The Role of Consumer Protection and Competition Authorities in Ensuring Fair Markets, Summaries of Law

Download The Role of Consumer Protection and Competition Authorities in Ensuring Fair Markets and more Summaries Law in PDF only on Docsity! # Ms °@ = od été, ik ¢: : 2. | The Interface between Competition and Consumer Policies 2008 The OECD Competition Committee debated The Interface between Competition and Consumer Policies in February 2008. This document includes an executive summary and the documents from the meeting: written submissions from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, European Commission, France, India, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Malta, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Suisse, Chinese Taipei, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uzbekistan as well as an aide-memoire of the discussion. The two policies share a common goal: the enhancement of consumer welfare. In this way they are highly complementary. Applied properly, they reinforce one another. Aside from their different approaches to markets, however, there are other differences between competition and consumer policies. These differences present both opportunities and challenges. Applied consistently, each policy will each make the other more effective, especially in situations of evolving markets. The challenge comes in co- ordinating them, and in ensuring that they do not work at cross purposes. Institutional design is an important factor in providing effective public palicy. With the increasing recognition of the importance of integrating competition policy and consumer policy, there is debate about how to design the most effective institutions for that purpose. Housing the two functions in a single agency offers several advantages, including more centralised control, operational efficiencies and cross-fertilisation between the two disciplines. There could be disadvantages as well, however. Competition Restrictions in Legal Professions (2007) Competition and Legal Restrictions in Retail Banking (2006) Competition and Efficient Usage of Payment Cards (2006) Competition in the Provision of Hospital Services (2005) Loyalty and Fidelity Discounts and Rebates (2003} OECD  Unclassified DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 05-Jun-2008 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ English/French DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMMITTEE Global Forum on Competition THE INTERFACE BETWEEN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER POLICIES JT03247229 Document complet disponible sur OLIS dans son format d'origine Complete document available on OLIS in its original format D A F/C O M P/G F(2008)10 U nclassified E nglish/French DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 4 35. Price Transparency DAFFE/CLP(2001)22 36. Competition Policy in Subsidies and State Aid DAFFE/CLP(2001)24 37. Portfolio Effects in Conglomerate Mergers DAFFE/COMP(2002)5 38. Competition and Regulation Issues in Telecommunications DAFFE/COMP(2002)6 39. Merger Review in Emerging High Innovation Markets DAFFE/COMP(2002)20 40. Loyalty and Fidelity Discounts and Rebates DAFFE/COMP(2002)21 41. Communication by Competition Authorities DAFFE/COMP(2003)4 42. Substantive Criteria used for the Assessment of Mergers DAFFE/COMP(2003)5 43. Competition Issues in the Electricity Sector DAFFE/COMP(2003)14 44. Media Mergers DAFFE/COMP(2003)16 45. Non Commercial Services Obligations and Liberalisation DAFFE/COMP(2004)19 46. Competition and Regulation in the Water Sector DAFFE/COMP(2004)20 47. Regulating Market Activities by Public Sector DAF/COMP(2004)36 48. Merger Remedies DAF/COMP(2004)21 49. Cartels: Sanctions against Individuals DAF/COMP(2004)39 50. Intellectual Property Rights DAF/COMP(2004)24 51. Predatory Foreclosure DAF/COMP(2005)14 52. Competition and Regulation in Agriculture: Monopsony Buying and Joint Selling DAF/COMP(2005)44 53. Enhancing Beneficial Competition in the Health Professions DAF/COMP(2005)45 54. Evaluation of the Actions and Resources of Competition Authorities DAF/COMP(2005)30 55. Structural Reform in the Rail Industry DAF/COMP(2005)46 56. Competition on the Merits DAF/COMP(2005)27 57. Resale Below Cost Laws and Regulations DAF/COMP(2005)43 58. Barriers to Entry DAF/COMP(2005)42 59. Prosecuting Cartels without Direct Evidence of Agreement DAF/COMP/GF(2006)7 60. The Impact of Substitute Services on Regulation DAF/COMP(2006)18 61. Competition in the Provision of Hospital Services DAF/COMP(2006)20 62. Access to key Transport Facilities DAF/COMP(2006)29 63. Environmental Regulation and Competition DAF/COMP(2006)30 64. Concessions DAF/COMP/GF(2006)6 65. Remedies and Sanctions DAF/COMP(2006)19 66. Competition in Bidding Markets DAF/COMP(2006)31 67. Competition and Efficient Usage of Payment cards DAF/COMP(2006)32 68. Vertical mergers DAF/COMP(2007)21 69. Competition and Regulation in Retail Banking DAF/COMP(2007)33 70. Improving Competition in Real Estate Transactions DAF/COMP(2007)36 71. Public Procurement – The Role of Competition Authorities in Promoting Competition DAF/COMP(2007)34 72. Competition, Patents and Innovation DAF/COMP(2007)40 73. Private Remedies DAF/COMP(2006)34 DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 5 74. Energy Security and Competition Policy DAF/COMP(2007)35 75. Plea Bargaining Settlement of Cartel Cases DAF/COMP(2007)38 76. Competitive Restrictions in Legal Professions DAF/COMP(2007)39 77. Dynamic Effiencies in merger Analysis DAF/COMP(2007)41 78. Guidance to Business on Monopolisation and abuse of Dominance DAF/COMP(2007)43 DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................... 8 SYNTHÈSE .................................................................................................................................................. 13 BACKGROUND NOTE ............................................................................................................................. 17 NOTE DE RÉFÉRENCE .............................................................................................................................. 39 NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS Argentina ....................................................................................................................................... 63 Australia ........................................................................................................................................ 67 Canada ........................................................................................................................................... 75 Chile .............................................................................................................................................. 81 Costa Rica ..................................................................................................................................... 87 El Salvador .................................................................................................................................... 89 Le Salvador.................................................................................................................................... 97 European Commission (Speech by Commissioner Kuneva) ....................................................... 105 European Commission ................................................................................................................ 109 France .......................................................................................................................................... 113 France .......................................................................................................................................... 121 India ............................................................................................................................................. 131 Japan ............................................................................................................................................ 137 Jordan .......................................................................................................................................... 143 Korea ........................................................................................................................................... 147 Malta ............................................................................................................................................ 155 Papua New Guinea ...................................................................................................................... 161 Poland .......................................................................................................................................... 169 Portugal ....................................................................................................................................... 175 Russian Federation ...................................................................................................................... 183 Singapore ..................................................................................................................................... 185 Slovak Republic .......................................................................................................................... 189 Switzerland .................................................................................................................................. 193 Suisse ........................................................................................................................................... 197 Chinese Taipei ............................................................................................................................. 201 Tunisie ......................................................................................................................................... 207 United Kingdom .......................................................................................................................... 215 United States................................................................................................................................ 225 Uzbekistan ................................................................................................................................... 233 DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 9 (2) Aside from their different approaches to markets, however, there are other differences between competition and consumer policies. Consumer policy is more diverse than competition policy. It is more than just making markets work; it includes, for example, preventing and redressing fraudulent conduct, and protecting consumers from unsafe products. Enforcement of consumer policy is typically more dispersed as well. Enforcement of competition policy tends to be concentrated in a single competition agency, though others may have some role, such as sector regulators and, in some countries, private parties through lawsuits. There also may be a single agency charged with enforcing a consumer protection law, but other government bodies – ministries of commerce or industry, sector regulators and in some countries regional and local governments – are also active. And often NGO consumer organisations are involved in forming consumer policy. Competition cases are typically fewer in number and broader in scope, affecting entire markets. Consumer cases are more numerous and more narrowly focused, sometimes involving a specific practice by a single business. Competition and consumer agencies also have different tools at their disposal for dealing with violations of their respective laws. The instruments available to competition agencies are more blunt: fines, or prohibition of anticompetitive conduct, for example. The remedies available to consumer agencies can be more targeted and specific: measures designed to improve information flows to consumers, for example. (3) These differences present both opportunities and challenges. Applied consistently, each policy will each make the other more effective, especially in situations of evolving markets. The challenge comes in co-ordinating them, and in ensuring that they do not work at cross purposes. Co-ordinating the two policies has obvious benefits, even at the level of a single case. Because they use different approaches, employing different tools, applying them together adds flexibility, especially in cases where market problems can be analysed before choosing which tools to deploy. The prime focus ought to be the market and what can make it work better. An equally important reason for co-ordination is to ensure that the application of one does not interfere with the other. The imposition of anticompetitive restrictions on behaviour – unnecessary restrictions on price advertising, for example – will harm competition and consumers. There are new developments that offer opportunities for integrating the two policies. Advances in the field of behavioural economics have contributed to new understanding of how consumers react in situations of imperfect information, which has implications for both consumer and competition policies. There is a steady trend toward deregulation across countries; more sectors are being exposed to competition, notable among them the professions, financial services, retail energy and mobile telephony. In these newly competitive markets there tends to be information asymmetry as between sellers and buyers, which can be addressed most efficiently through co- ordination of competition and consumer policies. Electronic commerce is another field that offers great promise in promoting competition, but again there exists the concern that consumers, or some segment of them, will lack sufficient information to use this medium effectively. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 10 Institutional design (4) Institutional design is an important factor in providing effective public policy. With the increasing recognition of the importance of integrating competition policy and consumer policy, there is debate about how to design the most effective institutions for that purpose. Public policies do not operate in a vacuum; they are implemented by institutions, and the quality of institutions determines in many ways the capacity of the system to deliver good policy products to individual citizens. In the case of competition and consumer policies, the central question is whether to combine the two functions in a single agency. There are advantages and disadvantages to this approach, and countries have made different decisions on this question. (5) Housing the two functions in a single agency offers several advantages, including more centralised control, operational efficiencies and cross-fertilisation between the two disciplines. There could be disadvantages as well, however. As noted above, co-ordination of the two policies is important, and placing them within a single agency should make it easier to do that. A few countries have gone to great lengths to integrate the two, even at the case level. A case team may include experts from both disciplines, and it may be decided whether to consider the matter as a competition case or a consumer case only after some inquiry. The full range of competition and consumer remedies is available in such an arrangement. More broadly, the consumer and competition sides may undertake a comprehensive evaluation of competition in an entire sector. Where there are deficiencies, appropriate remedies from both disciplines can be applied. Whether or not there is integration at the case level, there can be sharing of information and intelligence between the two sides, and policy making can be more coherent. Also, consumer policy and competition policy require similar, though not identical, expertise, the supply of which is limited. Combining the two policy functions may allow this expertise to be used more efficiently. Several small economies have found these efficiency arguments important and have combined the two functions for that reason, though not all small countries have done so. In countries where competition policy is relatively new, the public tends to be more familiar with consumer policy and to view it more favourably. Combining the two could help to transfer this good will to competition policy. Conversely, within government consumer policy sometimes has fewer supporters than competition policy, resulting in an inadequate budget for consumer policy. Again, combining them could help to remedy that problem. But joining the two functions in one agency could also introduce problems. Competition policy and consumer policy are far from identical, after all. Although not cited by joint agencies as having occurred, in theory co-ordinating their disparate procedures, cases and objectives could be difficult. The two sides may compete for resources, with the outcome being less than optimal. Also there is the view, though perhaps a minority one, that if the two policies operating separately can be adequately co-ordinated, then two voices in unison, for example in public advocacy, can be more effective than one. (6) Some countries may elect to maintain separate agencies, and the two policies probably cannot be completely integrated in a single agency in any event. It is still possible to co-ordinate them, however, in a way that benefits consumers. As noted above, neither competition policy nor consumer policy can be fully contained within one agency, and this is especially true for consumer policy. Co-ordination should be possible, DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 11 however. In some countries this is done by means of a central commission within government, usually having advisory powers only, on which sit representatives of the various consumer constituencies, including, in some cases, NGO consumer organisations. A representative of the competition community, usually the head of the competition agency, may also be a member. In some countries the competition and consumer agencies have entered into a co-operation agreement, much like co-operation agreements between competition agencies and sector regulators, which ensure that the two agencies will consult and will share information. The two agencies might even jointly participate in a case, which has been successfully demonstrated in at least one country. The outcome of any such co-ordination should be that their policies operate to the ultimate benefit of consumers. To this end, it would seem that policy makers should understand that market-based solutions are preferable to regulatory ones. Nevertheless, there will be instances where consumer policy intervention is necessary, especially in situations of information imperfection or switching costs. Care should be taken in these instances that the interventions do not unnecessarily restrict competition. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 14 (2) Outre leur approche différente du marché, la politique de la concurrence et la politique à l’égard des consommateurs se distinguent par d’autres caractéristiques spécifiques. La politique à l’égard des consommateurs est plus éclectique que la politique de la concurrence. Elle ne se borne pas seulement à garantir le bon fonctionnement du marché : elle vise notamment à empêcher et corriger les pratiques frauduleuses et à protéger les consommateurs contre les produits dangereux. Sa mise en œuvre est également plus variée en règle générale. L’application de la politique de la concurrence tend à être concentrée au sein d’une seule autorité, même si d’autres parties prenantes sont aussi impliquées comme les autorités de tutelle sectorielles et, dans certains pays, les personnes privées par le biais des poursuites judiciaires. S’il peut exister une seule autorité responsable de l’application du droit de la protection des consommateurs, d’autres organismes peuvent y contribuer (ministère du commerce ou de l’industrie, autorités de tutelle sectorielles et, dans certains pays, administrations locales et régionales). Par ailleurs, les associations de consommateurs participent fréquemment à la formulation de la politique de la consommation. Les affaires de concurrence sont généralement moins nombreuses et de plus grande envergure, puisqu’elles peuvent concerner des marchés entiers. Dans le domaine de la consommation, les affaires sont plus nombreuses et plus ciblées et peuvent parfois porter sur une pratique spécifique adoptée par une seule entreprise. Les autorités en charge de la concurrence et de la protection des consommateurs ont en outre recours à des outils différents pour traiter les infractions à leur droit respectif. Les instruments utilisés par les autorités de la concurrence sont moins nuancés : amendes ou interdiction de pratiques anticoncurrentielles par exemple. En revanche, les solutions mises à la disposition des autorités en charge de la protection des consommateurs sont plus ciblées et spécifiques, à l’instar des mesures visant à améliorer les informations fournies aux consommateurs. (3) Ces différences présentent à la fois des aspects positifs et des aspects négatifs. Si elles sont correctement appliquées, chaque politique renforcera l’efficacité de l’autre, plus particulièrement sur les marchés en mutation. Le défi consiste à garantir leur coordination et à veiller à ce qu’elles ne visent pas des objectifs contradictoires. La coordination de ces deux politiques présente des avantages évidents, même au niveau des affaires individuelles. Leur application conjuguée offre en effet de la souplesse, puisqu’elles sont fondées sur des démarches et des outils différents. Il en est particulièrement ainsi lorsque les problèmes posés par le marché concerné peuvent être étudiés avant de décider des mesures à mettre en œuvre. Le marché et les solutions à apporter pour en améliorer le fonctionnement sont les cibles prioritaires. Autre point essentiel : la coordination garantit que l’application d’une des politiques ne nuise pas à l’efficacité de l’autre. L’application de restrictions anticoncurrentielles (restrictions superflues sur la publicité sur les prix par exemple) est néfaste à la fois pour la concurrence et pour les consommateurs. Certaines tendances récentes offrent des opportunités d’intégration des deux politiques. Les progrès accomplis dans le domaine de l’économie comportementale ont permis de mieux comprendre la réaction des consommateurs en situation d’information imparfaite, ce qui a des implications à la fois pour la politique de la concurrence et pour la politique à l’égard des consommateurs. La tendance en faveur de la déréglementation se généralise à l’échelle mondiale : de plus en plus de secteurs se sont ouverts à la concurrence, parmi lesquels les professions libérales, les services financiers, la distribution d’énergie et la téléphonie mobile. Sur ces nouveaux marchés concurrentiels, il existe en général une asymétrie de l’information entre vendeurs et acheteurs, qui peut être résolue de manière efficace grâce à la coordination des DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 15 politiques de la concurrence et de la consommation. Si le commerce électronique se révèle également très prometteur du point de vue de la concurrence, il suscite la crainte que les consommateurs, ou du moins certains d’entre eux, ne soient pas suffisamment informés pour en tirer le meilleur profit. Mécanismes institutionnels (4) La conception des institutions est un facteur essentiel pour garantir l’efficacité des politiques publiques. Face à la prise de conscience croissante de la nécessité d’intégrer politique de la concurrence et politique à l’égard des consommateurs, la question de la conception des institutions en charge de cette intégration fait actuellement débat. Les politiques publiques n’opèrent pas en vase clos : elles sont mises en œuvre par des institutions dont la qualité détermine à bien des égards la capacité du système à élaborer des politiques efficaces pour les citoyens. S’agissant des politiques de la concurrence et de la consommation, la principale question qui se pose est de savoir s’il convient de les réunir au sein d’une même entité. Cette approche présente des avantages et des inconvénients et les solutions retenues divergent. (5) Le regroupement de ces deux fonctions au sein d’une même autorité présente plusieurs avantages : contrôle centralisé, gains de productivité et enrichissement mutuel. Néanmoins, il n’est pas exempt d’inconvénients. Comme indiqué précédemment, la coordination des deux politiques est essentielle et devrait être facilitée si elles sont réunies au sein d’une même autorité. Quelques pays ont déployé beaucoup d’efforts pour intégrer les deux politiques, et ce même au niveau des affaires individuelles. Ainsi, l’équipe en charge d’une affaire peut être composée d’experts des deux disciplines et il n’est décidé de la traiter comme une affaire de concurrence ou comme une affaire de consommation qu’après une procédure d’enquête. Dans ce cas, l’équipe a accès à l’ensemble des outils utilisés dans le domaine de la concurrence et dans celui de la consommation. D’une manière plus générale, les experts de la consommation et les experts de la concurrence peuvent entreprendre un examen exhaustif de la concurrence au sein d’un secteur donné. En cas de défaillance, les solutions appropriées sont appliquées. Que l’intégration ait été mise en œuvre ou non au niveau des affaires, il peut y avoir un échange d’informations et de connaissances entre les deux communautés, de manière à améliorer la cohérence de la formulation de l’action publique. Par ailleurs, politique de la consommation et politique de la concurrence nécessitent des compétences similaires, quoique distinctes, qui sont plutôt difficiles à trouver. L’intégration des deux politiques pourrait donc permettre de faire un meilleur usage de ces compétences. Plusieurs économies de petite envergure ont été convaincues par ces arguments et ont regroupé les deux fonctions pour gagner en efficacité et en productivité, mais tous les petits pays n’ont pas suivi cette voie. Dans les pays où la politique de la concurrence est relativement récente, l’opinion publique tend à être plus familiarisée avec la politique de la consommation et à la considérer de manière plus favorable. L’intégration des deux politiques pourrait donc permettre de faire bénéficier la politique de la concurrence de cette bienveillance. A l’inverse, la politique à l’égard des consommateurs est parfois moins bien perçue par les pouvoirs publics, qui lui allouent alors des budgets insuffisants. Là encore, l’intégration des deux politiques pourrait pallier ce problème. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 16 Cependant, le regroupement des deux fonctions au sein d’une même autorité peut susciter des problèmes. Après tout, il existe des différences importantes entre les deux politiques. En théorie, la coordination de leurs procédures, affaires et objectifs propres pourrait donc s’avérer un véritable défi. Toutefois, les agences intégrées n’ont pas indiqué y avoir été confrontées en pratique. Par ailleurs, les deux disciplines pourraient entrer en concurrence pour obtenir des ressources, ce qui nuirait à leur efficacité. Peut être minoritaires, certains ont aussi fait valoir que si les deux politiques peuvent être efficacement coordonnées tout en restant soumises à des autorités distinctes, alors deux voix s’exprimant à l’unisson, notamment lors de campagnes à l’intention du public, peuvent se révéler plus efficaces qu’une seule. (6) Certains pays peuvent choisir de conserver deux autorités distinctes : les deux politiques ne peuvent probablement pas être intégrées totalement quoi qu’il en soit. Il est néanmoins possible de garantir leur coordination, de manière à ce qu’elles aient des effets bénéfiques pour le consommateur. Ni la politique de la concurrence ni la politique de la consommation ne peuvent être complètement intégrées au sein d’une même autorité, ce qui est plus particulièrement vrai pour la politique de la consommation. En revanche, leur coordination doit être possible. Certains pays garantissent cette coordination au moyen d’une commission centrale intégrée au gouvernement, qui n’a généralement que des pouvoirs consultatifs, et au sein de laquelle siègent des représentants des différentes organisations en charge de la protection des consommateurs, notamment dans certains cas des organisations non gouvernementales. Un représentant de la communauté de la concurrence, en général le chef de l’autorité de la concurrence, peut également siéger au sein de cette commission. Dans certains pays, les deux autorités ont conclu un accord de coopération, à l’instar des accords de coopération signés entre l’autorité de la concurrence et l’autorité de tutelle d’un secteur, afin de faciliter les consultations et partages d’informations. Les deux autorités peuvent également participer conjointement à une même affaire, procédure qui a fait ses preuves dans au moins un pays. Une telle coordination devrait aboutir à ce que les deux politiques œuvrent en faveur du consommateur. Pour y parvenir, les responsables de la formulation de l’action publique doivent prendre conscience que les solutions fondées sur le marché sont préférables aux mesures réglementaires. Néanmoins, l’intervention de la politique de la consommation sera nécessaire dans certains cas, notamment en situation d’information imparfaite ou de coûts de transfert. Dans ce cas, il faudra veiller à ce que ces interventions n’imposent pas de restrictions indues à la concurrence. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 19 The same applies to many consumer policy interventions. For example, policies that ensure that advertising and product descriptions are honest and reasonably informative, that contract terms and the obligations they involve are understandable and not disproportionate, and that consumers can reasonably expect products to be safe and fit-for-purpose, will both make consumer choice a more effective discipline (thus directly strengthening competition) and will force firms to compete on the merits (rather than on the basis of fraudulent or misleading claims or of unfair contract terms).3 Equally, product standards, by facilitating comparisons between products, increasing the ease with which products from one supplier can be replaced by products from another, and concentrating competition on performance rather than on features that are inessential to it, can directly improve both consumer choice and the competitive process. In short, each of these policy instruments can be used to advance the goals also pursued by the other: competition policy, by keeping markets effectively competitive, can reduce the work that needs to be done by consumer policy; consumer policy, by enhancing the ability of consumers to exercise choice, can help make markets more effectively competitive and force firms to compete on the merits, thereby supporting the ends of competition policy. At the same time, each of these instruments can create challenges for the other. For example, opening a previously highly regulated market to competition may well raise new issues for consumer protection: • Many OECD countries faced new consumer protection issues as a result of the liberalisation of financial markets, which, however beneficial it may have been, exposed consumers to new risks and difficulties.4 • Equally, the introduction of competition into some public utility markets (such as electricity and telecommunications) has created challenges in terms of regulation of service quality and of issues such as the management of churn, of customer complaints and of disconnection for non- payment.5 It has also raised questions about the ability of consumers to understand what are often complex pricing schemes and exercise choice between them. • Finally, liberalisation of professional services poses complex questions about balancing competitive pressures (for example, in terms of pricing and marketing, including advertising) with the protection of consumers in situations characterised by potentially large information asymmetries and substantial error costs. Moreover, when a market becomes more exposed to competition than it was previously (say, because of the removal of trade barriers), the incentives of market participants may change in ways that raise consumer protection concerns: 3 European Commission (2004), ‘Identifying and tackling dysfunctional markets’, Note submitted to OECD for discussion at the joint meeting of the Competition Committee and the Committee on Consumer Policy, 13 October 2004, at pp. 2-3 4 These challenges are discussed by Australia’s Secretary to the Treasury at Henry. K. (2007), ‘Connecting consumers and the economy: The big picture’, Closing address to the National Consumer Congress, at pp. 7-8, available at http://www.treasury.gov.au/ncc/content/download/Presentations/Transcripts/connecting_consumers_and_t he_economy.rtf 5 Some of these problems are discussed in Waddams, C. ‘Reality bites - The problems of choice’ and other papers following, in OECD (2006) Roundtable on demand-side economics for consumer policy: Summary report’. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 20 • For example, incumbent firms, faced with customers that are more mobile, may seek ways of locking customers in, including by building termination penalties into customer contracts. While those arrangements can be fully reasonable in some instances, they may raise both competition and consumer protection concerns in others. • Additionally, to the extent to which an inefficient dominant firm realises that it will lose market share and perhaps even be entirely displaced, it may have less of an incentive to invest in long- term assets such as reputation, and therefore be more willing to take advantage of any customers it has that are locked in or otherwise vulnerable. • Moreover, where the dominant firm was previously a monopolist operating in a highly regulated environment, it may well have very little experience with consumer-oriented marketing. Especially in the initial stages of competition, where the incumbent is seeking to slow and deflect competitive entry and clear consumer protection measures have not yet been put in place, this can result in a temptation to resort to tactics that are not fully consistent with accepted business practices. • At the same time, the liberalised market may attract “fly by night” operators, whose unscrupulous practices undermine consumer confidence in the market as a whole, reduce consumers’ willingness to rely on information firms in that market provide, and thereby erode the incentives for all firms to act honestly. Moreover, those firms that do act honestly will be forced to bear additional costs in so doing (as they seek to signal to consumers the higher quality of the information they provide), increasing prices and reducing both consumer and producer surplus.6 In the same way, consumer protection policies, however well-intentioned they may be, can have adverse consequences for competition, with the ultimate outcomes being contrary to the goals that both consumer and competition policy should seek. Classic cases include prohibitions on comparative advertising, mandatory product standards that exclude low-cost entrants and products, and transparency and posted price requirements that facilitate collusion.7 In summary, the relation between competition policy on the one hand, and consumer policy on the other, is relatively complex. In most instances, the one supports the other; but there are cases where, in practice, they are in tension or conflict. 3. Emerging Challenges The issues associated the appropriate mix of competition and consumer policy have recently attracted increased attention partly as a result of developments in our understanding of consumer behaviour (discussed below at 3.1) and partly as a result of changes in the extent and functioning of markets (discussed at 3.2). 6 In the extreme case, this results in the so-called ‘lemons’ problem discussed in Akerlof, G. (1970), "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism". Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3): 488–500 7 A case study of inappropriate interventions can be found in the legal services market. See OECD (2004), Identifying and tackling dysfunctional markets at pp. 6-10. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 21 3.1 Developments in understanding of consumer behaviour The economics of consumer protection have received a considerable boost in recent years as a result of advances in “behavioural economics”. Those advances have stressed the impact that cognitive limitations have on consumer choice. The area of behavioural economics is very large indeed, and it is not possible or desirable to survey that area at all systematically here. However, a consideration of some important aspects of the results found in the literature on behavioural economics is helpful in illustrating how competition and consumer policy considerations interact. Thus, economists have long recognised that information is costly and imperfect, so that consumers may not be able to allocate their budgets in ways that always secure the products they prefer, at the lowest prices available and hence from the most efficient supplier. That standard model of rational choice under conditions of costly and imperfect information remains an extremely powerful tool for understanding consumer and competition policy issues, and framing appropriate policy responses. What “behavioural economics” adds, relative to that model, is an emphasis on what appear to be departures from rational decision-making, at least as that is defined in conventional decision analysis. Those deviations from “rational actor” conduct could cause consumers to take decisions that appear inconsistent with welfare maximisation even when markets are reasonably competitive and search and information costs are not especially high. Indeed, some of these results suggest that increased competition, to the extent to which it leads to a proliferation of choices available to consumers, could yield only small, or in some instances even negative, welfare gains.8 While many of these findings are robust in experimental terms9, their interpretation is understandably controversial.10 Even more importantly, it is by no means clear that they amount to a case for a more interventionist – “paternalist” – stance in respect of consumer protection policy generally. Nor is it clear that these findings diminish the value of, or weight that should be given to, protecting (and where appropriate, promoting) competition. In effect, a move away from primary reliance on competitive markets as the means of empowering consumers and/or to a more interventionist approach to consumer policy could involve substantial costs. These include the costs of the regulatory errors that are inevitable under a paternalist approach, especially one that involves limiting consumer choice. Moreover, those costs need to be weighed against the fact that if cognitive limitations lead to potential gains from trade not being realised, then firms themselves may have incentives to seek ways of achieving those gains. There may, in other words, be market solutions to some of the welfare losses that would otherwise arise from constraints on individual rationality. Put slightly differently, competition and market forces may themselves be important ways of addressing concerns about the efficacy with which consumers take complex choices, because firms in competitive markets have incentives to offer consumers “solutions” that allow potential gains from trade to be more fully realised. 8 See Ergas, H (2007) “Policy Implications of behavioural economics: the case of consumer protection”, Productivity Commission Round Table on Behavioral Economics, Melbourne, Australia. 9 See generally Guala, F. (2005) The Methodology of Experimental Economics. Cambridge University Press. 10 For example, Plott and Zeiller, “Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect Theory?, American Economic Review, September 2007, and Plott and Zeiller, “The Willingness to Pay–Willingness to Accept Gap, the ‘Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuation,” American Economic Review, June 2005, suggest that results that seem consistent with behavioural models of choice may also be fully capable of being explained by conventional rational choice models. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 24 (and profit from the fuller realisation of gains from trade) will be by assisting consumers to improve on the choices they make. In short, while the results of the behavioural economics may suggest a need for a consumer policy response – in the direction of greater paternalism – it may be that at least some of the issues it raises are best addressed through the competitive process: that is, by ensuring competitive forces are effective. While it is important to recognise these limits of the policy inferences properly drawn from findings in behavioural economics, it would be a mistake to suggest that market incentives will cure all cognitive limitations. This has long been recognised by economists with respect to that markets that are distorted by misrepresentation, which in its extreme forms amounts to fraud. As with all information asymmetries, misrepresentation can give rise to allocative inefficiencies (as trades will not reflect accurate valuations of the goods being traded), as well as to productive inefficiencies (because consumer search costs are increased, production may be allocated to less rather than more efficient firms, and firms may waste resources either in lying or in trying to establish a reputation for telling the truth). Of course, in the extreme (and even in conventional models of rational choice), bad information drives out good, no firm has the ability or incentive to disclose truthfully, and the market disappears.17 The same issues about the efficacy of the self-remedying properties of markets can arise, albeit likely in significantly less extreme form, in some of the cases that have been discussed in the consumer policy literature arising from behavioural economics. For example, even when market solutions do emerge to problems such as “confusopoly” or to the pricing of “shrouded attributes”, those solutions may be directed at the more sophisticated consumers (who in any event would have likely suffered the least harm), leaving other consumers still exposed. Indeed, it could be argued that the rise of the Internet as a marketing channel has aggravated the problem of vulnerable consumers. In effect, Internet marketing channels provide firms with considerable scope to differentiate their offers as between customer segments, and most obviously and immediately, as between consumers who are frequent and confident users of the Internet and those who are not. This reduces the extent to which sophisticated consumers “price protect” those consumers who are unsophisticated. While this problem may be merely transitory for some classes of consumers – who over time will become more adept at using the Internet and hence will benefit from the marketing features it provides – they will persist for others, such as the intellectually disabled, the very elderly and (at least in countries such as Australia) important parts of the indigenous population. The policy issue this raises is whether those more vulnerable consumers are best protected through the general instruments of consumer policy, or by more targeted interventions. Moreover, for some of cognitive limitations highlighted in the behavioural research, market solutions may simply not emerge. “Addiction goods” are potentially a case in point, as consumers, prior to addiction, may not value “non-addictive” variants sufficiently to allow them to drive more harmful varieties out of 17 This is the extreme case of adverse selection, in which the market collapses, so that all the potential gains from trade are lost. See Akerlof. G. (1970) “The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 84, pp. 488-500 and Hillier, B (1997) The Economics of Asymmetric Information. St. Martins’ Press, Inc., New York, N.Y., pp. 46-49. The other way of stating matters is to note that complete distrust is a self-enforcing equilibrium: see for example, Gambetta, D. (1998) “Concatenations of Mechanisms” in Hedstrom, P. and R. Swedberg (1998) Social Mechanisms, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp. 102-124. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 25 the market.18 Here too, the greatest risks are likely to fall on vulnerable consumers, such as young people who are vulnerable to the lure of advertisements for cigarettes, alcohol and other potentially addictive goods. That said, care needs to be taken, in protecting those consumers who are most vulnerable and/or poorly informed, not to unduly undermine the rewards to those consumers who invest in information gathering. It is true that there are cases where the nature of information as a pure public good means that duplicated search amounts to nothing but waste19; but there are also many cases where private investment in information is socially valuable, because it helps guide the price discovery process to ever changing fundamental values. In these latter instances, efforts at improving the position of less-informed consumers can reduce the return other consumers make by investing in information, and hence erode the quality of price discovery and welfare overall. This trade-off has been extensively studied in the context of consumer protection issues in securities markets; suffice it to say most economists would place considerable weight on the need to ensure disclosure requirements do not eliminate incentives for costly information acquisition, while still encouraging widespread participation in the relevant markets.20 This does not mean that vulnerable consumers should not be protected; rather, it means that the protection should be designed in a way that avoids unnecessary harm to the incentives that those consumers who are able to invest in information face to do so. In short, there is a need for caution in drawing from the findings of “behavioural economics” generalised inferences about the stance of consumer and competition policies, all the more so given the fact that regulators too, suffer from cognitive limitations, imperfect information and other constraints on decision-making. Moreover, there will generally remain an issue about which instruments are most appropriate for dealing with the market imperfections arising from cognitive limitations on consumers’ ability to make complex choices. This is important because the findings of behavioural economics do seem of obvious relevance to the design of consumer policy interventions, if not to the determination of the optimal extent of those interventions. 21 Behavioural economics may, in other words, be even more valuable in helping shape how consumer policy agencies intervene than in determining whether to intervene. For example, labelling requirements need to take account of the way “information overload” can degrade the quality of consumer decision- making. Equally, an awareness of the biases associated with endowment or default positions may be useful 18 Although for a contrary view with respect to narcotics, see O’Flaherty, Brendan (2005) City Economics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., at Chapter 17. 19 See Barzel, Y. (1982) “Measurement costs and the organisation of markets” Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 25, pp. 27-48 discusses these instances but concludes that when the relevant conditions apply, producers will take measures to avoid wasteful duplication of search. 20 See O’Hara, M. (1995) Market Microstructure Theory, Blackwell Publishing and Harris, L. (2003) Trading and Exchanges, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. The need to protect the returns on investment in information, and the importance of maintaining a mix of investor types in the market, can justify limitations on disclosure requirements, such as allowing reduced transparency (i.e. somewhat reduced pre- and post-trade disclosure) for block trades. 21 See especially Mulholland, J (2007), “Behavioral Economics and the Federal Trade Commission”, Paper for the Productivity Commission Round Table on Behavioral Economics, Melbourne, Australia. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 26 in deciding how schemes that involve opt-outs (for example, for liability) should be structured. Similarly, framing effects may be relevant to the design of regulations affecting advertising material, for instance with respect to the fat and sugar content of foods. Finally, the reliance that research in behavioural economics places on experimental trials has resulted in significant improvements in the practice and methodology of experimental economics; given those improvements, there is considerable scope for consumer protection agencies to use experiments in the design of policy instruments (such as labelling standards) and perhaps even in examining individual cases (for example, in assessing whether a particular advertisement is indeed misleading). 3.2 Expanding role of markets Bringing the insights and methods of behavioural economics to bear on the design of consumer policy interventions may be especially important in the areas that are currently at the frontier of competition policy. The last fifteen years have seen a far-reaching process of liberalisation in both the OECD countries and in many developing countries. A forthcoming paper, for example, finds that taking the world’s 57 largest economies from 1970 onwards, 56 out of these 57 countries have become less regulated over the period: the only exception to the general trend is Venezuela.22 Within the 21 countries in the OECD group, the greatest decreases in market- limiting interventions occurred in Portugal, followed by New Zealand, the UK and Sweden. Among the other advanced countries, Israel stands out. As for the developing countries, countries which significantly decreased the extent of market-limiting interventions include Mexico, Egypt, Turkey, India, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru. Additionally and importantly, the difference in the extent of reliance on markets between the OECD group and the other ‘advanced economies’, on the one hand, and the developing countries and former communist countries on the other, has narrowed appreciably since 1970. This change, which in many countries reflects a greater appreciation of the merits of competition as a means of allocating society’s resources, has also created significant new challenges for competition policy and for consumer policy. Those challenges have been most acute in areas such as the traditional public utilities, where issues include the difficulties of preventing nascent competition from being eliminated and the difficulties consumers face in exercising choice in areas which have long been monopolies. There have also been significant difficulties in liberalised finance markets, especially in protecting consumers who are taking choices that are often highly complex. More recently, there has been discussion of the scope to introduce, and in numerous instances moves to actually introduce, greater competition in the professions and in social services (which include education, health and aged care). These are markets that are often complex for consumers to operate in, all the more so as they are relatively new or rapidly changing. Moreover, in some instances, the decisions consumers take in these markets can have very serious consequences – as is obviously true for education, retirement savings and health care – but product quality and “value for money” are difficult to observe and assess. All of these difficulties are again more acute, and potentially more laden with severe consequences, for consumers who are poorly educated or otherwise especially vulnerable, such as the elderly, the sick and the frail. The issues this poses for the interaction of competition policy and consumer protection can be illustrated by considering two cases: occupational licensing, especially of the professions; and the introduction of competition into markets for social services. 22 Henderson P. D. (2007) “The Uneasy Trend to Greater Economic Freedom” mimeo. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 29 Although these moves have great potential to improve the efficiency with which those services are provided, 30 they also raise very challenging issues for both competition and consumer policy. For example, while most countries have long had non-government schools, parents’ ability to exercise choice within the public system has often been limited by rules that allocate children to particular schools (usually on the basis of place of residence). At the same time, funding rules have limited the extent to which public subsidies to schools follow the flow of students, distorting competition both within the public system (to the extent to which schools that gain students do not similarly gain in funding) and between the public system and the non-government sector. Allowing greater parent choice, and making the income stream to schools more dependent on that choice, can be a powerful way of increasing the responsiveness of the education system to parental preferences.31 However, securing those gains, and ensuring that they are to the ultimate benefit of students and society, involves myriad issues of policy design. To the extent to which schools move into the competitive arena, difficult questions need to be addressed about information disclosure (which is vital to the exercise of choice, but may distort the incentives facing teachers and school administrators),32 about information sharing and cooperation between schools, and about how desirable information sharing can be reconciled with effective competition.33 30 Hanushek, E. and L. Wolfsmann 2007, Education quality and economic growth, World Bank, pp. 20-21; M Harrison 2004, Education Matters: Government, Markets and NZ Schools, NZBR, Wellington; C. Hoxby 1994, ‘Do Private Schools Provide Competition for Public Schools?’, NBER Working Paper No. W4978. S Bradley and J. Taylor 2002, ‘The Effect of the Quasi-market on the Efficiency-equity Trade-off in the Secondary School Sector’, 54, Bulletin of Economic Research p. 295-314; E Hanushek, and S. Rivkin 2003, ‘Does Public School Competition Affect Teacher Quality?’, The Economics of School Choice ; G Holmes, J. DeSimone and N. Rupp 2003,‘Does School Choice Increase School Quality?’ NBER Working Paper No. W9683 May; and P Bayer and R. McMillan 2005, ‘Choice and Competition in Local Education Markets’, NBER Working Paper No. W11802.. 31 See Burgess, S., C. Propper and D. Wilson 2004, ‘The impact of choice in education and health: a review of the economic literature’, Centre for Market and Public Organisation, particularly on pp. 15-23. Such considerations are equally relevant to developing economies where as noted previously there has been a wealth of policy experiments – see for instance Patrinos, H. 2006, ‘Public-Private Partnerships: Contracting Education in Latin America’, World Bank; Barrera-Osorio, F. 2007, ‘The Impact of Private Provision of Public Education: Empirical Evidence from Bogota's Concession Schools’, World Bank; and Patrinos, H. and S. Sosale (eds) 2007,’ Mobilizing the Private Sector for Public Education : A View from the Trenches’, World Bank. 32 In reviewing the economic literature, Burgess, S., C. Propper and D. Wilson 2004, ‘The impact of choice in education and health: a review of the economic literature’, Centre for Market and Public Organisation conclude that (p. 16): “For choice to work, the supply side must be responsive to (changes in) demand. But the form that these responses take depends on the type of performance measure used and the incentives therefore created.. If parental choice is based on the information contained in performance measures, schools have the incentive to improve measured performance.This does not necessarily mean an improvement in actual outcomes…Different performance measures may be suited to the different objectives of accountability and facilitating a choice programme.”. The influence of target setting and information disclosure on providers (and the unintended consequences that can result in) are discussed in Hood, C. (2006) “Gaming in Targetworld”, Public Administration Review, 66(4), 515. 33 This is illustrated by cases in the UK and US where private schools and colleges have come under investigation or lawsuits for alleged anti-competitive conduct because of information sharing and cooperative practices. In the UK, private schools came under investigation in late 2006 for exchanging information on future fees – see Decision of the Office of Fair Trading No. CA98/05/2006, ‘Exchange of information on future fees by certain independent fee-paying schools’, 20 November 2006. In the US, in 1993 the federal government successfully challenged an agreement between universities limiting DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 30 Similar issues arise in health care. Particularly for countries that are experiencing rapid population aging,34 the issues that are central to ensuring efficient provision of health care services are changing. While the provision of care for acute conditions remains of obvious importance, there is a growing emphasis on (and allocation of resources to) the treatment of chronic conditions, such as the various impairments associated with age (for instance, dementia), as well as those associated with obesity and other “life-style” diseases.35 These are forms of care where choice by consumers (or their families) can be especially important, both because the care itself can involve a de facto choice of living conditions (as is the case, for example, for residential aged care), and/or because patient incentives and motivation matter greatly to the efficacy of treatment (as in the treatment of life-style conditions). However, making choice work well in these areas is no easy matter; as with schools, it involves difficult questions about information disclosure and consumer rights and obligations, as well as difficult issues about how competition between providers can be reconciled with the wider social objectives that are also being pursued. Here too, different forms of expertise – of health practitioners and specialists, of competition authorities and of experts in consumer protection – need to be brought to bear in the design of market (or “market-like”) instruments.36 3.3 Conclusions In summary, issues associated with the interaction between consumer protection and competition policy have received considerable attention in recent years, with some of that increased attention coming from research findings about inherent limitations on the quality and efficacy of consumer choice. It would be premature and likely incorrect to conclude from those studies that less reliance should be placed on consumer choice in a competitive market-place as the best means for promoting efficiency and social wellbeing. However, they do have important implications for policy design, most obviously of consumer protection measures. As competition and consumer policy are extended into new areas – such as emerging markets for the social services traditionally provided by governments – the lessons of that research need to be brought fully to bear. 4. Institutional design and institutional challenges The discussion above has highlighted the interdependence between competition policy on the one hand, and consumer policy on the other, and the shared nature of the objectives they pursue. It has also highlighted the way they come together in policy design, most obviously when competition is being extended to new areas. This leads naturally to a consideration of the institutional arrangements for competition policy and consumer policy, including the question of whether they should be “housed” within a single institution. competition in the distribution of financial aid through an agreement to award aid solely on the basis of need through a common formula – see United States v Brown Univ. 5 F.3d 658. 34 The Australian case is illustrative of the wider OECD trend. Thus, on current demographic projections, the number of Australians aged 85 and over will increase from 330,000 in 2006 to 580,000 in 2021 and then to over 1.6 million in 2051 – see generally Ergas, Henry and David Cullen (2007) Providing and Financing Aged Care in An Aging Society, (in press) available at www.greenwhiskers.com.au. 35 Extrapolating from similar trends in the US – see Reynolds, S. L., Y. Saito and E. M. Crimmins, 2005, ‘The Impact of Obesity on Active Life Expectancy in Older American Men and Women’, The Gerontologist, vol. 45, pp. 438-444. See Ergas, Henry and David Cullen, ibid, for a discussion of trends in chronic disease and their implications for provision and choice in aged care. 36 For a good survey of the impact of consumer choice in health markets see Burgess, S., C. Propper and D. Wilson 2004, ‘The impact of choice in education and health: a review of the economic literature’, Centre for Market and Public Organisation, pp. 25-33. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 31 There are both benefits and costs to placing competition policy and consumer policy within a single institution. We consider first the benefits and then turn to an assessment of the costs. 4.1 Benefits of integration There are three major advantages to integrating the primary responsibility for competition policy and consumer policy within a single institution. These are: • Gains from treating competition and consumer policy as instruments that can be flexibly combined and more generally managed within a single portfolio of policy instruments; • Gains from developing and sharing expertise across these two areas; and • Gains in terms of the wider visibility to the community, and understanding in the community, of competition and consumer issues. 4.1.1 The portfolio of policy instruments By keeping markets effectively competitive, competition policy can reduce the work that needs to be done by consumer policy; equally, consumer policy, by enhancing the ability of consumers to exercise choice, can help make markets more effectively competitive and force firms to compete on the merits, thereby supporting the ends of competition policy. This interdependence is important because it means that there may be scope for substitution between these instruments. As a result, joining the instruments within a single armoury may allow both objectives to be pursued at lower net cost (or equivalently, with greater net gain), as the least cost instrument is used in each fact situation. For example, as a general matter, competition policy, other than by prohibiting anti-competitive conduct, has relatively little scope to make markets more structurally competitive than they would otherwise be; moreover, policies that seek to “de-concentrate” oligopolistic markets, either through forced divestments or by subsidising or otherwise assisting entry, are often contentious and often seem likely to impose costs that are considerably greater than the benefits. In that sense, competition authorities may have few means to alter the supply side of markets so as to make rivalry a more effective discipline. However, in those cases, action on the demand side of the market may provide an effective alternative: for example, if better consumer information, or reduced switching costs, make the demand each firm faces more elastic, that will usually create incentives for each firm to price more aggressively for any given market structure.37 The value of seeing these instruments as being within a common portfolio of tools is accentuated by the fact that consumer policy can often be tailored to the needs of particular markets in ways that would be impossible and/or inappropriate for competition policy. For example, it would not be desirable to have a specific set of competition policy instruments that applied to (say) electricity retailing; however, the particular issues associated with improving customer information in that market may well be properly dealt with through consumer policy instruments (such as information campaigns) that are specific to the market at issue. In that sense, while competition policy is by its nature a relatively blunt instrument, interventions 37 This is not always the case. For example, in a market that is growing rapidly, switching costs may induce firms to bid more aggressively for customers so as to benefit from subsequent lock-in effects. Artificially lowering switching costs in such a market may attenuate price competition, at least in the growth phase. However, the reduced competition in the growth phase may be offset by more intense competition once the market size has stabilised. As a result, even in those cases, there is a trade-off between switching costs and competition. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 34 Thus, by and large, competition policy is implemented through the enforcement of the competition laws, which involves a mix of administrative proceedings (such as those used in merger clearance and in the authorisation (administrative approval) of agreements) and of litigation in courts and tribunals. Typically, the case load involves relatively small numbers of cases, with individual cases that are often very large in absolute terms. Additionally, direct interaction with the public is often quite limited, with much of the information flow occurring through highly formalised processes, such as information filings and document discovery. These characteristics of the work flow have a significant influence on the structure and conduct of the agencies, including in terms of the training of staff, the types of skills and career paths that make for advancement, and the allocation of the time and attention of senior personnel. In contrast, consumer policy is inherently more varied in its instruments, form and substance. As regards the instruments, while consumer policy has a conventional enforcement element (that is most marked in respect of misleading and deceptive conduct), it also covers weights and measures, product quality and safety standards, industry codes of conduct, the regulation of behaviour in individual professions and consumer ombudsman and dispute resolution mechanisms. While there are some important instruments that are economy-wide, they are usually paralleled by an extensive assortment of sector- or market-specific instruments. These rely on a broad range of enforcement instruments and in some cases (such as information and consumer education) are very “soft” forms of regulation. Moreover, the process of policy formation and implementation tends to be itself very varied and in many respects porous, with significant direct involvement with the public, a case load that involves many individually small cases, and considerable industry input into policy design. In turn, these features map into a policy process that is far more decentralised – in terms of the range of players involved – and far more geographically localised than is the formation and enforcement of competition policy. One result of these differences is that consumer policy, when it is integrated within an agency that also has responsibility for competition policy, may find it difficult to attract the attention it deserves. The highly varied nature of the consumer policy case load, and the fact that many consumer policy cases are relatively small and have low stakes in absolute terms (though they may be of great significance to individual consumers), can lead to consumer policy receiving less top management attention and support than it should. The fact that much of consumer policy involves decentralised interaction with other agencies and territorial levels of government can induce a tendency to delegate the work to relatively junior levels and not to give it the funding, resources and profile that competition policy – with its ongoing stream of high visibility, large scale, litigation – invariably secures. These issues arise from differences in the nature of instruments and tasks these respective policy instruments involve. In theory, of course, that could change. In particular, there could be gains to consolidating consumer policy, in terms of giving it a more unified statutory and institutional basis, and in that respect making it somewhat more similar to competition policy. Indeed, in a very recent review of Australian consumer policy, the Productivity Commission (which advises the Australian Government on issues that affect economic efficiency) has recommended that it would be preferable to rely on the generic law, rather than resorting to industry- specific regulation, in dealing with many consumer problems.38 In effect, such reliance on generic law: • Facilitates consistency in approach across consumers and markets; • Allows regulators to deal with emerging problems without the need for new statutes — an especially important feature given that many consumer markets are evolving rapidly; 38 Productivity Commission (2007) Review of Australia's Consumer Policy Framework: Draft Report, Canberra. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 35 • Generally avoids boundary line problems and the gaps in regulatory coverage that can ensue; and • Imposes relatively few costs on the overwhelming majority of suppliers who do the right thing by consumers. Set against those benefits, industry-specific consumer regulation explicitly seeks to prevent certain behaviours rather than rely on the deterrent effect of the threat of prosecution for breaches of general law and possible liability for compensation. Its use, the Productivity Commission notes, is most likely to be desirable when: • The risk of consumer detriment is high and/or the detriment suffered if things go wrong is potentially significant and possibly irremediable. (Such considerations are the primary reason why specific regulation is employed in the medical and consumer credit areas); • The suitability and quality of services is hard to gauge before or even after purchase (the ostensible rationale for many other professional licensing regimes); and/or • The technical nature of a product or service makes it easier for a regulator to assess breaches of appropriate behaviour against some ‘objective’ standards. These considerations are well made and, at least as far as Australia is concerned, they do suggest gains in placing somewhat greater weight on achieving consumer protection objectives through economy- wide statutory instruments. Nonetheless, even with such a move, the major differences noted above between the nature of the tasks, skills and processes involved in competition policy on the one hand, and consumer policy on the other, seem highly likely to remain. This, in turn, creates practical difficulties to seeking to manage both of these functions within a single agency of government. While these difficulties need not be insuperable, they limit the economies of scope between the functions and may make for their separate administration. 4.2.2 Limits on integration in practice Largely as a result of the characteristics noted above, it is an inherent feature of any effective regime of consumer protection that it will involve a number of quite distinct agencies of government. Moreover, those agencies may well span separate territorial levels of administration, especially in countries with a federal structure. This multi-agency character is especially marked when consumer protection issues arise in industries that are subject to extensive industry-specific regulation, such as financial services and health care. In those instances, the industry-specific regulators naturally play a substantial role in consumer protection issues, and indeed, often bear the primary responsibility in that respect. As a result, it is not generally feasible to centralise responsibility for consumer policy to the same extent and in the same way that occurs as regards responsibility for the enforcement of competition policy. Even when aspects of the functions are combined in a single institution (as is the case with the ACCC in Australia), many important aspects of consumer protection fall outside its remit, and will likely continue to do so. This implies that, in practice, the degree of integration between these policy instruments will never be complete. Rather, any integration will be selective, and hence will need to focus on those aspects of the policies which are most tightly interdependent and where the economies of scope in policy design and implementation are greatest. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 36 4.3 Conclusions on institutional design issues Overall, there are a number of respects in which gains can be achieved by locating responsibility for both competition policy and consumer policy in a single institution. Those gains include: • Benefits in terms of better policy coordination, and in particular, in the selection of policy instruments to meet the needs of particular fact-situations; • A better understanding by policy-makers and enforcers in each area of the role and limitations of the other; and • The ability to secure economies of scope in access to resources and in the efficacy of monitoring and accountability processes. However, there are also inherent limits to the possibilities for integration: • The nature of the tasks involved in implementing consumer policy differs greatly from those involved in the administration of competition policy, reducing the economies of scope achievable through their integration; and • It is an inherent feature of any effective policy of consumer protection that it will involve a range of agencies, and (especially in Federal countries) span several territorial levels of administration. These conflicting pressures can obviously be addressed through a range of quite differing approaches. In practice, what appears most important is: • To ensure that the competition authority has in-house access to the skills involved in the formulation of consumer policy, and at the very least a watching brief with respect to consumer policy, as well as scope to intervene in consumer policy decisions that have material competition implications; and • That there be within government, an entity that has “whole of government” oversight of consumer protection, and that exercises that oversight in a manner mindful of competition concerns. Periodic surveys of particular instruments – such as occupational licensing, or restrictions on advertising – aimed at reviewing whether they are consistent with efficient competition, could play a useful and important role in this respect. These surveys would provide a regular opportunity to review whether the objectives pursued through whatever restrictions are imposed using these instruments could be achieved in less restrictive, or more efficient, ways. Developing a program of such reviews, starting with those instruments that are most likely to be unnecessarily restrictive, could be an effective approach to giving such a process a structure and clear time-line. 5. Conclusions It has recently been emphasised that consumer policy can “activate” competition policy – that is, can help bring competitive processes to life, giving them the vitality they need to achieve the objective of making markets efficient and effective.39 39 Sylvan, L. 2004, “Activating competition: The consumer – competition interface”, Competition & Consumer Law Journal, pp. 191-206. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 39 NOTE DE RÉFÉRENCE INTERACTION ET COORDINATION DE LA POLITIQUE DE LA CONCURRENCE ET DE LA POLITIQUE À L’ÉGARD DES CONSOMMATEURS : DIFFICULTÉS ET POSSIBILITÉS(*) 1. Introduction On a souvent pu constater et on admet généralement que la politique de protection des consommateurs et la politique de la concurrence sont des instruments très interdépendants de la politique économique, visant toutes deux à rendre le fonctionnement des marchés plus efficace. On observe aussi généralement qu’il peut exister, et qu’il existe parfois, des tensions entre ces deux politiques. À cela s’ajoutent, dans la pratique, des différences dans la manière dont elles fonctionnent l’une et l’autre et dans la nature du processus de décision et de mise en œuvre qui leur est propre. Admettre l’existence de ces tensions et de ces différences conduit naturellement à examiner les dispositifs institutionnels à l’œuvre pour chacune d’entre elle et, particulièrement, ce qu’il convient de faire pour les coordonner. Cette note analyse ces questions, mettant en relief les principaux thèmes essentiels à cet égard, sans tenter toutefois de les traiter de manière exhaustive. Elle dresse les principaux constats suivants : • Politique de la concurrence et politique à l’égard des consommateurs partagent généralement un même objectif tout en reposant sur des instruments dissemblables pour y parvenir. En règle générale, elles se renforcent mutuellement, mais il n’est pas rare qu'elles entrent en conflit comme c'est le cas, par exemple, quand on utilise la politique à l'égard des consommateurs d’une manière qui a pour effet de restreindre inutilement la concurrence. À l’inverse, l’ouverture à la concurrence peut avoir lieu sans que soient suffisamment prises en compte les questions relatives à la protection des consommateurs (section 2). • Si ces problèmes d’équilibre et de coordination de la politique de la concurrence d’une part et de la politique à l’égard des consommateurs d’autre part ne sont guère nouveaux, ils suscitent, depuis ces dernières années, un intérêt croissant pour un certain nombre de raisons et notamment : − les avancées de l’économie comportementale, qui ont mis en évidence les limitations cognitives ayant une incidence sur le comportement des consommateurs (section 3.1) ; et − l’extension de la concurrence à de nouveaux domaines complexes, (section 3.2), notamment les professions libérales et les marchés des services aux collectivités et des services plus généralement. (*) Ce document a été préparé en tant que Note du Secrétariat par Henry Ergas (Directeur Régional, Asie Pacifique, CRA International; Professeur, Département d’Économie, Faculté de Gestion et d’Économie, Monash University, Australie) et Professeur Allan Fels (Doyen, The Australia and New Zealand School of Government – ANZSOG). DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 40 Si ces évolutions n'ont pas d'effet sur le rôle dévolu à la politique de la concurrence et à la politique à l'égard des consommateurs et sur leur poids respectif, elles appellent d’autant plus une coordination de ces deux volets de l'action publique. • Cela conduit logiquement à se demander comment on peut réussir à articuler au mieux ces politiques (section 4) : − S’il peut être avantageux d’intégrer au sein d’une seule et même institution la responsabilité de la mise en œuvre de la politique de la concurrence et de la politique à l’égard des consommateurs, il n’en demeure pas moins que l’étendue et l’efficacité de cette intégration ne sauraient être que limitées. − Ainsi, la nature des missions attachées à ces deux domaines de l’action publique diffère à plusieurs titres et non des moindres ; de plus, la politique à l’égard des consommateurs met en jeu, par essence, un éventail d'instruments très divers, qui sont pour beaucoup propres à un secteur ou à une branche d’activité donnés et qui ne peuvent être aisément regroupés sous un seul étendard. • De ce fait, quel que soit le degré jugé approprié d'intégration institutionnelle de la mise en œuvre du droit de la concurrence et du droit des consommateurs, il importe que cette intégration vise, à tout le moins, à assurer que l'autorité de la concurrence dispose des compétences requises pour pouvoir garder un œil sur les évolutions qui interviennent dans la définition et l'administration de la politique à l'égard des consommateurs et promouvoir la concurrence dans le cadre de ce processus. De même, on est en droit de penser que les organismes compétents en matière de consommation doivent être en mesure de surveiller et d’évaluer les problèmes de concurrence. − En outre, il convient sans doute de s’assurer qu’il existe, au sein de l’appareil d’État, une entité qui exercera, au nom de l’État dans son ensemble, un suivi en matière de protection des consommateurs, sans perdre de vue les préoccupations relatives à la concurrence. − L’examen régulier de certains instruments – comme les agréments professionnels ou les restrictions à l’encontre de la publicité – afin de vérifier qu’ils ne nuisent pas à l’efficacité de la concurrence, est susceptible de jouer un rôle utile et important pour structurer ce processus de coordination. 2. Les Liens entre Politique de la Concurrence et Politique à l’égard des consommateurs Généralement, la politique de la concurrence vise à protéger et, chaque fois que cela est utile et nécessaire, à élargir la palette de choix des consommateurs. Parallèlement, la politique à l’égard des consommateurs s’attache à protéger et, chaque fois que cela est nécessaire, à améliorer la qualité de ce choix tout en assurant que les consommateurs peuvent réellement l’exercer, confiants en l’équité et l’intégrité des mécanismes du marché1. Il n’est pas difficile de démontrer que chacune de ces politiques contribue largement à promouvoir les objectifs visés par l’autre. 1 Voir Muris, T. (2002), ‘The interface of competition and consumer protection’, notes préparées lors de la 29e conférence annuelle sur le droit et la politique de la concurrence du Fordham Corporate Law Institute et Sylvan, L. (2004), ‘Activating competition: The consumer-competition interface’, 12 Competition and Consumer Law Journal. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 41 Ainsi, en général, le risque de disparition encouru par les entreprises sur les marchés réellement concurrentiels les incite à améliorer et à protéger leur réputation de fournisseurs fiables, car elles peuvent de ce fait tabler sur une répétition des transactions et une réduction de leur frais de commercialisation. Dans la mesure où les entreprises sont d’elles-mêmes incitées à satisfaire les attentes des consommateurs, voire à aller au-delà, la charge que représenterait la mise en œuvre de normes de produits et de services – charge qui retomberait, dans le cas contraire, sur la politique à l’égard des consommateurs – s’en trouve allégée d’autant. En ce sens, assurer qu’un marché est réellement concurrentiel peut permettre de résoudre l'une des préoccupations fondamentales de la politique à l’égard des consommateurs2. Dans le même ordre d’idée, les entreprises exerçant leur activité sur des marchés réellement concurrentiels et qui peuvent de ce fait espérer enlever des clients à leurs concurrents, seront incitées à réduire les coûts de changement de fournisseur pour lesdits clients, à la fois en les informant des avantages que leur procureront ce changement et en les aidant à assumer les coûts ponctuels qu’il induit. Or, si les entreprises investissent pour réduire les coûts de changement de fournisseur à la charge de leurs clients mutuels, cela peut avoir pour effet de dynamiser la concurrence tout en rendant moins nécessaires les interventions de la politique de protection des consommateurs pour les faire baisser. Là encore, la mise en place d’une structure de l’offre concurrentielle peut être un moyen efficace de résoudre ce qui serait parfois sinon un problème relevant de la politique à l’égard des consommateurs – en l’occurrence, les coûts de changement de fournisseur. Cet exemple vaut aussi pour bien d’autres domaines d’intervention de la politique à l’égard des consommateurs. Ainsi les mesures visant à assurer que la publicité et les descriptions de produits sont honnêtes et raisonnablement informatives, que les conditions contractuelles qui y sont mentionnées sont compréhensibles et ne sont pas abusives et que les consommateurs peuvent raisonnablement escompter que les produits seront sûrs et conviendront à l’usage prévu, permettront aux consommateurs d’exercer leur choix plus efficacement (ce qui renforcera directement la concurrence) et obligera les entreprises à se faire concurrence sur leurs réels mérites (et non par des proclamations frauduleuses ou trompeuses ou en recourant à des conditions contractuelles déloyales)3. De la même façon, les normes de produits, peuvent renforcer à la fois le choix des consommateurs et le jeu de la concurrence en facilitant les comparaisons entre les produits, en leur permettant de remplacer facilement les produits d’un fournisseur par ceux d’un autre et en polarisant la concurrence sur l’utilité réelle d'emploi des produits plutôt que sur leurs aspects superfétatoires. En somme, chacun de ces deux instruments de l’action publique peut être utilisé pour promouvoir les objectifs également visés par l’autre : la politique de la concurrence, en préservant la concurrence réelle des marchés, peut alléger la tâche dévolue à la politique à l’égard des consommateurs ; à l’inverse, la politique à l’égard des consommateurs, en renforçant la faculté des consommateurs à exercer leur choix, peut contribuer à rendre la concurrence des marchés plus efficace et contraindre les entreprises à se livrer concurrence sur leurs mérites respectifs, ce qui sert les visées de la politique de la concurrence. Dans le même temps, chacun de ces deux instruments est susceptible de créer pour l’autre des difficultés. Ainsi, l’ouverture à la concurrence d’un marché auparavant très réglementé peut fort bien susciter de nouveaux problèmes du point de vue de la protection des consommateurs : 2 OCDE (2004), Identifier et surmonter les dysfonctionnements du marché, p. 3. 3 Commission européenne (2004), ‘Identifier et surmonter les dysfonctionnements du marché’, Note présentée à l’OCDE pour examen lors de la réunion conjointe du Comité de la concurrence et du Comité de la politique à l’égard des consommateurs, le 13 octobre 2004, pp. 2-3 DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 44 comportements qui s’écartent apparemment d’un processus rationnel de décision, du moins tel que l’entend l’analyse classique. Ces biais par rapport au comportement de « l’acteur rationnel » pourraient amener les consommateurs à prendre des décisions apparemment contraires à la maximisation de leur bien-être, même lorsque les marchés sont raisonnablement concurrentiels et que les coûts de recherche et d’information ne sont pas particulièrement élevés. De fait, certaines conclusions de l’économie comportementale donnent à penser qu’une concurrence accrue, dès lors qu’elle induit une prolifération des choix pour les consommateurs, peut ne produire que des gains de bien-être limités, sinon négatifs8. Si nombre de ces observations sont expérimentalement confirmées9, on peut aussi comprendre que leur interprétation puisse prêter à controverse10. Mais surtout, on ne saurait en conclure qu’elles plaident en faveur d’une orientation plus interventionniste ou « paternaliste » de la politique de protection des consommateurs en général ou encore diminuent en quoi que ce soit la nécessité – ou l’intérêt – de protéger et (le cas échéant) de promouvoir la concurrence. De fait, ne plus compter essentiellement sur la concurrence des marchés pour donner plus de pouvoir aux consommateurs voire adopter une approche plus interventionniste de la politique de protection des consommateurs pourrait coûter très cher. Il n’est besoin que de citer en exemple les coûts qui résulteront des erreurs de réglementation, inhérents à toute approche paternaliste, surtout si celle-ci a pour corollaire de limiter le choix des consommateurs. De plus, ces coûts doivent être mis en regard du fait que, si certains gains des échanges peuvent ne pas être réalisés en raison de ces limitations cognitives, les entreprises peuvent alors être incitées à rechercher d’elles-mêmes des moyens de les réaliser. En d’autres termes, le marché peut trouver lui même des solutions à certaines pertes de bien-être que pourraient causer, s’il s’en dispensait, les limitations de la rationalité des individus. Pour dire les choses un peu différemment, la concurrence et les mécanismes de marché peuvent être, en eux-mêmes, un moyen de remédier aux préoccupations relatives à l’efficacité des choix complexes auxquels sont confrontés les consommateurs. En effet, les entreprises opérant sur des marchés concurrentiels peuvent être incitées à proposer aux consommateurs des « solutions » qui leur permettront de profiter plus pleinement l’ensemble des gains des échanges éventuels. Pour ne prendre qu’un seul cas de figure, lorsque la versatilité du consommateur – concernant, par exemple, ses engagements d’épargne – constitue par exemple la principale difficulté, des produits peuvent être mis au point pour tenter à tout le moins de réduire cette difficulté en y associant diverses formes de pré-engagement. Ainsi, un plan épargne retraite facultatif mis en place avec succès en Australie, proposé par un certain nombre de gros employeurs du pays à leurs nouveaux salariés, repose sur le fait que les salariés choisiront moins probablement de sortir d’une situation par défaut que d’y entrer – autrement dit, le produit repose sur un effet de dotation. S’ils ne choisissent pas de « sortir » de cette situation par défaut, le système les oblige alors à verser des cotisations de retraite supérieures au taux obligatoire. 8 Voir Ergas, H (2007) “Policy Implications of behavioural economics: the case of consumer protection”, Productivity Commission Round Table on Behavioral Economics, Melbourne, Australie. 9 Voir de manière générale, Guala, F. (2005) The Methodology of Experimental Economics. Cambridge University Press. 10 Par exemple, Plott et Zeiller, « Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect Theory? », American Economic Review, septembre 2007, et Plott et Zeiller, « The Willingness to Pay–Willingness to Accept Gap, the ‘Endowment Effect’, Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuation », American Economic Review, juin 2005, donnent à penser que les résultats qui paraissent se conformer aux modèles comportementaux du choix peuvent aussi parfaitement être explicités par les modèles classiques du choix rationnel. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 45 De même, l’existence d’un « confusopole » – à savoir, les tentatives apparemment délibérées de certaines entreprises pour proposer aux consommateurs des choix de nature à créer une certaine confusion, par exemple en affichant des prix qu’ils auront du mal à comparer aux autres offres présentes sur le marché – peut parfois représenter un problème sérieux pour certains consommateurs. Cela étant, de même que certaines entreprises cherchent à gagner des clients en rendant leurs offres difficiles à étudier ou à comparer, d’autres peuvent tenter au contraire de gagner des clients en se démarquant de la confusion ambiante et en adoptant une grille de prix simple que les consommateurs trouvent attrayante. Les tentatives de certaines entreprises en place pour « créer de la confusion » peuvent ainsi inciter un ou plusieurs nouveaux fournisseurs à se différencier en introduisant une grille de prix plus simple et de ce fait plus attrayante. On a pu constater, sur plusieurs marchés en Australie, combien ce mécanisme peut être efficace. Ainsi, dans de nombreux pays, les premiers stades de la déréglementation du secteur ont vu proliférer les offres tarifaires complexes, notamment pour les services longue distance, ne permettant que très difficilement aux consommateurs de se faire une idée du rapport qualité-prix. Récemment, cependant, on a pu observer une tendance à la simplification et à lisibilité de la tarification avec la généralisation d’offres proposant un accès illimité à travers le groupage de multiples services. De même, dans le secteur aérien australien, la concurrence entre les compagnies « classiques » impliquait une discrimination par les prix complexe, s’articulant autour de restrictions sur la date, le jour et l’heure d’arrivée, assorties notamment d’obligations de durée minimale du séjour et de nuitée sur place du samedi au dimanche. Les marges relativement élevées qui s’en sont suivies ont créé des conditions propices à l’entrée de nouveaux concurrents à bas coûts. Ces compagnies aériennes (comme South West in aux États-Unis, RyanAir en Europe et Virgin Blue en Australie) ont introduit une structure tarifaire bien plus simple, sans obligation de durée de séjour minimum, reposant sur des prix principalement fixés en fonction de la date d’achat du billet. Face à cette forme de concurrence, les compagnies full service ont réagi en simplifiant leur propre tarification, favorisant ainsi l’efficacité du choix des consommateurs. Dans la grande distribution aussi, les soldes et autres promotions sont utilisées comme des formes de discrimination par les prix, mais elles augmentent les coûts de recherche pour les consommateurs (ce qui est, en pratique un facteur important du fonctionnement de la discrimination par les prix). Aux États-Unis Walmart a brisé ce schéma en adoptant un modèle fondé sur des « prix bas tous les jours », reposant sur des marges commerciales faibles mais constantes. Ce modèle a été repris dans le monde entier. Les études menées ont démontré que les enseignes qui l’ont adopté ont, en général, bénéficié d’une augmentation importante de leur part de marché et de leur rentabilité relative alors même que la concurrence dans le secteur de la distribution s'est intensifiée11. Il ressort essentiellement de tous ces exemples que les modes de décision ne sont pas le seul fait des consommateurs, mais qu’ils dépendent aussi de l'action des entreprises. Les entreprises qui maximisent leurs bénéfices sont incitées à mettre à profit les gains des échanges, dont elles seraient privées dans le cas contraire, notamment en renforçant la faculté des consommateurs à agir selon leurs préférences. Ces incitations seront sans doute plus fortes pour les entreprises les plus efficientes, qui ont davantage à gagner de la réduction des coûts de recherche qu’elles assurent au consommateur. Par conséquent, les entreprises peuvent prendre, et prennent souvent, des mesures en vue « d’internaliser » et par conséquent de compenser le manque à gagner (autrement dit les gains des échanges dont elles seraient privées) 11 Hoch, Stephen J. et Dreze, Xavier et Purk, Mary E. (Oct 1994), EDLP, Hi-Lo, and Margin Arithmetic, Journal of Marketing, 58 ; Lal, Rajiv et Rao, Ram (1997), Supermarket Competition: The Case of Every Day Low Pricing, Marketing Science, 16 (1) ; Ortmeyer, Gwen et Quelch, John A. et Salmon, Walter (Automne 1991), Restoring Credibility to Retail Pricing, Sloan Management Review, 55 (12) ; et Tang, Christopher S. et Bell, David R. et Ho, Teck-Hua (Hiver 2001) Store Choice and Shopping Behaviour: How Price Format Works, California Management Review, 43 (2). DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 46 qu’induiraient, si elles s’en dispensaient, les limitations cognitives aux décisions prises par les clients. Cet aspect de la dynamique de la concurrence est généralement absent des conditions de la plupart des études menées en laboratoire dans le domaine de l’économie comportementale12. La réaction des entreprises face aux limitations cognitives qui ont un effet sur les consommateurs est aussi largement absente des modèles de marché se caractérisant par des « attributs dissimulés » – ce qui est le cas lorsque certains consommateurs, et d’autres non, n’ont pas connaissance des coûts cachés de certains produits (comme ceux des cartouches pour imprimantes à jet d’encre ou encore la facturation des connexions à haut débit dans les chambres d’hôtel)13. Dans ce cas, les producteurs peuvent ne pas avoir intérêt à divulguer les coûts cachés, tant que les consommateurs les mieux informés ont la possibilité de les éviter tout en continuant à acheter les produits les moins onéreux grâce à la « subvention » que leur procurent les consommateurs naïfs. Ces modèles, fondés sur des « attributs dissimulés », sont séduisants et peuvent donner matière à réflexion14, mais ils sont largement théoriques. Plus précisément, tout comme les théories classiques – et complexes – de la rationalité individuelle exigeaient de résoudre des problèmes du même type, on peut toujours présupposer qu'aucune entreprise n’aurait vraiment avantage à être la première à s'écarter de la stratégie des « coûts cachés »15. Cette hypothèse semble cependant quelque peu contredire les enseignements présentés brièvement plus haut, qui montraient que certaines entreprises ont pu tirer d’importantes rentes d'innovation en étant les premières à tirer profit de gains des échanges jusque là non réalisés16. Donner à penser que les mécanismes de marché peuvent, du moins en partie, corriger certains biais et certaines limitations du choix des consommateurs ne signifie pas que les entreprises ne tenteront pas d’exploiter ces biais et limitations. De fait, l’inverse sera sans doute vrai, surtout dans le domaine du marketing et de la publicité, qui s’appuie de plus en plus sur une compréhension fine de la manière dont les 12 L’une des rares tentatives de reproduire les effets de ce genre d’innovation est exposée dans la note de Chu, Y. P et R. L. Chu (1990) « The Subsistence of Preference Reversals in Simplified and Market like Experimental Settings » The American Economic Review, vol 80, pp. 902-911. Les auteurs introduisent l’arbitrage dans un jeu de pompe monétaire. Il est intéressant de noter qu’ils arrivent à la conclusion que, si les sujets affichent des renversements de préférences en l’absence d’arbitrage, en revanche, une fois placés face à un arbitrage, leurs préférences se rapprochent des normes de « l’acteur rationnel ». 13 Voir Ellison, G. (2005) « A Model of Add-On Pricing » Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 120, pp. 585-638 et Gabaix, X. et D. Laibson (2006) « Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets » Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 121, pp. 505-540. 14 Voir par exemple, l’application d’un tel modèle aux prêts immobiliers résidentiels dans Campbell, J. Y. (2006) « Household Finance » The Journal of Finance, vol. 61, pp. 1553-1603. 15 Campbell part ainsi de l’hypothèse que les entreprises ne sont dotées d’aucune forme de protection de la propriété intellectuelle ou que cette protection est si faible qu’il n’existe pas de rentes d’innovation. De plus, ce type de modèle est généralement très sensible à la répartition précise de la population des consommateurs « avisés » et des consommateurs « naïfs », à la propension à payer de chacun de ces groupes et aux coûts de recherche. 16 Il est intéressant de noter que les économistes supposent très souvent que les entreprises ne peuvent réaliser sur la durée de gains unilatéraux en s’écartant d’une stratégie de prix concertée, car ces stratégies sont faciles à reproduire. (Ce constat sous-tend le concept « d’équilibre de la réponse rapide », tel qu’il est matérialisé dans la courbe de demande coudée.) Dans la réalité commerciale cependant, il est généralement extrêmement compliqué de définir et d’appliquer des stratégies tarifaires et cela implique de modifier les différents systèmes, les dispositifs de formation et de facturation, de comptabilité et de vérification des comptes. En conséquence, il est souvent très difficile de reproduire les changements importants d’une structure de prix, et surtout de le faire à bon escient et rapidement. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 49 En somme, on ne peut conclure avec certitude, à partir des observations de l’économie comportementale, à des interférences généralisées de la politique à l’égard des consommateurs et de la politique de la concurrence, d’autant que les autorités de tutelle ne sont pas épargnées, elles non plus, par les limitations cognitives, l’imperfection de l’information et autres restrictions à la prise de décision. En revanche, il importera de se demander, en tout état de cause, quel instrument il convient d’utiliser pour corriger les imperfections du marché dues aux limitations cognitives qui entravent la faculté des consommateurs à exercer des choix complexes. Cette question est importante parce que les observations de l’économie comportementale semblent objectivement utiles pour définir ce que seront les interventions de la politique de protection des consommateurs, sinon pour en déterminer le périmètre idéal21. En d’autres termes, le rôle de l’économie comportementale peut être bien plus de contribuer à formuler comment les organismes de protection des consommateurs doivent intervenir que de déterminer s’ils doivent intervenir. Ainsi, les obligations d’étiquetage doivent tenir compte du fait que « l’excès d’information » peut dégrader la qualité des décisions prises par les consommateurs. De même, il peut être utile de connaître les biais liés à une situation de dotation ou de défaut pour décider comment doivent être structurés les plans comportant une option de sortie (par exemple, en ce qui concerne la responsabilité). De même, il peut être utile de tenir compte des effets de cadrage pour élaborer les réglementations relatives au matériel publicitaire, en ce qui concerne, par exemple, la teneur en graisse et en sucre des aliments. Enfin, le recours de l’économie comportementale aux essais expérimentaux a entraîné une amélioration considérable de la pratique et de la méthodologie de l’économie expérimentale ; les organismes de protection des consommateurs ont ainsi désormais très largement la possibilité de mettre à profit ces expérimentations pour mettre au point les instruments de l’action publique (comme les normes d’étiquetage) et peut-être aussi pour examiner certaines situations (pour déterminer, par exemple, si une publicité donnée est effectivement trompeuse). 3.2 Extension du rôle des marchés Il peut être surtout essentiel d’assurer que les apports et les méthodes de l’économie comportementale sont mis à profit pour définir quelles seront les interventions de la politique à l’égard des consommateurs dans les domaines situés à l’intersection de la politique de la concurrence. Ces quinze dernières années ont été marquées par un vaste processus de libéralisation à la fois dans les pays de l’OCDE et dans de nombreux pays en développement. Une étude à paraître, conclut ainsi que dans un échantillon composé des 57 plus grandes économies mondiales examinées depuis 1970, 56 d’entre elles sont devenues moins réglementées au cours de cette période, seul le Venezuela faisant exception à cette tendance générale22. En ce qui concerne les 21 pays de l’OCDE représentés dans l’échantillon, c’est le Portugal qui a connu le plus fort reflux des interventions ayant un effet restrictif sur le marché, suivi de la Nouvelle-Zélande, du Royaume-Uni et de la Suède. Au nombre des pays avancés, Israël se classe en tête. En ce qui concerne les pays en développement, le Mexique, l’Égypte, la Turquie, l’Inde, le Brésil, l’Argentine, le Chili et le Pérou font partie de ceux qui ont fortement réduit l’ampleur des interventions publiques ayant un effet restrictif sur le marché. De plus, il importe de noter qu’en ce qui concerne le recours aux mécanismes du marché, l’écart entre le groupe des pays de l’OCDE et les autres « économies avancées » d’une part et les pays en développement et les anciens pays communistes d’autre part, s’est sensiblement réduit depuis1970 . 21 Voir en particulier Mulholland, J (2007), « Behavioral Economics and the Federal Trade Commission », Paper for the Productivity Commission Round Table on Behavioral Economics, Melbourne, Australie. 22 Henderson P. D. (2007) « The Uneasy Trend to Greater Economic Freedom » document non publié. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 50 Cette évolution qui témoigne, dans bien des pays, d’une meilleure appréciation des mérites de la concurrence en tant que moyen d’affecter les ressources de la collectivité, a aussi créé d’importantes difficultés du point de vue de la politique de la concurrence et de la politique à l’égard des consommateurs. Ces difficultés se posent avec le plus d’acuité dans des secteurs comme celui des services aux collectivités classiques où les problèmes sont notamment les difficultés pour empêcher une élimination de la concurrence naissante ou celles auxquelles se heurtent les consommateurs pour exercer un choix dans des secteurs qui ont été longtemps monopolistiques. Des difficultés importantes ont également été rencontrées sur les marchés de capitaux déréglementés, notamment du point de vue de la protection des consommateurs appelés à exercer des choix souvent très complexes. Récemment, l’ampleur de l’ouverture à la concurrence et, dans des biens des cas, le mouvement même d’ouverture à la concurrence, des professions libérales et des services sociaux (que sont par exemple l’éducation, la santé et la prise en charge des personnes âgées) ont suscité des débats. Il s’agit là de marchés souvent complexes pour les consommateurs, d’autant plus qu’ils sont relativement nouveaux ou évoluent rapidement. De plus, les décisions que prennent les consommateurs sur ces marchés peuvent parfois avoir des conséquences très graves – comme c’est le cas, à l’évidence, de l’éducation, de l’épargne retraite et des soins de santé – alors même que la qualité et le « rapport qualité-prix » y sont difficiles à appréhender et à évaluer. Là encore, ces difficultés se posent toutes avec plus d’acuité, et peuvent avoir de plus graves conséquences, pour les consommateurs à faible niveau d’éducation ou particulièrement vulnérables pour toute autre raison, comme les personnes âgées, malades ou fragiles. Les problèmes que cela pose en termes d’interaction de la politique de la concurrence et de la protection des consommateurs peuvent être illustrés au moyen de deux exemples que sont l’agrément professionnel, des professions libérales notamment, et l’introduction de la concurrence sur les marchés des services sociaux. 3.2.1 Agrément professionnel des professions libérales Dans l’économie moderne, le terme de « professions libérales » recouvre une grande variété de services, englobant aussi bien les comptables, les architectes, les avocats, les professions médicales et paramédicales, les ingénieurs-experts, peut-être les agents immobiliers et d’autres catégories professionnelles exerçant diverses activités qualifiées comme les électriciens, les plombiers et bien d’autres. Dans la majorité, sinon dans tous les pays, l’accès à ces professions est réglementé, de même que les comportements des personnes qui sont agréées pour les exercer. L’imperfection de l’information est la principale justification de ces réglementations. Ainsi, une personne qui achète des biens et des services a besoin d’en évaluer la qualité. Les conséquences d’une erreur d’appréciation (à savoir le risque) pour un bien relativement simple, présentant peu de spécificités, seront assurément limitées, notamment dès lors que les consommateurs peuvent en estimer la valeur avec suffisamment de précision. En revanche, les consommateurs ont nettement plus de mal à évaluer les services professionnels. Cinq de leurs caractéristiques fondamentales amplifient l’asymétrie de l’information et ses conséquences. Premièrement, les consommateurs ne peuvent examiner la qualité de ces services qu’après l’acquisition, car ils ne sont pas en mesure de les inspecter avant l’achat aussi directement qu’ils peuvent le faire avec la plupart des produits. Deuxièmement, les services professionnels sont par nature complexes et il faut souvent être doté de compétences considérables pour les fournir et les adapter aux besoins des consommateurs. De ce fait, ceux-ci peuvent avoir du mal à évaluer la qualité du service avant l’achat. Troisièmement, la qualité de nombreux services peut être difficile à évaluer même après l’achat. Par exemple, si une personne fait appel à un avocat dans le but d’intenter un procès, et qu’elle le perd au bout DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 51 du compte, elle peut avoir du mal à savoir si cela tient à la piètre qualité des services juridiques fournis ou au fait que l’affaire était en soi difficile à gagner. Quatrièmement, de nombreux consommateurs ne consomment que très occasionnellement ce type de services. Ils n'effectuent donc pas d’achats répétés qui les aideraient à en évaluer la qualité. Cinquièmement, les conséquences de l’achat de services professionnels de mauvaise qualité peuvent être lourdes. Le service peut ainsi entraîner une grosse dépense pour le consommateur et un service (un pontage coronarien, par exemple) défectueux peut occasionner des dommages graves et irréversibles23. Ces caractéristiques peuvent servir à justifier la mise en place d'une réglementation visant à assurer la qualité des prestations. De tels dispositifs sont destinés à garantir aux consommateurs une certaine qualité de service et par conséquent, à réduire les risques associés à l’achat de services professionnels. Dans une certaine mesure, ils se substituent aux efforts de recherche et de collecte de l’information menés par les particuliers car la collecte de l’information et l’évaluation du service s’effectuent par le biais d’un quelconque mécanisme réglementaire. Ils peuvent réduire les coûts de transaction pour les consommateurs et permettre au marché de fonctionner efficacement. Cela étant, l’expérience montre aussi que ces réglementations ont généralement des effets qui vont au- delà d’une assurance de la qualité, ou de la recherche d’une assurance de la qualité, des services que les consommateurs acquièrent. Au nombre de ces effets, citons notamment : • La création d’un monopole du fait que la pratique et l’activité sont exclusivement réservées aux membres de la profession. À cela peut s’ajouter une nouvelle subdivision du travail, certaines prestations étant à leur tour exclusivement réservées à des sous-catégories précises de ladite profession, comme c’est le cas de la chirurgie esthétique qui ne peut être réalisée que par des « chirurgiens esthétiques ». • La mise en place de restrictions anticoncurrentielles à l’accès à une profession, par des dispositifs d’agrément ou d’accréditation ou par des restrictions à l’accès des étrangers ou des personnes venues d’une autre région d’un pays. • L’imposition de restrictions anticoncurrentielles aux comportements, par exemple en matière de prix, de publicité ou d’éthique. • Des formes particulières de comportements anticoncurrentiels peuvent également exister, comme des ententes sur les prix ou des boycottages collectifs qui, sur d’autres marchés, seraient sans conteste en infraction au droit de la concurrence. Face à ces conséquences, le plus difficile, du point de vue de l’action publique, est de trouver comment tenir compte des préoccupations légitimes liées à la nécessité d’une assurance de la qualité, tout en permettant aux mécanismes concurrentiels de s’exercer bien plus pleinement que cela n’est généralement le cas. À cette fin, il faudra réussir à combiner et à articuler les instruments de la politique de la concurrence et ceux de la politique de protection des consommateurs : • Les instruments de la politique à l’égard des consommateurs doivent rechercher des moyens efficaces de protéger les consommateurs, sans pour autant restreindre indûment ou inutilement la concurrence ; alors que 23 Voir Allan Fels, David Parker, Blair Comley et Vishal Beri (2001) « Occupational Regulation », dans Anticompetitive Impact of Regulation, resp. pub. Guiliano Amato, Laraine L. Laudati, Edgar Elgar, pp. 104-115. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 54 Des problèmes de même nature se posent dans le secteur de la santé. Dans des pays comme l’Australie particulièrement, caractérisés par un vieillissement rapide de la population34, les questions que l’on doit se poser pour assurer l’efficacité de la prestation des services de santé sont en train de changer. Si la prestation de soins pour les pathologies aiguës conserve à l’évidence toute son importance, la priorité est de plus en plus accordée (et les ressources sont de plus en plus allouées) au traitement des maladies chroniques, comme les diverses pathologies du vieillissement (comme la démence sénile), ou de l’obésité ou encore de celles liées aux modes de vie35. Il s’agit là de formes de prise en charge pour lesquelles le choix des consommateurs (ou de leur famille) peut être particulièrement important, du fait que la nature même de la prise en charge implique en tout état de cause un choix de mode de vie (comme c’est le cas pour les résidences médicalisées pour personnes âgées), ou du fait que les incitations et la motivation des patients sont déterminantes pour l’efficacité du traitement (comme dans le cas des pathologies liées aux modes de vie). Cela étant, faire en sorte que le choix puisse s’exercer efficacement dans ces domaines n’est pas aisé ; comme pour le secteur scolaire, il s’ensuit des questions difficiles tant en termes de diffusion de l’information qu’en ce qui concerne les droits et obligations des consommateurs. En résultent également des problèmes complexes concernant la façon de concilier la concurrence entre les prestataires et les objectifs sociaux plus généraux qui doivent aussi être poursuivis. Là encore, différentes sortes de compétences – celles des praticiens et des spécialistes de la santé, celles des autorités de la concurrence et celles des spécialistes de la protection des consommateurs – doivent être mises à profit pour concevoir des instruments de marché (ou assimilables au marché)36. 3.3 Conclusions En somme, les problèmes liés à l’interaction entre la protection des consommateurs et la politique de la concurrence ont suscité un intérêt considérable ces dernières années, notamment à la suite des observations des chercheurs concernant les limitations inévitables de la qualité et de l’efficacité du choix des consommateurs. Il est cependant trop tôt et on aurait probablement tort d’en conclure pour autant qu’il faille moins s’en remettre au choix des consommateurs, sur un marché concurrentiel, pour promouvoir au mieux l’efficacité et le bien-être collectif. Cela étant, ces études sont importantes pour définir l’action publique et, de toute évidence, les mesures de protection des consommateurs. Dès lors que la politique de la concurrence et la politique à l’égard des consommateurs gagnent de nouveaux domaines – comme les marchés émergents des services sociaux qui étaient jusque là fournis par les pouvoirs publics – il convient de mettre pleinement à profit les enseignements qui en sont tirés. 34 L’exemple de l’Australie illustre bien la tendance générale observée dans les pays de l’OCDE. Ainsi, l’après les projections démographiques actuelles, le nombre d’Australiens âgés de 85 ans et plus va passer de 330 000 en 2006 à 580 000 en 2021 et à plus de 1.6 million en 2051 – voir en général sur cette question Ergas, Henry et David Cullen (2007) Providing and Financing Aged Care in An Aging Society, (en cours d’impression) disponible à l’adresse Internet suivante : www.greenwhiskers.com.au. 35 En extrapolant à partir de tendances similaires observées aux États-Unis – Voir Reynolds, S. L., Y. Saito et E. M. Crimmins, 2005, ‘The Impact of Obesity on Active Life Expectancy in Older American Men and Women’, The Gerontologist, vol. 45, pp. 438-444. Voir Ergas, Henry et David Cullen, ibid., pour l’analyse des tendances observées en matière de pathologies chroniques et de leurs implications sur la prestation de services aux personnes âgées et sur le choix de la prise en charge dans ce domaine. 36 Pour une étude de bonne qualité sur l’impact du choix des consommateurs dans les marchés de la santé, voir Burgess, S., C. Propper et D. Wilson 2004, ‘The impact of choice in education and health: a review of the economic literature’, Centre for Market and Public Organisation, pp. 25-33. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 55 4. Conception des institutions et difficultés institutionnelles L’analyse qui précède a mis en évidence l’interdépendance de la politique de la concurrence d’une part et de la politique à l’égard des consommateurs d’autre part, et la nature commune des objectifs qu’elles poursuivent. Elle montre aussi la manière dont elles doivent aller de pair lors de la définition de l’action publique, notamment lorsque la concurrence gagne de nouveaux domaines. Cela conduit tout naturellement à s’intéresser au cadre institutionnel de la politique de la concurrence et de la politique à l’égard des consommateurs, et notamment à se demander si elles doivent toutes deux être « logées » au sein d’une unique institution, ce qui présenterait à la fois des avantages et des coûts. Nous analyserons d’abord ces avantages, avant d’évaluer les coûts. 4.1 Avantages de l’intégration Intégrer la responsabilité première de la politique de la concurrence et de la politique à l’égard des consommateurs au sein d’une institution unique présente trois grands avantages : • les gains tirés du traitement de la politique de la concurrence et de la politique à l’égard des consommateurs en tant qu’instruments que l’on peut articuler avec souplesse et gérer, plus généralement, au sein d’un seul et même portefeuille d’instruments à la disposition des pouvoirs publics, • les gains tirés du renforcement et du partage des expériences dans ces deux domaines, • les gains tirés du fait que la collectivité a une vue plus claire de ces politiques et comprend mieux les préoccupations relatives à la concurrence et à la protection des consommateurs. 4.1.1 Le portefeuille d’instruments à la disposition des pouvoirs publics En préservant une réelle concurrence sur les marchés, la politique de la concurrence peut alléger la charge de travail de la politique de protection des consommateurs ; de la même façon, cette dernière peut renforcer l’aptitude des consommateurs à exercer un choix, peut aider les marchés à être plus efficacement concurrentiels et obliger les entreprises à se livrer concurrence sur leurs mérites respectifs, contribuant ainsi aux visées de la politique de la concurrence. Cette interdépendance est importante car elle signifie qu’il existe des possibilités de substitution mutuelle de ces divers instruments. Par conséquent, regrouper lesdits instruments au sein d’un même arsenal peut permettre de réaliser à la fois ces deux objectifs pour un coût net moins élevé (ou pour un gain net plus élevé), puisque cela permettra d’utiliser l’instrument le moins onéreux pour chaque situation à régler. Ainsi, mise à part l’interdiction des pratiques anticoncurrentielles, la politique de la concurrence n’a en général guère de moyens pour rendre les marchés structurellement plus concurrentiels qu’ils ne le seraient autrement ; en outre, les politiques visant une déconcentration des marchés oligopolistiques, soit en contraignant les entreprises à procéder à des cessions, soit en subventionnant les nouveaux entrants ou en les aidant de toute autre manière à s’implanter, sont souvent contestables et semblent en général de nature à occasionner des coûts bien plus importants que les avantages qui en découlent. En ce sens, les autorités de la concurrence n’ont parfois guère de moyens pour influer sur le côté de l’offre, en vue de discipliner la concurrence et de la rendre ainsi plus efficace. En revanche, dans ces cas là, les mesures portant sur le côté de la demande peuvent constituer une solution efficace. Par exemple, si une meilleure information des consommateurs ou une réduction des coûts de changement de fournisseur accroît DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 56 l’élasticité de la demande pour chaque entreprise, cela l’incitera généralement à adopter une stratégie de prix plus agressive, quelle que soit la structure du marché37. L’intérêt de voir ces instruments regroupés au sein d’un portefeuille commun est amplifié par le fait que la politique à l’égard des consommateurs peut s’ajuster aux besoins de certains marchés donnés, ce que la politique de la concurrence ne pourrait ou ne saurait faire. Il ne serait ainsi pas souhaitable qu’une série d’instruments de la politique de la concurrence vise spécifiquement (à titre d’exemple) le secteur de la distribution d’équipements électriques ; en revanche, les problèmes particuliers que posent, sur ce marché, la nécessité d’une meilleure information des consommateurs peuvent être correctement traités par les instruments de la politique à l’égard des consommateurs (par des campagnes d’information, par exemple) s’adressant spécifiquement à ce marché. Si, de ce point de vue, la politique de la concurrence est, par nature, un instrument assez peu incisif, les interventions du côté de la demande permettent, quant à elles, de s’attaquer de manière bien plus pointue aux spécificités de chaque secteur. Dans le même temps, gérer ces instruments au sein d’un seul et même portefeuille peut être une manière efficace d’identifier, et donc de supprimer ou de réduire, les incohérences de l’action publique. Ainsi, les normes de produits obligatoires peuvent restreindre la concurrence en entravant l’entrée sur les marchés de producteurs à bas coûts et de moindre qualité. Cet effet préjudiciable aura plus de chance d’être mis au jour et de donner lieu à des mesures correctrices au sein d’une institution qui aura été accoutumée à promouvoir la concurrence et qui sera amenée, de par ses fonctions, à effectuer des enquêtes de concurrence sur des marchés très divers, que si tel n’était pas le cas. Plus généralement, en assurant que chaque marché, et que les instruments utilisés pour agir sur ce marché, sont pris comme un tout – et concernent le fonctionnement de ce marché à la fois du côté de l’offre et du côté de la demande – il sera possible de mieux maîtriser le risque que l’un des volets de l’action publique ne soit utilisé pour saper les effets de l’autre. 4.1.2 Partage des compétences Dans les économies de petite taille notamment, mais pas uniquement, il est probable que le gisement de compétences dont dispose le secteur public pour analyser les problèmes complexes relevant de l’action publique qui ont trait à la structure et au fonctionnement des marchés sera très limité. Comme la politique à l’égard des consommateurs et la politique de la concurrence s’appuient l’une et l’autre sur un même genre de compétences, gérer, au sein d’une institution unique, celles qui sont disponibles permettra de les utiliser de façon plus efficiente. Parallèlement, cette gestion intégrée peut offrir des opportunités de promotion professionnelle des individus concernés qui seront appelés à traiter à la fois de questions relevant de la politique de la concurrence et de questions relevant de la politique à l’égard des consommateurs, et approfondiront leurs connaissances dans ces deux domaines. Cet aspect est particulièrement important lorsqu’il est indispensable de recourir à des analyses couvrant à la fois le côté de l’offre et le côté de la demande. Par exemple, il peut être difficile de comprendre (vu du côté de l’offre) certains accords qui peuvent sembler indûment restrictifs, si l’on ne comprend pas la manière dont fonctionne le côté de la demande d’un marché donné. Les accords permettant aux assureurs de « diriger » les consommateurs vers certains 37 Tel n’est pas toujours le cas. Ainsi, sur un marché en croissance rapide, les coûts de changement de fournisseur peuvent inciter les entreprises à démarcher plus agressivement les clients de façon à bénéficier d’effets de captivité ultérieurs. Diminuer artificiellement ces coûts sur un tel marché peut réduire la concurrence sur les prix, du moins durant la phase de croissance. Cela étant, la réduction de la concurrence durant cette phase peut être contrebalancée par une intensification de la concurrence, une fois que la taille du marché s’est stabilisée. En conséquence, même dans ces cas là, il faut trouver un compromis entre les coûts de changement de fournisseur et la concurrence. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 59 ou trompeurs), son périmètre d’action couvre aussi les poids et mesures, les normes de qualité et de sécurité des produits, les codes de conduite sectoriels, la réglementation des pratiques professionnelles et les mécanismes de médiation avec les consommateurs et de règlement des différends. Si certains de ses instruments importants couvrent l’économie dans son ensemble, ils sont souvent parallèlement assortis d’un arsenal important d’instruments spécifiques à un secteur ou à un marché donné. Il s’agit d’instruments très divers qui peuvent dans certains cas (comme en matière d’information et d’éducation des consommateurs par exemple) prendre la forme d’une réglementation très « allégée ». De plus, généralement le processus de formulation et de mise en œuvre de la politique est lui aussi par nature très varié et, à bien des égards, poreux, puisqu’il se nourrit d’une grande implication directe du grand public, du flux des nombreuses petites affaires traitées et de l’apport considérable des différents secteurs à la définition de l’action publique. Ces caractéristiques aboutissent à un processus bien plus décentralisé – de par la diversité des intervenants concernés – mais géographiquement bien plus circonscrit que ne le sont la formulation et la mise en œuvre de la politique de la concurrence. Il découle notamment de ces différences que la politique à l’égard des consommateurs, lorsqu’elle est intégrée au sein d’un organisme exerçant aussi des responsabilités en matière de politique de la concurrence, peut avoir du mal à susciter l’attention qu’elle mérite. Compte tenu de la nature très variée des affaires qui en relèvent et du fait que nombre d’entre elles sont relativement petites et ont de faibles retombées dans l’absolu (même si chacune d’entre peut avoir une grande importance pour les consommateurs), cette politique peut donc retenir moins qu’elle ne le devrait l’intérêt et l’adhésion des hauts responsables. Du fait de la décentralisation de ses liens avec d’autres organismes et d’autres échelons territoriaux de l’État, il peut s’ensuivre que les missions soient confiées à des collaborateurs relativement jeunes et inexpérimentés et que cette politique ne dispose pas des financements, des ressources et de la visibilité qu’obtient invariablement la politique de la concurrence – avec son lot incessant de différends très médiatisés et de grande envergure. Ces problèmes sont liés à la nature dissemblable des instruments et des missions respectifs que ces deux types de politiques impliquent. Théoriquement, bien sûr, cela pourrait changer. En particulier, il pourrait être avantageux de centraliser la politique à l’égard des consommateurs, en la dotant d’une assise juridique et institutionnelle plus unifiée, et, en l’assimilant de cette façon un peu plus à la politique de la concurrence. De fait, dans une étude très récente consacrée à la politique australienne de protection des consommateurs, la Productivity Commission (qui conseille les pouvoirs publics australiens sur les questions ayant un effet sur l’efficience économique) a déclaré qu’il serait préférable de s’appuyer sur un droit générique, plutôt que de recourir à des réglementations sectorielles, pour traiter de nombreux problèmes concernant les consommateurs38. En effet, faire appel à un droit générique : • favorise la cohérence de l’approche adoptée pour l’ensemble des consommateurs et des marchés, • permet aux autorités de tutelle de s’attaquer aux problèmes émergents sans avoir besoin de nouvelles législations – ce qui est un aspect très important du fait de l’évolution rapide des marchés de consommation, • permet, de manière générale, d’éviter les problèmes de délimitation des responsabilités et les lacunes de la réglementation qui peuvent s’ensuivre, • impose des coûts relativement faibles à la très grande majorité des fournisseurs qui agissent correctement vis-à-vis des consommateurs. 38 Productivity Commission (2007) Review of Australia's Consumer Policy Framework: Draft Report, Canberra. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 60 Au regard de ces avantages, les réglementations sectorielles de protection des consommateurs visent, quant à elles, expressément à empêcher certains agissements précis et non l’effet dissuasif général que peut avoir, en cas d’infraction au droit général, la menace de poursuites pénales ou civiles. Dès lors, y recourir serait, de l’avis de la Productivity Commission, sans doute souhaitable lorsque : • le risque de préjudice pour les consommateurs est élevé ou que le préjudice subi si la situation tourne mal est important et sans doute irrémédiable. (Ces aspects justifient principalement le recours à des réglementations spécifiques dans le domaine de la médecine ou du crédit à la consommation), • le caractère adéquat et la qualité des services est difficile à évaluer avant, ou même après, l’achat (c’est l’argument utilisé pour justifier de nombreux régimes d’agrément professionnel), ou • du fait de la nature technique du produit ou service, l’autorité de tutelle sectorielle peut plus facilement déterminer les infractions au comportement de rigueur par rapport à certaines normes « objectives ». Ces arguments sont fondés, et du moins en ce qui concerne l’Australie, donnent à penser qu’il peut être avantageux de recourir un peu plus à des instruments juridiques qui soient applicables à l’économie dans son ensemble pour réaliser des objectifs de protection des consommateurs. Néanmoins, même si l’on va dans ce sens, les principales différences évoquées précédemment, entre la nature des missions, des compétences et des processus à l’œuvre dans le cadre de la politique de la concurrence d’une part et de la politique à l’égard des consommateurs d’autre part subsisteront sans doute. Dans ces conditions, lorsque l’on tentera d’administrer ces deux fonctions au sein d’un seul et même organisme public, des difficultés pratiques se poseront immanquablement. Ces difficultés ne sont certes pas insurmontables, mais elles limitent les économies d’échelle entre ces fonctions et peuvent plaider en faveur de leur administration distincte. 4.2.2 Limites pratiques à l’intégration Du fait en grande partie des caractéristiques déjà citées, il s’ensuit que tout régime efficace de protection des consommateurs impliquera nécessairement l’intervention d’un certain nombre d’organismes publics assez divers. En outre, il peut arriver que ces organismes couvrent plusieurs régions administratives, surtout dans les pays dotés d’une structure fédérale. L’intervention de multiples organismes est particulièrement prononcée lorsque des problèmes de protection des consommateurs se font jour dans des secteurs d’activité soumis à une réglementation sectorielle exhaustive, comme les services financiers et la santé. Les autorités de tutelle sectorielles jouent alors naturellement un rôle essentiel en ce qui concerne les problèmes de protection des consommateurs et en assument de ce fait généralement la principale responsabilité. En règle générale, il n’est donc n’est pas possible de centraliser la responsabilité de la politique à l’égard des consommateurs comme on peut le faire de la responsabilité de la mise en œuvre de la politique de la concurrence. Même lorsque certains aspects de ces fonctions sont regroupés au sein d’une institution unique (comme c’est le cas de l’ACCC en Australie), de nombreuses facettes de la politique de protection des consommateurs n’entrent pas dans ses attributions et il n’y a pas vraiment de raison que cela change. Dans la pratique, l’intégration de ces instruments de l’action publique ne sera donc jamais totale. Au lieu de cela, toute intégration sera sélective et de ce fait ne devra porter que sur les aspects les plus imbriqués de ces politiques, ceux où les économies d’échelle en matière de définition et de mise en œuvre des politiques sont les plus importantes. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 61 4.3 Conclusions relatives aux questions de conception des institutions Dans l’ensemble, l’intégration, au sein d’une institution unique, de la responsabilité de la politique de la concurrence et de la protection des consommateurs peut présenter des avantages à de nombreux égards et notamment : • des avantages liés à une meilleure coordination de l’action publique, particulièrement en ce qui concerne le choix des instruments disponibles à utiliser pour faire face aux exigences de telle ou telle situation, • une meilleure compréhension par les pouvoirs publics et les instances répressives intervenant dans l’un de ces deux domaines du rôle et des limites de l’autre domaine, • la possibilité de réaliser des économies d’échelle en ce qui concerne l’accès aux ressources et l’efficacité du suivi et des processus de responsabilisation. Cela étant, les possibilités d’intégration sont en elles-mêmes limitées : • La nature des missions requises pour mettre en œuvre la politique à l’égard des consommateurs diffère largement de celle des missions requises pour administrer la politique de la concurrence, ce qui réduit les économies d’échelle qui découleraient de l’intégration, • toute politique efficace de protection des consommateurs impliquera nécessairement des organismes très divers et (surtout dans les États fédéraux) couvrira plusieurs régions administratives. À l’évidence, des approches assez diverses peuvent être adoptées pour régler ces contradictions. Dans la pratique, il importe surtout : • d’assurer que l’autorité de la concurrence dispose, en interne, des compétences nécessaires à la formulation de la politique à l’égard des consommateurs ou ait, à tout le moins, une vue d’ensemble des questions qui s’y rapportent, ainsi que de la possibilité d’influer sur les décisions relevant de cette politique qui sont susceptibles d’avoir des conséquences importantes du point de vue de la concurrence, • de s’assurer qu’il existe, au sein de l’appareil d’État, un organisme qui puisse exercer, au nom de l’État dans son ensemble, un suivi des questions en matière de protection des consommateurs, sans perdre de vue les préoccupations relatives à la concurrence. À cet égard, l’examen régulier de certains instruments – tels les agréments professionnels ou les restrictions à l’encontre de la publicité – afin de vérifier qu’ils ne minent pas l’efficacité de la concurrence, pourrait jouer un rôle utile et important. Ces enquêtes pourraient donner régulièrement l’occasion de déterminer si les objectifs visés par les éventuelles restrictions qui sont imposées par le biais de ces instruments ne pourraient être atteints de manière moins restrictive ou plus efficiente. Il pourrait être utile d’arrêter un calendrier, commençant par l’examen des instruments susceptibles d’être le plus inutilement restrictifs, afin de structurer ce processus et de lui imposer une échéance précise. 5. Conclusions Une étude a récemment mis en évidence la manière dont la politique à l’égard des consommateurs peut « dynamiser » la politique de la concurrence, contribuer à donner naissance à des mécanismes DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 64 The latter is more probable to happen in certain markets such as financial markets, where the consumers are asked to sign contracts with predisposed clauses which scope they are not aware of. In the same sense, consumers are more vulnerable in situations of pressure through aggressive publicity or with insufficient or distorted information, so they are not in the proper conditions for a reasonable choice or simply, due to the proper complexity of the good, they do not have enough information to assess the quality or possible defects. Sanction statistics in Argentina show that it is precisely in those types of markets where the consumer policy is more necessary. In this way, in the case of complaints through consumption arbitrage, historically, the markets with more complaints have been: mobile phone companies (16.74%), banks (12.13%), timeshare (11.45%), appliances (8.78%) and automobile (7.83%). As regards this fact, it can be mentioned that within the period 2006/2007, in the Secretariat of Domestic Commerce, there have been 400 sanctions fines for infraction of Law Nº 24240 of Consumer Defence, for a total amount of AR$13,438,100, i.e. €2,951,955, and a sanction for summons. 2. Institutional aspects in the enforcement of competition and consumer policies. This regards the institutional structure under which the competition and consumer policies are enforced. In the first case, the law provides the creation of an independent tribunal, whose members would be elected through competitive examination (one president and six commissioners) but, up to now, it has not been constituted, so the National Commission for Defence of Competition (CNDC) is still working. Its President and commissioners write opinions that suggest the decision that the Secretary of Domestic Commerce should take (for example, to approve an economic merger or to sanction a company). In the case of consumer policy, the enforcement authority is also the Secretariat of Domestic Commerce, which delegates in the National Director of Domestic Commerce the final decision about possible infractions to the Law and the eventual enforcement of a sanction. In the same sense, the Directions of Domestic Commerce or equivalent agencies in the provinces of Argentina are also enforcement authorities and can deal with any of the complaints presented. It is also worth to mention that, from 1998, Argentina has its National System of Consumption Arbitrage, as a mechanism designed exclusively to solve conflicts originated by the final consumption of goods and services. Up to date, this System has received almost 20000 consumer’s complaints. From the point of view of the contents of the complaints for possible infractions to one or the other law, it can happens that a file opened in the area of competition defence is sent later to consumer defence, given that the complaint fits its law. It can also happen the other way around, that a complaint opened in the Consumer defence area, ultimately is a possible infraction to the competition law, so it is sent to the CNDC. In the latter case, it is interesting to mention that, from the point of view of the enforcement of both laws, some of the complaints presented in the Directions of Commerce of the Provinces as infractions to the consumer law are actually actions that can be framed within the competition law, being finally sent to the area of consumer defence of the federal government and in last instance received by the CNDC. Here lays an important difference because the competition law does not have dispositions allowing delegation of reception and resolution of complaints to the provinces, so all the files opened in the country must be conducted by the CNDC. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 65 3. Possible Conflicts between Competition and Consumer Policies. About possible conflicts between competition and consumer policies, as in any other legislation for consumer protection, in our system, there are standards that, to ensure health or safety to consumers or to compensate eventual asymmetries of information between the provider and the consumer, can eventually create or increase the barrier of the entrance in certain markets or to restrict the competition in them. As it probable happens with most of the legislations, Argentina has specific standards related to safety in consumption (food; chemical, agrochemical and pharmaceutical products, electronic devices, etc.). These standards, in some cases, could have implications in the competition processes of the markets involved, especially if its effective enforcement implies some kind of barrier for the entrance of new competitors (for example, if the entrance requirements to be approved by the public authority go beyond reasonable parameters). However, we also have to bear in mind that these standards ensure other legal items, not less important than competition, as consumer health and safety. Besides the mentioned standards, the proper legislation about consumption can present cases of trade off between competition in the market and prevention in other deficiencies of it. This could be the case when there is, legally, a general assurance for certain kind of goods due to deficiencies or vices. If consumers could not internalise the difference between the technical services of each product at the moment of the purchase, it is possible that entrance barrier could be generated in some markets of "technical services and of “spare parts and replacements”. In fact, the CNDC has had several complaints of abuse of dominant position on behalf of agents or franchisers or the same manufacturers that deny selling original spare parts to other providers of technical services or of repairs that do not belong to their own net of official agents. There are cases in the industries of elevators, automobiles and others. We estimate that this type of legislation can also restrict in some way the competition in the import market of this type of products, to the extent that this kind of legislation promotes exclusive franchising and representations. However, we understand that the existence of a legislation on guaranties, that protects consumers against hidden vices in the differed consumer products, in general justifies the restriction over competition that the standard fixes, besides, in many of these cases the mentioned restriction is compensated by a strong competition “inter-brand” in the involved markets. On the other hand, there is in Argentina a legislation that regulates market activity developed in competition conditions. This can be the case of Law Nº 25065, which regulates the operation of credit cards in aspects that, generically, the Consumer Defence Law considers as the information that must be provided to the client in the monthly report of operations or in the conditions of the contract. It also regulates other aspects related to the system costs, such as fixation of limits to the financing interests of credit cards and “higher” the established limits to the fee that the issuing bank charges to the different shops involved, avoiding their dispersion. 4. Price fixation policies in certain markets From a perspective exceeding the scope of the consumer protection legislation, we can mention those governmental interventions in certain markets of massive consumption items or their devices, many of which can be internationally tradable (corn, bread, milk, petroleum), where the government has promoted price stability agreements or has fixed export taxes, in a way that, for those products, prices paid in the domestic market are lower than the prices in international markets. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 66 The pursued aim with these policies is to avoid the exclusion of an important range of domestic consumers from the complete or lower demand of these goods. Beyond pursued aims, the truth is that price fixation of these products is conducted with mechanisms different from the competition ones. These policies have also been verified in Argentina for some services, which are offered partially in private and which consumption includes relatively important population sectors. The most significant examples are education and medical services. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 69 effectiveness of the anti-competitive conduct provisions of the TPA, chaired by Sir Daryl Dawson, a retired High Court judge (the Dawson Review). The Dawson Review concluded that the TPA was largely effective and worked well but that improvements were needed in some areas, including, improving the administration and accountability of the ACCC, improving the ACCC’s regulatory processes, specifically through a new merger clearance process and changes to the collective bargaining provisions, and also recommending increases to penalties and the introduction of criminal sanctions for cartel conduct. Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs (other ministers in respect of specific sectors) Commonwealth sectoral legislation (eg, telecommunications, media) Trade Practices Act 1974 The Department of the Treasury Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Industry regulators Federal Courts (Federal Court of Australia, Federal Magistrates Court) Policy framework Enforcement RedressPolicy development In response to the review’s recommendations, and widespread publicity about recent cartel cases, the Australian Government proposes to criminalise cartel conduct by allowing for the gaoling of persons who make, or give effect to, agreements between competitors that aim to fix prices, restrict output, divide markets or rig bids. The Australian Government intends put this legislation before the Australian Parliament in 2008 and is presently consulting on it. Australia embarked on extensive structural reform from the mid-1990s with the implementation of the National Competition Policy (NCP) by the Australian Government and the States and Territories. NCP was focussed on reforming Australia’s institutional and regulatory frameworks to create new markets and introduce competition into existing markets. NCP included the extension of competition regulation to cover all businesses, the disaggregation of previously vertically-integrated monopoly service sectors, such as publicly owned utilities, to create competitive markets, the introduction of competitive neutrality between public and private sector businesses and the introduction of a regime for access to essential facilities (see below). A second wave of structural reform commenced in 2005, with the introduction of the National Reform Agenda (NRA) under the auspices of CoAG. The NRA covered reforms in the areas of human capital, competition and regulatory reform, aimed at further raising living standards and improving services by lifting national productivity and workforce participation. A key element of the NRA is the introduction of regulatory best practice by all Australian Governments, including the requirement to consider at an early stage the impact of proposed reforms on markets. 1.1.2 Economic regulation of infrastructure The TPA provides for a national access regime for infrastructure (under Part IIIA TPA). Access regulation in Australia seeks to promote the economically efficient operation of, use of and investment in the infrastructure by which services are provided, thereby promoting effective competition in markets and overall economic efficiency. Part IIIA of the TPA provides for the regulation of third-party access to nationally significant infrastructure on reasonable terms and conditions where commercial negotiations with the infrastructure owner have failed. In such instances, a party wanting access to a particular infrastructure service may apply to have the service ‘declared’ to be an essential service. In addition, the regime provides a DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 70 framework and guiding principles to encourage a consistent approach to access regulation in each industry. The regime therefore provides for the designated Australian Government Minister to ‘certify’ a state or territory access regime as an ‘effective’ access regime. Where an effective access regime is found to exist, declaration is not available and an access seeker must use the effective regime. The National Competition Council (NCC) is an independent statutory authority established under Part IIIA of the TPA. The NCC’s role involves making recommendations to the relevant Minister on whether essential infrastructure services should be declared and on whether certain state and territory access regimes should be certified. It reports annually on the national access regime, including on recent legislative developments and the operation and effectiveness of the regime (copies of NCC reports can be obtained from its website, www.ncc.gov.au). 1.1.3 Consumer Policy Australia regards consumer policy and competition policy as part of an integrated approach to regulating markets and ensuring consumer well-being. Australian consumer policy is focussed on demand- side issues, enabling consumers to make effective choices and providing protection, where required, from misleading, exploitative or harmful conduct by traders. It serves to activate competition, leading to wider economic benefits, such as increased productivity and growth. Consumer laws provide a range of approaches for action against businesses that mislead, exploit or harm consumers, including private rights of action, providing specific guarantees of fitness for purpose and quality, regulating labelling and contract terms, prohibiting specific forms of conduct and product safety regulation. Australian consumer policy is developed, implemented and enforced at the national and state levels. Generally speaking, national laws apply to businesses operating across state borders and internationally, and state laws apply within their jurisdiction. The Australian Government works closely with the States and Territories to integrate and harmonise policy development and consumer law enforcement. Australia’s governments are also active in consumer information and education campaigns and encourage the use, where possible, of industry self-regulation to address issues in the market. State and Territory Ministers for consumer affairs State and Territory fair trading legislation State and Territory Departments State and Territory Fair Trading Offices State and Territory Courts and Tribunals Co-regulatory and self-regulatory schemes Industry bodies Australian Government Ombudsman and ADR schemes Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer Affairs Trade Practices Act 1974 The Department of the Treasury Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Federal Courts (Federal Court of Australia, Federal Magistrates Court) MCCA Secretariat States and Territories Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs Policy framework Enforcement Redress DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 71 1.3 Enforcement: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Australia’s competition and consumer policy arrangements separate policy and enforcement functions. While national policy responsibility rests with the Minister and Treasury, enforcement is the responsibility of the ACCC (www.accc.gov.au). The ACCC’s role goes well beyond simply taking action for breaches of the TPA, but seeks to “enhance the welfare of Australians by promoting vigorous, lawful competition and informed markets, encouraging fair trading and protecting consumers and regulating national infrastructure services and other markets where there is limited competition.” The States and Territories also have their own enforcement bodies, which enforce State and Territory consumer laws.2 The ACCC and the State and Territory enforcement bodies work cooperatively through formal and informal links. The ACCC is an independent statutory commission, made up of the chairman and a board of commissioners, which is responsible to Parliament, with supporting staff. It was set up in 1995 to take over the functions of the Trade Practices Commission and the Prices Surveillance Authority, so as to achieve better coordination of competition and consumer law enforcement. Like the Treasury in relation to policy issues, the ACCC provides advice to ministers on law enforcement issues. Enforcing both competition and consumer laws gives the ACCC synergies and efficiencies in carrying out its functions. For example, understanding the competitive dynamics of a market can assist the ACCC to identify and assess likely consumer detriment. The ACCC has a range of enforcement powers at its disposal, so as to use the most effective mix of litigation, enforceable undertakings, administrative settlements, persuasion and education to achieve compliance with the TPA. The ACCC recognises that the vast majority of businesses wish to comply with the law, and widely utilises education and awareness tools to inform businesses and consumers about their rights and obligations, with the aim to reducing potential breaches. The ACCC takes a targeted approach to enforcement, including targeting conduct that has a national or international focus or where the implications of the case can have a broad educational or deterrent effect. This is to ensure that their resources are utilised effectively in the delivery of well functioning markets. In addition to the ACCC each state has its own consumer regulatory body, with broadly similar enforcement powers within their jurisdictions. There are also a number of markets regulated on a sectoral basis. These include: • financial services, where the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (www.asic.gov.au) works with the ACCC to enforce consumer regulation; • communications and the media, where the Australian Communications and Media Authority (www.acma.gov.au) has primary responsibility for the enforcement of competition and consumer laws , but also works with the ACCC; and • energy, where the Australian Energy Regulator (www.aer.gov.au) works closely with the ACCC to enforce laws regulating national energy networks and whose role will expand to cover consumer regulation in the near future. 2 State and Territory enforcement bodies include: New South Wales Office of Fair Trading, Consumer Affairs Victoria, Queensland Office of Fair Trading, Western Australian Department of Consumer and Employment Protection, South Australian Office of Consumer and Business Affairs, Tasmanian Office of Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading, Australian Capital Territory Office of Fair Trading and the Northern Territory Department of Justice. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 74 DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 75 CANADA 1. Competition and Consumer Policy Landscape in Canada The Canadian institutional landscape responsible for competition and consumer issues reflects the uniqueness of the Canadian political system. Consumer protection and policy is, in practice, a shared responsibility between the Canadian federal and provincial governments as the Canadian Constitution does not specifically assign consumer affairs to either level of government. Under their constitutional power to regulate property and civil rights, Canadian provincial and territorial governments administer and enforce statutes that create a wide variety of rights and remedies for consumers. Examples of their work include the legislation of contractual matters associated with the terms and conditions of the sale of goods and services (such as guarantees and licensing of vendors) and certain sectoral issues (such as building codes and electrical safety). Most provinces also have statutes regarding unfair business practices and misleading marketing1. Complementing provincial consumer protection statutes, the Canadian federal government has responsibility over consumer issues that are a consequence of its various jurisdictional powers, including broad marketplace rules such as peace, order and good government; trade and commerce; criminal law; currency; banking; and weights and measures2. In practice, a variety of federal government departments are therefore responsible for consumer protection issues that are a consequence of their more general powers to regulate certain industries (such as transportation, telecommunications and banking), and for a large number of health and safety issues (such as food, general consumer products, new vehicles and inter- provincial transportation services). Under the Department of Industry Act, the Minister of Industry has a role in promoting and protecting consumer interest throughout Canada. The Office of Consumer Affairs (OCA) responds to these responsibilities by helping to build trust in the marketplace so that consumers can both protect themselves and be able to confidently and knowledgeably drive demand for innovative products and services at competitive prices. It prepares various tools that consumers can use to make informed purchasing decisions; expands marketplace consumer protection by encouraging the development of voluntary codes and standards; helps consumer organisations to build their capacity so that they are better able to contribute to the development of public policy; and facilitates the harmonisation of consumer protection legislation and regulations between provinces and territories. In this regard, the OCA co-chairs the Consumer Measures Committee (CMC)3, which is a forum providing for open dialogue between the federal, provincial and territorial governments in the area of consumer protection. 1 Please see the Industry Canada website, OCA – Canada’s Consumer Legislation at: http://www.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/oca-bc.nsf/en/ca02240e.html. 2 Jenkin, M. “Federal-Provincial Cooperation: The Role of Ministers and Officials in Consumer Protection Policy”, presentation at Mount Allison University, February 8, 2006. 3 Further information on the CMC can be found at the CMC Web site at: http://cmcweb.ca/epic/site/cmc- cmc.nsf/en/home. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 76 The Competition Bureau (Bureau), on the other hand, is an independent law enforcement agency responsible for the administration and enforcement of the Competition Act and the three standard-based acts, which include: the Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act, the Textile Labelling Act and the Precious Metals Marking Act. The Competition Act’s purpose clause states that the Act serves: ...to maintain and encourage competition in Canada in order to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy, in order to expand opportunities for Canadian participation in world markets while at the same time recognising the role of foreign competition in Canada, in order to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate in the Canadian economy and in order to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices. The reference to consumers in the purpose clause of the Competition Act reflects Parliament’s appreciation that a properly functioning marketplace requires not only enforcement against market power abuses, but also transparency in information provided to consumers to promote well informed purchasing decisions. Hence, consumer and competition policy are mutually reinforcing and the Bureau operates with this premise while carrying out its law enforcement duties. This portion of the Bureau’s mandate is administered by the Fair Business Practices Branch (FBPB). The Bureau therefore focuses not only on traditional antitrust issues such as cartels and abuse of dominance and their downstream effects on prices (which ultimately affect consumers) but also investigates false or misleading representations and deceptive marketing practices to ensure that consumers are not confronted with deceptive price and product information when making purchasing choices. The Bureau is further responsible for the accuracy of information on packaging and labels and performance claims regarding the efficacy of product and services. As such, while the Bureau aims to protect the integrity of information in the marketplace to ensure both a level playing field for competitors and adequate information for consumers, the OCA strives to offer consumers various tools to enable them to make informed purchasing decisions. Lastly, there are additional networks in Canada that deal with consumer issues, including organisations such as the Better Business Bureau and the Canadian Anti-Fraud Call Centre (previously known as Phone Busters)4. There are also several consumer groups in Canada, including the Consumers Council of Canada, the Consumers’ Association of Canada, the Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Option consommateurs and l’Union des consommateurs5. However, the Canadian consumer movement is smaller and less well resourced relative to many other OECD countries. 2. How Competition and Consumer Policy Interact in Canada In Canada, over time, there have been varying degrees of interaction among the agencies that have jurisdiction over competition and consumer protection issues. Most notably, coordination has occurred in the area of public education, where it is recognised that increasing the public’s awareness of competition and consumer policy helps to create consumers who are demanding, knowledgeable, and better equipped to make informed purchasing decisions. As a result, various partnerships and initiatives have been 4 Please see the Canadian Better Business Bureau Web site at: http://www.ccbbb.ca/ and the Canadian Anti- Fraud Call Centre Web site at: http://www.antifraudcentre.ca. 5 For links to Canadian consumer association Web sites, please visit the Consumers’ Association of Canada Web site at: http://www.consumer.ca/1655. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 79 competitors and in staying ahead of the fraudsters who bilk consumers and businesses to the tune of millions of dollars by using borders to their advantage. Greater similarity in standard tests for determining competitive effects and penalties such as extradition would also promote greater compliance among businesses operating trans-nationally and would prevent perpetrators from hiding behind national borders. Greater convergence in the area of e-commerce is also suggested given the growing prevalence of this type of borderless commerce. In conjunction with the OECD Guidelines for Protecting Consumers from Fraudulent and Deceptive Commercial Practices Across Borders, the Committee on Consumer Policy could begin to look at whether the EU Enforcement Cooperation Regulation model could be extended beyond Europe to allow enforcers around the world to take on cross-border scams. It would also be useful to build greater consensus on appropriate consumer protection principles more broadly, so that consumers may know, no matter what the jurisdiction involved, what to expect in terms of protection. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 80 DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 81 CHILE 1. Introduction In Chile there is increasing awareness on the complementarity between Competition and Consumer Protection policies and authorities. The notion that competitive markets are the best way to achieve consumer welfare impinges political discourses and policy proposals in the entire political spectrum, and the perception of poor competitive conditions in a particular market rapidly triggers actions and the mobilisation of consumer associations and representatives, as well as both Competition and Consumer Protection authorities. But this is a prerequisite, since on the other hand, there are several market failures which go beyond market power or, more practically, beyond the usual reach of competition authorities. Those market failures, such as information asymmetries, transaction costs and externalities, may under some circumstances threat consumers’ rights, which enforcement is guaranteed by the consumer protection policy. There are also several areas in which Competition and Consumer Protection may interact. For instance, freedom of choice, adequateness of information, advertising regulation (misleading advertising does not only affect consumers, but also competition since it detours people’s choice; comparative advertising can also affect competition) is essential for both areas at the same time. Moreover, the right working of the markets is paramount in both Competition and Consumer Protection policies, and for their common search of the public interest. There are two separate agencies within the Chilean government one for each area: the FNE (Fiscalía Nacional Económica) enforcing Competition Law, and the SERNAC (Servicio Nacional del Consumidor) in charge of Consumer Protection. 2. Competition authorities Besides the FNE, the Chilean System for the Defence of Free Competition currently operates on the basis of the decisions of a Competition Tribunal,1 created in April 2004. The system started in 1959, with the enactment of the Law Nr. 13.305. This miscellaneous statute, in one of its chapters, created the “Antimonopoly Commission”, entitled with the powers to punish conducts and to control industrial and commercial activities. Later on, the FNE was created as a prosecution office, for the technical support of the mentioned Commission and for the investigations procedures aimed at the improving of the effectiveness of the law. In 1973, the Decree Law Nr. 211 was enacted. This was the first regulating body exclusively related to competition law in Chile. Over the years, both the FNE and the Commissions (the decisions were divided into several commissions) developed and became well established. The Decree Law Nr. 211 was amended several times, but it was not until 2004 that the current decisional structure was set, with all of the decisions being concentrated into a single body, the already mentioned Competition Tribunal, which was 1 Its Spanish acronym is TDLC, which stands for “Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia” (Free Competition Defence Tribunal). DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 84 Department Stores and supermarkets, and that in case the merger was approved, they estimated that the new Company would be the second most claimed company in Chile; (5) that the information given by retail companies about the credit conditions offered by their own cards is scarce and vague; (6) that there are also huge differences between the interests charged by different competitors. Furthermore, there are major differences between the interest rates charged by the same department stores to different customers. SERNAC explained that the information given by Department Stores and Supermarkets about their credit conditions was extremely complicated. For instance, charges are divided into different items (i.e. interest rate, commissions, etc) and these items are expressed in different formats (for instance percentages, indexed units, etc). Regarding advertising, there were cases in which companies claimed that people could buy without paying interests while they were charging high commissions for the use of their credit cards. Furthermore, even though they offered discounts if people bought with their store cards, the overall prices paid were much higher than the prices paid in cash, once interests and commissions were actually charged. Moreover, SERNAC described several safety infringements and abusive clauses incurred by both companies in their contracts, which had been penalised by Chilean courts. For instance, the Chilean Supreme Court declared void a contract clause established by Falabella in which consumers were made responsible for transactions made with their stolen credit cards, and condemned the company to compensate the consumers with US$ 50.000. SERNAC also claimed against several abusive clauses included in the credit card contracts of D&S. For instance, consumers were forced to contract three different types of insurance, and the company established that it could unilaterally change the conditions of the contract. Both clauses were ruled out by the Chilean Consumer Protection Act. In SERNAC’s opinion, all of these consumer claims and statistics could have an impact on Competition in this market. If there is not enough competition, if concentration continues to grow, and the number of rival players in the retail markets continues to fall, not only this will lead to higher prices as stated by the FNE, but also to consumer harm in a broader sense. Hence, all of the evidence added by the SERNAC constituted a sample and example of the symptoms and current problems faced by consumers in the retail and credit card markets, which are projected to grow if the operation goes on. 5. Conclusion The presentations submitted by the FNE and the SERNAC in a merger case are good examples of how the existence of different agencies for Competition and Consumer Protection is not an obstacle for cooperation. By developing good communication practices, agencies can take advantage of their individual strengths and yet develop synergies. This experience is also an example of the strong relationship between Competition and Consumer Protection. In a non competitive market, consumers are not only going to be affected by higher prices, but also because of potential harms in several of their rights that may be affected. As we suggested while introducing this document, violations of consumers’ rights are many times indicative of behavioural or structural problems in competition. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 85 APPENDIX: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 1. How does Consumer Policy interact with Competition Policy in your Country, if at all? Can you give examples where they have conflicted? Where have they been complementary? There are separate agencies in Chile for Consumer Protection and Competition policy. However, both agencies are aware of the synergies that they can generate when they act together. For instance, they have both recently participated in the Competition Tribunal consultation on the merger operation between D&S and Falabella (the example given above) and in the legal actions established recently against a credit bureau. 2. What do you feel are the benefits and drawbacks to your own country’s choice of “dual- function” or “separate agencies” for handling competition and consumer policy? The main benefit is the institutional autonomy. In Chile, the choice of “separate agencies” allows each agency to define their own strategy, based on their own strengths and faculties. No decision is subordinated to the interest or priority of the other agency. Importantly, as each institution develops its own reputation, in which their autonomy plays a role, coordination proves to have an additional impact. The drawback is the natural difficulty and cost of coordination, and to identify areas of synergies on a regular basis. 3. Has your country required that “no frills” versions of complicated products be offered, to help vulnerable consumers? If so, who provided the product and how was the supply enforced? What was the effect in competition, if any? There are minimum information requirements in products and services such as credit, safety instructions, among others. The Consumer Protection Act mandates that all information and advertising must be clear and understandable and has to be provided before the transaction 4. Can you identify areas where a better convergence of both competition and consumer policies globally would be beneficial? Areas in which a better convergence between competition and consumer policies would be beneficial are: credit, retail, basic services (natural monopolies) and telecommunications. 5. Can you provide examples of sectors or products where an increased international cooperation between competition authorities and consumers representatives could render the markets more competitive while ensuring and adequate protection of consumers around the globe? Although no decision has been made by the Chilean authorities on this matter, at this stage, it is considerable that in areas within the software industry, when highly concentrated (if not monopolistic), several consumer protection issues arise (for instance security breaches). The fact that this is an extremely technical product also raises several information issues linked to both competition and consumer protection matters. Another instance of cooperation could be ICPEN (International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network). This International Organisation carries out several actions against frauds on the internet that might be useful in order to maintain a healthy environment for Competition. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 86 DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 89 EL SALVADOR 1. The Consumer and Competition Policy: Its Origin in the Peace Accords 1.1 The efforts on consumer protection and competition matters The Constitution in force since December 1983 raised to a constitutional level the State´s obligation to promote economic and social development, as well as the defence of consumers´ interests, forbidding monopolistic practices in order to insure entrepreneurial freedom and protect consumers´ interests. Years later, with the peace negotiations of El Salvador which culminated with the subscription of the Chapultepec Accords in January 1992, various objectives were set forth, amongst others, to contribute to the strengthening of the market economy and the creation of the necessary conditions to improve the population´s level of life. As far as the economic and social stabilisation are concerned, parallel to the implementation of the Peace Accords, the Government of El Salvador set forth a five year Economic and Social Development Plan, aiming, amongst others, at creating the necessary conditions to achieve a sustainable economic development and, in the medium term, implement a social program to establish a market economy and the reforms to the economic system. In Chapter V, number 6 of the Peace Accords, two important aspects were included regarding the measures to alleviate the social costs of the structural adjustment programs, amongst which were found those related to consumer protection. In said Accords, the Salvadoran Government committed itself to adopt the policies and create the effective mechanisms in order to insure the consumers´ defence, pursuant to the mandate set forth in Article 101 of the Constitution of the Salvadoran Republic. For the enforcement of the aforementioned constitutional mandate, the Government committed itself to present to the Legislative Assembly within 60 days after the subscription of the said Accords, a draft of the Consumers´ Protection Law, which would include the strengthening of the Ministry of Economy and would lay down the first step in the eventual creation of a consumers´ protection authority. Likewise, a commitment was set forth to adopt the mechanisms to prevent monopolistic practices and, simultaneously, guarantee entrepreneurial freedom and protect consumers´ interests, pursuant to Article 110 of the Constitution. The price liberalisation and a free competition market scheme, thus, permitted a normal supply of goods and services and price stability. During 1992, the discussion of the legal framework on free competition to regulate monopolies and oligopolies was also initiated. Nevertheless, these definitions where incorporated in the Consumers´ Protection Law. In 1994, the first draft of a Free Competition Law was presented to the Legislative Assembly but did not achieve its approval. The competition issue was practically unknown in the country, hence, various study delegations were formed by different economic agents´ representatives, from both public and private sectors, including assemblymen of the Legislative Assembly, who were part of the commission responsible for analysing the aforementioned draft. The objective of these study visits was to know about the experiences of countries with a long tradition in competition law enforcement. In a ten year period, DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 90 different draft laws were presented; each one differing from others basically regarding the nature of the authority responsible of enforcing the law, the view point on mergers and acquisitions, and the system of sanctions. Likewise, the 2004 National Meeting of the Private Enterprise (in Spanish, Encuentro Nacional de la Empresa Privada, ENADE), stated the following: “The country must adopt a policy that protects and promotes competition, through adequate mechanisms, strong institutions, and an unmistakable legal framework, insuring the efficient assignment of resources and a market development that benefits all. “Said policy must include, amongst others, the promotion and defence of competition, an engagement against unfair commercial practices -such as smuggling, dumping, fiscal fraud, the informal sector of the economy- the prevention of anticompetitive practices, the promotion of economic efficiency, and the consumers´ welfare. “Consequently, a clear understanding must be provided regarding the benefits to be obtained from the economic system as a result of a public policy intended to protect and promote competition with the support of consumers, businessmen, and politicians”. In order to comply with the aforementioned constitutional principles and as a recognition of the need to achieve a more competitive and efficient economy, promoting its transparency and access, encouraging its dynamism and growth in order to benefit the consumer, El Salvador found convenient to issue in 2004 the Competition Law in force since January 1st, 2006; at the same date, the Competition Superintendence started its operations. It is important to point out that the protection of competition is a constitutional duty; nevertheless, such obligation lacked of detail in the legal framework to make it effective, thus, the new law was a step forward for the consolidation of the constitutional regime. 1.1.1 Consumer Protection Law • The first Consumer Protection Law was issued in 1992. During this period, the Consumer Protection Division was created as part of the Ministry of Economy, with the objective to safeguard the consumers´ interest, establishing a legal framework to protect individuals from fraud and market abuses. Objective of the aforementioned law: “Art. 1.- The objective of this law is to safeguard the interest of the consumers, establishing the legal framework to protect individuals from frauds and abuses within the market.” • During 1996, the 1992 Consumer Protection Law was abolished and a new law was approved, under the mandate of Article 101 of the Constitution, which states: “It is the State´s duty to promote economic and social development, through the generation of the optimum conditions for an increment in the production of goods and services, encouraging, at the same time, the defence of the consumers´ interests.” On the other hand, the aforementioned law vested the Ministry of Economy with the power to enforce said legal framework through the Consumer Protection General Division. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 91 Objective of said law: “The objective of this law is to safeguard the interest of the consumers, establishing the legal framework to protect individuals from frauds and abuses within the market.” As done by the previous law, this one intended to strengthen the conditions in our country for its introduction in the worldwide globalisation process, guaranteeing the participation of the private enterprise, promoting competition, and entitling consumers with the necessary rights for their legitimate defence. • In August 2005, the currently in force Consumer Protection Law was issued, abolishing the 1996 law. Objective of the aforementioned law: “Art. 1.- The objective of this law is to protect the rights of the consumers, in order to procure equilibrium, certainty, and legal security in their relations with suppliers.” Various elements were taken under consideration when issuing said law, figuring as the principal reason, the need for a better structure and systematic development, as well as a global and preventive vision that guarantees the consumers´ protection. i) National System for Consumer Protection Article 151 of the aforementioned law institutes the National System for Consumer Protection in order to promote and develop the consumers´ protection. This system is formed by the Authority of the Consumer (in Spanish Defensoría del Consumidor), agencies of the Executive Branch, and other State institutions, vested with the attribution to look by sector after consumers´ rights or watch over enterprises that work with public. Article 153 of the said law mentions the activities of the National System for Consumer Protection, establishing amongst others, the following activities related to consumer protection: • Training its officers in that topic; • Register and classify complaints filed by consumers and the sanctions imposed or the supplier´s exoneration, whichever is the case; • Creation of nets of participants in the System´s officers to execute specific and preventive actions relating to consumer protection; • Strategically plan the necessary activities for the surveillance and enforcement of the legal framework relating to consumers; • Elaborate information and communication instruments; • Elaborate the technical framework, methods, and guides for officers in charge of enforcing the law; and, DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 94 imposed by the resolution authorising a merger or acquisition, and to those who do not comply with the precautionary remedies ordered. • 2006-2007 Activities During its first two years of operations (2006-2007), the Competition Superintendence received 30 complaints and initiated 8 ex-officio investigations, regarding alleged violations to the Competition Law committed by economic agents from different sectors of the Salvadoran economy. Twenty seven cases concerning anticompetitive practices were analysed, 15 of which were for abuses of dominant position. Seven anticompetitive practices were sanctioned. 6 merger and acquisition notifications were received, 5 of which were authorised and 1 was declared not to require the prior Superintendence´ authorisation, pursuant to Article 31 of the Competition Law. Cooperation and technical assistance agreements for the enforcement of the Competition Law • With Government institutions Internationally, cooperation and collaboration agreements have proven to be useful tools for the effective enforcement of the Competition Law. Since its creation and during 2006 and 2007, the Competition Superintendence has subscribed cooperation and technical assistance agreements with various regulators in order to strengthen the investigative process and the access to information. It is important to point out the agreements signed with the Electricity and Telecommunications General Superintendence (in Spanish, Superintendencia General de Electricidad y Telecomunicaciones, SIGET), the Maritime Port Authority (in Spanish, Autoridad Marítima Portuaria. AMP), the Financial System Superintendence (in Spanish, Superintendencia del Sistema Financiero, SSF), the Science and Technology National Council (in Spanish, Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, CONACYT), the Civil Aviation Authority (in Spanish, Autoridad de Aviación Civil, AAC), the Securities Superintendence (in Spanish, Superintendencia de Valores, SV), the Pension Funds Superintendence (in Spanish, Superintendencia de Pensiones, SP), and the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador (in Spanish, Banco Central de Reserva de El Salvador, BCR). • With Competition Authorities In order to exchange experiences and know about diverse techniques, the Competition Superintendence signed cooperation and technical assistance agreements with different competition authorities such as the National Competition Commission of Spain (in Spanish, Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia de España, hoy Comisión Nacional de Competencia de España), the Tribunal for the Defence of Competition of Chile (in Spanish, Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia de Chile), the National Economic District Attorney´s Office of Chile (in Spanish, Fiscalía Nacional Económica de Chile), the National Institute for the Defense of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property of Peru (in Spanish, Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual -INDECOPI- de Perú), the Authority for Consumer Protection and Defence of Competition of Panama ( in Spanish, Autoridad de Protección al Consumidor y Defensa de la Competencia de Panamá), the Federal Competition Commission of Mexico (in Spanish, Comisión Federal de Competencia de México), and the Commission for Competition Promotion of Costa Rica (in Spanish, Comisión para Promover la Competencia de Costa Rica). Several studies on competition conditions have been completed in the following sectors: Cargo, terrestrial transportation, liquid fuels, medicines, electricity, eggs and chickens, liquid fuel gas, and telecommunications. Furthermore, two internships in the Swiss Competition Authority (COMCO) were concluded. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 95 Likewise, relations for information exchange are maintained with institutions such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice of the United States of America. 2. Competition Policy as Core of Economic Efficiency and Consumer Fundamental Rights Protection. Due to its scope and dynamism, competition policy, together with the fiscal and political policy, constitutes the fundamental milestones of the economy. Hence, the competition authority must be viewed as enforcer of the economic policy of the country and not as a mere enforcer of the Competition Law. And this is so because competition policy fits within its broad concept; it refers to all the government measures which may influence the intensity of competition in the national markets or which may impact on the freedom of economic agents to carry out profitable or non-profitable economic activities. Thus, the competition law of any country is part of its competition policy, as well as other laws and policies, including commercial policies, measures to attract direct foreign investment, regulations of enterprises at a national level, privatisations initiatives, consumer protection law, amongst others. Currently, there is an almost unanimous criterion that the objective of competition policy must be the promotion of economic efficiency and consumer welfare. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, there is still some debate on whether to include in this objective other goals of social and distributive nature. Nevertheless, there is unanimity as to include consumer protection in the objective of competition policy, even though for competition purposes the meaning of the term changes to the more commonly used definition. Under the context stated herein, it is important to point out that, contrary to the consumer protection policy, the competition policy does not consider the consumer as the principal core of its activities. This is due to the fact that the objective of competition policy is to preserve competitive conditions in the market. For the abovementioned policy, the consumer is an indirect beneficiary of the consequences resulting from fair competition amongst economic agents in the market. Nevertheless, it is necessary to emphasise that for competition policy the aforesaid does not mean a lesser importance of the consumer, because when a possible remedy for an anticompetitive practice is presented, the remedy that benefits consumers the most will be preferred, without diminishing economic efficiency and the legitimate rights of all economic agents to participate, giving preference to the generation of added value to all phases of the value chain. Hence, the objective of competition policy is to protect, guarantee, and reestablish competitive conditions in the market and its economic efficiency, which indirectly, result in benefits for the consumers. In spite of the above mentioned, the relation between both State institutions is vital and necessary but understood within each other´s roles. As it can be understood from the mere reading of the cited legal frameworks, the Competition Superintendence has wrongly been included in the National Consumer Protection System, due to the fact that it is not a duty of the Superintendence to protect consumers´ rights on a sectoral basis or watch over enterprises that operate with public, its objective is far beyond the aforesaid: economic efficiency and consumer welfare understood pursuant to the concepts stated herein. Furthermore, the Consumer Authority is also an economic agent for the purposes of the Competition Law, and, thus, must file complaints pursuant to the requirements determined by the law and not because of a mere belief of the existence of anticompetitive practices, complying with Article 42 of the aforementioned law. DAF/COMP/GF(2008)10 96 On the other hand, it is of upmost importance to emphasise the concept of competition policy as a pivot for the establishment of healthy competition in the different markets, as a means to guarantee the economic and social development of the country, as well as the defence of the consumers´ interest, through the prevention and elimination of anticompetitive practices, thus, achieving a more competitive and efficient economy, promoting its dynamism and growth for the benefit of consumers. Hence, in order to contribute to the development of competition and competitiveness of productive activities, both in local and foreign markets, it is vital to have a clear and transparent scheme of action which impedes the existence of discriminatory barriers to economic agents. That is why it is not only necessary to adopt a competition law but also to enforce a competition policy which recognises the identification and elimination of anticompetitive agreements, the abuse of dominant position, and also, to have sound instruments to control mergers and acquisitions that allow an increase of a healthy competition, an increase of investment, and promote the voluntary adoption of good business practices in favour of economic efficiency. To summarise, in the country´s policies, the Competition Law and the Consumer Protection Law play a determining role in the establishment of the rules of the game that serve as a guide to enforce other economic and social policies which are the basis for the development of the country. Nonetheless, both authorities must join efforts to accomplish, within their respective legal frameworks, the objective of each ones law, respecting each others´ attributions and duties. There are still other pending chores to carry out for the consolidation of the competition culture, such as the signature of cooperation and coordination agreements with the consumer protection authority, which as an economic agent, may considerably contribute to achieve a better enforcement of the Competition Law and a better understanding of the society in general, in order to make sure that the market, as a good of our society, is understood as an authentic style of life and of development, rather than just a mere economic concept.