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FDI and Economic Growth: The Role of Local Financial Markets, Essays (university) of Financial Management

This paper examines the links among foreign direct investment (FDI), financial markets, and economic growth. The authors explore whether countries with better financial systems can exploit FDI more efficiently. Empirical analysis, using cross-country data between 1975-1995, shows that FDI alone plays an ambiguous role in contributing to economic growth. However, countries with well-developed financial markets gain significantly from FDI.

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Download FDI and Economic Growth: The Role of Local Financial Markets and more Essays (university) Financial Management in PDF only on Docsity! FDI and Economic Growth: The Role of Local Financial Markets* Laura Alfaro Harvard Business School Areendam Chanda North Carolina State University Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan** University of Houston Selin Sayek International Monetary Fund February 2003 Forthcoming: Journal of International Economics Abstract In this paper, we examine the various links among foreign direct investment (FDI), financial markets, and economic growth. We explore whether countries with better financial systems can exploit FDI more efficiently. Empirical analysis, using cross-country data between 1975-1995, shows that FDI alone plays an ambiguous role in contributing to economic growth. However, countries with well-developed financial markets gain significantly from FDI. The results are robust to different measures of financial market development, the inclusion of other determinants of economic growth, and consideration of endogeneity. Key words: Foreign direct investment, capital markets, credit markets, economic growth, spillovers. JEL Classification: F23, F36, F43 ____________________ * The authors thank the referee, Eduardo Borenzstein, Michael Devereux, Eduardo Fernandez- Arias, Alex Hoffmaister, Tim Kehoe, Ross Levine, Edmundo Murrugarra, Julio Rotemberg, Bent Sorensen, Beata K. Smarzynska and seminar participants at Bentley College, Brandeis University, Harvard Business School, University of Houston, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, Union College, World Bank; the 2002 “FDI Race: Who gets the Price? Is it Worth the Effort?” Conference of Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank, Washington D.C., and the 2001 SED Conference in Stockholm for valuable comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the I.M.F. **Corresponding Author: Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Department of Economics, University of Houston, Houston, Texas, 77204, Phone: 713-743-3824, Fax: 713-743-3798, Sebnem.Kalemli-Ozcan@mail.uh.edu. Other authors: Laura Alfaro, Harvard Business School, 263 Morgan Hall, Boston, MA 02163; Areendam Chanda, Dept. of Economics, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695-8110; Selin Sayek, IMF, 700 19th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20341. 1. Introduction “In a trade English capital is instantly at the disposal of persons capable of understanding the new opportunities and making good use of them. In countries where there is little money to lend enterprising traders are long kept back, because they cannot at once borrow the capital, without which skill and knowledge are useless.” Bagehot, 1873. The past decade was marked by the increasing role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in total capital flows (See Table 1). In 1998, FDI accounted for more than half of all private capital flows to developing countries.1 This change in the composition of capital flows has been synchronous with a shift in emphasis among policymakers in developing countries to attract more FDI, especially following the 1980s debt crisis and the recent turmoil in emerging economies. The rationale for increased efforts to attract more FDI stems from the belief that FDI has several positive effects which include productivity gains, technology transfers, the introduction of new processes, managerial skills , and know-how in the domestic market, employee training, international production networks, and access to markets.2 If foreign firms introduce new products or processes to the domestic market, domestic firms may benefit from accelerated diffusion of new technology. In other situations, technology diffusion might occur from labor turnover as domestic employees move from foreign to domestic firms. These benefits, in addition to the direct capital financing it generates, suggest that FDI can play an important role in modernizing the national economy and promoting growth.3 Based on 1 World Development Report (2000). 2 See Caves (1996) for a review of the empirical and theoretical literature on multinational enterprises. 3 See Grossman and Helpman (1991, 1995) and Barro and Sala -i-Martin (1995, 1997) for the role of technology transfers and market integration in growth. In addition to the technology transfer literature, the positive role of FDI has appeared in the broader capital market integration and garment exports from Bangladesh would have increased from $55,000 in 1980 to $2 billion in two decades.6 In addition, the potential of FDI to create backward linkages, in the absence of well- developed financial markets, is severely impeded. The importance of linkages that multinationals can create spawned a huge empirical literature following Albert Hirschman’s (1958) seminal book on this topic.7 Even though backward linkages may allow existing firms, which already produce inputs in the industry, to achieve economies of scale that may not have existed earlier, it also can encourage the creation of new firms. An excellent example is the involvement of Suzuki in India. Suzuki entered into a joint venture with the Government of India in 1981 to manufacture small-sized affordable cars. Initially, all the car’s parts were imported from Japan. Within ten years, the plant had become the center of gravity of scores of ancillary parts manufacturers that did not exist earlier. Today, these suppliers provide 90% of a car’s parts.8 Without external financing, it is unlikely that these manufacturers would have emerged. In similar vein, following Intel’s construction of a semiconductor assembly plant in Costa Rica in 1996, local software production in Costa Rica increased dramatically. Evidence indicates that the sector benefited from newly created training programs in higher education institutions that have become “Intel Associates.” However, producers and potential entrepreneurs in the software sector continuously complain that a lack of 6 See Easterly (2001) and Rhee and Belot (1990). Bangladesh, however, does not rank very well in terms of the financial market indicators that we use. At the same time, it is rather well known for micro-credit institutions. 7 For a theoretical treatment on the ability of FDI to create linkages see Rodriguez-Clare (1996). 8 See Parikh (1997), page 138. funds and/or the high cost of available financing hinder the growth of the sector and its ability to compete in the international arena.9 The preceding arguments and anecdotes illustrate the significant role financial markets play in allowing spillovers and linkages associated with FDI to materialize. Furthermore, to the extent that significant FDI arrives through mergers and acquisitions, it is not just easy availability of loans but also well-functioning stock markets that matter. Well-functioning stock markets, by increasing the spectrum of sources of finance for entrepreneurs, play an important role in creating linkages between domestic and foreign investors. To summarize, one can conjecture that the extent of development of financial institutions may be a decisive factor in determining whether foreign firms operate in isolated enclaves with no links whatsoever with the domestic economy (beyond hiring labor). Or, whether they become the catalysts for technology transfers and other benefits that economists have long argued these firms should be. Despite this rather obvious role for financial markets, the literature on FDI seems to have ignored its importance altogether. In fact, the role of not just financial markets but other factors, such as potential shortages of skills, knowledge, and infrastructure in the recipient countries, have been neglected in the development literature. Caves (1999) notes that the four volumes of The Handbook of Development Economics have nothing to say about the kind of constraints local firms might face to reap such spillovers. It is only recently that such issues have been addressed. For example, Borensztein et al. (1998), using a data set of FDI flows from industrialized countries to 69 developing countries, show that FDI allows for transferring technology and for higher growth. However, higher productivity is possible only when the host country has a minimum threshold stock of human capital. Likewise, Xu (2000), using data on U.S. multinational enterprises (MNEs), finds that a country needs to reach a minimum human capital threshold in 9 On Intel in Costa Rica, see Spar (1998), Hanson (2001), Larrain, et al. (2000). On the financing issues, see Perez (2000). order to benefit from the technology transfer of U.S. MNEs, and that most LDCs do not meet this threshold. The World Bank’s 2001 edition of global development finance talks about the importance of “absorptive capacities” and the success of FDI.10 Absorptive capacities here include macroeconomic management (as captured by inflation and trade openness), infrastructure (telephone lines and paved roads), and human capital (share of labor force with secondary education and percentage of population with access to sanitation). Financial markets are not mentioned. Although the empirical evidence on FDI and economic growth is ambiguous, the interaction between financial markets and growth itself has been studied extensively and has reached more positive conclusionsnamely, that well-developed financial markets promote economic growth. The theoretical framework has been well established in the literature, with supporting evidence at the country level reported in the empirical studies such as those of King and Levine (1993a, 1993b), Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000), and Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), suggesting that financial systems are important for productivity growth and development. In an analysis of the roles of different types of financial institutions, Levine and Zervos (1998) show that stock markets and banks provide different services, but both stock market liquidity and banking development positively predict growth, capital accumulation, and productivity improvements. At the industry level, Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that the state of financial development reduces the cost of external finance to firms, thereby promoting growth. Combining industry and country level data, Wurgler (2000) shows that even if financial 10 The discussions demonstrate how some countries with low absorptive capacities, such as Morocco, Uruguay and Venezuela (the last based on Aitken and Harrison, ibid.), failed to reap spillovers; whereas Malaysia and Taiwan fared well with higher absorptive capacities. See World Bank (2001) page 62. associated with the former are available from the World Bank Financial Structure Database.12 Four variables are included in our work. First, Liquid Liabilities of the Financial System (henceforth, LLY): equals currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonfinancia l intermediaries divided by GDP. It is the broadest measure of financial intermediation and includes three types of financial institutions : the central bank, deposit money banks, and other financial institutions. Hence, LLY provides a measure for the overall size of the financial sector without distinguishing between different financial institutions. Second, Commercial-Central Bank Assets (henceforth, BTOT): equals the ratio of commercial bank assets divided by commercial bank plus central bank assets. BTOT measures the degree to which commercial banks versus the central bank allocate society’s savings. King and Levine (1993a) and Levine et al. (2000), as well as others, have used this measure, which provides a relative size indicator, i.e., the importance of the different financial institutions and sectors relative to each other. Third, Private Sector Credit (henceforth, PRIVCR): equals the value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP. The two previous measures do not differentiate between the end users of the claims of financial intermediaries, i.e., whether the claims are in the public or the private sector. This measure, and the one that follows, focus solely on the claims on the private sector. Fourth, Bank Credit (henceforth, BANKCR): equals the credit by deposit money banks to the private sector as a share of GDP (it does not include non-bank credits to the private sector and therefore may be less comprehensive than PRIVCR for some countries). The number of countries for which we have these financial market variables and FDI shares is 71.13 12 The URL for the database is http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/ database.htm. We are grateful to the referee for directing us to this website. 13 In keeping with the literature, we use the logarithm of the financial sector variables. The stock market data consist of variables introduced in Levine and Zervos (1998). Stock market liquidity is measured as the value of stock trading relative to the size of the economy, labeled as “value traded” (henceforth, SVALT). In order to capture the relative size of the stock market, we use the average value of listed domestic shares on domestic exchanges in a year as a share of the size of the economy (the GDP). This series is labeled “capitalization” (henceforth, SCAPT). The stock market data series are also available from the World Bank Financial Structure Database. The restrictiveness of the availability of stock market measures, accompanied by those of FDI data, limits the sample size to approximately 50 and also the length of the period to 1980- 1995. The countries included in the various regressions are listed in the data appendix.14 Growth rate of output is measured as the growth of real per capita GDP in constant dollars, and the data are obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI, 2000). Gross domestic investment data come from WDI (2000), which consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Inflation, measured as the percentage change in the GDP deflator, is used as a proxy for macroeconomic stability. The data are from WDI (2000). The institutional stability and quality in the economies are proxied by using data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), a monthly publication of Political Risk Services that reports data on the risk of expropriation, level of corruption, the rule of law, and the bureaucratic quality in an economy. A detailed description of all the data is included in the Data Appendix. To capture openness to international trade, we use the ratio of the sum of exports plus imports to total output (GDP). Human capital is measured as the “average years of secondary schooling”, 14 For Value Traded, we have data on 53 countries; for Capitalization we have data on 49 countries. The four countries for which we do not have data for the latter variable are Costa Rica, Ireland, Honduras, and Panama. obtained from Barro and Lee (1996) series.15 The government consumption data come from the WDI (2000) and is the ratio of central government expenditures to GDP. Finally, the population growth data are also obtained from WDI (2000). 3 Empirical Analysis The first data set, relating to the “credit market indicators” includes 20 OECD countries and 51 non-OECD countries. The second data set, concentrating on “equity market indicators” consists of 20 OECD countries and 29 non-OECD countries.16 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for investment, growth, and financial development data. There is considerable variation in the share of FDI in GDP across countries, ranging from -0.15% in Sierra Leone (1975-1995) to 10% in Singapore (1980-1995). GDP growth also shows variation, ranging from -4% for Guyana to 7% for Korea (both for 1975-1995). The financial development variables also range extensively; capitalization of the stock market ranges from 1% for Uruguay to 126% for South Africa; value traded ranges from close to 0% for Uruguay to 130% for Switzerland. Finally, the liquidity measure (M2/GDP) ranges from 16% for Argentina to 161% for Japan. The private sector credit variable ranges from 3% for Ghana to 164% for Switzerland. Ghana and Switzerland also form the two ends of the spectrum for the bank credit variable. Ghana also has the lowest value for the share of Commercial-Central Bank Assets; Austria records the highest. 3.1 Growth and FDI: Financial Markets as a Channel 15 We used the updated data available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html. 16 Here OECD countries refer to those that were “early” members and therefore exclude newer members, such as Mexico and Korea among others. For Value Traded, we also have Ireland in the sample , increasing the number of OECD countries to 21. the same sample of countries as the financial sector variable changes –clearly making the case for looking at the range of financial sector variables rather than a few. Table 4 also reports a) the joint significance test of financial markets with the interaction term and b) the joint significance test of foreign direct investment with the interaction term. For most financial market variables, the tests confirm the importance of both financial markets and FDI. The hypothesis that the coefficients of both FDI and the interaction between FDI and financial markets are zero cannot be rejected outright at the 10% level only in the case of BTOT and SVALT. Not surprisingly the coefficients of the interaction terms in these two regressions also report the lowest t-statistics compared to the counterparts in the other columns. The hypothesis that the coefficients of both financial markets and the interaction between FDI and financial markets are zero is rejected in all regressions. To get an estimate of how important the financial sector has been in enhancing the growth effects of FDI, one can ask the hypothetical question of how much a one standard deviation increase in the financial development variable would enhance the growth rate of a country receiving the mean level of FDI in the sample.21 If we use the PRIVCR variable (i.e., column (4)), it turns out that having better financial markets would have allowed countries to experience an annual growth rate increase of 0.60 percentage points during the 20-year period, where the net effect being measured is 2 log( ) 3 log( )( )i privcr privcrmeanFDIβ σ β σ× × + .22 An alternative way to see how countries performed is to simply use the estimated coefficients for the sample of countries and calculate the net effect of FDI on growth for each country. It turns out that most countries actually had a negative effect from FDI. The net effect of FDI on growth 21 The mean value for FDI is 1.003% in the 71-country sample. Note that the financial development variable here is the log of the financial market indicator. 22 Here mean FDI is 1.003% as mentioned in the earlier footnote. The standard deviation of log PRIVCR is equal to 0.78. is equal to 1 2( log( ))i i iFDI FDI Financeβ β× + × × .23 Table 5a lists the distribution of the sample in terms of number of countries that benefited and number of countries that actually experienced negative growth because of FDI. As can be observed, there is considerable variation depending on which financial market variable we look at. The stock market variables are particularly disturbing since they suggest that most countries experienced a negative effect due to FDI. Of course this might partly be due to the fact that most countries’ stock markets are even less developed compared to banks and thereby exaggerating the problem. However, irrespective of which financial market variable we use, there remains the concern that an unusually large number of countries seem to experience negative effects. One explanation could be that we have forced a linear relationship on what is essentially a non-linear interaction between FDI and financial markets.24 Other than this problem, the results confirm our conjecture that insufficiently developed financial institutions can choke the positive effects of FDI. Table 5b reports the results of the significance tests of linear combinations of coefficients at different levels of financial development. The null hypothesis is that 0)( 21 =×+ FINANCEββ at different levels of “FINANCE”. Therefore, here we report the significance of FDI for different values of the financial market variables. As a crude guide, we present the results at the minimum, mean and maximum values for each of the six financial market variables. As expected, at the lowest levels of financial development, FDI registers strong 23 Again, note that the financial market variable is a logarithm of the actual indicator and hence is negative for any country with a value less than 1 (i.e. less than 100% of GDP). Therefore, even if the estimated coefficients are positive, the net effect may still be negative if log (financei) is sufficiently negative. 24 Borenzstein et al. (1998) suggest a similar possibility for the interaction with human capital. Such non linearities seem to provide support to theories of “poverty traps” (see Galor (1996)). negative effects. This reconfirms the results of Table 5a. From the Table 5b, it is also apparent that even countries with levels of financial development equa l to the sample average did not derive significant positive effects from FDI. In fact, though not significant, the effect of FDI at the average level of financial development also remains negative for most of the variables. It is only at the maximum level of financial development that the effects of FDI seem to be positive and significant. However here too the effects are not strong for at least two financial market variables: BTOT and SCAPT. The results for BTOT are in keeping with the failure of the F-test for joint significance of variables involving FDI in Table 4. The findings for SCAPT reinforce the results for the same variable in Table 5a. The strong positive correlation between the domestic investment ratio and the growth rate of an economy is one of the few consistent results to have emerged from the multitude of cross- country growth regressions that have appeared in the past decade. One could argue that the reason FDI appears significant in the above analysis is because the domestic investment ratio was not controlled for. Therefore, for further robustness checks, we add domestic investment to the list of independent variables, and the results are reported in Table 6. Including domestic investment leads to a couple of interesting results. First, the significance of the interaction term increases, particularly for BANKCR, BTOT, PRIVCR, and LLY. Only for stock market capitalization does the coefficient become less significant. Second, the t-ratio of the FDI term also increases across all the columns, though still not always significant. This suggests that FDI may have positive effects over and above its direct role in capital accumulation. In particular, the so-called “positive externality” effect may be what is reflected here, though one would need more convincing results to come to a firm conclusion. As expected, domestic investment enters significantly in all the regressions.25 A final issue of robustness concerns the interaction between FDI and human capita l 25 In initial stages of our research, we found that the introduction of domestic investment made FDI insignificant. We further found that this could be explained by the fact that both types of added to the list of instruments for SCAPT. In column (5), the creditor rights variable also is added to the list of instruments (note that it significantly reduces the sample size). All columns show that the interaction term is still positive and significant and results are very similar to the OLS results in column (1). All of the columns also report the test statistic for no overidentifying restrictions to confirm the validity of the instruments. 27 Among the few consistently significant determinants of FDI are real exchange rates and lagged FDI. Real exchange rates, either through altering relative costs or relative wealth, impact the foreign investment decisions of multinational firms. In a model with imperfect capital markets, Froot and Stein (1991) link FDI decisions with real exchange rate variations where, for example, a depreciation of the domestic currency increases the relative wealth of foreign firms, which leads them to increase their investment abroad. Similarly, Blonigen (1997), assuming imperfections in the goods market, shows that the real exchange rate influences the relative wealth of firms, thereby generating foreign investment flows. In the empirical literature, Klein and Rosengren (1994) find supporting evidence that the real exchange rate is a significant determinant of FDI. Along these lines, real exchange rate is used as an instrument for FDI in the following analysis, where the real effective exchange rate is calculated as the ratio of the local price index to the U.S. price index converted to the local currency. Likewise, following the evidence provided by Wheeler and Mody (1992) that FDI is self-reinforcing, i.e., that existing stock of foreign investment is a significant determinant of current investment decisions, lagged 27 We experimented with using at least three legal origin variables as instruments for each of the financial market variables. It was only in the case of SCAPT that the null hypothesis of no overidentifying restrictions was not rejected. Further, the sample correlation between English and the French legal origins was approximately -0.8 making it difficult to enter both simultaneously as instruments. In addition the first stage regressions where we use French and English dummies in the same regression with another dummy do not provide a good fit. FDI is used as an additional instrument for FDI in the following analysis. This result is further reinforced in several country level studies in the literature.28 Columns (6) and (7) control for both the endogeneity of FDI and financial market indicators by instrumenting FDI with one-period lagged FDI and real exchange rate levels respectively and financial markets with the legal origin variables used in column (4). The results continue to support the finding that FDI promotes growth through financial markets. The coefficients, however, increase considerably in values compared to the earlier OLS results in Table 5. Instrumental variable estimation here corrects for classical measurement error, which biases the OLS coefficients to zero. The higher values of the coefficients also alter the balance between countries that lose and those that benefit from FDI. For example, if we repeat the earlier exercise of figuring out how many countries in the sample benefited from FDI but now use the coefficients from column (7) for our original sample of 49 countries, we find that as many as 20 countries benefited. This is a much higher figure compared to our earlier finding that only 5 benefited. 4 Conclusion Following the debt crisis in the 1980s and the recent turmoil in emerging markets in the late 1990s, developing countries have changed their attitude towards FDI because it is believed that FDI can contribute to the development efforts of a country. In general, a multinational firm’s decision to extend production to another country is driven by lower costs and higher efficiency considerations. From the host country’s perspective though, the benefits of FDI are not restricted to improved use of its resources, but also stem from the introduction of new processes to the domestic market, learning-by-observing, networks, training of the labor force, and other spillovers and externalities. Due to the “growth-development” benefits FDI seems to convey, 28 Markusen and Maskus (1999) use different FDI determinants, such as lagged FDI, to discriminate among alternative FDI theories. Borensztein et al. (1998) used these variables as instruments for FDI in their work. different countries and regions have pursued active policies to attract FDI. Most countries, including both developed and emerging nations , have established investment agencies, and have policies that include both fiscal and financial incentives to attract FDI as well as others that seek to improve the local regulatory environment and the cost of doing business. Even though such policies can be very effective in attracting foreign investment, local conditions can limit the potential benefits FDI can provide to the host country by not generating benefits that go beyond the “capital” FDI brings and the wages it generates. In this paper, we focused, in particular, on the role of local financial markets and the link between FDI and growth. We believe that the lack of development of local financial markets, in particular, can adversely limit an economy's ability to take advantage of such potential FDI benefits. Whereas bad financial markets may mean that a country is not in a position to cope with unregulated short-term capital flows, our work suggests that the full benefits of long-term stable flows also may not be realized in the absence of well-functioning financial markets. Our empirical evidence suggests that FDI plays an important role in contributing to economic growth. However, the level of development of local financial markets is crucial for these positive effects to be realized, and to the best of our knowledge this has not been shown before. We also provide evidence that the link between FDI and growth is causal, where FDI promotes growth through financial markets. The result of this paper suggests that countries should weigh the cost of policies aimed at attracting FDI versus those that seek to improve local conditions. These two policies need not be incompatible . Better local conditions not only attract foreign companies but also allow host economies to maximize the benefits of foreign investments. creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceed that result form the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. The index ranges from 0 to 4. Source: La Porta et al. (1997,1998). Domestic Investment: “Gross domestic investment” measuring the outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Source: WDI (2000). Inflation: Percentage changes in the GDP deflator. Source: WDI (2000). Government Consumption: Total expenditure of the central government as a share of GDP. It includes both current and capital (development) expenditures and excludes lending minus repayments. Sources: WDI (2000). Trade Volume: Exports plus imports as a share of GDP. Source: WDI (2000). Schooling: Human capital measured as the average years of secondary schooling in total population. Source: Barro and Lee (1994). Updated version downloadable from: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html Bureaucratic quality: The institutional strength of the economy. High levels of quality imply that the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy, or interruption to public services. Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Risk of expropriation: The probability that the government may expropriate private property. Source: ICRG. Black market premium: It is calculated as the premium in the parallel exchange market relative to the official market (i.e., the formula is (parallel exchange rate/official exchange rate- 1)*100). The values for industrial countries are added as zero. Source: World Bank. (http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm). Real effective exchange rate: Calculated as the ratio of local price index to the multiplication of the U.S. price index and the official exchange rate. Source: World Bank. (http://www.worldbank.org/ research/growth/GDNdata.htm) References Aitken, B.J., Harrison, A., 1999. Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign Investment? Evidence from Venezuela. American Economic Review 89, 605--618. Bagehot, Walter, 1873. Lombard Street. Irwin, Homewood, IL. Barro, R., Lee, J.W., 1996. International Measures of Schooling Years and Schooling Quality. American Economic Review 86, 218--23. Barro, R., Sala -i-Martin, X.,1995. Economic Growth. McGraw-Hill Inc. Barro, R., Sala -i-Martin, X., 1997. Technology Diffusion, Convergence and Growth. Journal of Economic Growth 2, 1--26. Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., Levine, R., 2000. A New Database on Financial Development and Structure. World Bank Economic Review, v14, n3, 597--605. Beck, T., Levine, R., Loayza, N., 200., Finance and the Sources of Growth. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 261--300. Blonigen, B. A., 1997. Firm-Specific Assets and the Link between Exchange Rates and Foreign Direct Investment. American Economic Review 87(3), 447--65. Borensztein, E., De Gregorio, J., Lee, J-W., 1998. How Does Foreign Direct Investment Affect Economic Growth? Journal of International Economics 45, 115--35. Boyd, J. H., Prescott, E.C., 1986. Financial Intermediary Coalitions. Journal of Economic Theory, 38(2), 211--232. Carkovic, M., Levine, R., 2003. Does Foreign Direct Investment Accelerate Economic Growth? University of Minnesota, Working Paper. Caves, R., 1996. Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, Cambridge University Press. Caves, R., 1999. Spillovers from Multinationals in Developing Countries: Some Mechanisms at Work. Manuscript prepared for the William Davidson Conference on “The Impact of Foreign Investment on Emerging Markets,” University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, July 18- 19. Easterly, W., 2001. The Elusive Quest for Growth, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. Froot, K., Stein, J., 1991. Exchange Rates and Foreign Direct Investment: an Imperfect Capital Market Approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 1191--1217. Galor, O., 1996, Convergence? Inferences from Theoretical Models, Economic Journal 106, 1056-1069. Galor, O., Zeira, J., 1993, Income Distribution and Macroeconomics, Review of Economic Studies 60, 35--52. Goldsmith, R. W., 1969. Financial Structure and Development, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. Greenwood, J., Jovanovic, B., 1990. Financial Development, Growth and the Distribution of Income, Journal of Political Economy, 98:5, Part 1: 1076--1107. Grossman, G., Helpman, E., 1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, Cambridge: MIT Press. Grossman,G. ,Helpman, E., 1995. Technology and Trade, in Grossman, G.M. and Rogoff, K. (Eds) Handbook of International Economics Volume III. Hanson, G. H., 2001. Should Countries Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, G-24 Discussion Paper 9. Hirschman, A.O., 1958. The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven: Yale University Press. Hermes, N., Lensink, R., 2003, Foreign Direct Investment, Financial Development and Economic Growth, forthcoming in the Journal of Development Studies. Hull, L., Tesar, L., 2003. Risk, Specialization and the Composition of International Capital Flows. Working Paper. International Monetary Fund, 2000, International Financial Statistics on CD-ROM. Washington, DC. Table 1: FDI Facts Value (billion dollars) Annual Growth 1982 1990 2001 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 FDI inflows 59 203 735 24 20 40 FDI inward stock 734 1,874 6,846 16 9 18 Gross product foreign affiliates 594 1,423 3,495 19 7 13 Notes: The data are from UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2002. UNCTAD defines FDI as an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control of a resident entity in one economy in an enterprise resident in an economy other that that of the foreign direct investor. FDI inflows comprise capital provided by a foreign direct investor to an FDI enterprise. FDI stock is the value of the share of the foreign enterprise capital and reserves (including retained profits) attributable to the parent enterprise plus the net indebtedness of affiliates to the parent enterprise. A parent enterprise is defined as an enterprise that controls assets of other entities in countries other than its home country, usually by owning a certain equity capital stake (10% or more of the equity stake). A foreign affiliate is an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which an investor, who is resident in another economy, owns a stake that permits a lasting interest in the management of the enterprise (an equity stake of 10% for an incorporated enterprise or its equivalent for an unincorporated enterprise). Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Sample 1: 71 Countries (1975-95) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Growth 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.07 FDI/GDP 0.01 0.008 -0.001 0.041 Investment/GDP 0.23 0.06 0.11 0.41 PRIVCR 0.44 0.34 0.03 1.64 BANKCR 0.33 0.24 0.03 1.37 BTOT 0.77 0.19 0.27 0.99 LLY 0.48 0.28 0.16 1.61 Sample 2: 49 countries (1980-95) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Growth 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.07 FDI/GDP 0.012 0.015 0.00 0.10 Investment/GDP 0.23 0.05 0.12 0.39 SVALT 0.11 0.21 0.00 1.30 SCAPT 0.27 0.30 0.01 1.26 Table 3: Growth and FDI Dependent Variable—Average annual per capita growth rate (1) (2) (3) (4) Period 1975-95 1975-95 1980-95 1980-95 Observations 71 71 49 49 log (Initial GDP) -0.009 -0.011 -0.007 -0.016 (-2.55) (-3.87) (-2.80) (-3.51) FDI/GDP 0.16 -0.076 0.347 0.063 (0.48) (-0.25) (2.31) (0.27) Schooling 0.014 0.011 -0.006 0.0001 (3.23) (2.62) (-1.41) (0.02) Population Growth -0.805 -0.192 -0.948 -0.265 (-2.51) (-0.61) (-3.59) (-0.91) Government Consumption 0.0001 -0.0003 0.008 -0.003 (0.02) (-0.07) (0.98) (-0.35) Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy -0.007 -0.017 -0.021 -0.021 (-1.15) (-2.63) (-4.78) (-3.80) Institutional Quality -- 0.005 -- 0.011 -- (2.62) -- (2.82) Black Market Premium -- -0.006 -- 0.007 -- (-1.68) -- (2.00) Inflation -- -0.018 -- -0.003 -- (-1.86) -- (-0.25) Trade Volume -- 0.00000 5 -- 0.008 -- (0.000) -- (1.25) R2 0.37 0.59 0.34 0.60 Notes: All regressions have a constant term. t-values are in parentheses. The first two columns refer to the sample of countries for which we have data on Bank Credit (BANKCR), Commercial Bank Assets as a ratio of Total Bank Assets (BTOT), Private Sector Credit (PRIVCR), and Liquid Liabilities (LLY). The second two columns refer to the sample of countries for which we have data on Stock Market Capitalization (SCAPT) and Stock Market Value Traded (SVALT). The Schooling variable is the log of (1+average years of secondary schooling) for the period of the regression. Population Growth is the average growth rate for the period. Government Consumption is log(average share of government spending/GDP) over the period. Institutional quality is measured by the average risk of expropriations. The Black Market Premium is log (1+average BMP) and inflation is log (1+ average inflation rate) for the period. Trade Volume is log (average of Exports + Imports as a share of GDP) for the period. Table 6: Growth and FDI—Robustness: Domestic Investment and Human Capital Dependent Variable—Average annual per capita growth rate (1) BTOT (2) BANKCR (3) LLY (4) PRIVCR (5) SCAPT (6) SVALT (7) Schooling& PRIVCR Observations 71 71 71 71 49 53 71 log (Initial GDP) -0.011 -0.01 -0.009 -0.01 -0.017 -0.017 -.0.01 (-4.15) (-3.55) (-3.10) (-3.42) (-4.36) (-4.87) (-3.40) Investment/GDP 0.119 0.096 0.069 0.096 0.143 0.128 0.99 (4.18) (3.35) (1.86) (3.32) (3.17) (3.11) (3.54) FDI/GDP 0.311 1.066 0.501 0.672 0.194 0.352 1.59 (1.13) (2.70) (1.67) (2.04) (1.26) (2.11) (2.28) (FDI/GDP)*Financ.Markets 1.684 1.059 1.158 0.912 0.241 0.161 1.167 (3.74) (3.49) (3.22) (3.19) (1.86) (1.94) (3.75) Financial Markets -0.013 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 -0.0009 -0.009 (-1.24) (-1.96) (-1.55) (-1.72) (-0.51) (-0.52) (-2.24) (FDI/GDP)*Schooling -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.429 -- -- -- -- -- -- (-1.31) Schooling 0.01 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.012 (2.40) (1.95) (1.69) (1.71) (1.22) (1.43) (1.93) Population Growth -0.454 -0.262 -0.045 -0.237 -0.673 -0.681 -0.304 (-1.71) (-0.98) (-0.14) (-0.87) (-2.06) (-2.23) (-1.16) Government Consumption 0.002 0.0002 -0.002 0.0002 0.004 0.004 -0.0006 (0.47) (0.04) (-0.46) (0.04) (0.59) (0.58) (-0.11) Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy -0.014 -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 -0.020 -0.015 (-2.04) (-2.81) (-2.94) (-2.80) (-2.82) (-3.57) (-2.27) Institutional Quality 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.004 (2.49) (2.65) (3.07) (2.73) (2.61) (2.89) (2.64) Black Market Premium -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 0.012 0.012 -0.008 (-2.08) (-2.63) (-2.24) (-2.65) (2.73) (3.33) (-2.39) Inflation -0.009 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.003 -0.003 -0.014 (-1.30) (-1.37) (-1.45) (-1.33) (-0.29) (-0.37) (-1.60) Trade Volume -.0007 -.0007 -0.001 -.0006 0.002 0.004 -0.001 (-0.17) (-0.15) (-0.31) (-0.13) (0.46) (0.089) (-0.35) R2 0.70 0.70 0.68 0.69 0.75 0.75 0.70 Notes: All regressions have a constant term. t-values are in parentheses. See notes to Table 3 for definitions of the variables. Table 7: Growth and FDI: The Role of Financial Markets—Endogeneity (IV) Dependent Variable—Average annual per capita growth rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Period 1975- 95 1975- 95 1980- 95 1980- 95 1980- 95 1980- 95 1980- 95 Observations 73 73 50 50 36 48 32 log (Initial GDP) -0.01 -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 -0.013 -0.01 -0.006 (-2.58) (-2.15) (-1.90) (-2.16) (-2.57) (-2.17) (-0.82) FDI/GDP 2.75 1.585 0.213 0.148 -0.178 0.243 1.525 (1.92) (1.60) (0.89) (0.62) (-0.75) (0.79) (1.84) (FDI/GDP)*Financ. Markets 2.51 1.918 0.552 0.514 0.441 0.68 1.221 (2.04) (1.85) (2.47) (2.41) (1.77) (1.69) (1.89) Financial Markets -0.014 -0.009 -0.0009 0.002 0.011 -0.003 0.001 (-0.92) (-0.50) (-0.09) (0.24) (1.67) (-0.37) (0.13) Schooling 0.014 0.012 -0.007 -0.002 -0.007 0.001 -0.016 (2.66) (1.99) (-0.08) (-0.28) (-0.71) (0.10) (-1.46) Population Growth -0.225 -0.228 -1.108 -1.28 -1.43 -1.00 -1.50 (-0.85) (-0.93) (-1.55) (-1.85) (-1.83) (-1.69) (-2.06) Government Consumption 0.009 0.007 -0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.003 0.006 (0.85) (0.73) (-0.17) (-0.10) (0.35) (-0.31) (0.52) Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy -0.021 -0.019 -0.02 -0.021 -0.031 -0.02 -0.025 (-2.51) (-2.41) (-1.88) (-1.98) (-4.02) (-2.13) (-1.48) Black Market Premium -0.012 -0.013 0.001 0.002 0.01 0.0004 0.005 (-2.88) (-2.63) (0.26) (0.51) (1.30) (0.09) (0.49) Inflation -0.011 -0.009 -0.020 -0.014 0.003 -0.025 0.047 (-0.60) (-0.55) (-0.80) (-0.57) (0.15) (-1.15) (1.20) Trade Volume 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.007 -0.005 (0.53) (0.66) (1.18) (1.19) (1.80) (1.16) (-0.76) OIR Test (Prob > χ2) 0.175 (0.915) 0.028 (0.989) 0.311 (0.855) 0.291 (0.571) 7.22 (0.30) 3.477 (0.481) 1.42 (0.83) Notes: All regressions have a constant term. t-values are in parentheses. See notes to Table 1 for the definitions of other variables. In column (1)-(3), the financial sector variables PRIVCR, BANKCR and SCAPT are instrumented by the English and Scandinavian legal origin dummy variables. In column (4), the French legal origin variable is added to the list of instruments for SCAPT. In column (5), the creditor rights variable is also added to the list of instruments. Columns (6) and (7) control for both the endogeneity problem in FDI and in financial market indicators by instrumenting FDI with one-period lagged FDI (FDI in 1979) and real exchange rate levels respectively and financial markets with the LLSV variables used in column (4). The OIR Test reports the Chi-square test statistic for overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that there are no overidentifying restrictions. The terms in parentheses represent the p-value. -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 F D I/ G D P -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 Log of Private Credit ARG AUS AUT BEL BRA CAN CHE CHL COL CRI CYP DNK EGY ESP FIN FRA GBR GHA GRC HND IDN IND IRL ISR ITA JAM JPN KEN KOR LKA MEX MYS NLD NOR NZL PAK PANPER PHL PRT SWE THA TTO URY USA VEN ZAFZWE BOL CMR COG DOM DZA ECU GMBGT GUY HTI IRN MLT MWI NE NIC PNG PRY SDN SEN SLE SLVSYR TGO Fig 1 FDI and Financial Markets (1975-95) Notes: Countries in this plot are the 71 countries for which all accompanying data are available and form the first sample in Table 2.
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