USAID's Impact on Elections, Parties, and Legislation in Nigeria, Summaries of Logistics

Download USAID's Impact on Elections, Parties, and Legislation in Nigeria and more Summaries Logistics in PDF only on Docsity! EVALUATION OF SUPPORT FOR ELECTORAL PROCESSES, POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENT AND LEGISLATIVE STRENGTHENING IN NIGERIA Under: Contract No. AEP-1-00-00-00008-00 (CLIN 003) Task Order No. 1, Rapid Response Prepared by: Yinka Oyinlola Team Leader Development Associates. Inc. Philip Griffin Mendez ~ n g l a n d & Associates Development Associates, Inc. 1730 Non11 Lynn Street ArlingIon, VA 22209-2023 July 2,2003 Page Xo . . . .. Abbrev~at~ons ............................................................................................................................ 11 ... Preface ........................................................................................................................................... $11 Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ iv Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1 A . Scope of evaluation ........................................................................................................ 1 3 B . Evaluation methodology 7 C . Evaluation constraints and limitations ............................................................................ . Country Setting .................................................................................................................... ........................................................................................ USAID'S DG Program Approach 5 Program Direct Results and Impact ..................................................................................... 6 A . International Foundation for Elections Systems (IFES) ................................................ 7 B . International Republican Institute (IN) .................................................................. 11 C . Mississippi Consortium for International Development (MCID) ............................... 15 ........................................................................... D . National Democratic Institute (NDI) 19 .................................................................................. Conclusions and Recommendations 24 A . Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 24 B . Recommendations ........................................................................................................ 29 ANNEXES Annex A . People contacted ......................................................................................................... A- 1 Annex B . Scope of work ............................................................................................................. B-1 Evolualion of Suppon for Elecroral Processes. 1 Ju!v 2 . 2003 Politico1 Party Development and Legislalive Sfrengihening in Nigeria The purpose of this evaluation was to assess the past and current assistance of USAID in support of Nigeria's electoral processes, national and state legislatures. and political parties. In addition to learning what has been achieved by this assistance, the evaluation sought to contribute to the quality and effectiveness of future USAID assistance. From May 19 though 30. 2003. the evaluation team employed a combination of desk studies and key informant inteniews with USAID's democracy and governance team, its implementing partners, and the pro_- beneficiaries. A key finding of this evaluation was that, due to political imperatives and high hopes about the prospects of democracy in Nigeria, there was an exponential growth in fimding activities that were broad and diverse but without the benefit of focused and targeted interventions that could effectively achieve sustainable impact on the democratic transition. Absent any form of baseline data, or some other kind of measurable indicators, it was extremely difficult to come to any conclusive affirmation that the targeted institutions perform better as a result of US-AID's investments. Notable amongst the lessons learned was the need for a beneficiary buy-in to external assistance efforts. This buy-in should not be limited to the technical cadre but should involve the political leadership of the targeted institutions. The turnover of recipients of training assistance from their respective institutions and organizations results in a 'training drain" and an "investment drain." Without complementary systems, procedures, budgets, and equipment in the targeted institutions, capacity strengthening efforts may not lead to performance enhancement. Nevertheless, USAID has made significant contributions to the overall democratic transition in Nigeria. In particular, USAID's activities enabled attitudinal changes. mitigation of political tensions, and improvements in the process through which political decisions are made. While the professionalism of election administration might have only marginally improved, INEC's IT Department, for example. made a giant leap due to USAID's assistance. The communications equipment, leased with USAID funding, that was used by INEC in diff~cult and remote areas during recent elections made a significant difference in forestalling electoral conflict. USAID's assistance for political party building enabled some women's caucuses to negotiate reform within their parties so as to enhance the access of women to leadership positions. The exemplary process by which the National Assembly engaged civil society with regard to HIVIAIDS legislation, was largely due to USAID's efforts. Even if the overall performance of the last National Assembly was disappointing, there is no doubt that it was able to assert itself as an independent political institution as opposed to being a rubber stamp; USAID'S support contributed to this irreversible democratic gain in the separation of powers. Key recommendations of this report include the need for the Mission to employ a strategic approach of targeted activities that deepen constituencies for reform in the political sector. This demand approach should be complemented by cross-sectoral synergies amongst the Mission's strategic objectives and its implementing partners. In order to achieve accountable and responsive political institutions, there is also an absolute need for the institutions to receive a push from ordinary citizens and their interest groups. Evnluation of Supporr for Electoral Processes, iv JUIJ L 2aM Poliriral Pony Developmenr and Legislarive Strengthening in Nigeria Development Associates, Inc. A successhl DG program in Nigeria requires complementary political and diplomatic interventions. In order to further the democratic agenda, it is recommended that the Mission engage in policy dialogue with the higher levels of political leadership. Equally important is the need for the Mission to give greater attention to recommendations from local program stakeholders and partners, particularly with regard to what the local stakeholders perceive as their needs. It is recommended that the Mission exercise its "substantial involvement" authority by measuring performance and using frequent reviews of performance measures to guide program management. Future institutional development efforts should be premised on an analysis of whether weaknesses within the targeted institution or environment could adversely affect the goal of performance enhancement. Evaluation of Supporr for Electoral Processes, v July 2,2003 Political Party Development and Legislative Strengthening in Nigeria EVALUATION OF SUPPORT FOR ELECTORAL PROCESSES, After decades of military oppression. and its anendant destruction of democratic institutions. USAIDMigeria began the implementation of a transition strategy afier transfer of power from the military to democratic government. USAID operates under difficult circumstances ranging from weak governance and public institutions to difficult working conditions. In addition to inexperienced democratic leaders and a conflict-prone environment. the Mission contended with rapid program growth during a short period of time. USAID's program approaches had to respond to challenges of capacity building and institutional strengthening at all levels. This was particularly true for the Mission's Strategic Objective on Democracy and Governance (DG). The democracy and governance transition strategy focused on supporting the most critical elements of governance, particularly in the areas of legislative strengthening. political party development, and support to electoral processes. After four years of program implementation and in order to prepare the groundwork for a sustainable development strategy for Nigeria USAIDMigeria resolved to evaluate its ongoing activities so that future investments can better respond to the priorities of democracy building in Nigeria. Accordingly, the Mission conuacted with Development Associates to conduct an external evaluation, which is the subject of this report. A. SCOPE OF EVALUATION The evaluation assessed the impact of past and current activities on legislative strengthening. political party development. and electoral processes support. At the same time. it sought to provide suggestions for future USAID assistance in support of Nigeria's democracy. Responses were provided to the following questions in the Scope of Work: b Did programs achieve their stated results? b What was the impact of [the] achievements on the relevant DG Intermediate Results (Rs) and Strategic Objective (SO)? b What explains [their] successes andlor failures? h How could the programs have done better? Initial meetings with the Mission's DG Ofice further clarified the purpose of the evaluation and encouraged an evaluation of individual activity performance. Specifically. the Mission requested the evaluation team to provide answers to the following key questions: h How have the performance of targeted institutions been enhanced as a result of investments? ) What are the new opportunities for investment? Evoluntion of Suppon for Electoral Processes, 1 Ju!v 2.2003 Politieol Pony Development and Legislative Strengthening in Ngerin Development Associates, Inc. equaling those elsewhere in Africa unless dramatic steps are taken in the very near term. Because of Nigeria's repressive history, the building of civil society and institutions lags far behind. It is important to note that "the trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. There is nothing basically wrong with the Nigerian character. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian land or climate or water or air or anything else. The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility, to the challenge of personal example which is the hallmark of true leadership."' The 1999 elections, despite the fact that they represented only a first step at resolving the above problem of leadership, were met with both national and international euphoria. Nevertheless, the new administration confronted a wide array of problems that made democratic consolidation tenuous. Notable amongst these problems were the provision of basic services, poverty, effective and accountable government, economic crisis, insecurity due to ethic and religious conflict, the role of the military, and even Nigeria's basic identity as a nation-state. However, over the intervening four years, Nigeria has made progress in establishing a foundation for democratic governance. Nigerians are still supportive of democracy and largely reject non- democratic political altemative~.~ Election violence, while still problematic, is down significantly. The country's vibrant press exercises its freedoms to the full and the judiciary has over the past few years operated with renewed independence. The rate of human rights violations has substantially diminished. The vibrancy of civil society activities, particularly in the social sectors and in working collaboratively, as opposed to the confrontations that characterized the military era, points to a revitalization of political freedoms and pluralism. Furthermore, the military, which at least so far has accepted civilian supremacy, appears to be more professional. Nigeria has exercised a constructive leadership role both continentally and internationally. Despite these encouraging developments and continued public support for democracy, most Nigerians reportedly consider the "democracy dividend" to have been elusive. The overall performance of the political transition of the last four years has been characterized largely by Executive-Legislature stalemate, lack of accountability of the political leadership, a stagnant economy, pervasive corruption, grim social indicators, and tribal and religious conflicts with resultant insecurity. It is against this backdrop, and within this context, that the United States Government, working through the US Agency for International Development, embarked on assisting Nigeria to "rebuild its economy, heal national and ethnic divisions, and advance its democratic agenda."3 i , Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria, Heinemann, 1984. 2 In a recent survey on "Changes in Attitudes Toward Democracy and Markets in Nigeria," 71 percent of Nigerians expressed their preference for democracy and 80 percent explicitly reject a return to military rule. Afro Barometer, December 200 1. "Nigeria: Supporting A New Path to Democracy, Prosperity and Leadership," Executive Summary of the US Inter- Agency Assessment, October I, 1999, p. 3. Evaluation of Support for Electoral Processes, 4 July 2,2003 Political Party Development and Legislative Strengthening in Nigeria Development Associates, Inc 111. USAID's DG PROGRAM APPROACH Prior to June 1998, especially during the military dictatorship of Sanni Abacha USAID's support to Nigeria was confined to humanitarian assistance. However, following the death of Abacha in June 1998, General Abdulsalami Abubakar's government embarked on a number of political reforms that included a transition from military to civilian rule. To assist the Government of Nigeria (GON) during this transition, the U.S. Government (USG) provided S5 million in elections support - specifically for training poll workers. for domestic election monitors. election supplies and logistical aid. After the elections, and before the inauguration of the new government, an additional $2 million was made available to train 11.000 elected officials in the fundamentals of representative democracy, accountability. transparency. constituent relations. and coalition building. The inauguration of President Olusegun Obasanjo led to a period of partnership and enga, oement by the USG. In June of 1999, an Inter-Agency Assessment Team went to Nigeria comprised of 17 members from the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Justice and Transportation. One of the results of the Assessment was a transition strategy for the engagement of USAID with Nigeria. The conclusions reached by that mission, and incorporated in the Transition Strategy, served as the underpinnings for USAID's Democracy and Governance (DG) programming during the transitional period from 1999 to 2003. The strategy provides for assistance to the GON and civil society to ensure that the '%ansition to democratic civilian governance is sustained" and to strengthen the GON's ability to govern responsibly. The strategy adopts a two-track approach, short-term and long-term. In the short term, immediate assistance was geared towards addressing issues that could derail Nigeria's political transition, namely the role of the military and concomitant civilian oversight; crime and corruption; government-societal consensus on economic reform; and regional conflicts. Longer-range programming was aimed at strengthening the institutional foundations for democracy and good governance. The problem analyses underlying the DG strategy included: citizens' lack of trust in governing institutions; absence of accountability with the attendant opportunities for corruption; disarray of the electoral system and resultant lack of viable political support for elected oEcials: personality and patronage-driven political party structures; the weaknesses of countervailing institutions such as the police and judiciary; and the lack of women's participation in public life. In light of the above problems, the DG strategy was designed to strengthen government institutions to be efficient and representative by achieving the following intermediate results: transparency and responsiveness of government institutions; establishing the foundations for fair and competitive electoral system; mitigating potentially destabilizing forces; and increasing participation by civil society in public deliberations and oversight of government. To achieve the above results, the Mission began in 1999 to implement four activities that can be grouped into three major areas: election administration assistance; political part?; support: and legislative strengthening. The assistance for election administration. implemented by the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), is premised on the expectation that the assistance would encourage the Election Commission (INEC) to initiate key reforms to improve the administration of future elections. These would include facilitating inter-party dialogue; Evaluation ofSupponfor EIrcrorol Processes. 5 JUIJ 2,2003 Political Par@ Development and Legislative Strengthening in Nigeria Development Associates, Inc electoral law reform with clear provisions for improving accountability; and an open, transparent and technically sound electoral process. To strengthen political parties, the International Republican Institute (IN) implements an activity that assumes that an increase in political parties' capacity will lead to a more effective and representative role for citizens in public policy development. Progress in this area would be indicated by greater internal democracy within the parties, platform development on key national issues and a greater role for women in the party leaderships and hierarchies. Finally, to accomplish the establishment of transparency and responsiveness of government institutions, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and Mississippi Consortium for International Development (MCID) are strengthening the capacity of national and state legislatures. NDI works with the National Assembly while MCID assists state legislatures, legislators, staffers and executive branch officials. It was expected that as a result the National Assembly would demonstrate increased ability to represent citizen interests in policy making and be more receptive to the input of citizens. The support to lower-level deliberative bodies was to enable the state legislatures to increase their ability to represent citizens' interests in government decision making. These efforts were to mirror those at the National Assembly. IV. PROGRAM DIRECT RESULTS AND IMPACT This chapter assesses the activities of each of the implementing partners of USAIDNigeria's program in support of electoral processes, political party development, and legislative strengthening. Each activity purpose is stated together with the strategies employed for achieving anticipated results (outputs). The summary of activities subsumes a review of the outputs based on the objectives and the indicators outlined in the cooperative agreements, work plans, and performance monitoring plans of the respective implementing partners. These outputs are juxtaposed with what happened as a result of the activity, i.e. the outcomes. A key question for the evaluation team was to what extent USAID's intervention made a difference based on the development hypothesis of what changes must occur at the end of the activity. Recognizing the tremendous challenges posed by the environment for activity implementation, the tenuous and shifting conditions over which neither USAID nor the implementing partners had control, and the problem of establishing causality, the team arrived at its findings by applying three evaluation criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, and appropriateness. Effectiveness refers to whether the activity produced an actual, and not potential or theoretical, medium or long-term developmental change through its chosen approach; efficiency speaks to whether the effect was achieved reasonably in terms of effort and/or expense; and appropriateness looks at how else the same effect could have been achieved so as to attain sustainability. The team is cognizant that control of activities and their outputs is within the management of the activities, and can largely be dealt with by project management adjustments. By contrast, the achievement of outcomes depends on exogenous factors of how target institutions and direct beneficiaries respond to the activity. However, in order to come up with lessons learned and a set of recommendations, the team focused on whether outcomes are or not being achieved. Evaluation of Support for Electoral Processes, 6 July 2,2003 Political Party Development and Legislative Strengrhening in Nigeria Development Associates, Ine. procedures. The CSOs that received sub-grants from IFES affirmed that in order to comply with IFES' requirements, they .had to improve their administrative and financial systems. These improved systems have, in turn, made the CSOs more attractive to other international donors. However, bearing in mind the premise that training and technical assistance are necessarily aimed at performance enhancement, the overall operational effectiveness of INEC was not deemed satisfactory. The administration of the 2003 elections left a lot to be desired "in the number of trained polling station officials [. . .], compilation of voters' list and [. . .] voter identification system."' Although logistics management was an area in which INEC received technical assistance from IFES, Nigerian Civil Society observers of the elections alleged "inadequate preparation by INEC, resulting in logistic problems and inefficiency of its oficia~s."~ Given that INEC was assisted to develop a strategic plan. in May 2000, and recognizing that the Commission was interested in "improving management, integrating systems and focusing on specific areas such as information technology, planning. and ~ogistics,"~ it is nevertheless doubtful to what extent INEC's operational effectiveness was enhanced. especially since "minimum standards for democratic elections were not met"" during the 2003 elections. Another area in which INEC received assistance was to improve its relationship with political parties and CSOs. Although the comments from the two entities ought to be contextualized in the Nigerian environment, the overall feedback from representatives of political parties and CSOs was not positive. It is understood that INEC would not receive a favorable rating from the newer political parties because the Commission had originally, although eventually overruled by the courts, refused to register 24 of the political parties; nonetheless, even some of the first and second 'generations' of the parties were not complimentary of INEC's ability to engage them. It was alleged that INEC only reached out to the CSOs in order to give the appearance of doing the right thing but that the Commission resisted substantive engagement. For example. INEC submitted a draft electoral bill for comments from CSOs in 37 public fora sponsored by IFES. However, in the bill that INEC eventual1 submitted to the National Assembly. none of the comments from the CSOs were included. INEC admitted that it had ..not done enough and early enough"'* in terms of its relationship with civil society. A key finding on IFES' activity was that there were certain factors beyond its control that constrained achievement. For example, INEC was faced with difficulties that stemmed from its constitutional/regulatory framework as well as from the GON's failure to disburse INEC's operational funds in a timely fashion. In addition, the departure of the first IFES Country Director, due to ill health, created a lull with attendant consequences on momentum in activity ' Statement by the African Union ObserverRvlonitoring Team on the 2003 Presidential. Gubernatorial and National Assembly Elections in the Federal Republic ofNigeria, issued on April 22,2003 by the AU Observer Team in Abuja; p. 3. 'Nigerian Civil Society Statement on the General Elections o f April 12' and 19'. 2003; p. 2 9 IFES Quarterly Report, April I-June 30,2001, p. 2 lo Second Preliminary Statement of European Union's Election Observation Mission to Nigeria 2003; Abuja April 22,2003; p. 1 " Dr. Jibrin Ibrahim, Executive Director, International Human Rights Group, Abuja; interview of May 21. 200; j2 Interview with Dr. Abel Guobodia, INEC's Chairman, May 28,2003 Evaluation opipporffor Electoral Processes. 9 J u ! ~ 2.2003 Political Pany Development and Legislative Strengrhening in Nigeria Development Associates, Inc. implementation. However, given IFES' engagement and close collaboration with INEC since 1999, some problems could have been hticipated and timely adjustments made.I3 Lessons Learned In order for training to have a meaningful impact, it must be conducted at all levels (national to ward) and for all types of personnel (permanent and ad-hoc). The impact of the BEAT program was reduced because the ward-level ad-hoc staff was not targeted. Although it was assumed that by training INEC's trainers, they would in turn train polling officials, there was no follow-on monitoring to ensure that INEC's Training Unit did in fact conduct the training. Consequently, the electorate was unable to feel the impact of BEAT. There appeared to be a disconnect between the conceptual design and implementation of IFES' activity. The activity was designed as a long-term institutional development of INEC, so as to achieve operational effectiveness. However, the implementation approach was heavily focused on the 2003 elections. It is recognized that "on-site advisory teams, serving an election commission on a long-term basis, have proven to be a successful means of securing credible and effective election admini~tration."'~ However, the delivery of some of the technical assistance was too late to have an impact; for example, the logistics management support and performance monitoring technical assistance were only provided in November and December 2002 respectively. Another important lesson is that technological support requires technical and technological adaptation in order to be fully successful. This was evident in the marginal value added of assisting INEC to develop a national logistics election plan. One of the objectives of this assistance was the development of an electoral material control database. While this could have tremendously facilitated the work of INEC's field operations staff as well as enhanced organizational effectiveness, this did not occur because most of the logistics personnel did not even know how to use computers. In considering approaches for activity implementation, it is important to consider the "corporate culture" of the target institution. By and large, most INEC staff are civil servants with civil service ethics and mentality. To encourage them to be results-oriented (a private sector culture) and to build constituencies (political parties and CSOs) requires an attitudinal shift so that modernization efforts can yield the desired results. Given the civil service culture, hierarchical by nature, the areas with the greatest impact within INEC had the buy-in of INEC's Chairman. The Director of the IT Department attributed his success to political support from the Chairman, despite an institution-wide skepticism with regard to c~m~uterization. '~ This supports the perception that for impact to be achieved, it is important to win the political support of the institution's top leadership. 13 For example, in the BEAT program, efforts could have been made to either speed up training or narrow the geographic areas of coverage so that training could permeate all levels of election workers in a few targeted states. In addition, IFES' Quarterly Reports sometimes included a 'Lessons Learned" section but there was little evidence that program implementation benefited kom such lessons. I 4 "Managing Assistance in Support of Political Processes", Center for Democracy and Governance, United States Agency for International Development, January 2000. Interview with Mr. Tunji Adesina, Acting Director of INEC's Department of Information Technology; May 27, 2003 Evaluation ofSuppoH for Electoral Processes, 10 July 2,2003 Political Pa@ Development and Legislative Strengthening in Nigeria Development Associates, Inc Recommendations It is important to pay attention to the type of capacity enhancement that is required at specific levels. For certain targeted audiences, while technical skills may be required. it ma?; also be important to consider complementq management skills in order to achieve impact. For example. assistance to INEC's cadre of Directors could have included some management mining so that assistance interventions might have maximum effect. Such training might have had the value added of attitudinal re-orientation that could filter through the organization. The smtegic plan that was not effectively implemented was largely due to insufficient skills in management principles and knowledge. It is recommended that future capacity building efforts include the provision of technical assistance in the form of an "embedded" person within INEC's top leadership. The initial success and access of IFES was due to the fact that the Country Director was always present in the corridors of INEC. This was effective and worthy of replication. For INEC to improve its performance there is an unquestionable need for it to receive a push from the outside, particularly from civil society but also from the political parties. Despite the deficiencies in the current electoral bill. the eventual amendments to it were the result of the lobbying and advocacy of a coalition of CSOs - the Electoral Reform Nehvork. In an environment such as Nigeria's, with little incentive for civil servants to be "customer-oriented." an effective approach is to have the '.customers" constantly and consistently demand "gmd service." Continued assistance to the electoral process should not wait till 2007. Some of the immediate activities that can have great impact on future elections include rebuilding the trust behveen INEC and the political parties as well as providing support to the constitution&reglatoq reforms that will surely take place. Furthermore, assistance can be provided now to P E C to develop a good core-training unit and to invest in voterlcivic education. such as jingles. so that the electorate will be better educated to safeguard the transparency of the process in the hture. It is also likely that a population census will take place in 200.5;'~ support to that process will be a worthy investment that will produce significant impact in election administration. B. INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE (IRI) The International Republican Institute (IRI) is implementing a political party strengthening and eiectoral processes support activity. This $2.75 million activih-, conducted since 1999. is aimed at capacity enhancement of political parties so as to foster a legitimate and transparent electoral process that can enhance political stability. To achieve this goal. IRl's program objectives include: b Assist political parties in addressing the risk of electoral conflict; b Promote effective participation of political parties in 2003 elections; Promote issue-based political agendas; Promote women's participation in political parties and poll monitoring; and b Enhance the skills of party poll agents. l6 Interview with Dr. Abel Guobadia. op. cit. Evaluation of Supporr for Electoral Processes, I t Ju@ 2.2003 Political Par@ Development and Legislalive Strengthening in Nigeria Development Associates. Inc Political party assistance must factor in environmental conditions (political, institutional, socioeconomic, and cultural) to be relevant and useful. Unlike in developed democracies where citizens identify with the ideology or program of a party, join as members and, sometimes, contribute in-kind for their parties to succeed, the spirit of volunteerism is yet to take root in Nigeria's nascent democracy. Party membership is yet to develop as a civic choice, loyalty, ideology, or conviction. The consequence of this, for example on polling agent training, is that assistance efforts need to include consideration of whether those trained could be remunerated so that there can be a return on the assistance investment. For political party development to succeed, it is imperative that the needs of the parties be defined by the party leaders themselves and not by the implementing partner. Although party leaders can be assisted to look beyond traditional approaches or short-term needs, the reality is that without their specifying what they need, assistance may be given and received but it may not be put to use. In fact, this lack of a feeling of ownership was why some parties sent low-ranking party officials to training and why, subsequently, the knowledge stayed with the low-ranking official without having any institutional impact. In targeting women politicians, a single-gender network is the most productive approach. Women participants in training reported being at ease when the room was filled with other women and, in certain instances and within some cultural/religious settings, the presence of men can have intimidating effects on women. Furthermore, direct communication with women politicians, through their party caucuses rather than via the party hierarchy, yields greater impact. There were states, e.g. Bauchi, where the women's leader was male. Weak administrative structures affect the parties' ability to take full advantage of party building efforts. Future efforts need to 'take this weakness into consideration. The most effective way to reform party systems is to encourage citizens to apply legitimate pressures so that political parties can behave as leadership training grounds. Recommendations Political party training is required at all levels (from national to ward). It is recognized that resources may not permit full penetration at all levels and therefore that the program will use the 'step-down' technique. In that event, there needs to be a built-in mechanism of follow-on monitoring to ensure that replication of training is conducted by the parties. Another pertinent suggestion, given the limited resources, is to develop focal states, instead of targeting the entire country, and deepen capacity development in those states. It is recommended that training content be adapted to the local environment and that the current approach of standardized training be reconsidered. This standardized approach draws heavily from the American experience by training in such areas as basic party organization and functions, how to conduct party meetings, and membership recruitment. For future programming, a pre- assessment must be carried out to gauge the actual, not presumed, level of party organization and the knowledge base of party officials. Without such a pre-assessment, the efficacy of training is doubtful. It is important that trainers understand local realities so that training can have relevance for the target audience. Some parties disclosed that some trainers used analogies of experiences in developed democracies that had little relevance to the Nigerian context. It was also observed that Evaluation of Support for Electoral Processes, 14 July 2,2003 Political P a m Develooment and Le~islrrtive Strengthening in Nigeria Development AssociaIes, Inc there was a preconceived bias, by Nigerians, that trainers who appear young could not have had sufficient hands-on experience to convey political knowledge. While this bias may appear subjective and irrelevant, unquestionably, trust between the technical experts or trainers and the party representatives is essential to how the message of the training is received. Support to women's participation in the political process merits a scaling-up. This recommendation is premised not only on the evidence that this support has worked but also on the fact that this represents a window of opportunity to satisfy an insatiable need of mainstreaming women in politics. A possible approach is to commence by supporting women's groups in specific political parties and then facilitate opportunities for such women politicians to work together across party line. It is recommended that the opportunity be capitalized upon, especially with the increased number of female Deputy Governors, to create a network of women political leaders (executive and legislative members as well as other women party leaders). In addition to, this women politicians network, serving as a forum for exchange of experiences, it can also provide access to or serve as a clearinghouse of relevant resource materials and other documents on women in politics. In terms of capacity building, the first step should be technical assistance in the areas of communications; negotiations; and alliance building. In order to achieve transparency at polls, an effective strategy is to empower voters to know procedures of polling so that they can be more vigilant to safeguard the credibility of the electoral process. The best approach to achieving this voter empowerment is through civic and voter education with a complementary assistance to domestic monitors. It is recommended that the support for capacity enhancement be provided to the existing pool of domestic obse~ers/monitors that worked with international monitors during the 2003 elections. C. MISSISSIPPI CONSORTIUM FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (MCW The Mississippi Consortium for International Development (MCID) is implementing a S4.2 million, over four years, state legislative strengthening program. The goal of this program is to enhance the capacity of state legislatures to carry out oversight, representation. and law making functions. Since 1999. eight of Nigeria's 36 states are being targeted: Adamawa Benue. Edo. Enugu, Katsina, Lagos, Niger and Rivers. To achieve its stated goals, the following are the objectives of MCID's activity: b Enhance an understanding of the legislative process; ) Provide comparative opportunities. on the functioning of US legislative process. to legislators, staffers and executive branch officials; b Enhance the analytical capability of the target group; b Develop a cadre of young Nigerians to understand the legislative process and effectively utilize it in carrying out their responsibilities as aides andior lawmakers; and Establish linkages between Nigerian Regional technology workshops and their G.S. counterparts, thus providing a resource for continued professional development. The activities to support the above objectives include: Evaluation of Suppon for Electoral Processes, 15 Juk 2.2W3 Political Party Development and Legislative Strengthening in Nigeria Development Associates, Inc b Training workshops; b Study tours; b Production and provision of information resources; and b Legislative intern program. After two years, of program implementation, MCID re-focused its activity to lay greater emphasis on budgeting and legislative drafting, engagement of civil society in legislative process, training on key policy issues (economic reform and poverty alleviation), and greater utilization and management of information resources. The following are the accomplishments of MCID's activities: b Conduct of numerous technology and legislative workshops for legislators, staffers and executive branch officials; b Training of over 100 trainers on Legislative Research and Drafting; b Establishment of a process to analyze pending or passed Bills, with local partner Nigeria b Institute for Social and Economic Research WISER); b Organization of study tours for legislators, staffers and executive branch officials; b Establishment and management of a legislative internship program; b Production of training and information materials such as Democracy Manual. Evaluation Findings The state legislatures have underachieved and to a great extent have not been able to carve out their niche in the political equation especially if the performance of the legislatures is assessed on the program objectives of oversight and representation functions. The obstacles present at the national level are also present at the state level, only accentuated; consequently, several of the Findings, Lessons Learned and Recommendations mirror those at the national level. The State Governors were unwilling to cede power for the legislatures to effectively perform, thereby resulting in lack of checks and balances that naturally occurs within branches of government. For example, in Niger State, while it is positive that there was no acrimony between, the Executive and Legislature, it could be interpreted that the legislature served as another agency of the Executive because it was disclosed that the Governor usually passed instructions to the legislature on issues important to him.20 The idea of the legislature as another center of political power in the state, if not a counterweight, had collectively eluded the legislators. However, on the other end of the spectrum is Enugu State which became so riven with internal dissent and Executive-Legislature squabbling that it was virtually moribund. Furthermore, the state legislators' inexperience inhibited their ability to be able to assert their constitutional powers to bring about oversight while, to a large extent, they did not efficiently perform their representation role as expected by their constituencies. Not achieving the desired 20 Interviews with representatives of Niger State Legislature: Alhaji Buhari Mohammed; Idris Adamu Kuta, Permanent Secretary and Clerk; Tafida Yakubu Pandogar, Principal Legislative Officer; and Shehu Mohammed, Principal Official Reporter. Evaluation of Suppon for Electoral Processes, 16 July 2,2003 Political Pany Development and Legislative Strengthening in Nigeria Development Associales. Inc. of impact in that some of the program re-focusing, that MCID eventually embarked upon. could have occurred much earlier and more time would have been possible to see visible results before the end of the last legislatures terms. Recommendations The demand side (civil society) of the political equation must be strengthened in order for investments to yield meaningful impact. This must include institutional strengthening, and developing capacity for advocacy and lobbying. Additionally, the skills of monitoring the performances of elected officials must be introduced. NGO's and others must be assisted to follow the work introduced by their elected official. Based on these efforts, or lack thereof. the NGO's can then support or admonish these elected officials. This will foster accountability in the political equation otherwise elected officials will have no incentive to be responsive. Work with key legislators and legislative staff must continue however, a tilt in emphasis of training towards permanent professional staff must be considered. The departure of many of the recipients of earlier training is notable. As the system matures, it can be expected that there would be an increase in the number and influence professional permanent staff. This is where the focus of activity should be, although nor at the complete expense of key legislators and staff but realignment must occur for the sums of money spent to have a lasting impact. A natural place to begin would be with the MCID interns that have become permanent members of the state legislative bureaucracies. Efforts should be increased to coordinate more closely with other international organizations working with state assemblies. For example, the European Union (EU) intends to embark on an assistance program to state legislatures and six states will be targeted." Unfortunately there is only one overlap with the eight states where MCID is presently working. It is not clear if this was deliberate, i.e. focusing on states where no work had been done, thus far. or if it resulted from a lack of coordination. It is recommended that future efforts be focused on areas where there is a base of knowledge already present. D. NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE (NDI) The National Democratic Institute has been implementing a National Assembly stren-@henkg program since 1999. This $4.54 million, four-year program focuses on providing skills training and workshops in the areas of budget analysis. rules and procedure, role of committees. legislative drafting, constituency relations. the role of civil society and media and the development of a legislative resources and IT Center. However, after two years of p r o w implementation with lessons learned and the growth in the constitutional role of the national legislature as well as realities of election cycle. NDI re-focused its program to lay emphasis on capacity strengthening in accordance with the following objective areas: b Strengthen the efficiency of key legislative committees, with the focus on training committee staff and improving the frequency and quality of committee hearings; Increase the involvement and capacity of Nigerian civil sociey organizations to participate in legislative business. including providing testimony, training, support and '' Interview with Adetokunbo George-Coker, EU's Program Manager. Evaluation of Suppon for Electoral Processes, 19 Ju@ 2.2003 Political Party Development and Legislalive Srrengthening in Nigeria Development Associates, Inc. information to the national assembly committees, lawmakers and staff in a nonpartisan fashion; b Reinforce linkages between legislators and constituents at the grassroots and district levels, as well as making the National Assembly in Abuja more accessible to citizens; b Enhance the ability of women legislators to serve as leaders in the National Assembly and actively participate in key legislative business; and b Foster greater responsiveness and transparency in governmental institutions. With a general focus on committee strengthening, institutional development, collaboration with civil society, and constituency relations, the specific activities were: Training for Senators, Representative and their staffs; Technical resource support; Technology workshops; Production of information and training materials; Legislative internship program; Legislative drafting training; Civil society strengthening; and Sub-granting to NGOs. In implementing the stated activities NDI achieved the following results: Initiated and managed a legislative fellows program; Took the lead in implementing the first phase of the National Assembly's IT program by developing an IT policy and equipping the IT Center; Produced training and information materials such as committee manuals, constituent outreach handbooks, constituent logs; budgetary and appropriations primers, etc;. Organized training workshops that were supplemented with one-on-one and small group technical assistance for Senators, Representative and their staffs; Provided technical assistance on several major policy initiatives, specifically on: 1999 and 2000 national budgets; 1999 and 2001 supplemental appropriations bills; Ethics Code of Conduct for the Senate; and other social security, disability and anti-corruption legislation; Organized, together with Pathfinder IntemationaItNigeria, a public hearing on HIVIAIDS that brought several key actors together; Trained Committees' staffs on hearings preparations; Trained legislators and staff on constituency relations; and Provided sub-grants to five CSOs to reinforce relations amongst legislators, civil society, and the Nigerian public. This effort led to the opening of more than 50 functional constituency offices. Evaluation Findings The National Assembly was described to us as the greatest disappointment in Nigeria's transition to democracy. This must be the point of departure when discussing the findings of this assessment. However, the disappointment must be viewed in the context of Nigeria's lack of a tradition of a democratic system with multi-polar centers of power. Under such circumstances, it is not difficult to imagine that a national legislature would find it challenging to assert its power. Evaluation of Supportfor Electoral Processes, 20 July 2,2003 Political Party Development and Legislative Strengthening in Nigeria Dwelapment Associates, Inc This poor rating of the performance of the National Assembly can be better understood in the context of the predominant power of the Executive Branch. the inexperience of the legislators and the aforementioned political culture. A relevant question is whether, after an extremely arduous learning process, the National Assembly will apply the lessons learned during the past four years to improve its performance in the future. The IT Center at the National Assembly received high marks from all the parties involved and from observers. With the concomitant training provided to staffs and legislators. this pro,gam has made a large impact. This is evidenced not only by numerous testimonia~s'~ but by the fact that the National Assembly purchased additional computers to supplement those provided by NDI. This indicates the possibility of key "buy ins" by local partners. This "buy in" gives credence to the likely sustainability of the Center after the end of USAID's assistance. NDI also produced information materials such as committee manuals. constituent outreach handbooks, constituent logs, and budgetary and appropriations primers. Public hearings on key laws were held. These included but were not limited to the Freedom of Information Act. HIVIAIDS and budgets. One of the more interesting anecdotal accounts was of Nigerian militar). officers testifying on budget issues relating to military expenditures. For all the negative aspects of the past four years at the National Assembly, incidents like this create hope for effective civilian oversight of the military. Can one or should one extrapolate from the anecdotal evidence that this change has occurred? One certainly cannot and should not. However, it is illustrative of positive changes during this transitional phase. NDI's efforts to organize a Women's Caucus were unable to gain'traction. This occurred for several reasons, not the least of which was that none of the women Senators or Representatives would take the lead role in organizing it. This forced NDI to pursue this objective in other ways. The basics of the committee system were established. NDI worked with the Speaker's Office to develop a committee system. It was through this mechanism that NDI began working closely with the House Committee on Women's Affairs and Youth Issues. This ultimately formed the nexus of their "Women's and Youth Issues Caucus" which was in turn instrumental in planning a National Summit on Issues Related to Nigeria's Women. Youth and Children. This was the avenue by which NDI pursued their ends of focusing on greater participation and influence of women in politics and of a greater emphasis on women's issues. NDI's work with Pathfinder InternationallNigeria on HIVIAIDS brought several key elements together. These were civil society. legislators and the executive. This xork was designed to respond to constituent needs. especially in light of ever-increasing sero-prevalence rates. The project sensitized some elected officials by providing them with information and encouraged legislators to engage in dialogue with the Executive Branch. A hearing on HIVIAIDS was held and an "HIVIAIDS Awareness Poster*' signed by political leaders from across the Nigerian political spectrum up to and including President Obasanjo was produced. The public hearings held on HIVIAIDS did not have the impact desired. The desire for personal political advantage overtook the intended purpose of these hearings and diluted much of any positive effects. 26 Senators Peter Adeyemo and 0. Osunbor; permanent professional staff members (Alh. Lawal Usman, Assistant Director o f Computer Services. and Alh. Nasiru Arab. Deputy Clerk): and parliamentary observers (Uju Okagdue. TV Journalist-TV MINAJ) Evaluation of Support for Elecroral Processes, 2 1 Ju& 2.2003 Polilical Par@ Developmenr and Legislative Strengthening in Nigeria Development Associates, Inc. While it is important to continue work with key legislators and legislative staff, as the system matures, it is conceivable that there will be an increase in the number and influence of professional permanent staff. This is where the focus of future activity should be. The cross-sectoral work done in the area of HIVIAIDS by the Democracy and Governance and Health offices at USAID needs to be expanded. This work has achieved an impact on the national dialogue; however, a more cohesive and integrated strategy for this cross-sectoral work is recommended, because it was observed that a vertical delineation of cross-sectoral synergies within the Mission is yet to translate into horizontal linkages. These will be key as other "targets of opportunity" for cross-sectoral synergies become evident. As the HIVIAIDS situation worsens, micro-credits and other poverty alleviation strategies will almost certainly need to be incorporated into the overall HIVIAIDS program. V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS A. CONCLUSIONS I. How has the performance of targeted institutions been enhanced as a result of USAID'S investments? An accurate assessment of this question must necessarily take into account the context in which USAID's intervention operates. The legacy of military rule with authoritarian leadership left Nigeria with unaccountable rulers who relied on patronage to govern. The centralized political structures were devoid of representation and government institutions were severely weakened. In addition to crises of governance, corruption, fiscal irresponsibility, and economic mismanagement were rife. Religious, ethnic, communal conflicts were rampant with the attendant result of insecurity. It was within this context that the political transition of 1999 took place. Nigerians were not the only ones with high hopes and expectations about the prospects of democracy. An Inter-Agency assessment of the US Government was full of expectations about what could be achieved in supporting Nigeria's transition. Consequently, there was an exponential growth of funds to support Nigeria's democratic experiment, but the broad and diverse program did not benefit from an in-depth sectoral assessment that usually generates focused and targeted interventions in areas that affect the stability of democratic transition. Over the last four years, however, "post-transition euphoria has given way to political realism'"' not only amongst Nigerians but also amongst international donors. Several factors can be attributed to the "euphoria" but chief amongst them was high expectations about what could be accomplished within a short period of time. Absent any form of baseline data; or some other kind of measurable indicators, it is extremely difficult to come to any conclusive affirmation as to what, or how much, performance enhancement has taken place as a result of USAID's investments. In order to be able to respond " USAID/Nigeria, Afro Barometer, "Down to Earth: Changes in Attitudes Toward Democracy and Markets in Nigeria" December 2001 Evaluation of Suppon for Electoral Processes, 24 July 2,2003 Political Party Development and Legislative Strengthening in Nigeria Development Associam, Inc directly to the question, causal linkages need to be established between the activities and performance; however, it was not possible to determine direct or plausible causalities. This is not entirely surprising because changes in a particular political system are generally due to a host of factors. It should also be noted that impacts in the DG sector are largely qualitative and changes take a longer time to be evident. Furthermore, systems and institutions take more than four years to change and it takes robust investment and sustained efforts to see changes. In the short term, however, improvements can be measured in terms of changes in attitudes. mitigation of political tensions, and even the very process through which decisions are made. Using this as a yardstick of measurement, USAID's activities have made important contributions to Nigeria's democratic institutions. b INEC: As outlined earlier in this report, there were changes that took place within the Commission that were the direct result of USAID's assistance. The performance of the IT Department is a clear example. The training in basic election administration was equally successful. The very fact that INEC reached out to civil society, through the 37 public fora financed by USAID, was evidence of success, especially if one takes into consideration the improvement in the INEC-CSO frosty relationships. The Commission has now recognized civil society as a key constituency with which INEC needs a better relat i~nshi~. '~ While most of the leadership cadre within INEC may have a 'Pivil-sewice mentality," and while the strategic plan was not implemented, the process that the Commission went through and the existence of the document would have resulted in attitudinal changes in some senior officials. USAID's funding of the communications equipment for transmission of results from difficult local government areas, has opened INEC's horizons about ways in which it could improve its efficiency. Political Parties: Recognizing that political party development is the most political type of DG programming and that for party programs to succeed they must address the needs of political parties as determined by the party leaders themselves. it would never be easy to meet the specific needs of all the 30 political parties in Nigeria. Nonetheless. USAID- funded training contributed to an aggregation and articulation of societal interests through the parties. Political dialogue, expression. choice. and socialization are unquantifiable impacts in which USAID has invested. Undoubtedly, some of the participants in the training are a generation away from attaining the mantle of leadership; but knowledge acquired through USAID's activities will positively affect them when they eventually become leaders. b National Assembly: The National Assembly suffered from a variety of factors ranging from an Executive that was not willing to cede power easily and the inexperience of the legislators to a lack of any tradition of a system of government where a legislature is equal or a counterweight to the executive. Despite these challenges, the National Assembly has endured. Its very survival must be viewed as a victory. It will hopefully continue to develop over the next four years. With sustained and focused external assistance this should be possible. There is a small cadre of returning legislators and permanent professional staff. the rudiments of a functioning Committee system, and technological support to facilitate the drafting, amending and passing of legislation. In the critical area " Interview with Dr. Guobadia. op. cit. Emluotion of Suppon for Electoral Processes, 25 J o b 2.2003 Political P a w Development ond Legislative Strengthening in Nigeria Development Associates, Inc. of HIVIAIDS, the engagement of NGO'sICivil Society, the National Assembly and Executive branch in a common purpose proves that the capability exists. It can be done and must be replicated. b State Legislatures: We have said that absent any form of baseline data, or some other kind of measurable indicators, it is extremely difficult to come to any conclusive affirmation as to what changes have taken place as a result of USAID's investments. Nowhere is this statement more apropos than at the State Legislature level. In a political system still dramatically developing, combined with an infrastructure that is wanting, it seems that some of the programs at this level were a bit premature. The knowledge gained and the sensitization of the staff and the legislators may pay dividends in the future. When will that time be remains unknown at this point. Still, as with more developed democracies, some of the next generation of national political leaders in Nigeria will gain their experience at the state level. 2. What are the opportunities for investment? b Increase demand for democratic governance. For the democratization process in Nigeria to move forward, broad political reforms are required along with strong institutions and changes in the political orientation of leaders and citizens. However, there appears to be insufficient political will, and demand for institutional reform to promote better governance is diluted by general bureaucratic inertia, present in every bureaucracy, and the fact that the current administrative weaknesses create opportunities for corruption. The current structure of the ec'onomy and government institutions allows the ruling elite to derive tremendous financial benefits from their positions. Similarly, lower level government officials enrich themselves through petty conuption. There is little personal incentive within the system to implement democratic reforms and improve the quality of governance. Therefore, the most critical investment that USAID could make to support democratization, would be to facilitate greater demand for democratic governance, which in turn will make the implementation of reforms a growing political necessity.33 Development assistance can be provided to target groups on how to efficiently work as a pro-active coalition for reform as opposed to simply reacting to policy initiatives or decisions. b Support reform-minded leaders. Critical to engendering effective political pressure is the cultivation and support of reform-minded citizens not only within the general public, but also within political institutions, be they legislators, political leaders, or civil servants. As activists in civil society reach out to one another and to partners within political institutions, they can strengthen the voice of those often isolated reformers in government and thus affect public policy and the character of governance in Nigeria. t The legislative arena matters insofar as it is policy oriented. The legislative arena will continue to offer opportunities for political reform but USAID's approach to legislative strengthening should be aimed at developing policy capacities. The five possible approaches are to assist the legislature to be: transparent; pluralistic; representative; 33 This strategy is similar to the one employed successfully by USAID during the past decade in Indonesia and Kenya, where political will was also a primary impediment to democratization. Evaluation of Supporl for Electoral Processes, 26 July 2,2003 Political P a m Development and Legislative Strengthening in Nigeria Development Associares. Inc evidence of improvements or changes that resulted fkom most training. Proving that individuals have acquired skills is thus only partially relevant for USAID's DG p r o - m : more relevant is evidence of change or enhanced performance of beneficiar?. organizations. b Performance enhancement and environmental factors: Performance enhancement implies taking into consideration. a priori. whether the environment is enabling for application of the skills acquired; it also means that the design of the capacity ~ t r e n g t h e ~ n g activity should consider whether the tools will be available for those trained to put their new skills to use. The evaluation team observed that some training sessions were designed with less consideration of factors within the environment and of tools that could enable or constrain performance. Consequently, beneficiaries could not apply the skills acquired and the purpose of the assistance was defeated. ) Performance monitoring systems are management tools: The implementing partners may have developed performance monitoring plans (PMP) and complimentq monitoring systems, but there was little evidence to suggest that their use substantively impacted the overall achievement of goals. Good program monitoring procedures would have assisted the partners, and the Mission, in testing whether the achievement of planned outputs would lead to achievement of the project purpose and of a sustainable outcome. Absent the use of monitoring systems, it was difficult to detect plausible linkages (individually and cumulatively) that demonstrated causality and consistency in the impact or performance of the provided assistance. Recognizing that achievement of results in the DG sector takes a longer time to be evident and are often more qualitative than quantitative, this makes monitoring the more imperative, so as to have records of changes or improvements to meet the results reporting requirements of USAID. B. RECOMMENDATIONS I . Assistance slzould depend upon what difference can be made As the Mission moves from transition to development strategy, it will have to confront the critical issue of the relevance of its assistance: what difference USAID's investment can make in Nigeria. Undoubtedly, support to Nigeria's democratic development is in the U.S. national interest strategically, politically, and economically. However, with competing demands for dwindling resources, there are strategic choices that will have to be made on areas that have the greatest potential for yielding 'bang for the buck.' 2. Grow with winners or start small and scale up Given the need for consolidating democracy in Nigeria and the scarce resources to meet all the development needs, the Mission should focus its future activities by doing fewer things very well. An approach to achieving this is by recognizing that not all that is important is feasible and not all that is feasible is doable. The Mission can opt to -'grow with its winners" by building upon its successes of the last four years, or to deepen the knowledge of the recipients of its on-going assistance. Another recommended approach. should there be reason to abandon some of the on- going activities, is to start small and scale up. Evaluation of Support for Electoral Processes, 29 JUIJ 2.2003 Political Pa* Development and Legislnlive Strengthening in Nigeria Development Associates, Inc. 3. Cross-sectoral synergies work and need to be expanded. Cross-sectoral synergies amongst Mission SOs and implementing partners need to be expanded. The work done in the area of HIVIAIDS by the Democracy and Governance and Health offices at USAID should be expanded. This work has achieved results and had an impact on the national dialogue. A more cohesive strategy for this cross-sectoral work is recommended. Strategies need to be further integrated to maximize the positive results. 4. Successful programming requires complementary interventions It is important to recognize that a successful program may require complementary political or diplomatic interventions. For example, after implementing partners have had consultations, discussions, and agreements with their technical counterparts, the Mission may have to follow up with a policy dialogue with the leadership of the targeted beneficiary institutions. It may even be necessary to call on the support of the Embassy in such an effort. 5. "Substantial involvement" authority needs to be better exercised The Mission needs to better exercise its "substantial involvement" authority by committing to measure performance and using frequent reviews of performance measures to guide program management. Crucial to monitoring are setting realistic performance indicators and establishing baseline data against which to measure progress. It should be noted that performance measurement does not work as an afterthought, so systems must be established for collecting data while developing a new strategy and before starting implementation of new activities. Had there been systems in place over the last four years, it is possible that program adjustments could have been made and greater impact could have been achieved. 6. Partners 'performance reporting requires standardization Reporting by implementing partners varied in quality. The SO Team should work towards developing parameters for quarterly and annual reports for the purpose of standardization so that the required information can be adequately and accurately captured in a simple manner. Z Project management experience needs to complement teclznical abilities The Chiefs of Party for the Mission's implementing partners have relevant and impressive professional backgrounds and technical experience. However, if such backgrounds and experience are not matched by relevant project management experience, especially in a developing country context such as Nigeria's, the overall achievement of project goals and objectives may be reduced. In approving key personnel, it is recommended that in addition to technical experience, the Mission require project management experience in environments similar to Nigeria's. 8. Institutional capacity-building should be targeted at institutional performance Activities that are aimed at institutional development should necessarily differentiate between institutional capability (trained staff, budget, equipment, system, and procedures) and institutional performance (delivery of service or goods). Future institutional development efforts Evaluation of Support for Electoral Processes, 30 July 2,2003 Political Party Development and Legislative Strengthening in Nigeria Development Associates, Inc. should be premised on an analysis of whether all the variables of capability are being addressed and whether a weakness of any of the variables could affect the goal of performance enhancement. It is insufficient to train staff if the procedures within the institution limit their ability to apply the skills acquired; at the same time, even if there were an enabling environment. if there is a shortage of tools and equipment, performance would still not be improved. Furthermore, future capacity building activities should seek ways to make individual kno\vledse and skills contribute to the organization's knowledge and skill base. 9. Accountable and responsive political institutions require a push Achievement of accountable and responsive political institutions requires a push from citizens and their interest groups. Civil society advocacy should be a major focus at the same time that political institution-strengthening activities are being conducted. Our impression is that the emphasis of current Mission activities has been heavily "top down" on the "supply" side of the political system. While this is understandable, given that most other donors concentrate largely on the "demand" side, efforts should be made to balance the equation. A possible approach. given declining resources, is to intensify donor collaboration and coordination so that USAID's supply- side assistance can complement or piggy-back on another donor's demand-side programs. 10. Buy-ins by local stakeholders and partners are needed Recommendations from local program stakeholders and partners need to receive greater anention by the Mission. In order to achieve greater ownership that fosters sustainability, a systematic process needs to be developed to receive periodic feedback from local stakeholders. A possible approach is to establish a local stakeholder forum in which ideas c& be presented directly to the Mission. This forum should consist of people with a degree of authority within their respective organizations so that feedback and possible recommendations for action can have the commitment of the organization. Evaluation of Supporr for Elecroral Processes. 31 July 2.2003 Political Pony Developmrnr and Legislative Strengthening in Nigeria Ibrahim Jibril, Executive Director, International Human Rights Law Group Phebian Okoye, Program Officer, IHRLG Godwin Odo, Program Officer, IHRLG Victoria Nwogu, Program Officer, IHRLG Mary Angelini, Country Director, IRIiNigeria Ted Lavasseur, Program Officer, IRIiNigeria Alhaji A.A. Abdulkadir, National Chairman, AD Sani Ahmed Kaura, National Director of Organization, PDP Chinwe Nnorom, National Senior Officer, PDP Josephine Anenih, National Woman Leader, PDP Muinat Obalowu, National Woman Leader, ANPP Antonia Ashieda, Political Consultant, PDP Sani Abdullahi Shinkafi, National Secretary, APGA Mr. Ukeje, National Administrative Secretary, APGA Goddy Idaminabo, National Secretary, UNPP Air Cmdr. I. Nkanga, National Secretary, NDP Senator Peter Adeyemo Senator 0. Osunbor Alh. Lawal Usman, Assistant Director of Computer Services, National Assembly Alh. Nasiru Arab, Deputy Clerk, National Assembly Alh. Sulieman Kabir, Director Research and Statistics, National Assembly Bala Yabani, Staff, Nigerian National Assembly Uju OkagdueTV Journalist-TV MINAJ Yinka Lawal, Constitutional Rights Project Fatimah Shagari, Pathfinder International Dr. Arabs, Pathfinder International Pamela D. Moore, Country Director, MCID Khulekani Sitole, Southern Africa Regional Director, MCID Philip Ikita, Program Officer, MCID Anthony Ubani, Program Officer, MCID Alh. Buhari Mohammed, Permanent Secretary and Clerk, Niger State Legislature Idris Adamu Kuta, Principal Legislative Officer, Niger State Legislature Tafida Yakubu Pandogar, Deputy Director of Research, Niger State Legislature Shehu Mohammed, Principal Official Reporter, Niger State Legislature Honorable Samson Osagie, State Legislator, Edo State Zakari Tanko Muhammad, AttacheIIntem, Niger State Legislature Buhari Abdualli, AttacheIIntem, Niger State Legislature Faroul Umar Isah, AttacheIIntern, Niger State Legislature Wayne Probst, Country Director, NDIiNigeria Akeem Jagun, IT Program Officer, NDI Deji Olaore, Program Officer, NDI Christine Owe, Senior Technical Advisor, NDI Francesta Farmer, Resident Senior Technical Advisor, NDI Bodurin Adebo, Program Assistant, NDI Sandra Ilema Omali, Senior Program Assistant, NDI Ibrahim Kalapo, IntedAttache, National Assembly Evaluation of Suppon for Electoral Processes, A-2 July 2,2003 Political Party Development and Legislative Strengthening in Nigeria Development Associates, Ine 90. Onu Okorie, IntedAttache, National Assembly 91. Ernmanuel Adeleke, IntedAttache, National Assembly 92. Lami Attah Ahmed, IntemIAttache, National Assembly Evaluafion of Supporr for Electoral Prdcesses. A-3 Juk 2,2003 Political Party Development and Legislative Strengthening in Nigeria EVALUATION OF SUPPORT FOR ELECTORAL PROCESSES, POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENT AND LEGISLATIVE STRENGTHENING IN NIGERIA I. S U M M Y The purpose of this contract is to: 6) (ii) (iii) 11. Evaluate past and existing USAIDiNigeria election assistance that is implemented by the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), the support for political strengthening implemented by the International Republican Institute (IRI)". and the legislative strengthening assistance programs of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the Mississippi Consortium for International Development (MCID)~~; Assess the contribution of the four programs to the Mission's democracy strategic objective and intermediate results; and Provide suggestions for future USAID assistance in support of Nigeria's political evolution toward to democratic governance. BACKGROUND The timing of this evaluation coincides with the end of USAIDMigeria's current Transition Strategy in December 2003 and the development of a new five-year strategic plan. In preparation for developing a new strategy, USAID/Nigeria2s Democracy and Governance (DG) Office requires a set of recommendations regarding the best opportunities for assisting the continued consolidation of democracy in Nigeria. In Nigeria, USAID is the largest bilateral donor in the democracy and governance sector. The goal of Agency's Transition Strategy is to '-assist Nigeria's transition to economic. social and political stability" through the sub-goal of "restoring public confidence in civilian-led democratic governance". The DG Office's mandate, outlined in Strategic Objective One (Sol). is to ensure that %ansition to democratic civilian governance is sustained'. Specifically, SO1 focuses on assisting Nigeria in the following areas: b Transparency and responsiveness of government institutions Establishing the foundations for fair and competitive electoral system 38 I N and IFES programs are implemented under the Consortium for Elections and Political Processes Strengthening (CEPPS) cooperative ayeement (DGC-A-00-01-00004). j9 NDI and MCID programs are implemented under cooperative agreement XX. Evaluation of Supponfor Elecroral Processes, B-l July 2.2M3 Polirieol Pam Development and Legislative Strengthening h Nigeria Develo~menl Associates, Inc While in Nigeria The team shall conduct interviews and meetings with USAID and US Embassy representatives; with field office staff of IFES, IN, NDI and MCID; and with field staff of other relevant assistance implementers and donors. The team shall present preliminary findings to USAID prior to departing Nigeria. Copies of the draft report shall be left with the USAID Mission for review and comments. VI. SCHEDULE/TIMEFRAME~~ Three days will be required of the Consultants in Washington, D.C. prior to departure for collection and review of documents, meetings with relevant persons at USAID, IFES, IRI, NDI, MCID and other organizations in Washington. Two days will be required of the Consultants to interact with the staff of the USAIDNigeria DG Office and review the scope of work and the draft itinerary. The Consultants shall meet with USAID and representatives of IFES, IRI, NDI and MCID in Abuja, Nigeria upon arrival to agree on the itinerary and come to a common understanding of the scope of work. The field evaluation will require a minimum of ten workdays. The team shall draft a summary of preliminary findings, and a draft outline of the report, prior to leaving Nigeria. At least two days shall take place at USAIDNgeria in order to prepare the draft report and debrief the USAID Mission. Fieldwork shall begin as early as April 21, 2003, but no later than May 1, 2003. Upon return to the United States, up to four workdays may be required, after receipt of USAID's comments, in order to finalize the report. USAID shall have the final report by June 10,2003. VII. WORKWEEK A six-day workweek is authorized with no premium pay. VIII. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT USAIDNigeria will provide logistical support during the team's stay in Nigeria. All other logistical support shall be provided and arranged for by the Contractor, unless otherwise specified (e.g., country clearance cable). IX. DELIVERABLES A. The Consultant shall produce a final report which will include: 1. Executive Summary. A summary, not to exceed four single-spaced pages, should list, in order of priority the major findings and lessons learned from the evaluation and recommendations for future programming. 40 The team's schedule and LOE was subsequently modified by agreement between the Mission and Development Associates. Evalualion of Suppor? for Elecloral Processes, B-4 July 2,2003 Polilical Party Development and Legislalive Strengthening in Nigeria 3 Development Associmes, Ine Body of the Report, not to exceed 40 pages. Generally, the report should be organized to describe the impact of the activities being evaluated, major findings, lessons learned. and recommendations for future programming. Annexes. Additional material should be submitted as Annexes, as appropriate (e.g.. Statement of Work, bibliography of documents reviewed, list of agencies and individuals interviewed, etc.). Reporting Procedures: Draft Report. The draft report will reflect the joint conclusions of the consultant team. Consultants will be responsible for writing the first draft. One copy of the draft report will be left with USAIDNigeria, and one will be submitted to USAIDIDCXNDG and USAID/AFR/WA. Final Report. USAID shall provide comments on the draft report to the Consultants within seven working days of receipt. The Consultants will review the comments together and come to agreement with each other on the nature of the changes and revisions to be made in the body of the report, and which to respond to separately. The final report, incorporating responses to all comments, shall be submitted to USAIDNigeria via electronic mail. In addition, five copies of the report-four bound and one loose leaf-shall be delivered to USAIDIDCHAIDG for distribution. TECHNICAL DIRECTION The Director of the Office of Democratic Transition, or her designee. shall provide technical direction during the performance of this task order. Evaluation of Suppon for Electoral Pmcesrer-NigeriadoclClin 003-5 Evalumion of Support for Electoral Processes, B-5 Ju@ 2, 2003 Political P a w Development und Legislative Strengthening in Nigerin