Constitutional Conventions: Unwritten Maxims and Political Restraints in the UK, Assignments of Law

Download Constitutional Conventions: Unwritten Maxims and Political Restraints in the UK and more Assignments Law in PDF only on Docsity! Student ID: 16399 1) The UK Constitution consists of legal and non-legal rules. The legal component is publicly recognized, and accepted legislation produced by parliament or derived from court precedent. Constitutional conventions are the principal non-legal source. Conventions are "unwritten maxims" that require people who execute the constitution to respect specific precedents. Sir Ivor Jennings said, "Constitutional conventions clothe the dry bones of the law," thus they create a broad "code of behavior" for the three organs of state to adhere. In this essay the candidates will discuss which constitution convention breach will have legal consequence since it unlikely legal sources. Thus, the candidates though that to make constitutional convention legally binding should be codified but if codified will restrict its flexibility. First and foremost, a discussion of conventions in practice will provide perspective. Often- taken-for-granted governmental duties are governed by convention. Salisbury-Addison convention forbids the House of Lords from refusing to vetoing a manifesto bill once at second or third reading or from proposing "wrecking amendments" that "destroy or change the bill beyond recognition." This ensures that the authority of the voters is respected, since the people voted for the party, and the upper chamber should give precedence to the party's general election manifesto. Conventions control executive conduct like ministerial authority and accountability. Under the Carltona principle, workers of departmental ministers may execute direct ministerial powers while lacking legislative authority. The minister is responsible to the parliament for decisions made under their authority. These conventions are practical; they allow for more efficient government while ensuring accountability. As a’ supplement' to the law, conventions must be compared to legal regulations in role and characteristics. Sources, enforceability, and breach consequences distinguish legal and non- legal regulations. Legal laws are more certain and verifiable than conventions. Conventions originate from precedents that take on a prescriptive form, while laws come from well- documented procedures like parliamentary sessions or judicial decisions. Conventions are less’ settled' than laws and are altered by societal factors including the political context. Following this differentiation, NW Barber argues that laws and conventions lay on a continuum of 'formalization' with laws at the most formalized side and conventions at the other, with no visible point separating the two. Legal rules are legally binding whereas conventions are politically or ethically binding. This implies that laws are immediately enforceable in courts, and a break of law becomes 'illegal' action, whereas conventions cannot be compelled in courts, and a breach of them will lead to reasonable criticism of the action being judged 'unconstitutional' Conventions are easier to change than laws, which must be overruled, amended, or revoked. In Miller, despite 3 out of 4 legislatures opposing the Withdrawal Agreement Bill, the UK Parliament could breach the Sewel Convention without legal consequences. Jennings offered a 3-part test to identify a convention: (a) the precedents; (b) if the precedent's performers believed they were bound by the rule; and (c) whether the rule had a reasonable basis. By evaluating the rule's purpose, its violation may be quantified and prioritized. Contrary to the consequences of breaching the law, the consequences of violating conventions are less definite and quick. In part, the repercussions depend on the significance of the issue to constitutional governance. Conventions that cannot be enforced: justifiable criticism and political reaction A breach of conventions may give rise to reasonable criticism and substantial political pressure given their role as political checks. This is due to the fact that conventions are often adhered to in order to avoid problematic political situations, such as significant public dissatisfaction or strained international ties. As was the case during Margaret Thatcher's time as prime minister in the 1970s, violating conventions that would elicit severe public censure will often need government intervention. Her acts of assembling an "inner cabinet" and compelling external cabinet members to adopt its discussions were deemed undemocratic and unconstitutional, and her rejection of consensus a "dangerous, anti-democratic trend in an executive-dominated political system". Despite sweeping victory in the elections of 1983 and 1987, she was ultimately removed from office by her own government. As shown in the preceding example, Thatcher stayed in power from 1979 to 1989 despite political stresses and criticisms, her career coming to an end not owing to the explicit desire of the public, but due to the 'desertion' and 'deception' of her government. Consequently, it is obvious that the violation of conventions never can result in a definite consequence, but rather depends on variables such as the severity of the particularly when violations might contribute to constitutional crises. Therefore, codification of conventions is debated to make them more definite and enforceable. Due to the varying relevance of conventions, this is challenging to formalize each one in code, but this has been done. Non-exhaustive list of conventions that needs ongoing updating. Codification would restrict conventions' flexibility and growth. Convention codification may contravene constitutional notions and concepts. Due to the political character of conventions, asking courts to rule on them might jeopardize judicial neutrality. Conventions' growth allows for experimentation and adaptation. The many levels of consequences of convention breach show that they play a vital part in the operation of the UK constitution, as viewed by Dicey, constitutional conventions secure the ultimate sovereignty of the voters as the genuine political sovereign of the State'. (1670 words) 4) The Royal Prerogative is among the most fundamental constitutional provisions of the United Kingdom. The concept Prerogative powers relates to the sovereign's exclusive powers. It derives from the mediaeval King's role as leader of the realm, yet it is in no way a mediaeval notion. Currently, the majority of the government's day-to-day operations are carried out using prerogative power; nevertheless, the use of these discretionary powers is restricted by Parliament and its jurisdiction over the exercise of Royal Prerogative. These constraints will be discussed in more detail later in the article. Prerogative power's history shows the Crown and Parliament's power conflict. Before 1600, the King had Parliamentary powers. Including lawmaking, judicial administration, commerce regulation, taxes, and security of the realm. After the 'Case of Proclamation,' much of the monarch's authority was constrained. Sir Coke, the judge, ruled that "The King hath no prerogative except that which the law of the realm permits him." This meant that the Monarch could only enact laws via Parliament. First, the Bill of Rights 1689 made certain applications and abuses of the prerogative unlawful; second, responsible governance and a constitutional monarchy grew. BBC v. John demonstrated that the crown's claim cannot exceed Royal Prerogative powers. Parliament's sovereignty was declared in 1689, and prerogative powers have lasted only if parliament hasn't controlled or repealed them. Prerogative Powers are not well-defined. A V Dicey and William Blackstone offered two popular definitions. Blackstone defined it as "powers the king enjoys alone, in contrast to others, and not those he shares with his people." Dicey's concept is recognised today and is wider than Blackstone's. According to him, "the residual of discretionary or arbitrary power, which is legitimately left in the Crown." Royal prerogative means exercising powers without Parliament's consent. These prerogatives contain the crown's specific rights and privileges and are part of common law. Three sources provide prerogative powers. First, the Queen's Constitutional prerogative powers. Sovereigns retain these discretionary powers. These include the right to advise, promote, appoint, and approve legislation. Crown prerogative authority follows. These are legal, not constitutional, prerogatives and include historical vestiges such as crown's rights to sturgeon, some swans, and whales. The legal premise isn't statutory. Prerogative executive powers also provide royal prerogative powers. These are historical sovereign powers now exercised by government ministers. Before the general election may be conducted, the current Parliament must be dissolved. This is accomplished by dissolving Parliament. Before to the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2001, The crown dissolved Parliament at the Prime Minister’s (PMs) request under royal prerogative. This power prompted several doubts and critiques. The most significant political critique was the PMs may pick the date of a general election so as to maximize the government’s re-election. The Coalition Government 2010 established a fixed five-year parliamentary term. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 legitimized the dissolution of Parliament. The Crown’s power to summon Parliament is unaltered. The royal prerogative is subject to political and statutory supervision by parliament and judicial review processes. First, Parliament Supremacy asserts that any Act approved by Parliament is the highest form of law, and that Parliament has the authority to abolish, modify, or restrict prerogative powers. Numerous instances in the past have shown that the Royal Prerogative may be limited by Parliament. The High Court ruled in R (Miller) v. Secretary of State that primary legislation is the only form of law that may modify or remove prerogative powers. The royal prerogative authority is residual, since it represents whatever is left of the Crown's power as an absolute monarch over the realm. Parliament has the ability to enact a law that might supplant prerogative power. A further case demonstrating Parliament's power is A G v. De Keysers Royal Hotel Ltd, in which it was determined that statute law overrides prerogative power. In Laker Airways v. Department of Commerce, it was determined that the Crown cannot exercise prerogative powers to circumvent statutory authority. When the overlap between prerogative power and legislation is ambiguous, however, the courts adopt a different approach. In R v. Home Secretary ex parte Northumbria Police, it was determined that the government may employ prerogative authority in supplementary to statute. The courts draw the line, however, when a prerogative power is used to undermine a legislative power, as in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Fire Brigades Union, when it was decided that the prerogative could not be used to circumvent a statutory obligation. When the exercise of prerogative powers necessitates the spending of funds, Parliament might once again serve as a constraining force. The ability to declare war is one of the crown's most significant rights, and the government may use it anytime it deems appropriate; yet, without the support of Parliament, which provides funds for soldiers and supplies, a war 5) Bill must be approved by both the House of Commons (HOC)and the House of Lords (HOL). Parliament Acts and the defeated House of Lords Reform Bill 2012 show unresolved tension. The candidates will discuss why the HOL needs change, what must be reformed, how to reform it, and if these reforms are possible and successful. In addition, Parliament debates and passes new administration legislation. HOC and HOL make up Parliament. A Bill can't become an Act of Parliament unless both houses vote for it. Acts of Parliament in 1911 and 1949 limited the House of Lords' bill-rejection power. A rejected Bill may become law if reintroduced to the Lords. Primary legislation making is also the important in HOC. The English Legal System's lawmaking stages are Bill, first reading, second reading, committee stage, report stage, third reading, HOL, and Royal Assent. The House of Commons first reads the bill's title and contents. The second stage debates and amends the Bill's details. MPs then vote on the Bill. The whip system is used to urge members to support their party, which nearly always results in the current government gaining the majority. After that, a House of Commons committee investigates the bill in committee. If necessary, the bill may well be amended immediately. After debating, the committee reports back to the House. The House votes on the Bill after debating. A third reading reintroduces the bill to the House. The proposal may be debated briefly, then accepted or rejected. After the third reading, the Bill goes to the Lords for the five steps mentioned above. The Commons considers proposed amendments. The Bill becomes an Act of Parliament when the queen approves it. Members of Parliament (MPs) are democratically elected to represent the public in parliament. Five-yearly elections choose them. If necessary, the PM may call early elections. If an MP dies or retires, a by-election is conducted. Based on the analysis above, the candidates believe that reforms probably no need to reforms since that we are agreed they are wholly elected and represent the public thus there is nothing to change. HOL is wholly unelected. This undemocratic, antiquated system provides numerous benefits that are often overlooked. Paradoxically, an unelected chamber's value lies in its independence, which undermines its role. Examining HOL's effect on government legislation will show its advantages. Before most hereditary peers were removed, they represented most peers and, as Conservative Members, could support Conservative government legislation and frustrate a Labour government. This thought prompted previous Labour to remove the hereditary aspect. 92 hereditary peers remain till second reform stage. Conservative life peers have outnumbered Labour peers historically. Appointing more Labour life peers is redressing this imbalance. Unfinished reforms have led to criticism that the government has excessive patronage powers, reducing HOL independence. The large independent peers, or 'cross benchers,' complicate House evaluation. The HOL comprised Bishops and Archbishops as generally. Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1867 appointed Lords of Appeal in Ordinary to HOL to strengthen its judicial role as the highest court. This infringed judicial independence and separation of powers, said critics. Through the Life Peerage Act 1958, Prime Minister may choose ministries, party members, and others to enhance legislation. These political nominations increased HOL member, enabled party disagreement, and offered merit-based appointments. The HOL may oppose any Bill to prolong a Parliament’s life under Parliament Act 1911. This may be considered as a constitutional “backstop” against a possible government power abuse, and Parliament’s life has been prolonged in times of national emergency. Lords must approve such expansion. Without Lord’s approval, a bill to suspend elections to safeguard a government’s authority cannot become law. Any advantages from the Lords’ existing composition must be evaluated against democratic expectations. An unelected second chamber with no participation in legislation may be acceptable to some, but one with genuine, if limited, legislative power is opposed to democratic government. Because of this HOL reform has been long-standing topic. The House of Lords votes on whether to approve or reject legislation from the House of Commons. They may present new laws to be considered and suggest amendments to House of Commons legislation. Although the Commons initiates the legislative process for significant laws, the House of Lords draughts certain legislation, such as guaranteeing that children with special needs and impairments have access to mainstream school, safeguarding the right to legal aid in welfare cases, and insisting on equality of NHS care for physical and mental health. Members devote roughly half of their time in the House on drafting legislation. All legislation must be examined by both Houses of Parliament before becoming law. Currently, HOL composition is criticized. These includes undemocratic, the Prime Minister appoints new Peers rather than electing them. Hereditary peers also affect this undemocratic system. Controversial dismissal of peers, no formal mechanism. Peers choose their own resignation date on HOL. A court can't evict a peer. Lord Sewel was caught using illegal drugs with a prostitute in 2015. Lord Sewel resigned under public pressure. No retirement age for peers. Peers may join the HL until they die. Peers may claim expenditures even if they can't fulfil their role. The HOL cost £1.3 million in 2014, according to the electoral reform organization. Only Church of England is spiritual peers. This is unique to Christianity. The Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 were the first government reforms. The 1911 Act reduced parliament's term from seven to five years. The HOL lost its right to reject "money bills" in 1911, and 1949 introduced a one-month delay limit. In 1911, the HOL veto power was replaced with a two-session delay power. The 1949 Act decreased the HOL's delay power to one session. The House of Lords Act 1999 followed both Parliament Acts. This Act would decrease hereditary peers from 800 to 92. The government said this Act was only the beginning of its reform. On October 14, 1999, the government declared it will reform HOL. Although the Royal Commission made several proposals, the government didn't execute any. The candidates think a more powerful HOL may also result in deadlock. If an elected HOL believed it had a majority of its own, deadlock may ensue, with bills failing to pass and no progress being made because the two chambers cannot agree. Tony Blair's 2001 White Paper proposed the next reform. This change would remove hereditary peers. Over 10 years, HOL members would be reduced to 600. This proposal proposes that 60% of peers be appointed, 20% elected, and 20% independent. This plan was never enacted since it was a public consultation, not a reform. Next came Gordon Brown's 2008 White Paper. The HOC voted for a fully elected second chamber or an 80% elected chamber. The HOL chose to stay entirely appointed. First-past- the-post or PR was suggested. Hereditary peers should be removed, and members should serve 12-15-year terms. The Church of England would be reduced to proportionately reflect the smaller HOC. This reform plan encouraged dialogue between chambers. Next election must contain this reform plan. The constitutional reform and governance bill 2008-09 was proposed in the commons in July 2009. As presented, the law enabled peer resignation,