Download Employment Status Dispute: Simpkins v. DuPage Housing Authority and more Summaries Law in PDF only on Docsity! In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit No. 17‐2685 ANTHONY E. SIMPKINS, Plaintiff‐Appellant, v. DUPAGE HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants‐Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 15 C 9103 — Charles R. Norgle, Judge. ARGUED MARCH 27, 2018 — DECIDED JUNE 20, 2018 Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and KANNE, Circuit Judges. BAUER, Circuit Judge. Anthony Simpkins sued the DuPage Housing Authority and DHA Management, Inc. (collectively, DHA), alleging various violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL), the Illinois Employee Classification Act (IECA), the Illinois 2 No. 17‐2685 Prevailing Wage Act (IPWA), and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). On cross‐motions for summary judgment, the district court held that Simpkins was not an employee of DHA, but rather an independent contractor. Therefore, it granted summary judgment in favor of DHA as to the federal claims and relinquished jurisdiction over the state law claims. Because there are genuine disputes of fact that are material to the determination of Simpkins’ employment status, we reverse and remand. I. BACKGROUND Simpkins began working for DHA in November 2009. He and DHA entered into an agreement titled “Independent Contractor Agreement,” with an expected completion date of June 2011. The contract stated that his duties were to include “general labor as needed” to complete the rehabilitation of vacant properties that were part of DHA’s Neighborhood Stabilization Program to make them suitable for new occu‐ pants. In that role, he performed carpentry, maintenance, and handyman work such as demolition, remodeling, removing fixtures, and discarding trash. In 2011, the rehab work slowed down and Simpkins began working primarily at Ogden Manor, a townhome community for which DHA served as the on‐site management. He per‐ formed much of the same work, but eventually focused specifically on maintenance work. Ogden Manor’s property manager and maintenance supervisor, who were DHA employees, gave Simpkins his list of job duties and prioritized the order in which he needed to complete those tasks. No. 17‐2685 5 business to which they render service.” Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1534 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Lauritzen, we compiled a list of factors “to assist in determining the true nature of the relationship,” while explain‐ ing that “no criterion is by itself, or by its absence, dispositive or controlling.” Id. at 1534. It is also important to note that the Lauritzen factors are not the exclusive means by which the ultimate determination can be made. See, e.g., Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 291 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We have declined to apply mulitfactor tests in the employment setting when they ‘fail to capture the true nature of the relation‐ ship’ between the alleged employee and the alleged em‐ ployer.”) (quoting Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 809). Instead, the inquiry is aimed at determining the economic reality of the working relationship by examining the totality of the circum‐ stances. Id. at 290. The posture of this case, as well as the parties’ citations in support of their preferred standards of review, present an opportunity for clarification of those standards, which is both long overdue and critical to the result here. In Lauritzen, we explained that “the determination of workers’ status is a legal rather than a factual one,” meaning it is subject to de novo review. 835 F.2d at 1535. We also noted, however, that the underlying factual findings that lead to that legal determina‐ tion are to be reviewed for clear error. Id. To explain that distinction, we cited the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, 814 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1987). See Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1535. In that case, after outlin‐ ing a similar multifactor test, the Fifth Circuit explained that 6 No. 17‐2685 there were three types of findings relevant to the determination of employment status: 1) “historical findings of fact” that underlie a finding regarding the relevant factors; 2) findings on the factors themselves, which are based on inferences drawn from the historical facts; and 3) the ultimate legal conclusion based on those two types of factual findings. Mr. W Fireworks, 814 F.2d at 1044–45. The court concluded that because the first two types of findings were factual in nature, they are subject to clear error review, while the third is subject to de novo review. Id. That analysis, however, has limited applicability in the context of reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Mr. W Fireworks was before the Fifth Circuit following a three‐day bench trial, during which the district court acted as the trier of fact and resolved all disputed issues. Id. at 1043. By contrast, on summary judgment, a district court makes no factual findings of its own. Instead, it is required to construe the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and identify, but not resolve, material factual disputes. Accordingly, a ruling on summary judgment does not present the same types of factual findings to which the court was referring in Mr. W Fireworks. To summarize then, our task here is to determine whether the district court was correct in concluding that there were no disputes of fact material to the determination of Simpkins’ employment status, and that DHA was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review that conclusion de novo, and because the court granted DHA’s motion, we review the facts in the light most favorable to Simpkins. Selective Ins. Co. of S.C. v. Target Corp., 845 F.3d 263, 266 (7th Cir. 2016). No. 17‐2685 7 B. Disputed Factual Issues The record in this case abounds with factual disputes that are material to the determination of the true relationship between Simpkins and DHA. As we have noted, none of the individual factors set forth in Lauritzen and its progeny are dispositive of the ultimate determination, which is the economic reality of the relationship. In light of that, the discussion that follows should not be construed as exhaustive of either the factors that may be relevant to determining the parties’ true economic relationship or the specific factual issues that remain unresolved. The first factor the district court analyzed in this case is the nature and degree of control the putative employer exercised over the manner in which the putative employee performed his work. See Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1535. On this point, the record presents numerous competing facts. For example, DHA assigned Simpkins to work specifically at the Ogden location and set his schedule. Simpkins states that he regularly worked from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., but the parties dispute whether DHA required him to work those set hours. Additionally, DHA assigned Simpkins specific projects and dictated the order in which he was to complete them. DHA argues that Simpkins had the autonomy to determine the manner in which those tasks were completed after they were assigned. How‐ ever, the extent and effect of that autonomy remains in dispute, particularly in light of the other ways in which DHA was in control of Simpkins’ work and employment. Considering those competing inferences in the light most favorable to Simpkins, a reasonable trier of fact could find that DHA’s control over