IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CASE NO. AMY ..., Study notes of Law

Download IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CASE NO. AMY ... and more Study notes Law in PDF only on Docsity! IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CASE NO. AMY HINMAN, Petitioner, -vs- STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON JURISDICTION ON PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT CARLOS J. MARTINEZ Public Defender Eleventh Judicial Circuit Of Florida 1320 N.W. 14th Street Miami, Florida 33125 (305) 545-1960 DANIEL TIBBITT Assistant Public Defender Florida Bar No. 816361 dxt@pdmiami.com Counsel for Petitioner I TABLEOFCONTENTS PAGE INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 1 STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS...................................................... 1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..............................................................................2 ARGUMENT...........................................................................................................3 THE DECISION OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE PRESENT CASE IS IN EXPRESS AND DIRECT CONFLICT WITH BERKEMER V. MCCARTY, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), CASO V. STA TE, 524 SO.2D 422 (FLA. 1988), AND STA TE V. HALL, 537 SO.2D 171 (FLA. 1sT DCA 1989). ................3 CONCLUSION........................................................................................................7 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE..............................................................................8 CERTIFICATE OF FONT .................................................................................... 8 I were hydrocodone and she was charged with trafficking in hydrocodone in violation of Florida Statutes section 893.135(1)(c)l.c. (2009). (A. 2-3). The trial court granted a Motion to Suppress, finding that the question about drugs was designed to elicit an incriminating response. (A. 3). The state appealed to the Third District, found that "In the case of a lawful traffic stop such as this . . . persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not in custody for purposes of Miranda.' Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984)." (A. 3). Ultimately, the Third District concluded, "In the case at hand, the preliminary question, 'Do you have any weapons or drugs?' did not by operation of law transform the lawful traffic stop into a formal arrest or a custodial interrogation." (Id.). The Third District reversed the circuit court's granting of petitioner's Motion to Suppress. (A. 2-4). A notice invoking this Court's discretionary jurisdiction was filed November 14, 2011. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The Third District's holding relies on interpreting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) to hold categorically that a traffic stop does not give rise to custody. The Third District misapplied Berkemer because although Berkemer does i say that an ordinary traffic stop does not require the administration of Miranda rights, Berkemer also says that "if a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him in custody for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda." Berkemer at 440. The First District recognized this in State v. Hall, 537 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), but the Third District has disregarded it, instead creating a per se rule that any traffic stop obviates the need for Miranda warnings. The Third District's recitation of the facts of petitioner's case makes it clear that this was not an ordinary traffic stop. The officer stopped petitioner "in connection with a narcotics investigation" and the first thing the officer did was, not ask her for her license or registration, but ask her if she had drugs on her. This Court had held that the test for whether one is in custody is whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have felt free to leave. Caso v. State, 524 I So.2d 422 (Fla. 1988). The Third District did not apply Caso, incorrectly applied Berkemer, and expressly and directly conflicted with Hall in holding that a traffic stop automatically equates to a finding that one is not in custody. I ARGUMENT THE DECISION OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE PRESENT CASE IS IN EXPRESS AND DIRECT CONFLICT WITH BERKEMER V. MCCARTY, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), CASO V. STA TE, 524 SO.2D 422 (FLA. 1988), AND STA TE V. HALL, 537 SO.2D 171 (FLA. 1sT DCA 1989). I The Third District in the instant case created express and direct conflict with the First District's decision in State v. Hall, 537 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1®' DCA 1989). There, the defendant was seen in a parked car exchanging a butane lighter with a passenger and lighting it for extended periods. Id. at 172. An officer approached the car and told the defendant he believed the defendant had drugs and asked whether this was the case, and the defendant answered affirmatively. Id. The First District applied Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) and found that this was not a "routine traffic stop" as a reasonable person in the suspect's position would not have felt free to leave, and upheld the trial court's order granting a motion to I suppress. Id. Just as in Hall, in this case a police officer approached a car with a suspicion that the occupant had drugs and immediately asked her if this was the case, without having read her Miranda rights, but here the Third District, also I relying on the authority of Berkemer, reached the opposite result and reversed the trial court's order granting a motion to suppress. I The Supreme Court, in Berkemer, found that the ordinary traffic stop does not trigger Miranda because "a motorist's expectations, when he sees a policeman's lights flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most I likely will be allowed to continue on his way". Berkemer at 437-38. Further, the free to ignore this question in these circumstances, not simply concluded that the question was permissible because it came subsequent to a traffic stop. For the foregoing reasons, the instant case is in direct and express conflict with Berkemer v. McCarty, 420 U.S. 468 (1984), Caso v. State, 524 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1988), and State v. Hall, 537 So.2d 171 (Fla. 18' DCA 1989). Thus, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv), this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing facts, authorities and arguments, petitioner respectfully requests this Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal. I Respectfully submitted, CARLOS J. MARTINEZ Public Defender Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida 1320 N.W. 14th Street Miami, Florida 33125 BY: DANIEL TIBBITT Assistant Public Defender dxt@pdmiami.com CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by email to CrimAppMIA@MyFloridaLegal.com, the email service address for the Office of the Attorney General, Criminal Division, 444 Brickell Avenue, Suite 650, Miami, Florida 33131, this 9 ay ofNovember, 2012. DANIEL TIBBITT Assistant Public Defender CERTIFICATE OF FONT Undersigned counsel certifies that the type used in this brief is 14 point proportionately spaced Times New Roman. DANIEL TIBBITT Assistant Public Defender I I IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA FSC CASE NO. DCA CASE NO: 3D11-2748 AMY HINMAN Petitioner, Vs. APPENDIX STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. DOCUMENTS PAGES I I I I 893.135(1)(c)1.c., Florida Statutes (2009). The officer asked the defendant to step out of her car, which she did, and she then pulled the bag ofpills from a pocket and placed it on the hood of the car. Before granting the motion to suppress, the court posed the question: [The defendant is] being stopped for the traffic violation. And she's asked the question, when [the officer is] stopping her for a traffic violation, and I think he was quite clear, that she was stopped for a valid traffic violation. How is that question regarding drugs, especially in light of the fact that you are stopping her for a valid traffic violation, and [the officer] also knows that he is following this person and stopping her for the narcotics team. How is it okay to ask that question? How is that question not designed to elicit an incriminatingresponse? In the case of a lawful traffic stop such as this, however, "persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not 'in custody' for the purposes of Miranda." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984). The Fourth District concluded, in a similar case (though involving a lawful bicycle stop rather than a lawful automobile stop), that a preliminary question asked of the defendant "by the deputy whether he had weapons or drugs on him," followed by the defendant's admission that he had drug paraphernalia, and a voluntary surrender of them to the deputy, did not transform it into a custodial interrogation. State v. Sherrod, 893 So. 2d 654, 655 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).3 3 The Fifth District reached the same conclusion in a case which also involved a bicycle stop (riding with no lights at 3:30 a.m.) and a police officer's "single 3 Similarly, in Hewitt v. State, 920 So. 2d 802, 803-04 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), a drug patrol officer, with four or five other officers of the drug patrol unit present, legally stopped the defendant's car for a traffic violation: For officer safety reasons, Peek [the officer] asked Hewitt if she had a gun, knives or drugs on her person. Hewitt started crying and said she had some "weed" on her. Hewitt retrieved two bags of marijuana. Officer Peek then arrested Hewitt. Upon searching Hewitt incident to arrest, Peek found a bag containing 14 grams of cocaine in Hewitt's I possession. Officer Peek did not Mirandize Hewitt before asking her if she had any drugs. The Fifth District affirmed the trial court's denial of Hewitt's motion to suppress, rejecting her argument that the police improperly initiated custodial interrogation without warning her of her constitutional rights. Id. at 805. In the case at hand, the preliminary question, "Do you have any weapons or drugs?" did not by operation of law transform the lawful traffic stop into a formal arrest or custodial interrogation. The order granting the defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence and statements is reversed. question about whether [the defendant] was in possession of weapons or drugs." State v. Stone, 889 So. 2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). 4