Legal Analysis of Breach of Duty, Negligence, and Strict Liability in Torts Cases, Exams of Law of Torts

Download Legal Analysis of Breach of Duty, Negligence, and Strict Liability in Torts Cases and more Exams Law of Torts in PDF only on Docsity! The facts for this question were based upon Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. White, 775 N.E.2d 1128 (2002)), in which the court affirmed a verdict against the inspection company). TORTS I PROFESSOR DEWOLF SUMMER 2004 July 12, 2004 MIDTERM EXAM SAMPLE ANSWER QUESTION 1 I would anticipate claims brought by the estates or personal representatives of Erickson and White. To succeed, they would have to show that Hartford ("H") breached a duty that proximately caused damages that are legally compensable. A breach of duty can be established either by negligence or strict liability. Negligence Negligence is defined as the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care is what a reasonably prudent person would have done in the same or similar circumstances. In this case H's employee Nasatka was working in the course and scope of employment, and therefore any negligence on his part would be attributed to H. One tool that may be used to establish the standard of reasonable care is to compare the burden of precautions against the probability of injury multiplied by the magnitude of the expected loss. This is known as the Learned Hand formula (Is B<P*L?). Here the plaintiff might argue that the burden on H was slight to check not only what was on the usual checklist, but anything unusual, like the oxidized cover plate. In light of the horrendous damage from a boiler explosion, even a very low probability of harm would still be compatible with a reasonable person taking some precaution. One measure that might help us is the custom of the industry. The way in which others similarly situated perform the same task (in this case, boiler inspection) is persuasive evidence of what would have been reasonable care. The fact that all boiler inspectors that ARPC is familiar with have not inspected the burner suggests that we were in compliance with this standard of the industry. On the other hand, courts have held that industry custom is only persuasive; a jury may set a higher standard if they believe that reasonable care requires it. Another measure of reasonable care is what is required by statute. There are certainly statutes requiring boiler inspection, but there may be more detailed statutes or regulations dealing with how the inspection is conducted. We would want to make sure that there is nothing that would be cited as a statutory violation. More than just evidence of negligence, in some jurisdictions a statutory violation may be treated as negligence as a matter of law. Along similar lines, we should be sure that there is no company practice or "rulebook" that H's inspectors follow that suggest further activity if something like an oxidized cover plate is observed. Any such noncompliance would be used as evidence that N was negligent. Strict Liability The only possible strict liability theory that could be applied would be an argument that th operation of a boiler is an abnormally dangerous activity, because of its potential to explode with such devastating results. However, it is the owner or operator of the boiler who would face strict liability; the inspector shouldn't expect such liability to be imposed. Proximate Cause In addition to establishing a breach of duty, plaintiffs would have to show that H's negligence proximately caused the damages. Proximate cause is composed of but-for cause and legal cause. A cause is said to be a but-for cause of injury where, more probably than not, the injury would not have occurred but for the defendant's breach of duty. Here the plaintiffs would certainly argue that a more thorough inspection would have led to repair of the boiler, but I would at least question whether that is true. ARPC had lived with this condition for some time, and had itself removed the DeWolf, Torts I, Summer 2004, Midterm Sample Answer Page 2 The facts of this case were drawn from Bridges v. Kentucky Stone Co., 425 N.E.2d 125 (1981). The trial court originally dismissed the case based on lack of proximate cause, but the intermediate court of appeals reversed. In turn, the Indiana Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's dismissal, finding that the murderer was a superseding cause. support for the burner, causing the ultimate explosion. The bad news for us is that there was a 9- month period between the inspection and the explosion. One other unknown is whether the questions raised about the condition of the burner would have affected the inspection certificate issued by the state. If the problems noted by a more thorough inspection would have prevented a certificate from being issued, then immediate repairs would have been likely. On the other hand, if the boiler itself was okay, but the burner was a separate issue, then even if N had gratuitously pointed out the problems with the burner, it might not have triggered repairs in a timely fashion to avoid the injury. If the evidence suggests that a better inspection still probably would not have avoided the injury, but deprived ARPC of a chance to make timely repairs, the plaintiffs might argue a loss of a chance theory, but most jurisdictions would reject anything outside the medical malpractice arena. On the other hand, if but-for causation is satisfied, I see no difficulty in establishing legal cause; the injuries are certainly foreseeable, there are no apparent superseding causes (all of the other causes occurred prior to the inspection), and the failure to conduct an adequate inspection certainly increased the risk of injury. Damages If found liable, H would be liable according to the wrongful death statute in Linden. The statute authorizes an award in "such an amount as may be determined by the court or jury." The award permits damages "including, but not limited to" medical and funeral expenses and lost wages. This leaves open the possibility of non-economic damages, but H could certainly argue that the lack of explicit authorization for non-economic damages should be read as a rejection of them. With respect to Joan Erickson, the statute directs the award of lost wages to a widow(er) or dependent children or dependent next of kin. Since her son is 27 years old, with children of his own, it's doubtful that he's a dependent. If not, he wouldn't be entitled to the lost wages recovery, and neither would anyone else. The only recovery would be for medical and funeral expenses, to be paid to the estate, along with the cost of administration. That's almost too good to be true. Even if her son was a dependent, the amount of lost wages would only reflect her remaining work years (she was already 55). With respect to Linda White, the damages are more substantial. She had a much longer career ahead of her, and she left a widower and dependent children. In addition, if the statute has been interpreted to permit noneconomic damages, they would certainly qualify, but it's unclear how they would be measured -- loss of companionship, loss of Linda's ability to enjoy life's nonremunerative activities, etc. I see now basis for an award of punitive damages. Courts award punitive damages when a defendant has engaged in malicious conduct or displays flagrant indifference. H may have been negligent, but wasn't flagrantly indifferent. QUESTION 2