Case Notes: Interpreting Statutory Offences and Contractual Liability in Australian Law, Schemes and Mind Maps of Communication

Download Case Notes: Interpreting Statutory Offences and Contractual Liability in Australian Law and more Schemes and Mind Maps Communication in PDF only on Docsity! Case Notes two views mentioned by the Full Court is the correct one. Probably the result in most cases, as in the instant case, will be the same whichever be the view adopted, and the Full Court seems to hint at this. • On the question of guilty intent the Court was of opinion that the regulationIl did not in terms "import any mental element neces­ sary to constitute the offence". It imposed a positive duty, perform­ ance of which could be excused only by the defendant satisfying the Court that he had done everything possible to ensure perform­ ance of the duty. This he had not done, nor had he given any evi­ dence of a bona fide and reasonable belief in the only facts which could exculpate him. Here the Court seems to approve the opinion of Dixon J. in Proudman v. Dayman.u The Court declared that the regulation did not admit of a construction which would require the informant to prove guilty intent. On this matter of mens rea and statutory offences the Court laid down no definite rule, and merely referred to McCrae v. Downey,13 in which O'Bryan J. in a very useful judgment reviews many of the cases, and to Proudman v. Dayman.14 In the latter case Dixon J., in the course of his judgment, said that "as a general rule an honest and reasonable belief in a state of facts which, if they existed, would make the defendant's act innocent affords an excuse for doing what would otherwise be an offence"Y Although the present case lays down no definite rule, it is an example of the modern trend of opinion that mens rea, in the sense of a specific state of mind, is not ordinarily a necessary element in a statutory offence. R. HATCH llSection 4 provided: "Every person shall ensure that no contravention of any of the provisions as to the use of electricity contained in any advertise­ ment ... occurs at these premises ... and in the event of any contravention of any of the said provisions occurring such person shall (unless he satisfies the Court that the contravention occurred in spite of his having done every­ thing possible to prevent its occurrence) be guilty of an offence .... " 12(1941) 67 C.L.R. 536. 13[1947] V.L.R. 194. 14supra. 15supra, 540. CONTRACT -COMMUNICATION OF OFFER ANOTHER TICKET CASE MOST of the contracts of everyday life are of a skeleton type into which the law must.imply terms to cover matters to which the parties themselves do not advert. In the so-called "ticket" cases one party hands to the other, at the time of the transaction, a document pur­ porting to limit the liability of the former by modifying or excluding 18 Res Judicatae the terms which the law would otherwise imply. The question for the Court then is, Has there been a sufficient communication of this offer to the recipient? The rules governing the matter are well settled, and are illustrated by the recent case of Causer v. Browne (1952) V.L.R. I. This was an action for damages for breach of contract or damages for negligence in dealing with a frock left with the defendants to be dry-cleaned. It was found that when the frock was deposited a docket was issued containing a printed condition purporting to relieve the defendants from all liability for loss or damage. Herring C.J. held that this special condition had not been communicated to and accepted by the offeree, so as to exclude the implied undertaking to use care in cases of locatio operis faciendi. The defendants not hav­ ing negatived negligence, judgment was given for the complainant. His Honour first stated the primary rule: that the offeree is bound if he knew the special conditions, or if he knew that the offer was subject to special conditions and accepted it without enquiring what they were.1 He then drew the well-established distinction in cases of this kind, between: (I) Transactions of a kind commonly entered into on the basis of special conditions, as in Nunan v. Southern Railway CO.,2 Penton v. Southern Railway,3 Thompson v. London, Midland and Scottish Railway Co.' In these cases the offeree is bound if the offeror shows, either that the offeree knew that the writing contained conditions, or that he (the offeror) had done what was reasonably sufficient to give the offeree notice of the conditions and that he was contracting on those terms. It is settled that the offeror has done what is "reasonably sufficient" if there is on the face of the ticket a reference to the conditions or a statement showing where they are to be fO!lnd. (2) Transactions of a kind commonly entered into without special terms, as in Parker v. South Eastern Railway Co.s Here the offeror must show that the offeree was aware (or ought to be treated as hav­ ing been aware) that the document was not a mere voucher or receipt but was also intended to introduce special conditions. In the absence of any such knowledge or good reason for belief, the offeree is not bound to examine the document with a view to ascertaining whether it contains any such conditions. His Honour found that the transaction in the instant case fell within the second class: 1[1952] A.L.R. 12, 14. 3[1931] 2 K.B. 203. 2[1923] 2 K.B. 703. 4[1930] 1 K.B. 41. S(1876) 1 C.P.D. 618, (1877) 2 C.P.D. 416. • • ,.