Lawsuit Filed: Age and Race Discrimination Allegations against National Linen Service, Study notes of Civil procedure

Download Lawsuit Filed: Age and Race Discrimination Allegations against National Linen Service and more Study notes Civil procedure in PDF only on Docsity! 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.1 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq.2 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHWESTERN DIVISION DONALD H. MELVILLE ) ) Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No.: ) CV-04-J-3179-NW v. ) ) NATIONAL LINEN SERVICE, ) A DIVISION OF NATIONAL ) SERVICE INDUSTRIES, INC. ) ) Defendant. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION Currently pending before the court is the defendant’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 15), memorandum and evidence in support thereof (docs. 16 and 17), to which the plaintiff responded (doc. 19). The defendant also submitted a reply brief in response to plaintiff’s brief in opposition to summary judgment (doc. 23). The court has reviewed all of the pleadings and briefs in support of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. I. Factual Background Plaintiff alleges that defendant, his former employer, terminated his employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age1 Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Plaintiff’s date of birth is June 28,2 FILED 2005 Nov-17 PM 04:23 U.S. DISTRICT COURT N.D. OF ALABAMA Case 3:04-cv-03179-IPJ Document 27 Filed 11/17/05 Page 1 of 15 2 1949, and he was fifty-four years old when the defendant fired him. Melville Depo. 6. He is also a Caucasian. Melville Depo. 157. The defendant, National Linen Service, Inc., hired Plaintiff as a Client Relations Manager for the Florence, Alabama plant on September 2, 1997. Melville Depo. 40. Plaintiff was 47 years old when the defendant hired him. The defendant’s Florence, Alabama plant launders linens for healthcare facilities, restaurants, and hotels. Kelley Decl. ¶ 3. Plaintiff served as Client Relations Manager until September 1999, when he was transferred to the Receiving Supervisor position. Melville Depo. 96-97. Plaintiff retained the same salary (Melville Depo. 97-98); however, his car allowance and milage compensation were not continued, because he was no longer traveling. Melville Depo. 98. Plaintiff later discovered that the Receiving Supervisor position did not continue the 401K matching program he had as the Client Relations Manager. Melville Depo. 120-121. Plaintiff testified he was under the impression that this transfer was only temporary (Melville Depo. 109-110); however, he realized this change was permanent when the defendant moved another employee (Carol Wilson, age 27) to the Client Relations Manager position. Melville Depo. 99, 110. Plaintiff claims that General Manager, Ron Brumbalow, told him that he wanted to keep Plaintiff as the Receiving Supervisor because the department was setting records under Plaintiff’s control. Melville Depo. 120. Plaintiff and other managers testified that the receiving department’s performance is of utmost importance to keeping the plant’s flow consistent. Melville Case 3:04-cv-03179-IPJ Document 27 Filed 11/17/05 Page 2 of 15 Mollie Shelnutt has been the Human Resources Manager at defendant’s Florence plant5 since June 2002. Shelnutt Decl. ¶ 2. 5 production supervisory positions (Receiving, Washroom, Flatwork and Loadbuilding), as well as a and Garment Manager position, which is also considered a “production” position. Shelnutt Decl. ¶ 10-11. From February 1996 until present,5 the washroom Supervisor has been Joe Goodloe, an African-American male, whose date of birth is September 17, 1958. Shelnutt Decl. ¶ 12. Dora Vinson served as the Flatwork Supervisor from March 1997 until her retirement in August 2004. She is an African-American female, whose date of birth is June 14, 1944. Shelnutt Decl. ¶ 13. Vinson was replaced by Murray DeGraffenreid, a Caucasian male ,whose date of birth is October 24, 1959. Shelnutt Decl. ¶ 14. Shirley Webster has been the Loadbuilder Supervisor since March 2001. She is an African American female, whose date of birth is June 7, 1985. Shelnutt Decl. ¶ 15. The Garment Manager position was first held by Larry Kelley (Caucasian, date of birth November 30, 1950), then by Farron Bevis (Caucasian, date of birth September 5, 1958). Bevis was replaced by Jessica Crosslin (Caucasian, date of birth November 20, 1975), then by Jimmie Grayson (Caucasian, date of birth November 6, 1955) until the position was eliminated. Shelnutt Decl. ¶ 16. Case 3:04-cv-03179-IPJ Document 27 Filed 11/17/05 Page 5 of 15 Ronald Brumbalow was General manager of the Florence plant during the relevant time6 period. Brumbalow Decl. ¶ 3. 6 All of the reprimands issued to the plaintiff were signed by Mr. Kelley, Mr. Brumbalow, Mr. Orr and Ms. Shelnutt. Melville Depo. 210-211. All of those6 individuals are white. Melville Depo. 210. Plaintiff was terminated on April 1, 2004, by Brumbalow, for “hot and cold and unacceptable” performance. Melville Depo. 262, 264. The plaintiff declined the severance package which was offered to him. Melville Depo. 262. Defendant testified that plaintiff was terminated due to poor work performance. Shelnutt Decl. ¶ 9; Brumbalow Decl. ¶ 9, 14. Furthermore, decision makers for defendant testified that neither plaintiff’s age nor his race was a factor in any of plaintiff’s disciplinary actions and/or his termination. Shelnutt Decl. ¶ 29; Kelley Decl. ¶ 30; Orr Decl. ¶ 16, 19; Brumbalow Decl. ¶ 15. Plaintiff alleges as evidence of age discrimination that Mr. Carroll Hart (the former Plant Manager) said he did not want to have “grayed-haired people meeting with the customers after promoting Carol Wilson (age 27) to Client Relations Manager. Melville Depo. 99, 102. He also asserts that someone called him “old man” and that he reported this to Larry Kelley, who said that he would talk with the individual who made that comment. Melville Depo. 128, 202-203, 244-245. Plaintiff contends that as the only white production supervisor, he was not given as much support as the African American supervisors. Melville Depo. 247. Plaintiff testified Case 3:04-cv-03179-IPJ Document 27 Filed 11/17/05 Page 6 of 15 Both Mr. Orr and Mr. Kelley are Caucasian. Orr Decl. ¶ 5, Kelley Decl. ¶ 5.7 7 that he felt that Mr. Kelly and Mr. Orr wanted to see him fail because of his age. Melville Depo. 257-258. Plaintiff also further testified that his race was another reason why Mr. Kelley and Mr. Orr wanted him to fail. Melville Depo. 258. 7 II. Summary Judgment Standard Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard as follows: [T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since the complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. The party moving for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrates the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the Case 3:04-cv-03179-IPJ Document 27 Filed 11/17/05 Page 7 of 15 10 or presumption.” Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581-82 (11th Cir. 1989). The plaintiff has offered no direct proof of such discrimination, with the possible exception of the comment that plaintiff was an “old man,” made by an employee subordinate to plaintiff. The Eleventh Circuit has found that “not every comment concerning a person’s age presents direct evidence of discrimination. Carter, 870 F.2d at 582, citing Young v. General Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 829 (11th Cir.1998). The Court in Young “made clear that remarks merely referring to characteristics associated with increasing age, or facially neutral comments from which a plaintiff has inferred discriminatory intent, are not directly probative of discrimination.” See Carter, 870 F.2d at 582. “Rather, courts have found only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of age, to constitute direct evidence of discrimination.” Id. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit has previously held that the comment “old man” does not constitute direct evidence of age discrimination. Schweers v. Best Buy, Inc., 132 Fed. Appx. 322, 324 (11th Cir. 2005). The court finds that the alleged “old man” comment by a subordinate is not sufficient by itself to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by the defendant. Therefore, the court relies on the McDonnell Douglas framework to evaluate the plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence of age and race discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For both Title VII and ADEA claims, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. Case 3:04-cv-03179-IPJ Document 27 Filed 11/17/05 Page 10 of 15 11 2000). “One method a plaintiff can use to establish a prima facie case for an ADEA violation is by showing that he (1) was a member of the protected age group, (2) was subjected to adverse employment action, (3) was qualified to do the job, and (4) was replaced by or otherwise lost a position to a younger individual.” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024. To establish a prima facie case that he was discriminated against by defendant on account of his race, the plaintiff must prove that (1) he belongs to a racial minority; (2) he was subjected to an adverse job action; (3) his employer treated similarly situated employees outside the protected classification more favorably; and (4) he was qualified for his job. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562-63 (11th Cir.1997); Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 232 F.3d 836, 842-43 (11 Cir.th 2000). Under either standard, assuming the employee meets his burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged discriminatory employment action. Harris v. Shelby County Board of Education, 99 F.3d 1078, 1083 (11 Cir.1996). The defendant can feasibly presentth such strong evidence of a nondiscriminatory rationale that summary judgment is warranted. Brown v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 939 F.2d 946, 950 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1058 (1992)(quoting Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590. 596 (11 Cir.1987). th Case 3:04-cv-03179-IPJ Document 27 Filed 11/17/05 Page 11 of 15 12 Once a defendant presents a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the presumption of discrimination drops from the case. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, 101 S.Ct. at 1094 and n. 10. The plaintiff must then demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason offered by the defendant was not the true reason for the employment decision, but rather a mere pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. at 1825. The focus of the case after the defendant meets its burden of production is on the defendant’s subjective intent and the motivation behind the defendant’s adverse employment action directed at plaintiff. Harris, 99 F.3d at 1083. Because the plaintiff was terminated and asserts that he was replaced by a younger black male, the court will assume for purposes of this opinion that the plaintiff has satisfied his prima facie case on both of his claims. Therefore, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Here, the evidence clearly supports the defendant’s assertion that the plaintiff was terminated for his poor performance as the Receiving Supervisor. The record abundantly supports defendant’s position that the plaintiff failed to perform his job in an adequate manner. See e.g., Shelnutt Decl. ¶ 7 a-o; Kelley Decl. ¶ 11; Orr Decl. ¶ 13. Plaintiff failed to meet the objective job requirements of the Receiving Supervisor position. Plaintiff, Brumbalow, Kelley and Orr all testified that the Receiving Department is critical to the rest of the plant remaining on schedule, Case 3:04-cv-03179-IPJ Document 27 Filed 11/17/05 Page 12 of 15