Constitutionality of One-House Veto in Immigration Laws: A Case Study on § 244(c)(2), Study notes of Art

Download Constitutionality of One-House Veto in Immigration Laws: A Case Study on § 244(c)(2) and more Study notes Art in PDF only on Docsity! INS v. CHADHA Syllabus IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v. CHADHA ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 80-1832. Argued February 22, 1982-Reargued December 7, 1982- Decided June 23, 1983* Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act) authorizes either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney General, to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States. Appellee-respondent Chadha, an alien who had been lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimnigrant student visa, remained in the United States after his visa had expired and was ordered by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to show cause why he should not be deported. He then applied for suspension of the de- portation, and, after a hearing, an Immigration Judge, acting pursuant to § 244(a)(1) of the Act, which authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to suspend deportation, ordered the suspension, and reported the suspension to Congress as required by § 244(c)(1). Thereafter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution pursuant to § 244(c)(2) ve- toing the suspension, and the Immigration Judge reopened the deporta- tion proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate the proceedings on the ground that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional, but the judge held that he had no authority to rule on its constitutionality and ordered Chadha deported pursuant to the House Resolution. Chadha's appeal to the Board of Im- migration Appeals was dismissed, the Board also holding that it had no power to declare § 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. Chadha then filed a peti- tion for review of the deportation order in the Court of Appeals, and the INS joined him in arguing that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals held that § 244(c)(2) violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, and accordingly directed the Attorney General to cease taking any steps to deport Chadha based upon the House Resolution. *Together with No. 80-2170, United States House of Representatives v. Immigration and Naturalization Service et al., and No. 80-2171, United States Senate v. Immigration and Naturalization Service et al., on certiorari to the same court. OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Syllabus 462 U. S. Held: 1. This Court has jurisdiction to entertain the INS's appeal in No. 80-1832 under 28 U. S. C. § 1252, which provides that "[a]ny party" may appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment of "any court of the United States" holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in "any civil action, suit, or proceeding" to which the United States or any of its agen- cies is a party. A court of appeals is "a court of the United States" for purposes of § 1252, the proceeding below was a "civil action, suit, or pro- ceeding," the INS is an agency of the United States and was a party to the proceeding below, and the judgment below held an Act of Congress unconstitutional. Moreover, for purposes of deciding whether the INS was "any party" within the grant of appellate jurisdiction in § 1252, the INS was sufficiently aggrieved by the Court of Appeals' decision pro- hibiting it from taking action it would otherwise take. An agency's status as an aggrieved party under § 1252 is not altered by the fact that the Executive may agree with the holding that the statute in question is unconstitutional. Pp. 929-931. 2. Section 244(c)(2) is severable from the remainder of § 244. Section 406 of the Act provides that if any particular provision of the Act is held invalid, the remainder of the Act shall not be affected. This gives rise to a presumption that Congress did not intend the validity of the Act as a whole, or any part thereof, to depend upon whether the veto clause of § 244(c)(2) was invalid. This presumption is supported by § 244's legisla- tive history. Moreover, a provision is further presumed severable if what remains after severance is fully operative as a law. Here, § 244 can survive as a "fully operative" and workable administrative mecha- nism without the one-House veto. Pp. 931-935. 3. Chadha has standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2) since he has demonstrated "injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed in- jury." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 79. Pp. 935-936. 4. The fact that Chadha may have other statutory relief available to him does not preclude him from challenging the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2), especially where the other avenues of relief are at most speculative. Pp. 936-937. 5. The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under § 106(a) of the Act, which provides that a petition for review in a court of appeals "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial review of all final orders of deportation... made against aliens within the United States pursu- ant to administrative proceedings" under § 242(b) of the Act. Section 106(a) includes all matters on which the final deportation order is contin- gent, rather than only those determinations made at the deportation INS v. CHADHA 919 Opinion of the Court CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari in Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171, and postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction in No. 80-1832. Each presents a challenge to the constitution- ality of the provision in §244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 216, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1254(c)(2), authorizing one House of Congress, by resolu- tion, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch, pur- suant to authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney General of the United States, to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States. I Chadha is an East Indian who was born in Kenya and holds a British passport. He was lawfully admitted to the United States in 1966 on a nonimmigrant student visa. His visa expired on June 30, 1972. On October 11, 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service or- dered Chadha to show cause why he should not be deported for having "remained in the United States for a longer time than permitted." App. 6. Pursuant to § 242(b) of the Immi- gration and Nationality Act (Act), 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b), a deportation hearing was held before an Immigration Judge on January 11, 1974. Chadha conceded that he was deport- able for overstaying his visa and the hearing was adjourned to enable him to file an application for suspension of depor- tation under § 244(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1254(a)(1). Section 244(a)(1), at the time in question, provided: "As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attor- ney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien who applies to the Attorney General for suspension of depor- tation and- "(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the provisions specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically present in the United OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 462 U. S. States for a continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of such applica- tion, and proves that during all of such period he was and is a person of good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attor- ney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for perma- nent residence." ' After Chadha submitted his application for suspension of deportation, the deportation hearing was resumed on Febru- ary 7, 1974. On the basis of evidence adduced at the hear- ing, affidavits submitted with the application, and the results of a character investigation conducted by the INS, the Immi- gration Judge, on June 25, 1974, ordered that Chadha's de- portation be suspended. The Immigration Judge found that Chadha met the requirements of § 244(a)(1): he had resided continuously in the United States for over seven years, was of good moral character, and would suffer "extreme hard- ship" if deported. Pursuant to § 244(c)(1) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1254(c)(1), the Immigration Judge suspended Chadha's deportation and a report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress. Section 244(c)(1) provides: "Upon application by any alien who is found by the At- torney General to meet the requirements of subsection (a) of this section the Attorney General may in his discre- tion suspend deportation of such alien. If the deporta- tion of any alien is suspended under the provisions of this subsection, a complete and detailed statement of the 1Congress delegated the major responsibilities for enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act to the Attorney General. 8 U. S. C. § 1103(a). The Attorney General discharges his responsibilities through the Immigration and Naturalization Service, a division of the Department of Justice. Ibid. INS v. CHADHA 919 Opinion of the Court facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall be reported to the Congress with the reasons for such sus- pension. Such reports shall be submitted on the first day of each calendar month in which Congress is in session." Once the Attorney General's recommendation for suspen- sion of Chadha's deportation was conveyed to Congress, Con- gress had the power under § 244(c)(2) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1254(c)(2), to vetoI the Attorney General's determination that Chadha should not be deported. Section 244(c)(2) provides: "(2) In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this subsection- "if during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case is reported, either the Senate or the House of Represent- atives passes a resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien or authorize the alien's voluntary departure at his own expense under the order of deportation in the manner provided by law. If, within the time above specified, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives shall pass such a resolution, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation proceedings." In constitutional terms, "veto" is used to describe the President's power under Art. I, § 7, of the Constitution. See Black's Law Dictionary 1403 (5th ed. 1979). It appears, however, that congressional devices of the type authorized by § 244(c)(2) have come to be commonly referred to as a "veto." See, e. g., Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Ex- ercise of Congressional Power, 68 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1982); Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 Ind. L. J. 367 (1977). We refer to the congressional "resolution" author- ized by § 244(c)(2) as a "one-House veto" of the Attorney General's decision to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States. OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 462 U. S. submitted to the Senate or presented to the President for his action. After the House veto of the Attorney General's decision to allow Chadha to remain in the United States, the Immigra- tion Judge reopened the deportation proceedings to imple- ment the House order deporting Chadha. Chadha moved to terminate the proceedings on the ground that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. The Immigration Judge held that he had no authority to rule on the constitutional validity of § 244(c)(2). On November 8, 1976, Chadha was ordered de- ported pursuant to the House action. Chadha appealed the deportation order to the Board of Im- migration Appeals, again contending that § 244(c)(2) is uncon- stitutional. The Board held that it had "no power to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress" and Chadha's appeal was dismissed. App. 55-56. Pursuant to § 106(a) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a), Chadha ified a petition for review of the deportation order in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service agreed with Chadha's position before the Court of Appeals and joined him in arguing that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. In light of the importance of the question, the Court of Appeals invited both the Senate and the House of Representatives to fie briefs amici curiae. After full briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeals held that the House was without constitutional authority to order Chadha's deportation; accordingly it directed the At- torney General "to cease and desist from taking any steps to deport this alien based upon the resolution enacted by the House of Representatives." 634 F. 2d 408, 436 (1980). The essence of its holding was that § 244(c)(2) violates the con- stitutional doctrine of separation of powers. We granted certiorari in Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171, and postponed consideration of our jurisdiction over the appeal in No. 80-1832, 454 U. S. 812 (1981), and we now affirm. INS v. CHADHA 919 Opinion of the Court II Before we address the important question of the constitu- tionality of the one-House veto provision of § 244(c)(2), we first consider several challenges to the authority of this Court to resolve the issue raised. A Appellate Jurisdiction Both Houses of Congress 4 contend that we are without jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 to entertain the INS appeal in No. 80-1832. Section 1252 provides: "Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of any court of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam and the District Court of the Virgin Islands and any court of record of Puerto Rico, holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the United States or any of its agencies, or any officer or employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is a party." Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 742, n. 10 (1974), makes clear that a court of appeals is a "court of the United States" for purposes of § 1252. It is likewise clear that the proceed- ing below was a "civil action, suit, or proceeding," that the INS is an agency of the United States and was a party to the proceeding below, and that that proceeding held an Act of Congress-namely, the one-House veto provision in § 244(c)(2)-unconstitutional. The express requisites for an appeal under § 1252, therefore, have been met. 4 Nine Members of the House of Representatives disagree with the posi- tion taken in the briefs filed by the Senate and the House of Represent- atives and have filed a brief amici curiae urging that the decision of the Court of Appeals be affirmed in this case. OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 462 U. S. In motions to dismiss the INS appeal, the congressional parties 5 direct attention, however, to our statement that "[a] party who receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and cannot appeal from it." Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U. S. 326, 333 (1980). Here, the INS sought the invali- dation of § 244(c)(2), and the Court of Appeals granted that relief. Both Houses contend that the INS has already received what it sought from the Court of Appeals, is not an aggrieved party, and therefore cannot appeal from the deci- sion of the Court of Appeals. We cannot agree. The INS was ordered by one House of Congress to deport Chadha. As we have set out more fully, supra, at 928, the INS concluded that it had no power to rule on the constitu- tionality of that order and accordingly proceeded to imple- ment it. Chadha's appeal challenged that decision and the INS presented the Executive's views on the constitutionality of the House action to the Court of Appeals. But the INS brief to the Court of Appeals did not alter the agency's deci- sion to comply with the House action ordering deportation of Chadha. The Court of Appeals set aside the deportation proceedings and ordered the Attorney General to cease and desist from taking any steps to deport Chadha; steps that the Attorney General would have taken were it not for that decision. At least for purposes of deciding whether the INS is "any party" within the grant of appellate jurisdiction in § 1252, we hold that the INS was sufficiently aggrieved by the Court of Appeals decision prohibiting it from taking action it would otherwise take. It is apparent that Congress intended that sThe Senate and House authorized intervention in this case, S. Res. 40 and H. R. Res. 49, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), and, on February 3, 1981, filed motions to intervene and petitioned for rehearing. The Court of Appeals granted the motions to intervene. Both Houses are therefore proper "parties" within the meaning of that term in 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1). See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 424, n. 7 (1977). INS v. CHADHA 919 Opinion of the Court The Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 14, 43 Stat. 162, required the Secretary of Labor to deport any alien who en- tered or remained in the United States unlawfully. The only means by which a deportable alien could lawfully remain in the United States was to have his status altered by a private bill enacted by both Houses and presented to the President pursuant to the procedures set out in Art. I, § 7, of the Con- stitution. These private bills were found intolerable by Con- gress. In the debate on a 1937 bill introduced by Represent- ative Dies to authorize the Secretary to grant permanent residence in "meritorious" cases, Dies stated: "It was my original thought that the way to handle all these meritorious cases was through special bills. I am absolutely convinced as a result of what has occurred in this House that it is impossible to deal with this situation through special bills. We had a demonstration of that fact not long ago when 15 special bills were before this House. The House consumed 52 hours considering four bills and made no disposition of any of the bills." 81 Cong. Rec. 5542 (1937). Representative Dies' bill passed the House, id., at 5574, but did not come to a vote in the Senate. 83 Cong. Rec. 8992-8996 (1938). Congress first authorized the Attorney General to suspend the deportation of certain aliens in the Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 671. That Act provided that an alien was to be deported, despite the Attorney General's decision to the contrary, if both Houses, by concurrent reso- lution, disapproved the suspension. In 1948, Congress amended the Act to broaden the cate- gory of aliens eligible for suspension of deportation. In addi- tion, however, Congress limited the authority of the Attor- ney General to suspend deportations by providing that the Attorney General could not cancel a deportation unless both Houses affirmatively voted by concurrent resolution to ap- prove the Attorney General's action. Act of July 1, 1948, OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 462 U. S. ch. 783, 62 Stat. 1206. The provision for approval by con- current resolution in the 1948 Act proved almost as burden- some as private bills. Just one year later, the House Judi- ciary Committee, in support of the predecessor to § 244(c)(2), stated in a Report: "In the light of experience of the last several months, the committee came to the conclusion that the require- ment of affirmative action by both Houses of the Con- gress in many thousands of individual cases which are submitted by the Attorney General every year, is not workable and places upon the Congress and particularly on the Committee on the Judiciary responsibilities which it cannot assume. The new responsibilities placed upon the Committee on the Judiciary [by the concurrent reso- lution mechanism] are of purely administrative nature and they seriously interfere with the legislative work of the Committee on the Judiciary and would, in time, in- terfere with the legislative work of the House." H. R. Rep. No. 362, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1949). The proposal to permit one House of Congress to veto the Attorney General's suspension of an alien's deportation was incorporated in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. 414, § 244(a), 66 Stat. 214. Plainly, Congress' desire to retain a veto in this area cannot be considered in isolation but must be viewed in the context of Congress' irritation with the burden of private immigration bills. This legislative his- tory is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of severability raised by § 406 because there is insufficient evidence that Congress would have continued to subject itself to the oner- ous burdens of private bills had it known that § 244(c)(2) would be held unconstitutional. A provision is further presumed severable if what remains after severance "is fully operative as a law." Champlin Re- fining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, supra, at 234. There can be no doubt that § 244 is "fully operative" and workable administrative machinery without the veto provision in § 244(c)(2). Entirely independent of the one-House veto, the INS v. CHADHA 919 Opinion of the Court administrative process enacted by Congress authorizes the Attorney General to suspend an alien's deportation under §244(a). Congress' oversight of the exercise of this dele- gated authority is preserved since all such suspensions will continue to be reported to it under § 244(c)(1). Absent the passage of a bill to the contrary,8 deportation proceedings will be canceled when the period specified in § 244(c)(2) has ex- pired." Clearly, § 244 survives as a workable administrative mechanism without the one-House veto. C Standing We must also reject the contention that Chadha lacks standing because a consequence of his prevailing will advance 8 Without the provision for one-House veto, Congress would presumably retain the power, during the time allotted in § 244(c)(2), to enact a law, in accordance with the requirements of Art. I of the Constitution, mandating a particular alien's deportation, unless, of course, other constitutional prin- ciples place substantive limitations on such action. Cf. Attorney General Jackson's attack on H. R. 9766, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), a bill to re- quire the Attorney General to deport an individual alien. The Attorney General called the bill "an historical departure from an unbroken American practice and tradition. It would be the first time that an act of Congress singled out a named individual for deportation." S. Rep. No. 2031, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, p. 9 (1940) (reprinting Jackson's letter of June 18, 1940). See n. 17, infra. 'Without the one-House veto, § 244 resembles the "report and wait" pro- vision approved by the Court in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1 (1941). The statute examined in Sibbach provided that the newly promul- gated Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall not take effect until they shall have been reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the be- ginning of a regular session thereof and until after the close of such ses- sion." Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064. This statute did not provide that Congress could unilaterally veto the Federal Rules. Rather, it gave Congress the opportunity to review the Rules before they became effective and to pass legislation barring their effectiveness if the Rules were found objectionable. This technique was used by Congress when it acted in 1973 to stay, and ultimately to revise, the proposed Rules of Evidence. Compare Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9, with Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926. OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 462 U. S. nations made during a proceeding conducted under § 242(b), including those determinations made incident to a motion to reopen such proceedings." It is true that one court has read Cheng Fan Kwok to preclude appeals similar to Chadha's. See Dastmalchi v. INS, 660 F. 2d 880 (CA3 1981).11 How- ever, we agree with the Court of Appeals in these cases that the term "final orders" in § 106(a) "includes all matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent, rather than only those determinations actually made at the hearing." 634 F. 2d, at 412. Here, Chadha's deportation stands or falls on the validity of the challenged veto; the final order of deportation was entered against Chadha only to implement the action of the House of Representatives. Although the Attorney General was satisfied that the House action was invalid and that it should not have any effect on his decision to suspend deportation, he appropriately let the controversy take its course through the courts. This Court's decision in Cheng Fan Kwok, supra, does not bar Chadha's appeal. There, after an order of deportation had been entered, the affected alien requested the INS to stay the execution of that order. When that request was de- nied, the alien sought review in the Court of Appeals under § 106(a). This Court's holding that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction was based on the fact that the alien "did not 'attack the deportation order itself but instead [sought] relief not inconsistent with it."' 392 U. S., at 213, quoting 11Under the Third Circuit's reasoning, judicial review under § 106(a) would not extend to the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2) because that issue could not have been tested during the administrative deportation proceed- ings conducted under § 242(b). The facts in Dastmalchi are distinguish- able, however. In Dastmalchi, Iranian aliens who had entered the United States on nonimmigrant student visas challenged a regulation that re- quired them to report to the District Director of the INS during the Ira- nian hostage crisis. The aliens reported and were ordered deported after a § 242(b) proceeding. The aliens in Dastmalchi could have been deported irrespective of the challenged regulation. Here, in contrast, Chadha's de- portation would have been canceled but for § 244(c)(2). INS v. CHADHA 919 Opinion of the Court Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F. 2d 772, 777 (CA2 1966). Here, in contrast, Chadha directly attacks the deportation order it- self, and the relief he seeks--cancellation of deportation-is plainly inconsistent with the deportation order. Accord- ingly, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under § 106(a) to decide these cases. F Case or Controversy It is also contended that this is not a genuine controversy but "a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding," Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S., at 346 (Brandeis, J., concurring), upon which the Court should not pass. This argument rests on the fact that Chadha and the INS take the same position on the constitutionality of the one-House veto. But it would be a curious result if, in the administration of justice, a person could be denied access to the courts because the Attorney General of the United States agreed with the legal argu- ments asserted by the individual. A case or controversy is presented by these cases. First, from the time of Congress' formal intervention, see n. 5, supra, the concrete adverseness is beyond doubt. Con- gress is both a proper party to defend the constitutional- ity of §244(c)(2) and a proper petitioner under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1). Second, prior to Congress' intervention, there was adequate Art. III adverseness even though the only par- ties were the INS and Chadha. We have already held that the INS's agreement with the Court of Appeals' decision that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional does not affect that agency's "aggrieved" status for purposes of appealing that decision under 28 U. S. C. § 1252, see supra, at 929-931. For similar reasons, the INS's agreement with Chadha's position does not alter the fact that the INS would have deported Chadha absent the Court of Appeals' judgment. We agree with the Court of Appeals that "Chadha has asserted a concrete con- troversy, and our decision will have real meaning: if we rule for Chadha, he will not be deported; if we uphold § 244(c)(2), OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 462 U. S. the INS will execute its order and deport him." 634 F. 2d, at 419.2 Of course, there may be prudential, as opposed to Art. III, concerns about sanctioning the adjudication of these cases in the absence of any participant supporting the validity of § 244(c)(2). The Court of Appeals properly dispelled any such concerns by inviting and accepting briefs from both Houses of Congress. We have long held that Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is inappli- cable or unconstitutional. See Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S., at 210, n. 9; United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946). G Political Question It is also argued that these cases present a nonjusti- ciable political question because Chadha is merely challeng- ing Congress' authority under the Naturalization Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 4, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. It is argued that Congress' Art. I power "To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause, grants it unreviewable authority over the regulation of aliens. The plenary authority of Congress over aliens under Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, is not open to question, but what is "A relevant parallel can be found in our recent decision in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574 (1983). There, the United States agreed with Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools that certain Revenue Rulings denying tax-exempt status to schools that discriminated on the basis of race were invalid. Despite its agreement with the schools, however, the United States was complying with a court order enjoining it from granting tax-exempt status to any school that dis- criminated on the basis of race. Even though the Government largely agreed with the opposing party on the merits of the controversy, we found an adequate basis for jurisdiction in the fact that the Government intended to enforce the challenged law against that party. See id., at 585, n. 9. INS v. CHADHA 919 Opinion of the Court yoke the political question doctrine. Resolution of litigation challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three branches cannot be evaded by courts because the issues have political implications in the sense urged by Congress. Mar- bury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), was also a "political" case, involving as it did claims under a judicial commission alleged to have been duly signed by the President but not delivered. But "courts cannot reject as 'no law suit' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority." Baker v. Carr, supra, at 217. In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892), this Court ad- dressed and resolved the question whether "a bill signed by the Speaker of the House of Represent- atives and by the President of the Senate, presented to and approved by the President of the United States, and delivered by the latter to the Secretary of State, as an act passed by Congress, does not become a law of the United States if it had not in fact been passed by Congress.... ".... We recognize, on one hand, the duty of this court, from the performance of which it may not shrink, to give full effect to the provisions of the Constitution relating to the enactment of laws that are to operate wherever the authority and jurisdiction of the United States extend. On the other hand, we cannot be unmindful of the conse- quences that must result if this court should feel obliged, in fidelity to the Constitution, to declare that an enrolled bill, on which depend public and private interests of vast magnitude, and which has been ... deposited in the public archives, as an act of Congress, ... did not become a law." Id., at 669-670 (emphasis in original). H The contentions on standing and justiciability have been fully examined, and we are satisfied the parties are properly before us. The important issues have been fully briefed and OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 462 U. S. twice argued, see 458 U. S. 1120 (1982). The Court's duty in these cases, as Chief Justice Marshall declared in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821), is clear: "Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty." III A We turn now to the question whether action of one House of Congress under § 244(c)(2) violates strictures of the Con- stitution. We begin, of course, with the presumption that the challenged statute is valid. Its wisdom is not the con- cern of the courts; if a challenged action does not violate the Constitution, it must be sustained: "Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto." TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194-195 (1978). By the same token, the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of democratic govern- ment and our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by the fact that congressional veto provisions are appearing with in- creasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority to executive and independent agencies: "Since 1932, when the first veto provision was enacted into law, 295 congressional veto-type procedures have been inserted in 196 different statutes as follows: from 1932 to 1939, five statutes were affected; from 1940-49, nineteen statutes; between 1950-59, thirty-four statutes; and from 1960-69, forty-nine. From the year 1970 through 1975, at least one hundred sixty-three such pro- INS. v. CHADHA 919 Opinion of the Court visions were included in eighty-nine laws." Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 Ind. L. Rev. 323, 324 (1977). See also Appendix to JUSTICE WHITE's dissent, post, at 1003. JUSTICE WHITE undertakes to make a case for the proposi-. tion that the one-House veto is a useful "political invention," post, at 972, and we need not challenge that assertion. We can even concede this utilitarian argument although the long- range political wisdom of this "invention" is arguable. It has been vigorously debated, and it is instructive to compare the views of the protagonists. See, e. g., Javits & Klein, Con- gressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitu- tional Analysis, 52 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 455 (1977), and Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Con- gressional Power, 68 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1982). But policy arguments supporting even useful "political inventions" are subject to the demands of the Constitution which defines powers and, with respect to this subject, sets out just how those powers are to be exercised. Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the legislative process. Since the precise terms of those familiar provisions are critical to the resolution of these cases, we set them out verbatim. Article I provides: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." Art. I, § 1. (Emphasis added.) "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Rep- resentatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United States .... " Art. I, § 7, cl. 2. (Emphasis added.) "Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Con- currence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 462 U. S. dent, or ill-considered measures. The President's veto role in the legislative process was described later during public debate on ratification: "It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse un- friendly to the public good, which may happen to influ- ence a majority of that body. "... The primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the Executive is, to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design." The Federalist No. 73, supra, at 458 (A. Hamilton). See also The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655, 678 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 123 (1926). The Court also has observed that the Presentment Clauses serve the important purpose of assuring that a "national" perspective is grafted on the legislative process: "The President is a representative of the people just as the members of the Senate and of the House are, and it may be, at some times, on some subjects, that the Presi- dent elected by all the people is rather more represent- ative of them all than are the members of either body of the Legislature whose constituencies are local and not countrywide ... ." Myers v. United States, supra, at 123. C Bicameralism The bicameral requirement of Art. I, §§ 1, 7, was of scarcely less concern to the Framers than was the Presiden- tial veto and indeed the two concepts are interdependent. By providing that no law could take effect without the con- currence of the prescribed majority of the Members of both Houses, the Framers reemphasized their belief, already re- INS v. CHADHA 919 Opinion of the Court marked upon in connection with the Presentment Clauses, that legislation should not be enacted unless it has been care- fully and fully considered by the Nation's elected officials. In the Constitutional Convention debates on the need for a bicameral legislature, James Wilson, later to become a Justice of this Court, commented: "Despotism comes on mankind in different shapes. sometimes in an Executive, sometimes in a military, one. Is there danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both proclaim it. If the Legislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it within itself, into distinct and independent branches. In a single house there is no check, but the inadequate one, of the virtue & good sense of those who compose it." 1 Farrand 254. Hamilton argued that a Congress comprised of a single House was antithetical to the very purposes of the Constitu- tion. Were the Nation to adopt a Constitution providing for only one legislative organ, he warned: "[W]e shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the most important prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus entail upon our posterity one of the most execrable forms of government that human infatuation ever contrived. Thus we should create in reality that very tyranny which the adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or af- fect to be, solicitous to avert." The Federalist No. 22, p. 135 (H. Lodge ed. 1888). This view was rooted in a general skepticism regarding the fallibility of human nature later commented on by Joseph Story: "Public bodies, like private persons, are occasionally under the dominion of strong passions and excitements; impatient, irritable, and impetuous.... If [a legislature] OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 462 U. S. feels no check but its own will, it rarely has the firmness to insist upon holding a question long enough under its own view, to see and mark it in all its bearings and rela- tions on society." 1 Story, supra, at 383-384. These observations are consistent with what many of the Framers expressed, none more cogently than Madison in pointing up the need to divide and disperse power in order to protect liberty: "In republican government, the legislative authority nec- essarily predominates. The remedy for this inconve- niency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit." The Federalist No. 51, p. 324 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (some- times attributed to "Hamilton or Madison" but now gen- erally attributed to Madison). See also The Federalist No. 62. However familiar, it is useful to recall that apart from their fear that special interests could be favored at the expense of public needs, the Framers were also concerned, although not of one mind, over the apprehensions of the smaller states. Those states feared a commonality of interest among the larger states would work to their disadvantage; represent- atives of the larger states, on the other hand, were skeptical of a legislature that could pass laws favoring a minority of the people. See 1 Farrand 176-177, 484-491. It need hardly be repeated here that the Great Compromise, under which one House was viewed as representing the people and the other the states, allayed the fears of both the large and small states. 15 "The Great Compromise was considered so important by the Framers that they inserted a special provision to ensure that it could not be altered, even by constitutional amendment, except with the consent of the states affected. See U. S. Const., Art V. INS v. CHADHA 919 Opinion of the Court tively delegated authority, 6 had determined the alien should remain in the United States. Without the challenged provi- sion in § 244(c)(2), this could have been achieved, if at all, only "Congress protests that affirming the Court of Appeals in these cases will sanction "lawmaking by the Attorney General.... Why is the Attor- ney General exempt from submitting his proposed changes in the law to the full bicameral process?" Brief for Petitioner in No. 80-2170, p. 40. To be sure, some administrative agency action-rulemaking, for example-may resemble "lawmaking." See 5 U. S. C. § 551(4), which defines an agency's "rule" as "the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or pre- scribe law or policy ... ." This Court has referred to agency activity as being "quasi-legislative" in character. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 628 (1935). Clearly, however, "[i]n the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faith- fully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 587 (1952). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 123. When the Attorney General performs his duties pursuant to § 244, he does not exercise "legislative" power. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 213-214 (1976). The bicameral proc- ess is not necessary as a check on the Executive's administration of the laws because his administrative activity cannot reach beyond the limits of the statute that created it-a statute duly enacted pursuant to Art. I, §§ 1, 7. The constitutionality of the Attorney General's execution of the authority delegated to him by § 244 involves only a question of delegation doctrine. The courts, when a case or controversy arises, can always "as- certain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed," Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 425 (1944), and can enforce adherence to statutory standards. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, at 585; Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 176 U. S. App. D. C. 373, 440, 541 F. 2d 1, 68 (en banc) (separate statement of Leventhal, J.), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 941 (1976); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 320 (1965). It is clear, therefore, that the Attorney General acts in his presumptively Art. II capacity when he administers the Immigration and Nationality Act. Executive action under legislatively delegated authority that might resem- ble "legislative" action in some respects is not subject to the approval of both Houses of Congress and the President for the reason that the Con- stitution does not so require. That kind of Executive action is always sub- ject to check by the terms of the legislation that authorized it; and if that authority is exceeded it is open to judicial review as well as the power of OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 462 U. S. by legislation requiring deportation. 7 Similarly, a veto by one House of Congress under § 244(c)(2) cannot be justified as an attempt at amending the standards set out in § 244(a)(1), or as a repeal of § 244 as applied to Chadha. Amendment and repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art. L8 The nature of the decision implemented by the one-House veto in these cases further manifests its legislative character. After long experience with the clumsy, time-consuming pri- vate bill procedure, Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to the Executive Branch, and specifically to the Attorney General, the authority to allow deportable aliens to remain in this country in certain specified circumstances. It is not disputed that this choice to delegate authority is pre- cisely the kind of decision that can be implemented only in accordance with the procedures set out in Art. I. Dis- agreement with the Attorney General's decision on Chadha's deportation-that is, Congress' decision to deport Chadha- no less than Congress' original choice to delegate to the At- torney General the authority to make that decision, involves determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral passage followed by presentment to the Congress to modify or revoke the authority entirely. A one-House veto is clearly legislative in both character and effect and is not so checked; the need for the check provided by Art. I, §§ 1, 7, is therefore clear. Con- gress' authority to delegate portions of its power to administrative agen- cies provides no support for the argument that Congress can constitution- ally control administration of the laws by way of a congressional veto. 17We express no opinion as to whether such legislation would violate any constitutional provision. See n. 8, supra. 8During the Convention of 1787, the application of the President's veto to repeals of statutes was addressed, and the Framers were apparently content with Madison's comment that "[a]s to the difficulty of repeals, it was probable that in doubtful cases the policy would soon take place of limiting the duration of laws as to require renewal instead of repeal." 2 Farrand 587. See Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 569, 587- 599 (1953). There is no provision allowing Congress to repeal or amend laws by other than legislative means pursuant to Art. I. INS v. CHADHA 919 Opinion of the Court President. Congress must abide by its delegation of author- ity until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.19 Finally, we see that when the Framers intended to author- ize either House of Congress to act alone and outside of its prescribed bicameral legislative role, they narrowly and pre- cisely defined the procedure for such action. There are four provisions in the Constitution,20 explicit and unambiguous, by which one House may act alone with the unreviewable force of law, not subject to the President's veto: (a) The House of Representatives alone was given the power to initiate impeachments. Art. I, § 2, cl. 5; (b) The Senate alone was given the power to conduct trials following impeachment on charges initiated by the House and to convict following trial. Art. I, § 3, cl. 6; (c) The Senate alone was given final unreviewable power to approve or to disapprove Presidential appointments. Art. II, §2, cl. 2; (d) The Senate alone was given unreviewable power to rat- ify treaties negotiated by the President. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Clearly, when the Draftsmen sought to confer special pow- ers on one House, independent of the other House, or of the President, they did so in explicit, unambiguous terms.21 'This does not mean that Congress is required to capitulate to 'the ac- cretion of policy control by forces outside its chambers." Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analy- sis, 52 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 455, 462 (1977). The Constitution provides Congress with abundant means to oversee and control its administrative creatures. Beyond the obvious fact that Congress ultimately controls ad- ministrative agencies in the legislation that creates them, other means of control, such as durational limits on authorizations and formal reporting requirements, lie well within Congress' constitutional power. See id., at 460-461; Kaiser, Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alterna- tives to the "Legislative Veto," 32 Ad. L. Rev. 667 (1980). See also n. 9, supra. 'See also U. S. Const., Art. II; § 1, and Amdt. 12. " An exception from the Presentment Clauses was ratified in Hol- lingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (1798). There the Court held Presi- dential approval was unnecessary for a proposed constitutional amendment OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Opinion of the Court 462 U. S. checks, and maintain the separation of powers, the carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be eroded. To accomplish what has been attempted by one House of Congress in this case requires action in conformity with the express procedures of the Constitution's prescrip- tion for legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President." The veto authorized by § 244(c)(2) doubtless has been in many respects a convenient shortcut; the "sharing" with the Executive by Congress of its authority over aliens in this manner is, on its face, an appealing compromise. In purely practical terms, it is obviously easier for action to be taken by one House without submission to the President; but it is crys- Neither can we accept the suggestion that the one-House veto provi- sion in § 244(c)(2) either removes or modifies the bicameralism and presen- tation requirements for the enactment of future legislation affecting aliens. See Atkins v. United States, 214 Ct. Cl. 186, 250-251, 556 F. 2d 1028, 1063-1064 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1009 (1978); Brief for Petitioner in No. 80-2170, p. 40. The explicit prescription for legislative action con- tained in Art. I cannot be amended by legislation. See n. 13, supra. JUSTICE WHITE suggests that the Attorney General's action under § 244(c)(1) suspending deportation is equivalent to a proposal for legisla- tion and that because congressional approval is indicated "by the failure to veto, the one-House veto satisfies the requirement of bicameral approval." Post, at 997. However, as the Court of Appeals noted, that approach "would analogize the effect of the one house disapproval to the failure of one house to vote affirmatively on a private bill." 634 F. 2d 408, 435 (1980). Even if it were clear that Congress entertained such an arcane theory when it enacted § 244(c)(2), which JUSTICE WHITE does not sug- gest, this would amount to nothing less than an amending of Art. I. The legislative steps outlined in Art. I are not empty formalities; they were de- signed to assure that both Houses of Congress and the President partici- pate in the exercise of lawmaking authority. This does not mean that leg- islation must always be preceded by debate; on the contrary, we have said that it is not necessary for a legislative body to "articulate its reasons for enacting a statute." United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 179 (1980). But the steps required by Art. I, H 1, 7, make certain that there is an opportunity for deliberation and debate. To allow Congress to evade the strictures of the Constitution and in effect enact Ex- ecutive proposals into law by mere silence cannot be squared with Art. I. INS v. CHADHA 919 POWELL, J., concurring in judgment tal clear from the records of the Convention, contemporane- ous writings and debates, that the Framers ranked other val- ues higher than efficiency. The records of the Convention and debates in the states preceding ratification underscore the common desire to define and limit the exercise of the newly created federal powers affecting the states and the people. There is unmistakable expression of a determina- tion that legislation by the national Congress be a step-by- step, deliberate and deliberative process. The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional Convention impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unwork- able, but those hard choices were consciously made by men who had lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary govermental acts to go unchecked. There is no support in the Constitution or decisions of this Court for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often en- countered in complying with explicit constitutional standards may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the President. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution. V We hold that the congressional veto provision in § 244(c)(2) is severable from the Act and that it is unconstitutional. Ac- cordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. The Court's decision, based on the Presentment Clauses, Art. I, § 7, cls. 2 and 3, apparently will invalidate every use of the legislative veto. The breadth of this holding gives one pause. Congress has included the veto in literally hundreds OCTOBER TERM, 1982 POWELL, J., concurring in judgment 462 U. S. of statutes, dating back to the 1930's. Congress clearly views this procedure as essential to controlling the delegation of power to administrative agencies.1 One reasonably may disagree with Congress' assessment of the veto's utility, 2 but the respect due its judgment as a coordinate branch of Gov- ernment cautions that our holding should be no more exten- sive than necessary to decide these cases. In my view, the cases may be decided on a narrower ground. When Con- gress finds that a particular person does not satisfy the statu- tory criteria for permanent residence in this country it has assumed a judicial function in violation of the principle of separation of powers. Accordingly, I concur only in the judgment. I A The Framers perceived that "[tihe accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether heredi- tary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." The Federalist No. 47, p. 324 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). Theirs was not a baseless fear. Under British rule, the Colonies suffered the abuses of unchecked executive power that were attributed, at least popularly, to a hereditary monarchy. See Levi, Some As- pects of Separation of Powers, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 369, 374 (1976); The Federalist No. 48. During the Confederation, 1As JUSTICE WHITE's dissenting opinion explains, the legislative veto has been included in a wide variety of statutes, ranging from bills for exec- utive reorganization to the War Powers Resolution. See post, at 968-972. Whether the veto complies with the Presentment Clauses may well turn on the particular context in which it is exercised, and I would be hesitant to conclude that every veto is unconstitutional on the basis of the unusual ex- ample presented by this litigation. 2 See Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Con- gressional Power, 68 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1982); Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 218 U. S. App. D. C. 34, 84, 673 F. 2d 425, 475 (1982). INS v. CHADHA 919 POWELL, J., concurring in judgment Court has not hesitated to enforce the doctrine. See Buck- ley v. Valeo, supra, at 123. Functionally, the doctrine may be violated in two ways. One branch may interfere impermissibly with the other's performance of its constitutionally assigned function. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 433 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974). Al- ternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to an- other. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, at 587; Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 203 (1928). These cases present the latter situation.4 II Before considering whether Congress impermissibly as- sumed a judicial function, it is helpful to recount briefly Congress' actions. Jagdish Rai Chadha, a citizen of Kenya, stayed in this country after his student visa expired. Al- though he was scheduled to be deported, he requested the Immigration and Naturalization Service to suspend his deportation because he met the statutory criteria for per- manent residence in this country. After a hearing,5 the Service granted Chadha's request and sent-as required by 'The House and the Senate argue that the legislative veto does not pre- vent the executive from exercising its constitutionally assigned function. Even assuming this argument is correct, it does not address the concern that the Congress is exercising unchecked judicial power at the expense of individual liberties. It was precisely to prevent such arbitrary action that the Framers adopted the doctrine of separation of powers. See, e. g., Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 5The Immigration and Naturalization Service, a division of the Depart- ment of Justice, administers the Immigration and Nationality Act on behalf of the Attorney General, who has primary responsiblity for the Act's enforcement. See 8 U. S. C. § 1103. The Act establishes a detailed administrative procedure for determining when a specific person is to be deported, see § 1252(b), and provides for judicial review of this decision, see § 1105a; Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217 (1963). OCTOBER TERM, 1982 POWELL, J., concurring in judgment 462 U. S. the reservation of the veto right-a report of its action to Congress. In addition to the report on Chadha, Congress had before it the names of 339 other persons whose deportations also had been suspended by the Service. The House Committee on the Judiciary decided that six of these persons, including Chadha, should not be allowed to remain in this country. Accordingly, it submitted a resolution to the House, which stated simply that "the House of Representatives does not approve the granting of permanent residence in the United States to the aliens hereinafter named." 121 Cong. Rec. 40800 (1975). The resolution was not distributed prior to the vote,6 but the Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law explained to the House: "It was the feeling of the committee, after reviewing 340 cases, that the aliens contained in the resolution did not meet [the] statutory requirements, particularly as it relates to hardship; and it is the opinion of the committee that their deportation should not be suspended." Ibid. (remarks of Rep. Eilberg). Without further explanation and without a recorded vote, the House rejected the Service's determination that these six people met the statutory criteria. On its face, the House's action appears clearly adjudica- tory.7 The House did not enact a general rule; rather it ' Normally the House would have distributed the resolution before acting on it, see 121 Cong. Rec. 40800 (1975), but the statute providing for the legislative veto limits the time in which Congress may veto the Service's determination that deportation should be suspended. See 8 U. S. C. § 1254(c)(2). In this case Congress had Chadha's report before it for ap- proximately a year and a half, but failed to act on it until three days before the end of the limitations period. Accordingly, it was required to abandon its normal procedures for considering resolutions, thereby increasing the danger of arbitrary and ill-considered action. 7The Court concludes that Congress' action was legislative in character because each branch "presumptively act[s] within its assigned sphere." Ante, at 952. The Court's presumption providep a useful starting point, INS v. CHADHA 919 POWELL, J., concurring in judgment made its own determination that six specific persons did not comply with certain statutory criteria. It thus undertook the type of decision that traditionally has been left to other branches. Even if the House did not make a de novo deter- mination, but simply reviewed the Immigration and Nat- uralization Service's findings, it still assumed a function ordinarily entrusted to the federal courts." See 5 U. S. C. § 704 (providing generally for judicial review of final agency action); cf. Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217 (1963) (holding that courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review INS decisions denying suspension of deportation). Where, as here, Con- gress has exercised a power "that cannot possibly be re- garded as merely in aid of the legislative function of Con- but does not conclude the inquiry. Nor does the fact that the House's action alters an individual's legal status indicate, as the Court reasons, see ante, at 952-954, that the action is legislative rather than adjudicative in nature. In determining whether one branch unconstitutionally has as- sumed a power central to another branch, the traditional characterization of the assumed power as legislative, executive, or judicial may provide some guidance. See Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 203 (1928). But reasonable minds may disagree over the character of an act, and the more helpful inquiry, in my view, is whether the act in question raises the dangers the Framers sought to avoid. 8The Court reasons in response to this argument that the one-House veto exercised in this case was not judicial in nature because the decision of the Immigration and Naturalization Service did not present a justiciable issue that could have been reviewed by a court on appeal. See ante, at 957, n. 22. The Court notes that since the administrative agency de- cided the case in favor of Chadha, there was no aggrieved party who could appeal. Reliance by the Court on this fact misses the point. Even if review of the particular decision to suspend deportation is not committed to the courts, the House of Representatives assumed a function that gener- ally is entrusted to an impartial tribunual. In my view, the Legislative Branch in effect acted as an appellate court by overruling the Service's application of established law to Chadha. And unlike a court or an admin- istrative agency, it did not provide Chadha with the right to counsel or a hearing before acting. Although the parallel is not entirely complete, the effect on Chadha's personal rights would not have been different in princi- ple had he been acquitted of a federal crime and thereafter found by one House of Congress to have been guilty. OCTOBER TERM, 1982 WHITE, J., dissenting 462 U. S. means by which Congress secures the accountability of exec- utive and independent agencies. Without the legislative veto, Congress is faced with a Hobson's choice: either to re- frain from delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself with a hopeless task of writing laws with the requisite speci- ficity to cover endless special circumstances across the entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to abdicate its law- making function to the Executive Branch and independent agencies. To choose the former leaves major national prob- lems unresolved; to opt for the latter risks unaccountable policymaking by those not elected to fill that role. Accord- ingly, over the past five decades, the legislative veto has been placed in nearly 200 statutes.2 The device is known in every field of governmental concern: reorganization, budgets, foreign affairs, war powers, and regulation of trade, safety, energy, the environment, and the economy. The legislative veto developed initially in response to the problems of reorganizing the sprawling Government struc- ture created in response to the Depression. The Reorga- nization Acts established the chief model for the legislative veto. When President Hoover requested authority to reor- ganize the Government in 1929, he coupled his request that the "Congress be willing to delegate its authority over the problem (subject to defined principles) to the Executive" with a proposal for legislative review. He proposed that the Executive "should act upon approval of a joint committee of Congress or with the reservation of power of revision by Congress within some limited period adequate for its consid- eration." Public Papers of the Presidents, Herbert Hoover, 1929, p. 432 (1974). Congress followed President Hoover's suggestion and authorized reorganization subject to legisla- 2A selected list and brief description of these provisions is appended to this opinion. INS v. CHADHA 919 WHrrE, J., dissenting tive review. Act of June 30, 1932, § 407, 47 Stat. 414. Al- though the reorganization authority reenacted in 1933 did not contain a legislative veto provision, the provision returned during the Roosevelt administration and has since been re- newed numerous times. Over the years, the provision was used extensively. Presidents submitted 115 Reorganization Plans to Congress of which 23 were disapproved by Congress pursuant to legislative veto provisions. See App. A to Brief for United States Senate on Reargument. Shortly after adoption of the Reorganization Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 561, Congress and the President applied the legisla- tive veto procedure to resolve the delegation problem for na- tional security and foreign affairs. World War II occasioned the need to transfer greater authority to the President in these areas. The legislative veto offered the means by which Congress could confer additional authority while pre- serving its own constitutional role. During World War II, Congress enacted over 30 statutes conferring powers on the Executive with legislative veto provisions.' President Roosevelt accepted the veto as the necessary price for ob- taining exceptional authority.4 Over the quarter century following World War II, Presi- dents continued to accept legislative vetoes by one or both Houses as constitutional, while regularly denouncing provi- sions by which congressional Committees reviewed Execu- tive activity.' The legislative veto balanced delegations of $Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 983, 1089-1090 (1975) (listing statutes). 4The Roosevelt administration submitted proposed legislation containing veto provisions and defended their constitutionality. See, e. g., General Counsel to the Office of Price Administration, Statement on Constitutional- ity of Concurrent Resolution Provision of Proposed Price Control Bill (H. R. 5479), reprinted in Price-Control Bill: Hearings on H. R. 5479 before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 983 (1941). 'Presidential objections to the veto, until the veto by President Nixon of the War Powers Resolution, principally concerned bills authorizing Coin- OCTOBER TERM, 1982 WHITE, J., dissenting 462 U. S. statutory authority in new areas of governmental involve- ment: the space program, international agreements on nu- clear energy, tariff arrangements, and adjustment of federal pay rates.6 During the 1970's the legislative veto was important in re- solving a series of major constitutional disputes between the President and Congress over claims of the President to broad impoundment, war, and national emergency powers. The mittee vetoes. As the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers found in 1969, "an accommodation was reached years ago on legislative ve- toes exercised by the entire Congress or by one House, [while] disputes have continued to arise over the committee form of the veto." S. Rep. No. 91-549, p. 14 (1969). Presidents Kennedy and Johnson proposed en- actment of statutes with legislative veto provisions. See National Wilder- ness Preservation Act: Hearings on S. 4 before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1963) (President Kennedy's proposals for withdrawal of wilderness areas); President's Mes- sage to the Congress Transmitting the Budget for Fiscal Year 1970, 5 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 70, 73 (1969) (President Johnson's proposals allowing legislative veto of tax surcharge). The administration of Presi- dent Kennedy submitted a memorandum supporting the constitutionality of the legislative veto. See General Counsel of the Department of Agricul- ture, Constitutionality of Title I of H. R. 6400, 87th Cong., 1st Session (1961), reprinted in Legislative Policy of the Bureau of the Budget: Hear- ing before the Subcommittee on Conservation and Credit of the House Committee on Agriculture, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 27,31-32 (1966). During the administration of President Johnson, the Department of Justice again defended the constitutionality of the legislative veto provision of the Re- organization Act, as contrasted with provisions for a Committee veto. See Separation of Powers: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Separa- tion of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 206 (1967) (testimony of Frank M. Wozencraft, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel). ' National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-568, § 302, 72 Stat. 433 (space program); Atomic Energy Act Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. 85-479, § 4, 72 Stat. 277 (cooperative nuclear agreements); Trade Ex- pansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. 87-794, § 351, 76 Stat. 899, 19 U. S. C. § 1981 (tariff recommended by International Trade Commission may be imposed by concurrent resolution of approval); Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-206, § 255(i)(1), 81 Stat. 644. INS v. CHADHA 919 WMTE, J., dissenting serves Congress' control over lawmaking. Perhaps there are other means of accommodation and accountability, but the increasing reliance of Congress upon the legislative veto suggests that the alternatives to which Congress must now turn are not entirely satisfactory." "While Congress could write certain statutes with greater specificity, it is unlikely that this is a realistic or even desirable substitute for the legisla- tive veto. The controversial nature of many issues would prevent Con- gress from reaching agreement on many major problems if specificity were required in their enactments. Fuchs, Administrative Agencies and the Energy Problem, 47 Ind. L. J. 606, 608 (1972); Stewart, Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1695-1696 (1975). For example, in the deportation context, the solution is not for Congress to create more refined categorizations of the deportable aliens whose status should be subject to change. In 1979, the Immigration and Naturalization Service proposed regulations setting forth factors to be considered in the exercise of discretion under numerous provisions of the Act, but not includ- ing § 244, to ensure "fair and uniform" adjudication "under appropriate dis- cretionary criteria." 44 Fed. Reg. 36187 (1979). The proposed rule was canceled in 1981, because "[tlhere is an inherent failure in any attempt to list those factors which should be considered in the exercise of discretion. It is impossible to list or foresee all of the adverse or favorable factors which may be present in a given set of circumstances." 46 Fed. Reg. 9119 (1981). Oversight hearings and congressional investigations have their purpose, but unless Congress is to be rendered a think tank or debating society, they are no substitute for the exercise of actual authority. The "delaying" procedure approved in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 15 (1941), while satisfactory for certain measures, has its own shortcomings. Be- cause a new law must be passed to restrain administrative action, Con- gress must delegate authority without the certain ability of being able to check its exercise. Finally, the passage of corrective legislation after agency regulations take effect or Executive Branch officials have acted entails the drawbacks endemic to a retroactive response. 'Post hoc substantive revision of legis- lation, the only available corrective mechanism in the absence of postenact- ment review could have serious prejudicial consequences; if Congress ret- roactively tampered with a price control system after prices have been set, the economy could be damaged and private rights seriously impaired; if Congress rescinded the sale of arms to a foreign country, our relations with that country would be severely strained; and if Congress reshuffled the bu- reaucracy after a President's reorganization proposal had taken effect, the OCTOBER TERM, 1982 WHITE, J., dissenting 462 U. S. The history of the legislative veto also makes clear that it has not been a sword with which Congress has struck out to aggrandize itself at the expense of the other branches-the concerns of Madison and Hamilton. Rather, the veto has been a means of defense, a reservation of ultimate authority necessary if Congress is to fulfill its designated role under Art. I as the Nation's lawmaker. While the President has often objected to particular legislative vetoes, generally those left in the hands of congressional Committees, the Ex- ecutive has more often agreed to legislative review as the price for a broad delegation of authority. To be sure, the President may have preferred unrestricted power, but that could be precisely why Congress thought it essential to retain a check on the exercise of delegated authority. II For all these reasons, the apparent sweep of the Court's decision today is regretable. The Court's Art. I analysis ap- pears to invalidate all legislative vetoes irrespective of form or subject. Because the legislative veto is commonly found as a check upon rulemaking by administrative agencies and upon broad-based policy decisions of the Executive Branch, it is particularly unfortunate that the Court reaches its decision in cases involving the exercise of a veto over deportation decisions regarding particular individuals. Courts should always be wary of striking statutes as unconstitutional; to strike an entire class of statutes based on consideration of a somewhat atypical and more readily indictable exemplar of the class is irresponsible. It was for cases such as these that Justice Brandeis wrote: "The Court has frequently called attention to the 'great gravity and delicacy' of its function in passing upon the validity of an act of Congress .... results could be chaotic." Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 455, 464 (1977) (footnote omitted). INS v. CHADHA 919 WHITE, J., dissenting "The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.' Liverpool, N. Y. & P. S. S. Co. v. Emigration Commissioners, [113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885)]." Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 345, 347 (1936) (concurring opinion). Unfortunately, today's holding is not so limited. 11 "Perhaps I am wrong and the Court remains open to consider whether certain forms of the legislative veto are reconcilable with the Art. I re- quirements. One possibility for the Court and Congress is to accept that a resolution of disapproval cannot be given legal effect in its own right, but may serve as a guide in the interpretation of a delegation of law- making authority. The exercise of the veto could be read as a manifesta- tion of legislative intent, which, unless itself contrary to the authorizing statute, serves as the definitive construction of the statute. Therefore, an agency rule vetoed by Congress would not be enforced in the courts be- cause the veto indicates that the agency action departs from the congres- sional intent. This limited role for a redefined legislative veto follows in the steps of the longstanding practice of giving some weight to subsequent legislative reaction to administrative rulemaking. The silence of Congress after con- sideration of a practice by the Executive may be equivalent to acquiescence and consent that the practice be continued until the power exercised be re- voked. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 472-473 (1915). See also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1965) (relying on congressional failure to repeal administration interpretation); Haig v. Agee, 453 U. S. 280 (1981) (same); Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574 (1983) (same); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 384 (1982) (relying on failure to disturb judicial decision in later revision of law). Reliance on subsequent legislative reaction has been limited by the fear of overturning the intent of the original Congress and the unreliability of discerning the views of a subsequent Congress. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 117-118 (1980); United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). These concerns are not forceful when the original statute authorizes subsequent legislative review. The presence of the review provision constitutes an express authorization for a subsequent Congress to participate in defining the meaning of the law. Second, the disapproval resolution allows for a reliable determina- tion of congressional intent. Without the review mechanism, uncertainty over the inferences to draw from subsequent congressional action is under- OCTOBER TERM, 1982 WHITE, J., dissenting 462 U. S. stitution. 1" We should not find the lack of a specific constitu- tional authorization for the legislative veto surprising, and I would not infer disapproval of the mechanism from its absence. From the summer of 1787 to the present the Gov- ernment of the United States has become an endeavor far beyond the contemplation of the Framers. Only within the last half century has the complexity and size of the Federal Government's responsibilities grown so greatly that the Congress must rely on the legislative veto as the most effec- tive if not the only means to insure its role as the Nation's lawmaker. But the wisdom of the Framers was to anticipate that the Nation would grow and new problems of governance would require different solutions. Accordingly, our Federal Government was intentionally chartered with the flexibility to respond to contemporary needs without losing sight of fundamental democratic principles. This was the spirit in which Justice Jackson penned his influential concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case: "The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context. While the Con- stitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dis- persed powers into a workable government." Youngs- town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952). This is the perspective from which we should approach the novel constitutional questions presented by the legislative veto. In my view, neither Art. I of the Constitution nor the doctrine of separation of powers is violated by this mecha- 5I limit my concern here to those legislative vetoes which require either one or both Houses of Congress to pass resolutions of approval or dis- approval, and leave aside the questions arising from the exercise of such powers by Committees of Congress. INS v. CHADHA 919 WHITE, J., dissenting nism by which our elected Representatives preserve their voice in the governance of the Nation. III The Court holds that the disapproval of a suspension of deportation by the resolution of one House of Congress is an exercise of legislative power without compliance with the prerequisites for lawmaking set forth in Art. I of the Consti- tution. Specifically, the Court maintains that the provisions of § 244(c)(2) are inconsistent with the requirement of bicam- eral approval, implicit in Art. I, § 1, and the requirement that all bills and resolutions that require the concurrence of both Houses be presented to the President, Art. I, § 7, cls. 2 and 3.16 I do not dispute the Court's truismatic exposition of these Clauses. There is no question that a bill does not become a law until it is approved by both the House and the Senate, and presented to the President. Similarly, I would not hesitate to strike an action of Congress in the form of a con- current resolution which constituted an exercise of original lawmaking authority. I agree with the Court that the Presi- 8 I agree with JUsTICE REHNQUIST that Congress did not intend the one- House veto provision of § 244(c)(2) to be severable. Although the general rule is that the presence of a saving clause creates a presumption of divisi- bility, Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210, 235 (1932), I read the saving clause contained in § 406 of the Im- migration and Nationality Act as primarily pertaining to the severability of major parts of the Act from one another, not the divisibility of different provisions within a single section. Surely, Congress would want the natu- ralization provisions of the Act to be severable from the deportation sec- tions. But this does not support preserving § 244 without the legislative veto any more than a saving provision would justify preserving immigra- tion authority without quota limits. More relevant is the fact that for 40 years Congress has insisted on retaining a voice on individual suspension cases-it has frequently re- jected bills which would place final authority in the Executive Branch. It is clear that Congress believed its retention crucial. Given this history, the Court's rewriting of the Act flouts the will of Congress. OCTOBER TERM, 1982 WHITE, J., dissenting 462 U. S. dent's qualified veto power is a critical element in the distri- bution of powers under the Constitution, widely endorsed among the Framers, and intended to serve the President as a defense against legislative encroachment and to check the "passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design." The Federalist No. 73, p. 458 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton). The records of the Convention reveal that it is the first purpose which figured most prominently but I acknowledge the vitality of the second. Id., at 443. I also agree that the bicameral approval required by Art. I, §§ 1, 7, "was of scarcely less concern to the Framers than was the Presidential veto," ante, at 948, and that the need to divide and disperse legislative power figures significantly in our scheme of Government. All of this, Part III of the Court's opinion, is entirely unexceptionable. It does not, however, answer the constitutional question before us. The power to exercise a legislative veto is not the power to write new law without bicameral approval or Presi- dential consideration. The veto must be authorized by stat- ute and may only negative what an Executive department or independent agency has proposed. On its face, the legisla- tive veto no more allows one House of Congress to make law than does the Presidential veto confer such power upon the President. Accordingly, the Court properly recognizes that it "must nevertheless establish that the challenged action under § 244(c)(2) is of the kind to which the procedural re- quirements of Art. I, § 7, apply" and admits that "[n]ot every action taken by either House is subject to the bicameralism and presentation requirements of Art. I." Ante, at 952. A The terms of the Presentment Clauses suggest only that bills and their equivalent are subject to the requirements of bicameral passage and presentment to the President. Arti- cle I, § 7, cl. 2, stipulates only that "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, INS v. CHADHA 919 WHITE, J., dissenting When the Convention did turn its attention to the scope of Congress' lawmaking power, the Framers were expansive. The Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, vests can Congress 81-83 (1979). More directly pertinent is the First Congress' treatment of the Northwest Territories Ordinance of 1787. The Ordi- nance, initially drafted under the Articles of Confederation on July 13, 1787, was the document which governed the territory of the United States northwest of the Ohio River. The Ordinance authorized the Territories to adopt laws, subject to disapproval in Congress. "The governor and judges, or a majority of them, shall adopt and publish in the district, such laws of the original states, criminal and civil, as may be necessary, and best suited to the circumstances of the district, and report them to Congress, from time to time; which laws shall be in force in the district until the organization of the general assembly therein, unless dis- approved of by Congress; but afterwards the legislature shall have author- ity to alter them as they shall think fit" (emphasis added). After the Constitution was ratified, the Ordinance was reenacted to con- form to the requirements of the Constitution. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50-51. Certain provisions, such as one relating to appointment of officials by Congress, were changed because of constitutional concerns, but the language allowing disapproval by Congress was retained. Subsequent provisions for territorial laws contained similar language. See, e. g., 48 U. S. C. § 1478. Although at times Congress disapproved of territorial actions by passing legislation, see, e. g., Act of Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 44, 2 Stat. 444, on at least two occasions one House of Congress passed resolutions to disapprove ter- ritorial laws, only to have the other House fail to pass the measure for rea- sons pertaining to the subject matter of the bills. First, on February 16, 1795, the House of Representatives passed a concurrent resolution disap- proving in one sweep all but one of the laws that the Governors and judges of the Northwest Territory had passed at a legislative session on August 1, 1792. 4 Annals of Cong. 1227. The Senate, however, refused to concur. Id., at 830. See B. Bond, The Civilization of the Old Northwest 70-71 (1934). Second, on May 9, 1800, the House passed a resolution to disap- prove of a Mississippi territorial law imposing a license fee on taverns. H. R. Jour., 6th Cong., 1st Sess., 706 (1826 ed.). The Senate unsuccess- fully attempted to amend the resolution to strike down all laws of the Mis- sissippi Territory enacted since June 30, 1799. 5 C. Carter, Territorial Papers of the United States-Mississippi 94-95 (1937). The histories of the Territories, the correspondence of the era, and the congressional Re- ports contain no indication that such resolutions disapproving of territorial laws were to be presented to the President or that the authorization for OCTOBER TERM, 1982 WHITE, J., dissenting 462 U. S. Congress with the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the fore- going Powers [the enumerated powers of § 8] and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." It is long settled that Congress may "exercise its best judgment in the selection of measures, to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the government," and "avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 415-416, 420 (1819). B The Court heeded this counsel in approving the modern administrative state. The Court's holding today that all legislative-type action must be enacted through the law- making process ignores that legislative authority is routinely delegated to the Executive Branch, to the independent regulatory agencies, and to private individuals and groups. "The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal trend of the last century.... They have become a veritable fourth branch of the Gov- ernment, which has deranged our three-branch legal the- ories ...." FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U. S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J. dissenting). such a "congressional veto" in the Act of Aug. 7, 1789, was of doubtful constitutionality. The practices of the First Congress are not so clear as to be dispositive of the constitutional question now before us. But it is surely significant that this body, largely composed of the same men who authored Art. I and se- cured ratification of the Constitution, did not view the Constitution as for- bidding a precursor of the modern day legislative veto. See J. W. Hamp- ton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 412 (1928) ("In this first Congress sat many members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787. This Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the founders of our gov- ernment and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs, long acquiesced in, fixes the construction to be given its provisions"). INS v. CHADHA 919 WHITE, J., dissenting This Court's decisions sanctioning such delegations make clear that Art. I does not require all action with the effect of legislation to be passed as a law. Theoretically, agencies and officials were asked only to "fill up the details," and the rule was that "Congress cannot dele- gate any part of its legislative power except under the llmita-. tion of a prescribed standard." United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 282 U. S. 311, 324 (1931). Chief Jus- tice Taft elaborated the standard in J. W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409 (1928): "If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power." In practice, however, restrictions on the scope of the power that could be delegated diminished and all but disappeared. In only two instances did the Court find an unconstitutional delegation. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935). In other cases, the 'Intelligible principle" through which agencies have at- tained enormous control over the economic affairs of the country was held to include such formulations as "just and reasonable," Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420 (1930); '"public interest," New York Central Securi- ties Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12 (1932); "public con- venience, interest, or necessity," Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266, 285 (1933); and "unfair methods of competition." FTC v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (1920). The wisdom and the constitutionality of these broad dele- gations are matters that still have not been put to rest. But for present purposes, these cases establish that by virtue of congressional delegation, legislative power can be exercised by independent agencies and Executive departments without the passage of new legislation. For some time, the sheer amount of law-the substantive rules that regulate private conduct and direct the operation of government-made by OCTOBER TERM, 1982 WHiTE, J., dissenting 462 U. S. The Court's opinion in the present cases comes closest to facing the reality of administrative lawmaking in considering the contention that the Attorney General's action in suspend- ing deportation under § 244 is itself a legislative act. The Court posits that the Attorney General is acting in an Art. II enforcement capacity under § 244. This characterization is at odds with Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 40 (1924), where the power conferred on the Executive to deport aliens was considered a delegation of legislative power. The Court sug- gests, however, that the Attorney General acts in an Art. II capacity because "[tlhe courts, when a case or controversy arises, can always 'ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed,' Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 425 (1944), and can enforce adherence to statutory standards." Ante, at 953, n. 16. This assumption is simply wrong, as the Court itself points out: "We are aware of no decision... where a federal court has reviewed a decision of the Attorney General suspending deportation of an alien pursuant to the standards set out in § 244(a)(1). This is not surprising, given that no party to such action has either the motivation or the right to appeal from it." Ante, at 957, n. 22. It is perhaps on the erroneous premise that judicial review may check abuses of the § 244 power that the Court also submits that "[t]he bicameral process is not necessary as a check on the Executive's administration of the laws because his adminis- trative activity cannot reach beyond the limits of the statute that created it-a statute duly enacted pursuant to Art. I, §§ 1, 7." Ante, at 953, n. 16. On the other hand, the Court's reasoning does persuasively explain why a resolution of dis- of-powers concerns underlying Art. I. To be sure, the doctrine of separa- tion of powers is also concerned with checking each branch's exercise of its characteristic authority. Section 244(c)(2) is fully consistent with the need for checks upon congressional authority, infta, at 994-996, and the legisla- tive veto mechanism, more generally is an important check upon Executive authority, supra, at 967-974. INS v. CHADHA 919 WmTE, J., dissenting approval under § 244(c)(2) need not again be subject to the bicameral process. Because it serves only to check the Attorney General's exercise of the suspension authority granted by § 244, the disapproval resolution-unlike the At- torney General's action--"cannot reach beyond the limits of the statute that created it-a statute duly enacted pursuant to Art. I." More fundamentally, even if the Court correctly charac- terizes the Attorney General's authority under § 244 as an Art. II Executive power, the Court concedes that certain ad- ministrative agency action, such as rulemaking, "may resem- ble lawmaking" and recognizes that "[tihis Court has referred to agency activity as being 'quasi-legislative' in character. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 628 (1935)." Ante, at 953, n. 16. Such rules and adjudications by the agencies meet the Court's own definition of legislative action for they "alte[r] the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons... outside the Legislative Branch," ante, at 952, and involve "determinations of policy," ante, at 954. Under the Court's analysis, the Executive Branch and the independ- ent agencies may make rules with the effect of law while Con- gress, in whom the Framers confided the legislative power, Art. I, § 1, may not exercise a veto which precludes such rules from having operative force. If the effective function- ing of a complex modern government requires the delegation of vast authority which, by virtue of its breadth, is legisla- tive or "quasi-legislative" in character, I cannot accept that Art. I-which is, after all, the source of the nondelegation doctrine-should forbid Congress to qualify that grant with a legislative veto. 21 1 The Court's other reasons for holding the legislative veto subject to the presentment and bicameral passage requirements require but brief discus- sion. First, the Court posits that the resolution of disapproval should be considered equivalent to new legislation because absent the veto authority of §244(c)(2) neither House could, short of legislation, effectively require the Attorney General to deport an alien once the Attorney General has OCTOBER TERM, 1982 WHITE, J., dissenting 462 U. S. C The Court also takes no account of perhaps the most rel- evant consideration: However resolutions of disapproval under § 244(c)(2) are formally characterized, in reality, a de- parture from the status quo occurs only upon the concurrence of opinion among the House, Senate, and President. Res- ervations of legislative authority to be exercised by Congress should be upheld if the exercise of such reserved authority is consistent with the distribution of and limits upon legislative power that Art. I provides. 1 As its history reveals, § 244(c)(2) withstands this analysis. Until 1917, Congress had not broadly provided for the de- portation of aliens. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, § 19, 39 Stat. 889. The Immigration Act of 1924 enlarged the categories of determined that the alien should remain in the United States. Ante, at 952-954. The statement is neither accurate nor meaningful. The Attor- ney General's power under the Act is only to "suspend" the order of deportation; the "suspension" does not cancel the deportation or adjust the alien's status to that of a permanent resident alien. Cancellation of deportation and adjustment of status must await favorable action by Con- gress. More important, the question is whether § 244(c)(2) as written is constitutional, and no law is amended or repealed by the resolution of dis- approval which is, of course, expressly authorized by that section. The Court also argues that the legislative character of the challenged action of one House is confirmed by the fact that "when the Framers in- tended to authorize either House of Congress to act alone and outside of its prescribed bicameral legislative role, they narrowly and precisely defined the procedure for such action." Ante, at 955. Leaving aside again the above-refuted premise that all action with a legislative character requires passage in a law, the short answer is that all of these carefully defined ex- ceptions to the presentment and bicameralism strictures do not involve action of the Congress pursuant to a duly enacted statute. Indeed, for the most part these powers-those of impeachment, review of appointments, and treaty ratification--are not legislative powers at all. The fact that it was essential for the Constitution to stipulate that Congress has the power to impeach and try the President hardly demonstrates a limit upon Con- gress' authority to reserve itself a legislative veto, through statutes, over subjects within its lawmaking authority. INS v. CHADHA 919 WrrE, J., dissenting by a concurrent resolution of the Congress. President Tru- man signed the bill without objection. Act of July 1, 1948, ch. 783, 62 Stat. 1206. Practice over the ensuing several years convinced Con- gress that the requirement of affirmative approval was "not workable ... and would, in time, interfere with the legis- lative work of the House." House Judiciary Committee, H. R. Rep. No. 362, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1949). In pre- paring the comprehensive Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the Senate Judiciary Committee recommended that for certain classes of aliens the adjustment of status be sub- ject to the disapproval of either House; but deportation of an alien "who is of the criminal, subversive, or immoral classes or who overstays his period of admission," would be can- celed only upon a concurrent resolution disapproving the deportation. S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 610 (1950). Legislation reflecting this change was passed by both Houses, and enacted into law as part of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 over President Truman's veto, which was not predicated on the presence of a legislative veto. Pub. L. 414, § 244(a), 66 Stat. 214. In subsequent years, the Congress refused further requests that the Attorney General be given final authority to grant discretionary relief for speci- fied categories of aliens, and § 244 remained intact to the present. Section 244(a)(1) authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to suspend the deportation of certain aliens who are otherwise deportable and, upon Congress' approval, to adjust their status to that of aliens lawfully admitted for per- manent residence. In order to be eligible for this relief, an alien must have been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven years, must prove he is of good moral character, and must prove that he or his immediate family would suffer "extreme hardship" if he is deported. Judicial review of a denial of relief may be sought. Thus, the suspension proceeding "has two phases: a OCTOBER TERM, 1982 WHITE, J., dissenting 462 U. S. determination whether the statutory conditions have been met, which generally involves a question of law, and a deter- mination whether relief shall be granted, which [ultimately] is confided to the sound discretion of the Attorney General [and his delegates]." 2 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immi- gration Law and Procedure § 7.9a(5), p. 7-134 (rev. ed. 1983). There is also a third phase to the process. Under § 244(c) (1) the Attorney General must report all such suspensions, with a detailed statement of facts and reasons, to the Con- gress. Either House may then act, in that session or the next, to block the suspension of deportation by passing a resolution of disapproval. § 244(c)(2). Upon congressional approval of the suspension-by its silence-the alien's per- manent status is adjusted to that of a lawful resident alien. The history of the Immigration and Nationality Act makes clear that § 244(c)(2) did not alter the division of actual au- thority between Congress and the Executive. At all times, whether through private bills, or through affirmative concur- rent resolutions, or through the present one-House veto, a permanent change in a deportable allen's status could be ac- complished only with the agreement of the Attorney General, the House, and the Senate. 2 The central concern of the presentment and bicameralism requirements of Art. I is that when a departure from the legal status quo is undertaken, it is done with the approval of the President and both Houses of Congress-or, in the event of a Presidential veto, a two-thirds majority in both Houses. This interest is fully satisfied by the operation of § 244(c)(2). The President's approval is found in the Attorney General's action in recommending to Congress that the deportation order for a given alien be suspended. The House and the Senate indicate their approval of the Executive's action by not passing a resolution of disapproval within the statutory period. Thus, a change in the legal status quo-the deport- ability of the alien-is consummated only with the approval INS v. CHADHA 919 WHITE, J., dissenting of each of the three relevant actors. The disagreement of any one of the three maintains the alien's pre-existing status: the Executive may choose not to recommend suspension; the House and Senate may each veto the recommendation. The effect on the rights and obligations of the affected individuals and upon the legislative system is precisely the same as if a private bill were introduced but failed to receive the neces- sary approval. "The President and the two Houses enjoy exactly the same say in what the law is to be as would have been true for each without the presence of the one-House veto, and nothing in the law is changed absent the concur- rence of the President and a majority in each House." Atkins v. United States, 214 Ct. Cl. 186, 250, 556 F. 2d 1028, 1064 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1009 (1978). This very construction of the Presentment Clauses which the Executive Branch now rejects was the basis upon which the Executive Branch defended the constitutionality of the Reorganization Act, 5 U. S. C. § 906(a) (1982 ed.), which pro- vides that the President's proposed reorganization plans take effect only if not vetoed by either House. When the Depart- ment of Justice advised the Senate on the constitutionality of congressional review in reorganization legislation in 1949, it stated: "In this procedure there is no question involved of the Congress taking legislative action beyond its initial passage of the Reorganization Act." S. Rep. No. 232, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 20 (1949) (Dept. of Justice Memorandum). This also represents the position of the Attorney General more recently.2 'In his opinion on the constitutionality of the legislative review provi- sions of the most recent reorganization statute, 5 U. S. C. § 906(a) (1982 ed.), Attorney General Bell stated that "the statement in Article I, § 7, of the procedural steps to be followed in the enactment of legislation does not exclude other forms of action by Congress.... The procedures prescribed in Article I § 7, for congressional action are not exclusive." 43 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 10, pp. 2-3 (1977). "[I]f the procedures provided in a given stat- ute have no effect on the constitutional distribution of power between OCTOBER TERM, 1982 WHITE, J., dissenting 462 U. S. lution of disapproval under § 244(c)(2). Certainly the legisla- tive veto is no more susceptible to this attack than the Court's increasingly common practice of according weight to the failure of Congress to disturb an Executive or independ- ent agency's action. See n. 11, supra. Earlier this Term, the Court found it important that Congress failed to act on bills proposed to overturn the Internal Revenue Service's in- terpretation of the requirements for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Bob Jones Uni- versity v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 600-601 (1983). If Congress may be said to have ratifed the Internal Revenue Service's interpretation without passing new legislation, Congress may also be said to approve a suspension of de- portation by the Attorney General when it fails to exercise its veto authority.'* The requirements of Art. I are not compro- mised by the congressional scheme. IV The Court of Appeals struck §244(c)(2) as violative of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. It is true that the purpose of separating the authority of Government is to prevent unnecessary and dangerous concentration of power in one branch. For that reason, the Framers saw fit to divide and balance the powers of Government so that each branch would be checked by the others. Virtually every part of our constitutional system bears the mark of this judgment. 2'The Court's doubts that Congress entertained this "arcane" theory when it enacted § 244(c)(2) disregards the fact that this is the historical basis upon which the legislative vetoes contained in the Reorganization Acts have been defended, n. 22, supra, and that the Reorganization Acts then provided the precedent articulated in support of other legislative veto provisions. See, e. g., 87 Cong. Rec. 735 (1941) (Rep. Dirksen) (citing Re- organization Act in support of proposal to include a legislative veto in Lend-Lease Act); H. R. Rep. No. 93-658, p. 42 (1973) (citing Reorganiza- tion Act as "sufficient precedent" for legislative veto provision for Im- poundment Control Act). INS v. CHADHA 919 WHITE, J., dissenting But the history of the separation-of-powers doctrine is also a history of accommodation and practicality. Apprehensions of an overly powerful branch have not led to undue prophy- lactic measures that handicap the effective working of the National Government as a whole. The Constitution does not contemplate total separation of the three branches of Govern- ment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 121 (1976). "[A] her- metic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively." Ibid.' Our decisions reflect this judgment. As already noted, the Court, recognizing that modern government must address a formidable agenda of complex policy issues, countenanced the delegation of extensive legislative authority to Exec- utive and independent agencies. J. W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928). The separation- of-powers doctrine has heretofore led to the invalidation of Government action only when the challenged action violated some express provision in the Constitution. In Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 118-124 (per curiam), and Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), congressional action com- promised the appointment power of the President. See also Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 200-201 (1928). In United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (1872), an Act of Congress was struck for encroaching upon judicial Madison emphasized that the principle of separation of powers is pri- marily violated "where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department." The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-3?6 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Madison noted that the oracle of the separation doctrine, Montesquieu, in writing that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers should not be united "in the same person or body of magistrates," did not mean "that these depart- ments ought to have no partial agency in, or control over the acts of each other." Id., at 325 (emphasis in original). Indeed, according to Montes- quieu, the legislature is uniquely fit to exercise an additional function: "to examine in what manner the laws that it has made have been executed." W. Gwyn, The Meaning of Separation of Powers 102 (1965). OCTOBER TERM, 1982 WHITE, J., dissenting 462 U. S. power, but the Court found that the Act also impinged upon the Executive's exclusive pardon power. Art. II, § 2. Be- cause we must have a workable efficient Government, this is as it should be. This is the teaching of Nixon v. Administrator of Gen- eral Services, 433 U. S. 425 (1977), which, in rejecting a separation-of-powers objection to a law requiring that the Administrator take custody of certain Presidential papers, set forth a framework for evaluating such claims: "[I]n determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it-prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitution- ally assigned functions. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 711-712. Only where the potential for dis- ruption is present must we then determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Con- gress." Id., at 443. Section 244(c)(2) survives this test. The legislative veto provision does not "preven[t] the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions." First, it is clear that the Executive Branch has no "constitutionally assigned" function of suspending the deportation of aliens. "'[Olver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over' the admission of aliens." Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 766 (1972), quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 339 (1909). Nor can it be said that the inher- ent function of the Executive Branch in executing the law is involved. The Steel Seizure Case resolved that the Art. II mandate for the President to execute the law is a directive to enforce the law which Congress has written. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). "The duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a 1000 INS v. CHADHA 919 Appendix to opinion of WHITE, J., dissenting by an appointed official but by the body immediately respon- sible to the people," Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part). I must dissent. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF WHITE, J., DISSENTING STATUTES WITH PROVISIONS AUTHORIZING CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW This compilation, reprinted from the Brief for the United States Senate, identifies and describes briefly current statu- tory provisions for a legislative veto by one or both Houses of Congress. Statutory provisions for a veto by Committees of the Congress and provisions which require legislation (i. e., passage of a joint resolution) are not included. The 55 stat- utes in the compilation (some of which contain more than one provision for legislative review) are divided into six broad categories: foreign affairs and national security, budget, in- ternational trade, energy, rulemaldng and miscellaneous. "A. "FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL SECURITY "1. Act for International Development of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 617, 75 Stat. 424, 444, [as amended,] 22 U. S. C. 2367 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Funds made available for foreign assistance under the Act may be terminated by con- current resolution). "2. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5, 87 Stat. 555, 556-557 (1973), [as amended,] 50 U. S. C. 1544 [(1976 ed. and Supp. V)] (Absent declaration of war, Presi- dent may be directed by concurrent resolution to remove United States armed forces engaged in foreign hostilities.) "3. Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-155, § 807, 87 Stat. 605, 615 (1973), 50 U. S. C. 1431 (National defense contracts obligating the United States for any amount in excess of $25,000,000 may be disapproved by resolution of either House). OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Appendix to opinion of WHITE, J., dissenting 462 U. S. "4. Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-365, §709(c), 88 Stat. 399, 408 (1974), [as amended,] 50 U. S. C. app. 2403-1(c) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Applications for export of defense goods, tech- nology or techniques may be disapproved by concurrent resolution). "5. H. R. J. Res. 683, Pub. L. No. 94-110, § 1, 89 Stat. 572 (1975), 22 U. S. C. 2441 note (Assignment of civilian person- nel to Sinai may be disapproved by concurrent resolution). "6. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-161, § 310, 89 Stat. 849, 860, [as amended,] 22 U. S. C. 2151n [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Foreign assistance to countries not meeting human rights standards may be terminated by concurrent resolution). "7. International Security Assistance and Arms [Export] Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, § [211(a)], 90 Stat. 729, 743, [as amended,] 22 U. S. C. 2776(b) [(1976 ed. and Supp. V)] (President's letter of offer to sell major defense equipment may be disapproved by concurrent resolution). "8. National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, § 202, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976), 50 U. S. C. 1622 (Presidentially de- clared national emergency may be terminated by concurrent resolution). "9. International Navigational Rules Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-75, § 3(d), 91 Stat. 308, 33 U. S. C. § 1602(d) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Presidential proclamation of International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea may be disap- proved by concurrent resolution). "10. International Security Assistance Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-92, § 16, 91 Stat. 614, 622, 22 U. S. C. § 2753(d)(2) (President's proposed transfer of arms to a third country may be disapproved by concurrent resolution). "11. Act of December [28], 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § [207(b)], 91 Stat. 1625, 1628, 50 U. S. C. 1706(b) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Presidentially declared national emergency and exercise of conditional powers may be terminated by concur- rent resolution). 1004 INS v. CHADHA 919 Appendix to opinion of WHrTS, J., dissenting "12. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95- 242, §§ [303(a), 304(a)], 306, 307, 401, 92 Stat. 120, 130, 134, 137-38, 139, 144, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2160(f), 2155(b), 2157(b), [2158] 2153(d) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Cooperative agreements concerning storage and disposition of spent nuclear fuel, pro- posed export of nuclear facilities, materials or technology and proposed agreements for international cooperation in nuclear reactor development may be disapproved by concurrent resolution). "B. "BUDGET "13. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 1013, 88 Stat. 297, 334-35, 31 U. S. C. 1403 (The proposed deferral of budget authority provided for a specific project or purpose may be disapproved by an impoundment resolution by either House). "C. "INTERNATIONAL TRADE "14. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 351, 76 Stat. 872, 899, 19 U. S. C. 1981(a) (Tariff or duty recommended by Tariff Commission may be imposed by con- current resolution of approval). "15. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 203(c), 302(b), 402(d), 407, 88 Stat. 1978, 2016, 2043, 2057-60, 2063-64, [as amended,] 19 U. S. C. 2253(c), 2412(b), 2432, [2437 (1976 ed. and Supp. V)] (Proposed Presidential actions on import relief and actions concerning certain countries may be disapproved by concurrent resolution; various Presiden- tial proposals for waiver extensions and for extension of non- discriminatory treatment to products of foreign countries may be disapproved by simple (either House) or concurrent resolutions). "16. Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-646, § 8, 88 Stat. 2333, 2336, 12 U. S. C. [635e(b)] (Presidentially proposed limitation for exports to USSR in OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Appendix to opinion of WHITE, J., dissenting 462 U. S. of established amounts may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (proposed award by President of individual contracts for purchase of more than 75,000 barrels per day of crude oil may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (President's proposals to overcome energy shortage through synthetic fuels development, and individual contracts to pur- chase more than 75,000 barrels per day, including use of loans or guarantees, may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (procedures for either House to disapprove proposals made under Act are established;) (request by Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC) for additional time to submit its compre- hensive strategy may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (proposed amendment to comprehensive strategy by SFC Board of Directors may be disapproved by concurrent resolution of either House or by failure of both Houses to pass concurrent resolution of approval;) (procedure for either House to disapprove certain proposed actions of SFC is es- tablished;) (procedure for both Houses to approve by concur- rent resolution or either House to reject concurrent resolu- tion for proposed amendments to comprehensive strategy of SFC is established;) (proposed loans and loan guarantees by SFC may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (ac- quisition by SFC of a synthetic fuels project which is receiv- ing financial assistance may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (SFC contract renegotiations exceeding initial cost estimates by 175% may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (proposed financial assistance to synthetic fuel projects in Western Hemisphere outside United States may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (President's request to suspend provisions requiring build up of reserves and limiting sale or disposal of certain crude oil reserves must be approved by resolution of both Houses). "E. "RULEMAKING "27. Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § [509(a)], 88 Stat. 484, 567, 20 U. S. C. 1232(d)(1) [(1976 ed., 1008 INS v. CHADHA 919 Appendix to opinion of WHITE, J., dissenting Supp. V)] (Department of Education regulations may be dis- approved by concurrent resolution). "28. Federal Education Campaign Act Amendments of. 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, § 109, 93 Stat. 1339, 1364, 2 U. S. C. 438(d)(2) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Proposed rules and regulations of the Federal Election Commission may be dis- approved by resolution of either House). "29. Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § [2(a)(1)], 88 Stat. 1926, 1948, 28 U. S. C. 2076 (Proposed amendments by Supreme Court of Federal Rules of Evidence may be disapproved by resolution of either House). "30. Act of August 9, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-88, § 208, 89 Stat. 433, 436-37, 42 U. S. C. 602 note (Social Security standards proposed by Secretary of Health and Human Serv- ices may be disapproved by either House). "31. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, §43(f)(3), 92 Stat. 1705, 1752, 49 U. S. C. 1552(f) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Rules or regulations governing employee protec- tion program may be disapproved by resolution of either House). "32. Education Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-561, §§ 1138, [212(b)], 1409, 92 Stat. 2143, 2327, 2341, 2369, 25 U. S. C. 2018, 20 U. S. C. [927], 1221-3(e) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Rules and regulations proposed under the Act may be disapproved by concurrent resolution). "33. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, § 7(b)(1), 94 Stat. 349, 352-353 (1980) 42 U. S. C. 1997e [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Attorney General's proposed standards for resolution of grievances of adults confined in correctional facilities may be disapproved by resolution of either House). "34. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 21(a), 94 Stat. 374, 393, 15 U. S. C. 57a-1 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Federal Trade Commis- sion rules may be disapproved by concurrent resolution). "35. Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 414(b), 93 Stat. 668, 685 (1979), 20 U. S. C. 3474 1009 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 Appendix to opinion of WHITE, J., dissenting 462 U. S. [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Rules and regulations promulgated with respect to the various functions, programs and responsibili- ties transferred by this Act, may be disapproved by concur- rent resolution). "36. Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, § 102, 94 Stat. 1208, 1213, 29 U. S. C. 1322a [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Schedules proposed by Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGO) which requires an in- crease in premiums must be approved by concurrent resolu- tion;) (revised premium schedules for voluntary supplemental coverage proposed by PBGC may be disapproved by concur- rent resolution). "37. Farm Credit Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-592, § 508, 94 Stat. 3437, 3450, 12 U. S. C. [2252 (1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Certain Farm Credit Administration regulations may be disapproved by concurrent resolution or delayed by resolution of either House.) "38. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa- tion, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 305, 94 Stat. 2767, 2809, 42 U. S. C. 9655 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Environmental Protection Agency regulations concerning hazardous substances releases, liability and compensation may be disapproved by concurrent resolution or by the adop- tion of either House of a concurrent resolution which is not disapproved by the other House). "39. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, § 501, 94 Stat. 2987, 3004, 16 U. S. C. 470w-6 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Regulation proposed by the Secretary of the Interior may be disapproved by con- current resolution). "40. Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-464, § 12, 94 Stat. 2060, 2067, 16 U. S. C. 1463a [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Rules proposed by the Secretary of Commerce may be disapproved by concurrent resolution). "41. Act of December 17, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-539, § 4, 94 Stat. 3194, 3195, 7 U. S. C. 136w [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Rules or regulations promulgated by the Administrator of the Envi- 1010 INS v. CHADHA 919 REHNQUIST, J., dissenting "51. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, §§ 203(c), 204(c)(1), 90 Stat. 2743, 2750, 2752, 43 U. S. C. 1713(c), 1714 (Sale of public lands in excess of two thousand five hundred acres and withdrawal of public lands aggregating five thousand acres or more may be disap- proved by concurrent resolution). "52. Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-19, § [401(a)] 91 Stat. 39, 45, 2 U. S. C. 359 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (President's recommenda- tions regarding rates of salary payment may be disapproved by resolution of either House). "53. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, §415, 92 Stat. 1111, 1179, 5 U. S. C. 3131 note [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Continuation of Senior Executive Service may be disapproved by concurrent resolution). "54. Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-523, § 304(b), 92 Stat. 1887, 1906, 31 U. S. C. 1322 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Presidential timetable for re- ducing unemployment may be superseded by concurrent resolution). "55. District of Columbia Retirement Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-122, § 164, 93 Stat. 866, 891-92 (1979) (Required re- ports to Congress on the District of Columbia retirement pro- gram may be rejected by resolution of either House). "56. Act of August 29, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-332, § 2, 94 Stat. 1057, 1058, 16 U. S. C. 1432 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Des- ignation of marine sanctuary by the Secretary of Commerce may be disapproved by concurrent resolution)." JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE WHITE joins, dissenting. A severability clause creates a presumption that Con- gress intended the valid portion of the statute to remain in force when one part is found to be invalid. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 312 (1936); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210, 235 1013 OCTOBER TERM, 1982 REHNQUIST, J., dissenting 462 U. S. (1932). A severability clause does not, however, conclu- sively resolve the issue. "[T]he determination, in the end, is reached by" asking "[wihat was the intent of the lawmakers," Carter, supra, at 312, and "will rarely turn on the presence or absence of such a clause." United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570, 585, n. 27 (1968). Because I believe that Congress did not intend the one-House veto provision of § 244(c)(2) to be severable, I dissent. Section 244(c)(2) is an exception to the general rule that an alien's deportation shall be suspended when the Attorney General finds that statutory criteria are met. It is severable only if Congress would have intended to permit the Attorney General to suspend deportations without it. This Court has held several times over the years that exceptions such as this are not severable because "by rejecting the exceptions intended by the legislature ... the statute is made to enact what confessedly the legislature never meant. It confers upon the statute a positive operation beyond the legislative intent, and beyond what anyone can say it would have enacted in view of the illegality of the exceptions." Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U. S. 90, 95 (1886). By severing § 244(c)(2), the Court permits suspension of deportation in a class of cases where Congress never stated that suspension was appropriate. I do not believe we should expand the statute in this way without some clear indication that Congress intended such an expansion. As the Court said in Davis v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478, 484-485 (1922): "Where an excepting provision in a statute is found unconstitutional, courts very generally hold that this does not work an enlargement of the scope or operation of other provisions with which that provision was en- acted and which was intended to qualify or restrain. The reasoning on which the decisions proceed is illus- trated in State ex rel. McNeal v. Dombaugh, 20 Ohio St. 167, 174. In dealing with a contention that a statute 1014 INS v. CHADHA 919 REHNQUIST, J., dissenting containing an unconstitutional provision should be con- strued as if the remainder stood alone, the court there said: 'This would be to mutilate the section and garble its meaning. The legislative intention must not be con- founded with their power to carry that intention into effect. To refuse to give force and vitality to a provision of law is one thing, and to refuse to read it is a very dif- ferent thing. It is by a mere figure of speech that we say an unconstitutional provision of a statute is "stricken out." For all the purposes of construction it is to be regarded as part of the act. The meaning of the legisla- ture must be gathered from all that they have said, as well from that which is ineffectual for want of power, as from that which is authorized by law.' "Here the excepting provision was in the statute when it was enacted, and there can be no doubt that the legis- lature intended that the meaning of the other provisions should be taken as restricted accordingly. Only with that restricted meaning did they receive the legislative sanction which was essential to make them part of the statute law of the State; and no other authority is compe- tent to give them a larger application." See also Frost v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 278 U. S. 515, 525 (1929). The Court finds that the legislative history of § 244 shows that Congress intended §244(c)(2) to be severable because Congress wanted to relieve itself of the burden of private bills. But the history elucidated by the Court shows that Congress was unwilling to give the Executive Branch per- mission to suspend deportation on its own. Over the years, Congress consistently rejected requests from the Executive for complete discretion in this area. Congress always in- sisted on retaining ultimate control, whether by concurrent resolution, as in the 1948 Act, or by one-House veto, as in the present Act. Congress has never indicated that it would be willing to permit suspensions of deportation unless it could retain some sort of veto. 1015