. This in turn will generate an incentive structure for employers to seek technical innovations that eliminate unpleasant work. Technical change would therefore not simply have a labor-saving bias, but a labor-humanizing bias. (3) Anti-poverty. BIG directly and massively eliminates poverty without creating the pathologies of means-tested antipoverty transfers. There is no stigmatization, since everyone gets the grant. There is no well- defined boundary between net beneficiaries and net contributors, since many people and families will freely move back and forth across this boundary over time. Thus, it is less likely that stable majority coalitions against redistribution will form once basic income has been in place for some length of time. There are also no “poverty traps” caused by threshold effects for eligibility for transfers. Everyone gets the transfers unconditionally. If you work and earn wages, the additional income is of course taxed, but the tax rate is progressive and thus there is no disincentive for a person to enter the labor market if they want discretionary income. (4) Decommodifies caregiving activity. BIG is one way to valorize a range of decommodified caregiving activities which are badly provided by markets, particularly caregiving labor within families, but also caregiving labor within broader communities. While universal income would not, by itself, transform the gendered character of such labor, it would counteract some of the inegalitarian consequences of the fact that such unpaid labor is characteristically performed by women. In effect, universal basic income could be considered an indirect mechanism for accomplishing the objective of the “wages for housework” proposals by some feminists: recognizing that caregiving work is socially valuable and productive and deserving of financial support. The effects of basic income on democracy and community are less clear, but to the extent that basic income facilitates the expansion of unpaid, voluntary activity of all sorts, this would have the potential of enhancing democratic participation and solidarity-enhancing activities within communities. 1.3 Problems/objection There are, of course, significant questions about the practical feasibility of universal basic income grants. Two issues are typically raised by skeptics: the problem of labor supply, and the problem of capital flight. (1) labor supply A universal basic income is only feasible if a sufficient number of people continue to work for wages with sufficient effort to generate the production and taxes needed to fund the universal Lecture 12. Envisioning Real Utopias 6 grant. If too many people are happy to live just on the grant (either because they long to be couch potatoes and or simply because they have such strong preferences for nonincome-generating activities over discretionary income) or if the marginal tax rates were so high as seriously dampen incentives to work, then the whole system would collapse. Let us define a “sustainable basic income grant” as a level of the grant which, if it were instituted, would stabley generate a sufficient labor supply to provide the necessary taxes for the grant. The highest level of such grants, therefore, could be called the “maximally sustainable basic income grant.” The empirical question, then, is whether this maximally sustainable level is high enough to provide for the virtuous effects listed above. If the maximally sustainable grant was 25% of the poverty line, for example, then it would hardly have the effect of rendering paid labor a noncoercive, voluntary act, and probably not dramatically reduce poverty. If, on the other hand, the maximally sustainable grant was 150% of the poverty level, then a universal basic income would significantly advance the egalitarian normative agenda. Whether or not this would in fact happen is, of course, a difficult to study empirical question and depends upon the distribution of work preferences and productivity in an economy. (2) capital flight, disinvestment Apart from the labor supply problem, universal basic income is also vulnerable to the problem of capital flight. If a high universal basic income grant significantly increases the bargaining power labor, and if capital bears a significant part of the tax burden for funding the grant, and if tight labor markets dramatically drive up wages and thus costs of production without commensurate rises in productivity, then it could well be the case that a universal basic income would precipitate significant disinvestment and capital flight. It is for this reason that Marxists have traditionally argued that a real and sustainable deproletarianization labor power is impossible within capitalism. In effect, the necessary condition for sustainable high-level universal basic income may be significant politically-imposed constraints over capital, especially over the flow of investments. Some form of socialism – in the sense of democratic political control over capital – may thus be a requirement for a normatively attractive form of basic income. But it may also be the case that in rich, highly productive capitalism, a reasonably high basic income could be compatible with capitalist reproduction. Particularly in generous welfare states, the increased taxes for funding a basic income might not be excessive, and the technological and infra-structural reasons why capital invests in developed capitalist economies may mean that massive capital flight is unlikely. Maybe. 2 Empowered participatory democracy The second example concerns the problem of deepening democracy. Democracy is in many ways an ideal subject for a discussion in the spirit of envisioning real utopias. After all, the very idea of democracy is a example of real utopian thinking: democracy means rule by the people. What an extraordinary, radical, egalitarian ideal: power should be vested in the people, not a hierarchy, not a king, not an elite, but the people. Of course, defenders of democracy have always recognized that this ideal requires concrete institutions, and such institutions will always embody compromises, compromises that reflect the difficult trade-offs any institution faces between Lecture 12. Envisioning Real Utopias 7 different values. In the case of democracy, for example, many people have argued for representative democracy instead of direct, participatory democracy not because representative democracy is the perfect embodiment of democratic ideals but because it is pragmatically the best compromise between values of democracy on the one hand and various other values, such as efficiency or the right of individuals to devote most of their time and energy to private rather than public concerns. But why do we need a real utopian discussion of democracy? For many people it may seem obvious that representative democracy – the institutions that we currently have in place – as good as we can do. Perhaps they need some tinkering – campaign finance reform, more public debates among candidates, rules that make third parties more viable – but given the complexity of the society in which we live, most people – and most scholars of the subject – believe that there is no alternative to representative democracy. I believe that there is urgency to this topic, not simply because I believe we can do better – that democracy can be enhanced beyond the constraints of existing institutions – but because our current institutions themselves are becoming less satisfactory for dealing with the problems we face. As the tasks of the state have become more complex and the size of polities larger and more heterogeneous, the institutional forms of liberal democracy developed in the nineteenth century — representative democracy plus techno-bureaucratic administration — seem increasingly ill-suited to the novel problems we face in the twenty-first century. The Right of the political spectrum has taken advantage of this apparent decline in the effectiveness of democratic institutions to escalate its attack on the very idea of the affirmative state. The only way the state can play a competent and constructive role, the Right typically argues, is to dramatically reduce the scope and depth of its activities. In addition to the traditional moral opposition of libertarians to the activist state on the grounds that it infringes on property rights and individual autonomy, it is now widely argued that the affirmative state has simply become too costly and inefficient. The benefits supposedly provided by the state are myths; the costs—both in terms of the resources directly absorbed by the state and of indirect negative effects on economic growth and efficiency—are real and increasing. Rather than seeking to deepen the democratic character of politics in response to these concerns, the thrust of much political energy in the developed industrial democracies in recent years has been to reduce the role of politics altogether. Deregulation, privatization, reduction of social services, and curtailments of state spending have been the watchwords, rather that participation, greater responsiveness, more creative and effective forms of democratic state intervention. As the slogan goes: “The state is the problem, not the solution.” In the past, the political Left in capitalist democracies vigorously defended the affirmative state against these kinds of arguments. In its most radical form, revolutionary socialists argued that public ownership of the principle means of production combined with centralized state planning offered the best hope for a just, humane, democratic and egalitarian society. But even those on the Left who rejected revolutionary visions of ruptures with capitalism insisted that an activist state was essential to counteract a host of negative effects generated by the dynamics of capitalist economies -- poverty, unemployment, increasing inequality, under-provision of public goods like training and public health. These defenses of the affirmative state have become Lecture 12. Envisioning Real Utopias 10 to pot hole repairs and working out a regional budget priority document. In June this document is voted on – in a largely ceremonial event – at a second plenary meeting of the regional assembly. At this meeting two delegates are selected for a city wide budget council which then meets for six months to reconcile the budgets from every region. It is at this point that city technocrats enter the game in a serious way, providing numbers, evaluating feasibility, etc. By November a final budget document is submitted to the Mayor who then submits it to the city council where – so far – it has been rubber stamped each year. One other interesting detail: there are seven city-wide thematic regions on things like culture, sports and leisure, transportation. These were introduced in part to deal with middle class dissatisfaction at the process, in which their priorities tended to be marginalized, but also in recognition that some budgetary issues were not easily disaggregated to a regional level. (2) Empirical Consequences How can we evaluate this experiment? A number of indicators suggest that this is a serious institutional experiment in deepening participatory democracy: 1) there has been a massive shift in spending towards the poorest regions of the city. As one would predict in a deliberative process where reasons and needs rather than power play the central role in allocations, the neediest parts of the city have gotten the most funding. 2) participation levels of citizens in the process have been high and sustained. In the 1997 cycle about 8% of the adult population participated in at least one meeting. 3) the vote for the PT has increased in each election, indicating that this process has generated high levels of legitimation. In the last election, for the first time, they won the state level Governor’s office as well. 4) The right has been unable to demonstrate any corruption in the process, in spite of considerable efforts at doing so. 5) there are some indications that tax compliance has increased even though tax surveillance and enforcement has not really changed, suggesting that the democratic legitimacy may have begun to affect norms of civic responsibility and obligation. Lecture 12. Envisioning Real Utopias 11 3. Market Socialism 3.1. The Problem Traditionally Marxists have drawn the following contrasts between capitalism and socialism: Capitalism Socialism Direct Separated from collectively own Producers means of production means of production separated from united with means of means of subsistence subsistence Property private ownership state ownership rights of means Distribution inegalitarian egalitarian wealth coordination markets planning of economy Relations competitive & cooperative & among individualist associative producers class power capitalist class working class = ruling class = ruling class For each term, socialism is seen basically as the negation of the corresponding term for capitalism. The crucial point is this: in traditional Marxism, while different aspects of the normative criticisms of capitalism are then seen as rooted in different elements in this list, these two sets of attributes are seen as wholistic gestalts. You can not radically change one element without transforming all of them. In the discussion of BIG we explored the possibility of changing one of these elements -- separattion of workers from the means of subsistence -- without tampering much with the rest. Today we will explore another change that stops short of turning every element on its head. The Lecture 12. Envisioning Real Utopias 12 idea is to change the mechanisms which distribute property rights in means of production without changing anything else and see what the economy would look like. The central question is this: can we imagine a property rights regime which has the effect of destroying the power of the capitalist class and eliminating capitalist exploitation without undermining the markets mechanisms that make capitalism efficient. Why would we want to even attempt this? The main reason is this: Historical experience and theoretical arguments have provided compelling evidence that central planning of complex economies is frought with inefficiencies. Many of us used to believe that this was due to the authoritarian quality of the bureaucracies and state that did the planning, but this is only part of the story. There are a number of problems with centralized problem that have been identified by prosocialist analysis: 1. information. The most crucial problem is that any centralized planning process is overwhelmed by the amount of information required to make planning decisions and is too slow to react to changes in production. The result is that it creates all sorts of rigidities and inefficiencies in the allocation of resources. Decentralized “planning” does not solve this unless the decentralized entities are as small as firms and they have power to actually make allocations. If this is the case, however, what we have looks a lot like markets. None of this would be a grave problem of technologies were constant and unchanging. The problem is that there is constant innovation -- which we want -- in both process and product, and this constantly requires producers to make adjustments which are blocked in a command allocation system. 2. risk taking. Coordinated Planning of production has a deep problem of managing risk-taking. It is very hard to make risk-takers accountable for their gambles if they are gambling with other people’s resources. Markets have the virtue of creating a specific incentive structure for gambles with innovation. 3. incentives. I think the incentive problem is over-rated. Incentives for effort are quite compatible with planning and the absence of real markets. Incentives for accountable risk taking are more difficult. This does not mean that planning is impossible. One can enhance the capacity of the state (communities) to set priorities -- to plan the market as some people say -- but this is not the same as directly planning the details of production. If this argument is correct, then we need to take serious the problem of combining socialist values with market mechanisms. To many people the expression “market socialism” is an oxymoron: either the markets have to be massively curtailed for socialist principles to mean anything, or the socialism has to be deeply Lecture 12. Envisioning Real Utopias 15 Coupon-socialism would enhance democratic capacity of different levels of government for several reasons. First of all, the threat of disinvestment and capital flight in response to state policies would be considerably reduced since firms are now owned by the population at large. In particular, this would mean that the capacity of the democratic state to raise taxes in a coupon-socialist economy would be greater than in a capitalist economy. The sustainable level of taxation that a state can raise is an indicator of the state’s capacity to democratically control the social surplus. This is not to argue that a maximally unconstrained democratic state would necessarily opt for the highest sustainable level of taxation, but it does mean that the scope of democracy is enhanced if the democratic state has the capacity to raise taxes to higher sustainable levels. In these terms, it seems likely that the democratic state in a coupon-socialism would have considerably enhanced capacities for taxation since it would not face the threat of disinvestment and capital flight in the face of rising tax rates. Among other things, this means that the level of egalitarian programs such as basic income that the state could sustain are also likely to be higher. By enhancing democratic political capacity, therefore, coupon socialism also potentially enhances economic equality. There are other, more subtle democracy enhancing effects of coupon socialism. Roemer argues in some detail that coupon-socialism will reduce the production of “public bads”, such as pollution, in the economy. The argument is that where there is massively unequal distribution of income from property holdings there will be a group of property-rich people who have a positive interest in the production of public bads like industrial pollution, since for them such pollution represents a significant source of income (by enhancing their profits). What is more, because they are property-rich, they are in a position to have a disproportionate effect on the political process through which state policies of regulation of pollution is produced. Equalizing property-wealth thus has the double effect of first, partially equalizing political power, and second, changing the incentive structure for pollution regulation. (3). autonomy The internal organization of production within coupon-socialist firms could in principle be just as hierarchical and alienating as in conventional capitalist firms. Indeed, John Roemer himself is rather unsympathetic to issues of workers control within production. He feels that the choice of institutional arrangements within firms should be mainly thought of as a pragmatic issue: which kind of organization will be the most efficient in the standard neoclassical economics sense. If it turns out that Tayloristic, despotic organization of the labor process is the most efficient, then Roemer believes workers would prefer this to more democratic organization since they will prefer the higher levels of productivity. In spite of Roemer’s own skepticism on this matter, I think that there are reasons why worker autonomy and democracy within firms is likely to be facilitated by coupon-socialism. In a coupon-socialist economy the issue of the internal organization of firms can become a matter of public deliberation and democratic choice. Since threats of disinvestment are weaker, and the Lecture 12. Envisioning Real Utopias 16 specific interests of employers in maintaining dominance within production have been reduced, a less constrained public debate over the trade-offs between alternative forms of organizing the labor process can take place. (4). Efficiency & rationality The core critique of capitalism as wasteful and irrational centers on the anarchy of the market and the way this generates variousn forms of irrational allocations: business cycles, hyper consumerism, pollution, unemployment, etc. Market socialism might appear to give up on this problem since it tries to preserve well functioning markets. In fact, coupon socialism does offer the prospect of taming the market if not transcending it. By destroying the power of a class of people whose power is rooted in their private control over market resources, coupoin socialism makes planning the market much more feasible and thus greatly expands the scope for democratic debate over priorities of economic development. BIG would be easier in coupon socialism than capitalism, for example. And more generally, a green economy with a trajectory towards reduced consumerism becomes an available objective. (5). Community. Community is the value least well-served by coupon socialism. Coupon socialism, like capitalism, places competition at the center of economic interaction. Individuals compete on labor markets every bit as much as in capitalism and firms compete in commodity markets. While democratic planning might moderate some of the undesirable by-products of such market competition, the central mechanism of economic rationality remains organized around greed and fear rather than solidarity. This, in turn, means that the kind of individualistic, greed-centered culture of capitalism is likely to continue in coupon-socialism. Such a culture reduces the potential that the enhanced democratic capacity would lead to more egalitarian social outcomes. This is a serious challenge to coupon socialism from the vantage point of classical socialist values. There are two principle lines of response. First, unless a more community-enhancing alternative to markets is institutionally feasible, then it may be a sad fact about coupon socialism that it does not provide a context for realizing this important value, but nevertheless this would not be a reason for rejecting coupon-socialism. Second, even though markets remain important in coupon socialism, it is possible that the social space for nonmarket principles of social organization would be enhanced. If coupon-socialism enhances the democratic capacity of the state to appropriate surplus, then in principle the democratically controlled portion of the surplus could be used for community-enhancing purposes. Instead of seeing economies as falling on a continuum from pure market mechanisms to pure communitarian mechanisms, it may be more useful to see economies as combining in complex ways both principles in different social contexts. It is thus possible that in spite of the continued presence of market competition in coupon socialism, a culture of solidarity and generosity could still be nurtured. Still, the anti-communitarian features of coupon Lecture 12. Envisioning Real Utopias 17 socialism are real and undermine its attractiveness as an institutional design for furthering socialist values. 3.4. But is this Socialism? To many people coupon socialism is a socialism without passion. It is a socialism that tries to mimic capitalism as much as possible by juggling property rights and institutional design in the stock market just enough to get a more or less egalitarian distribution of dividends. Yet, ironically, even though the result may be more like a “people’s capitalism”, it still would require the massive redistribution of the wealth of the capitalist class and thus may be politically as infeasible as more traditional images of socialism as democratically controlled state ownership. One might argue that since this proposal is no more achievable in practice than more radical socialisms, why not advocate the more radical alternative. At least the more radical alternatives embody a utopian vision which may inspire and mobilize people. It is hard to see workers on the barricade under the banner of “Smash capitalism; build coupon-stock market socialism!” Such objections, I think, miss the critical value of constructing models of what might be termed a sustainable egalitarian economy. Especially at this point in history, it is important to have a clear and rigorous understanding of the normative implications of various alternatives to capitalism that attempt to accomplish socialist values. As a proposal, coupon-socialism is thus like the proposals for guaranteed universal basic income -- proposals that attempt to further socialist values by transforming specific features of capitalism. Basic income does this by breaking the tight link for most people between income and labor market participation characteristic of capitalism. In capitalism workers are separated from both the means of production and the means of subsistence, and it is this double separation which shapes their class relation to the capitalist class. By restoring workers’ access to the means of subsistence, basic income grants can be seen as a partial deproletarianization of labor. In this way it transforms one crucial aspect of capitalism in an egalitarian direction. Coupon-socialism does the same thing with respect to separation from the means of production. By creating a mechanism for an egalitarian distribution of property rights in means of production independently of anyone’s contribution to the economy, coupon socialism would transform another of the central features of capitalism which block socialist values. Coupon-socialism is thus not meant to be a blueprint of some final destination of social struggles for human emancipation. Rather, it is a model designed to counter the claim that the only efficient and sustainable way of organizing property relations in a developed economy is through capitalist private ownership. Re-establishing the belief in viable alternatives to capitalism is a critical task for leftwing intellectuals, and Roemer’s models are a provocative and innovative contribution to this effort. V. Conclusion Basic income, empowered participatory governance and Market Socialism – and other kinds of proposals which we could discuss – in various ways challenge the prevailing idea that there are Lecture 12. Envisioning Real Utopias 20 involved in politics only to the extent that they chose decision makers – their representatives – through elections and voice their opinions through various channels of communication. The ideal of empowered participatory governance involves ordinary citizens directly in the deliberations and problem-solving through which decisions are made. Process Principle 2. Pragmatic orientation. At the center of political decision-making in EPG institutions is what might be termed a pragmatic orientation towards concrete problem-solving. The idea is to bring people to the political table who share a common interest in accomplishing certain concrete, practical goals – in solving practical problems – even if they also have significant conflicts of interests outside of the immediate problem-solving agenda. This may mean that certain issues are “off the table” because they are not tractable to such a practical orientation, and this in turn may mean that the pragmatic orientation deflects political energy away from more radical challenges to inequalities of privilege and power. But the idea is that pragmatic solutions to real problems are often possible in spite of these broader conflicts and inequalities, and further, that in the long run empowering people to deal with concrete problems can set the stage for more profound reconfigurations of power. Process Principle 3. Deliberative solution generation: Within EPG decisions are made in a way that gives a significant role for active deliberation rather than simply bargaining, strategic maneuvering, logrolling, and so forth. In a conventional liberal democracy, the basic idea is that political decisions are the result of majority rule, where majorities are constructed through various complex processes of mobilization of support and bargaining. Bargaining involves compromises, and through such compromises conflicts of interests may be resolved, but the bottom line is that the majority rules by exercising power. The deliberative democratic ideal, in contrast, emphasizes the problem of consensus formation through public dialogue rather than power-based bargaining. Conflicts are resolved more through creative problem-solving in which there is transformation of interests of the participants than through mobilization of power resources. Design Principle 1. Devolution. Since empowered participatory governance targets problems and solicits participation localized in both issue and geographic space, its institutional reality requires the commensurate reorganization of the state apparatus. It entails the administrative and political devolution of power to local action units – such as neighborhood councils, personnel in individual workplaces, and delineated eco-system habitats – charged with devising and implementing solutions and held accountable to performance criteria. These bodies are not merely advisory bodies, but rather creatures of a transformed state endowed with substantial public authority to act on the results of their deliberation. Decision-making is moved downward to the locus of problems as much as possible. Design Principle 2. Centrally coordinated decentralization. Though they enjoy substantial power and discretion, local units do not operate as autonomous, atomized sites of decisionmaking in empowered participatory governance. Instead the institutional design involves linkages of accountability and communication that connect local units to superordinate bodies. These central Lecture 12. Envisioning Real Utopias 21 offices can reinforce the quality of local democratic deliberation and problem-solving in variety of ways: coordinating and distributing resources, solving problems that local units cannot address by themselves, rectifying pathological or incompetent decision-making in failing groups, and diffusing innovations and learning across boundaries. Unlike New Left political models in which concerns for liberation lead to demands for autonomous decentralization, empowered participatory governance suggests new forms of coordinated decentralization. Driven by the pragmatic imperative to find solutions that work, these new models reject both democratic centralism and strict decentralization as unworkable. The rigidity of the former leads it too often to disrespect local circumstance and intelligence and as a result it has a hard time learning from experience. Uncoordinated decentralization, on the other hand, isolates citizens into small units, surely a foolhardy measure for those who don’t know how to solve a problem but suspect that others, somewhere else, do. Thus these reforms attempt to construct connections that spread information between local units and hold them accountable. Design Principle 3. State-centered institutionalization. A third design characteristic of these experiments is that they colonize state power and transform formal governance institutions. Many spontaneous activist efforts in areas like neighborhood revitalization, environmental activism, local economic development, and worker health and safety seek to influence state outcomes through outside pressure, but they leave intact the basic institutions of state governance. By contrast, EPG reforms attempt to remake official institutions. These experiments are thus in a sense less “radical” than most varieties of activist self-help in that their central activity is not “fighting the power.” But they are more radical in that they have larger reform scopes, are authorized by state or corporate bodies to make substantial decisions, and, most crucially, try to change the central procedures of power rather than merely attempting occasionally to shift the vector of its exercise. These transformations attempt to institutionalize the on-going participation of ordinary citizens, most often in their role as consumers of public goods, in the direct determination of what those goods are and how they should be best provided. This perpetual participation stands in contrast, for example, to the relatively brief democratic moments in both outcome-oriented, campaign-based social movements and electoral competitions in ordinary politics in which leaders/elites mobilize popular participation for specific outcomes. If popular pressure becomes sufficient to implement some favored policy or elected candidate, the moment of broad participation usually ends; subsequent legislation, policy-making, and implementation then occurs in the largely isolated state sphere. In EPG the goal is create durable institutions of sustainable empowered participation of ordinary citizens in the activities of the state rather than simply episodic changes in the policies of the state.