Law, Ethics, and Morality in War During the Battle of Algiers, Slides of Law

Download Law, Ethics, and Morality in War During the Battle of Algiers and more Slides Law in PDF only on Docsity! LAW, ETHICS, AND MORALITY IN WAR DURING THE BATTLE OF ALGIERS A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE Military History by JONATHAN D. HOWELL, MAJ, USA B.S., Aerospace Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1994 M.A., Liberal Arts, Louisiana State University, 2009 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2009-02 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. ii REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 11-12-2009 2. REPORT TYPE Master’s Thesis 3. DATES COVERED (From - To) FEB 2009 – DEC 2009 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Law, Ethics, and Morality in War During the Battle of Algiers 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) Major Jonathan D. Howell 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301 8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT The most notorious period of the French-Algerian War was the Battle of Algiers. The war was brought on by many developments beginning with the original French invasion in 1830 and subsequent annexation of Algeria as part of the French empire. Ultimately, the simplistic legal definition of who was French and enduring distinctions between citizens and subjects were at the root of the war. Noteworthy international land warfare laws evolved during France’s rule of Algeria. Notable acts of legislation compounded the discrimination between the French and the Algerians. These laws, many overwhelmingly supported in a nation founded upon the idea of equality, culminated with special powers extended to the military when the politicians and domestic law enforcement entities could no longer maintain the status quo discrimination. Algerians found themselves protected by neither domestic nor international laws. Notwithstanding the legality of French actions, moral and ethical contradictions with French concepts of the rights of man prevented military success from eliminating dissent domestically as well as internationally. Legitimate war must therefore not only be legal but also moral and ethical or popular support may diminish, falter, or even disappear. There are distinctive parallels between the French-Algerian War and the Global War on Terror--The Long War beyond the origins of contemporary doctrine for counterinsurgency. The study of these historical lessons, provides examples of good and bad, right and wrong, insight for success and, just as important, foreshadowing of failed tactics and techniques to avoid. 15. SUBJECT TERMS International Laws of Land Warfare, Lieber Code, Indigenous Code, Geneva Convention, Hague Convention, Ethics, French-Algerian War, Battle of Algiers, Torture, Global War on Terrorism--The Long War (GWOT) 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT 18. NUMBER OF PAGES 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code) (U) (U) (U) (U) 98 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18 v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS To my family first and foremost, thank you for your patience and encouragement to pursue this topic. Your support while I completed two Masters simultaneously and worked on my professional engineer license is beyond measure. Thank you. No student could proceed without sources for research. The librarians at the Combined Arms Research Library were most supportive and are host to the greatest collection of materials in one place for as definitive study of any topic that a U.S. military officer could hope to have available. Their assembly of books, downloads, translations, and other published works simplified the task of independent study. Many thanks must also be given to the patience of my committee. Unbeknownst to them for the greater part of my study of the Battle of Algiers I did not know just what it was that I expected to discover. Perhaps this is just as well given that I have resolved to continue my study in greater depth. The parallels between the French experience in Algeria and the United States of America’s ongoing experience in Iraq and Afghanistan are unnerving. The laws regarding how the French treated indigenous peoples are eerily similar to the ambiguous definition of contemporary detainees in the Global War on Terror--The Long War. In much the same way that contemporary detainees are not treated as prisoners of war nor afforded protection of arrested criminals, Algerians were neither prisoners of war nor provided the protection of French laws as they were not French citizens although they lived on French domestic territory. Even with obligatory arrest documentation, the perceived injustice of treatment ethically and morally was sufficient to influence domestic French opinion negatively after initial overwhelming popular support. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ............ iii  ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iv  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................v  TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... vi  ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................... viii  ILLUSTRATIONS ..............................................................................................................x  TABLES ............................................................................................................................ xi  CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................1  Contradictions in Law and War ...................................................................................... 1  Algeria Becomes Part of France ..................................................................................... 2  Obligations ...................................................................................................................... 5  The Eve of Battle--1954-1956 ........................................................................................ 7  Body of Research .......................................................................................................... 12  CHAPTER 2 EVOLUTION OF LAND WARFARE LAWS ...........................................21  19th Century Law ......................................................................................................... 22  The Geneva Convention of 1864 .............................................................................. 23  Lieber Code of 1863 ................................................................................................. 24  The Indigenous Codes of 1865 and 1881 ................................................................. 29  20th Century Law ......................................................................................................... 31  Hague Conference of 1907 ....................................................................................... 31  Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949 .................................................................... 32  Special Powers Act of 12 March 1956 ..................................................................... 33  21st Century Law .......................................................................................................... 35  Patriot Act of 26 October 2001 ................................................................................. 35  Military Commissions Act of 2006 ........................................................................... 37  CHAPTER 3 MODERN WARFARE, PACIFICATION, AND SMALL WARS ............42  The Battle of Algiers ..................................................................................................... 42  Modern Warfare ............................................................................................................ 47  Pacification ................................................................................................................... 51  Small Wars .................................................................................................................... 54  vii CHAPTER 4 TERRORISM, REPRISALS, AND TORTURE .........................................58  Harsh Measures ............................................................................................................. 58  Terrorism ...................................................................................................................... 59  Reprisals ........................................................................................................................ 61  Torture .......................................................................................................................... 64  CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND FINDINGS ..............................................................70  Comparison to the Global War on Terror--The Long War ........................................... 70  ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................................................................................76  TABLES ............................................................................................................................81  GLOSSARY ......................................................................................................................82  BIBLIOGRAPHY ..............................................................................................................83  INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ......................................................................................87  x ILLUSTRATIONS Page Figure 1.  New York Journal cartoon ...............................................................................76  Figure 2.  Map of Algeria .................................................................................................77  Figure 3.  Map of Algeria with Military Boundaries .......................................................78  Figure 4.  Map of the city of Algiers ................................................................................79  Figure 5.  The Victory Over Terrorism-The Smallpox Chart ..........................................80  xi TABLES Page Table 1.  Guilty Verdicts from August 1957 (Algiers Military Tribunal) ......................81  1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Contradictions in Law and War The field of research into the Algerian War is vast in size, and much of it as yet un-reconnoitred. ― Lt. Colonel Frédéric Guelton1 The French-Algerian War, or the Algerian War of Independence, is a huge topic, as Lieutenant Colonel Guelton noted in 2002. Even the most notorious period of the war, the Battle of Algiers, is a broad topic. The history of international and domestic laws for war and, more specifically, how they influenced the way in which the Battle of Algiers was fought is the subject of this analysis. Further, French military advocates promoted multiple theories for counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and counter-guerrilla warfare leading up to the battle. However, not all of these theories placed a preponderance of emphasis on the rule of law in the balance of a triad for legitimacy including morality and ethics in addition to legality. Competing strategies to conduct war legitimately as perceived by the population must not only be legal but also moral and ethical or popular support may diminish and falter or even disappear. The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between international laws for war and domestic laws of the French during the Battle of Algiers balanced with the requirements to conduct moral and ethical combat. The objective is to determine if contradictions in the balance of legal, moral, and ethical requirements placed on military forces influence the outcome of a conflict in contrast to battlefield operations. More simply put, is it possible to achieve a perceived legitimate victory in a legally acceptable conflict by immoral or unethical means? While the answer would seem to be obviously 4 Islamic courts with secular French courts, such an extreme measure ensured cultural and religious discrimination from the perspective of Muslims. Immediately following the German surrender of the Second World War, Algerians assembled for representation and recognition. Alistair Horne described Sétif, Algeria, as “A Town of No Great Interest,” yet the events in Sétif on 8 May 1945 resulted in a transition point for many Algerians from peaceful petition to open revolt and insurrection.4 While the particulars of the day are unclear, the response by the French government was immediate, intense, and overwhelming. It became known as the Sétif Massacre. While most of Europe celebrated the end of the Second World War, Algerians in Sétif marched ostensibly to pay tribute to the fallen Muslims at the town monument. Notwithstanding the presumption of a peaceful if somber procession, those in the assembly were clearly harboring resentment. Whether the French police or armed troublemakers among the marchers fired the first shots, shocking atrocities occurred over the next five days. Algerians hunted down Europeans as enraged locals murdered, raped, mutilated, and burned whole towns. The Algerian nationalists slaughtered more than one hundred men and women including the elderly as well as children. The ensuing French response resulted in thousands of Algerian deaths; the precise figures are uncertain but totals range from a low estimate of 6,000 to over 50,000. Applying the same techniques used by Field Marshal Robert Thomas Bugeaud in Algeria 100 years earlier; techniques which were also deplored by Samuel Clemens and Lieutenant General Nelson A. Miles in the Philippines 50 years later, the French authorities employed “Senegalese units legendary for their ferocity” and “involved a 5 number of summary executions.”5 These so called “‘pacifying’ operations” included bombing more than forty “less accessible mechtas, or Muslim villages . . . while the cruiser Duguay-Trouin lying off in the Gulf of Bougie bombarded the environs of Kerrata at extreme range (and, presumably, comparable accuracy)”6 (see figures 2 and 3). The French official reaction implemented what would continue to be the primary method of addressing Algerian desire for reform--military intervention. Seemingly ignorant of the evolution of public perception involving brutal treatment of indigenous peoples, the French government ultimately legalized “all necessary measures,” even those in dissonance with prevailing national values, to restore stability. Commanding the French military operations following the Sétif Massacre, General Raymond-Francis Duval reported, “I have secured you peace for ten years. If France does nothing, it will all happen again, only next time it will be worse and may well be irreparable.”7 It was to be a remarkably accurate forecast. Obligations The Muslim resident is French; however, he will continue to be subjected to Muslim law. He may be admitted to serve in the terrestrial and marine Army. He may be called to functions and civil employment in Algeria. He may, on his demand, be admitted to enjoy the rights of a French citizen; in this case, he is subjected to the political and civil laws of France.8 Through an ironic turn of counterrevolutionary application, the corvée,** previously outlawed by the French Revolution, was reinstated as prestation†† in 1871. With this, the Indigenous Code created a subordinate work force taxed by the French **Compelled labor imposed by the state or a chore imposed by an authority figure. ††Payment of an obligation. 6 empire to provide funds and services for France, subject to punishment outside of due process, and further subject to compulsory conscription distinctly from genuine French citizens. The fact that the European residents of Algeria (pieds noir‡‡) expected such obligations and the Algerian people endured them so long is remarkable considering that the ultimate objective of the Indigenous Code was to produce French citizens. Thousands of native Algerians served French authorities without receiving the privileges of French citizenship. In fact, only a very limited number of Algerians ever became French citizens. According to Alistair Horne, “by 1936, after seventy-five years of ‘assimilation’, no more than 2,500 Muslims had actually crossed the bar to French citizenship.”9 In 1944, Frenchman Robert Aron noted, “France did much for Algeria, too little for the Algerians.”10 Many Algerians, whose culture was less alien to that of France or who had learned to speak French, adopted France by service in the military. Military duty, however, was insufficient to achieve French citizenship. In the First World War, 173,000 Algerians served in the Army of Africa, approximately 25,000 of these died.11 Many of the leaders of the National Liberation Front (FLN§§) had also served with the French army during the Second World War. Three of the nine founding members of the FLN, known as the neuf historiques,*** Ben Bella, Mostefa Ben Boulaid, and Belkacem Krim, ‡‡Common term for Algerian residents of European descent, literally “black feet” perhaps ascribed to work boots or military boots. Another commonly used term to describe non-native Algerians was colons, literally “colonist.” §§Front de Libération Nationale. ***The neuf historiques: Hocine Ait Ahmed, Ahmed Ben Bella, Mostefa Ben Boulaid, Larbi Ben M’Hidi, Rabbah Bitat, Mohamed Boudiaf, Mourad Didouche, Mohamed Khider, and Belkacem Krim. 9 During the interval from the Sétif Massacre to the Geneva Conference Messali Hadj, a revolutionary Muslim advocate of Algerian independence, founded the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD§§§). Placed under house arrest in Europe, Hadj ultimately lost control of the MTLD in 1954 and it subsequently fractured into disparate groups with different opinions on acceptable means to achieve their ends. Prior to its dissolution, the MTLD struggled to exist as a moderate and accommodating organization intent on obtaining reconciliation of Algerian grievances with France. Basically, the MTLD wanted to achieve progress and recognition in much the same way as had Morocco and Tunisia. Failing to achieve accommodation within the official French system, reform- minded Algerians once again took up active opposition to the distinct and discriminatory treatment they endured under French authority. On 1 November 1954, the FLN issued its own intent to achieve independence from France.17 The distinctions between Algeria and Indochina, Tunisia and Morocco as wholly French territories or colonial protectorates were peculiar as Mendès-France asserted: One does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the nation, the unity and integrity of the Republic. The Algerian departments are part of the French Republic. They have been French for a long time, and they are irrevocably French. . . . Between them and metropolitan France there can be no conceivable secession. This must be clear once and for all, in Algeria and in metropolitan France as much as in the outside world. Never will France--any French government, or parliament, whatever may be their particularistic tendencies--yield on this fundamental principal. Mesdames, Messieurs, several deputies have made comparisons between French policy in Algeria and Tunisia. I declare that no parallel is more erroneous, that no compromise is falser, or more dangerous. Ici, c’est la France!18 §§§Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques. 10 Even with a policy that Algeria was France and during a period of autonomy extended to French protectorates, the French still denied citizenship to the Algerians. In 1954, the population of Algeria was 8.7 million, with fewer than 1 million of those of European descent.19 The remainder of the population was primarily Muslim and Arab and most notably, marginalized without genuine and credible representation in the government that assured them of Liberté! Égalité! Fraternité! While overwhelmingly the majority in Algeria and part of domestic France for over 120 years, few enjoyed French citizenship. Algerians fought for the French in both the First and Second World Wars and even participated in the official response to the Sétif uprising. Nevertheless, the French government segregated the Algerians from the Europeans in both political accommodations and living conditions. Having been denied the ability to participate legitimately in local government, Algerian insurgents attacked the institutions of French military authority and, most poignantly, the aspects of civilian French society most distinct from Algerian society with coordinated terrorist acts throughout Algeria on 1 November 1954. In addition to the defeat in Indochina and the beginnings of transition to full autonomy for Morocco and Tunisia, the events surrounding the Suez Crisis of October 1956 perhaps especially strengthened the perception in France that international forces supported the Algerian insurgency. In the days leading up to the Suez Crisis, the French intercepted a Sudanese flagged vessel smuggling weapons bound for Morocco and destined for the FLN and paid for with Egyptian funds. The weapons and ammunition represented substantial assistance from the Egyptians to the FLN. 11 In addition to the capture of weapons, French intelligence also determined that senior members of the FLN would be travelling from Morocco to Tunisia. Four of the neuf historiques were afterwards hijacked by the French military by forcing the pilot, a French reserve officer, to land in Algiers. The four neuf historiques thereafter became political prisoners held without trial under penalty of death for their crimes.20 Despite the evidence of foreign support leading to internal French instability, violation of Moroccan sovereignty by the French military raised international objections. Subsequent international condemnation of Britain, France, and Israel in the Suez Crisis influenced French leaders, especially military leaders, to place less emphasis on foreign opinion and focus more on obtaining tangible national security results. National security for the French included the elimination of any insurrection within Algeria perceived to be organized, influenced, and funded by international communist sympathizers such as the “Soviet-inspired agitation and nationalist movements” of Egypt.21 France became paranoid that “the rebellion was being directed from President Nasser’s Cairo, and consequently, it was assumed, by the USSR.”22 This paranoia extended to France’s allies “once the Gaullists concluded not only that the enemy was international communism, but that France was alone among the Western Allies in recognizing the fact.”23 Compounding the isolation was a perceived betrayal of France by America in Indochina and in Suez: . . . America was guilty once again of not recognizing the fundamentally anti-Western aspect of national liberation movements; as Debré put it, In Washington they refuse to see, behind Arab imperialism, an ardent political crusade against the West . . . The American dream which hopes to defend the West by replacing France with an anti-European but pro-American nationalism is an unheard-of chimera.24 14 himself. Early in his assignment, through a shared personal connection with the American consular officer in Algiers, Lewis Clark, Morgan met with an American, Don Davies, working in Algiers. Morgan recalled his initial discussion with Davies regarding the work of Massu’s paras. “‘Massu may help stop the terrorism,’ Davies said, ‘but he’s also digging the ditch that separates the two communities a little deeper by acting on the theory that every Arab is guilty until proven innocent. For every terrorist he catches, he makes two more Arab enemies.’”29 Prior to the recent memoirs of Paul Aussaresses and Ted Morgan, Martin Evans published The Memory of Resistance: French Opposition to the Algerian War (1954- 1962) in 1997. An Algerian viewpoint for the Battle of Algiers and in fact the entire French-Algerian War, Mouloud Feraoun’s Journal 1955-1962: Reflections on the French-Algerian War presented a day-by-day account from a Muslim perspective. All of these works identified the extreme methods the French military used against Algerians to dismantle the Algerian terrorist network and insurgency. The alienation of one part of the population for the protection of another was racist and unethical yet legal. The definitive history of the French-Algerian War, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, by Alistair Horne, provided much of the objective background for this study. Mouloud Feraoun’s Journal 1955-1962: Reflections on the French-Algerian War was instrumental for actual accounts during the Battle of Algiers. Feraoun’s daily contemplations highlighted the anxiety, fear, and vision of further violence propagated by the retribution and vengeance in Algeria. His assassination by the Organization of the 15 Secret Army (OAS‡‡‡‡) was intended to disrupt the 1962 peace talks known as the Evian Accords but merely continued a pieds noir penchant for silencing parties willing to negotiate.30 Ultimately, Feraoun was the ideal indigène§§§§ desired under the Indigenous Code and promoted by Algerian governor-general Maurice Violette. Feraoun’s most significant contribution for this study was providing the unique lens of actually enduring modern warfare in practice. Among soldiers, Roger Trinquier documented French theory for counterinsurgency warfare in Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. David Galula captured his thoughts in Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Aspects of the collection of intelligence described by Trinquier, Aussaresses, and Morgan also appear in more disturbing and visceral detail in The Question by Henri Alleg. Galula further described the related theory of pacification in Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958. Simon Murray described the tactics in the field of the French Foreign Legion in his memoir Legionnaire providing insight similar to Morgan’s experiences and in contrast to native French perspectives. Domestic French perspective on international relations, national security, and a growing sense of isolation was described in an essay by Stephen Tyre in France and the Algerian War (1954-62): Strategy, Operations, and Diplomacy entitled “The Gaullists, the French army and Algeria before 1958: Common Cause or Marriage of Convenience?” Another short essay “The French Army ‘Centre for Training and Preparation in Counter- ‡‡‡‡Organization de l’Armée Secrète. §§§§Meaning an indigenous person of Algeria, not a settler. 16 Guerrilla Warfare’ (CIPCG*****) at Arzew” by Lt. Colonel Frédéric Guelton in France and the Algerian War provided further insight to French strategy and operations. France and the Algerian War edited by Martin S. Alexander and J.F.V. Keiger furthermore provided support for the application of tactics through the short article “A Case of Successful Pacification: the 548th Bataillon du Train at Bordj de l’Agha (1956-57)” by Alexander Zervoudakis. Collectively, the three articles by Tyre, Guelton, and Zervoudakis provided clear insight to the fractures between the ends, ways, and means, respectively, of French national strategy. A national-level paranoia justified extreme measures to ensure security despite the presence of a military center for cultural understanding and capable officers with effective techniques to neutralize the insurgents without alienating the population. Both Alexander and Keiger collaborated with Martin Evans to edit another publication The Algerian War and the French Army, 1954-62: Experiences, Images, Testimonies which documented the psychological effects of Algerian combat on the French soldiers and, more significantly, the experiences of native Algerians known as harkis who fought with the French against the FLN. In direct opposition to the French army strategy, The Algerian Guerrilla Campaign: Strategy and Tactics by Abder-Rahmane Derradji presented the fellagha’s vision. Furthermore, this work identified the competing operational challenges of the struggle against the Algerian Nationalist Movement (MNA†††††). Founded by Messali Hadj when he transformed the MTLD, the MNA and the FLN waged a second war in Algeria and metropolitan France known as the café wars. Interestingly, the MTLD itself *****Centre d’Instruction et de Préparation à la Contre-Guérilla. †††††Mouvement Nationaliste Algérien. 19 Algerians as well as Americans was implicit. The case of Maurice Audin, coupled with Henri Alleg and in parallel with the assassination of Mouloud Feraoun, demonstrated just how acute the bitterness against Muslim ascension to full citizenship affected European French (in)sensibility. 1Frederic Guelton, “The French Army ‘Centre for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare’ (CIPCG) at Arzew” in France and the Algerian War (1954- 62): Strategy, Operations, and Diplomacy (London, UK: Frank Cass, 2002), 34. 2Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1978), 98. 3Ibid., 36. 4Ibid., 23. 5Ibid., 26. 6Ibid. 7Mohammed Harbi, “Massacre in Algeria,” Le Monde diplomatique-English Edition, May 2005, http://mondediplo.com/2005/05/14algeria (accessed 3 November 2009); and Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer, Aux origins de la guerre d’Algérie 1940-45 (Paris: Le Découverte, 2002), 330-334. 8Indigenous Code, 14 July 1865, http://encyclopedie-afn.org/index.php/ D%C3%A9cret_d%27application_de_la_loi_du_14_juillet_1865 (accessed 3 November 2009), Article 1. 9Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 35. 10Ibid., 65. 11Ibid. 12Ibid., 77. 13Ibid., 36. 14Ibid., 37. 15Unattributed, “Revolt of the Fellagha,” Time, 26 December 1955. 20 16Mohammed Harbi, “Massacre in Algeria,” Le Monde diplomatique-English Edition, May 2005, http://mondediplo.com/2005/05/14algeria (accessed 3 November 2009). 17Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 94-95. 18Ibid., 98. 19Helen Chapman Metz, Algeria: a country study (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1994), 76. 20Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 157-164. 21Stephen Tyre, “The Gaullists, the French Army and Algeria before 1958: Common Cause or Marriage of Convenience?” France and the Algerian War (1954-62): Strategy, Operations, and Diplomacy (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), 103. 22Ibid. 23Ibid. 24Journal Officiel de la République Française, Conseil de la République, 14 January 1958. 25Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 184. 26George Santayana, The Life of Reason, Volume 1 (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1905), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15000/15000-h/vol1.html (accessed November 2009). 27Ted Morgan, My Battle of Algiers, (New York, NY: Smithsonian Books, 2005), xix. 28Ibid., 76, 92, 125. 29Ibid., 129. 30Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 37. 31Benjamin Stora, Algeria, 1830-2000: A Short History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 47; and John Talbott, “The Strange Death of Maurice Audin,” Virginia Quarterly Review (Spring 1976): 224-242, http://vqronline.org/articles/1976/ spring/talbott-strange-death/ (accessed 3 November 2009); and Morgan, 128. 32National Assembly of France, “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen” (Paris: National Assembly of France, 26 August 1789), Article 9. 21 CHAPTER 2 EVOLUTION OF LAND WARFARE LAWS The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. ― Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), Article 22. I cannot believe that this is me; that my senses have been dulled to this extent, that I am past caring about anything or that my values have disappeared. What are my values? Christ, what a thought. ― Simon Murray, Legionnaire1 Hugo Grotius, a Dutch philosopher, jurist, and theologian undertook some of the earliest work to develop international laws for land warfare. In 1625 his three-volume set, On The Law of War and Peace,* explained legitimate causes for war. The second volume actually defined examples of legitimate causes and more significantly provided reparations and punishments for violations. The final volume actually set forth appropriate conduct for combatants and treatment of both prisoners and neutral parties. This work on laws for war followed Grotius’ earlier publication of The Free Sea† in 1609. Establishing the international usage of the seas, the ability of states or nations to stake maritime claims was limited to the range of weapons capable of defending them. Defined after Grotius’ death in 1702 this gave rise to acceptance of the three-mile limit in staking maritime claims. Grotius’ extensive thought coupled with his general guidelines provided sufficient foundation for consensus around and adoption of the principles he championed as the basis for international law. These principles endured with growing international adoption and acceptance without much change for over 200 years. *De Jure Belli ac Pacis. †Mare Liberum. 24 wounded combatants as well as atrocities against casualties from friend and foe alike. In 1862, he published A Memory of Solferino using his own funds.4 Its circulation and widespread reception led to the development of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1863 and subsequently led to the first Geneva Convention in 1864 and established the “obligatory force from the implied consent of the states which accepted and applied them in the conduct of their military operations.”5 France was one of the original twelve signatories of the first Geneva Convention in 1864. The United States followed the lead of other international powers with ratification in 1882. The creation of the YMCA and ICRC as well as the ratification of the first Geneva Convention clearly demonstrated the evolution of government and public perception of acceptable practice in warfare. Lieber Code of 1863 A place, district, or country occupied by an enemy stands, in consequence of the occupation, under the martial law of the invading or occupying army, whether any proclamation declaring martial law, or any public warning to the inhabitants, has been issued or not. Martial law is the immediate and direct effect and consequence of occupation or conquest. The presence of a hostile army proclaims its martial law.6 About the same time that Henry Dunant was establishing the ICRC in 1863, the United States of America published General Order 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field. General Order 100 was also commonly known as the Lieber Code after its primary author, Francis Lieber. Published in 1863, this regulation was the first modern attempt to codify the treatment of insurgents who were not part of the organized army of a nation state. The Lieber Code granted liberal and ultimate power to the U.S. military forces operating in areas without civil government in 25 order to promote the restoration of domestic administration and government through martial law; “Martial law is simply military authority exercised in accordance with the laws and usages of war.”7 The foundation for the Lieber Code was the commonly accepted practice of warfare of that period. Both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps benefited from the authority to serve as judge, jury, and executioner during counterinsurgency operations such as those conducted during the Caribbean “Banana Wars,” and most poignantly in the Philippine-American War at the turn of the 20th century. Among the documented principles in the Lieber Code were the use of military tribunals or courts to judge conduct by military personnel and civilians, both American and otherwise. In principle, with the ability to review actions taken, the Lieber Code sought to maintain restraint and mutual respect between combatants by avoiding unnecessary escalation of hostilities: Military oppression is not martial law; it is the abuse of the power which that law confers. As martial law is executed by military force, it is incumbent upon those who administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor, and humanity--virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed.8 Notwithstanding otherwise righteous principles, one of the more controversial aspects of the Lieber Code was the authorization for the military to carry out reprisals in response to acts committed by enemy forces: The law of war can no more wholly dispense with retaliation than can the law of nations, of which it is a branch. Yet civilized nations acknowledge retaliation as the sternest feature of war. A reckless enemy often leaves to his opponent no other means of securing himself against the repetition of barbarous outrage. Retaliation will therefore never be resorted to as a measure of mere revenge, but only as a means of protective retribution, and moreover cautiously and unavoidably--that is to say, retaliation shall only be resorted to after careful 26 inquiry into the real occurrence and character of the misdeeds that may demand retribution. Unjust or inconsiderate retaliation removes the belligerents farther and farther from the mitigating rules of regular war, and by rapid steps leads them nearer to the internecine wars of savages.9 Viewed from a modern perspective, this equivocation over what constituted a legitimate breach of accepted warfare practices set the army on an inevitable path towards the very internecine warfare it purported to hope to avoid. Foreshadowing the severe measures the U.S. military used later in the Philippines and again in Algeria by a different French army, noted French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville remarked in 1841 how such harsh measures were necessary for the war in Algeria: . . . war in Africa is a science. Everyone is familiar with its rules and everyone can apply those rules with almost complete certainty of success. One of the greatest services that Field Marshal [Thomas Robert] Bugeaud has rendered his country is to have spread, perfected and made everyone aware of this new science. . . . In France, I have often heard men I respect but do not approve of, deplore that crops should be burnt and granaries emptied and finally that unarmed men, women and children should be seized. In my view these are unfortunate circumstances that any people wishing to wage war against the Arabs must accept.10 Later in 1843, Lieutenant Colonel Lucien-François de Montagnac, a soldier fighting in Algeria under Field Marshal Bugeaud’s command, wrote home of the French military’s adoption of de Tocqueville’s recommendations: All populations which do not accept our conditions must be despoiled. Everything must be seized, devastated, without age or sex distinction: grass must not grow any more where the French army has put the foot. Who wants the end wants the means, whatever may say our philanthropists. I personally warn all good soldiers which I have the honour to lead that if they happen to bring me a living Arab, they will receive a beating with the flat of the saber. . . . This is how, my dear friend, we must do war against Arabs: kill all men over the age of fifteen, take all their women and children, load them onto naval vessels, send them to the Marquesas Islands or elsewhere.11 29 capability merged with the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine when the U.S. military began intervention in Latin America. Despite the changing international social attitudes for acceptable conduct during warfare, the Lieber Code further served as an intermediate progression for continued evolution of land warfare laws as it provided more precise language than Grotius’ earlier work. Ultimately, the U.S. imposed punishment upon its military leaders who exceeded their authority to act independently and thereby restored the legitimacy of the Lieber Code for a time. Identifying the Lieber Code’s shortcomings eventually facilitated the further advance of land warfare laws in the 20th century. The Indigenous Codes of 1865 and 1881 In order to prevent us from crying out: ‘Thief! Assassin!’ imperialism gags us with the Code de l’Indigénat, a vestige of the darkest barbarism. By virtue of this code, all the violence carried out on the natives by the colonists are [sic] legitimated in advance. Theft, torture, and murder are openly encouraged, and the guilty assured of impunity.16 During the period between America’s adoption of the Lieber Code and its application in the Philippine-American War, France imposed the Indigenous Code upon the Algerian people on Bastille Day in 1865, less than one year after signing the first Geneva Convention. Charles Louis Napoléon Boneparte, otherwise known as Emperor Napoléon III, intended for the Indigenous Code of 1865 to provide Muslim autonomy within a portion of France. Napoléon III travelled to Algeria and wanted to create an Arab kingdom within Algeria, essentially a protectorate, with himself as the king of the Arabs. The frequent revision of French constitutions during the last half of the 19th century contributed to inconsistent oversight of domestic intentions for Algerians because of subsequent international conflict such as the Franco-Prussian War. 30 ioner. Under the Indigenous Code, Napoléon III intended to divide Algeria into a French zone, an Arab zone, and a military zone. The capture of Napoléon III in 1870 during the Battle of Sedan, however, ended the idea of an autonomous region within French Algeria. Originally well-intentioned, in June 1881 the new Third French Republic revised the spirit of the Indigenous Code to explicitly authorize punitive power over the indigenous Algerians. The 1881 revision of the Indigenous Code imposed discrimination upon all French subjects in any French colony. In Algeria, its punitive measures ensured European control of the agriculturally productive regions to offset the loss of territories and farmlands of Alsace-Lorraine due to France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. Authority to impose punishment was arbitrary for vague offenses such as disrespect and resided with the lowest echelon of French government administration, the Cercle.17 These Cercle commanders wielded the same authority as their U.S. military counterparts during the Philippine-American War under the Lieber Code: judge, jury, and execut Ultimately, Cercle commanders collected taxes, fines, and coordinated projects by naming chiefs from the local population to serve at their pleasure or whim. New settlers displaced from the lost territories subsequently expanded the cultivation of Algeria resulting in the further loss of indigenous Algerian land ownership. The inflow of new colons brought voting rights with them and imposed progressively harsher conditions upon the native Algerians by systematically depriving them of land under the authority of the Indigenous Code. The most successful entrepreneurs, who became known as the grands colons, enjoyed tax breaks from the French government to stimulate the growth of their businesses. Their power and 31 influence enabled them to designate public projects to enhance their businesses. By the middle of the 20th century, Europeans in Algeria earned thirty times the average Algerian annual wage. Furthermore, the wealthiest grands colons earned five times the income of their counterparts in metropolitan France but paid lower taxes.18 20th Century Law Hague Conference of 1907 There were significant shortcomings in the application of the Lieber Code during the Philippine-American War as Major General Arthur MacArthur noted on 20 December 1900: In the armed struggle against the sovereign power of the United States now in progress in these islands [the Philippines], frequent violations of important provisions of the laws of war have recently manifested themselves, rendering it imperative . . . to remind all concerned of the existence of these laws, that exemplary punishments attach to the infringement thereof, and that their strict observance is required not only by combatant forces, but as well by noncombatants, native or alien, residing within occupied places.19 The Hague Conference of 1907 substantially clarified land warfare laws regarding reprisals and retribution. Article 23 on the laws and customs of war on land added to prohibitions already expressed in the 1899 Hague Conference: [I]t is especially forbidden- . . . To declare abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party. A belligerent is likewise forbidden to compel the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent’s service before the commencement of the war.20 This statement reinforced the earlier and consistent Article 4 protecting prisoners of war from individuals and army commanders: “Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Government, but not of the individuals or corps who capture them.”21 Bound legally, commanders were representatives of their governments in the treatment of prisoners of 34 perception of French motivation: “The achievement of France is self-evident. It leaps to the eyes, and it would be unjust to deny it; but if the French have done a lot, they did it for themselves.”28 Three days after his day of tomatoes,§ Mollet called upon the National Assembly to authorize an extension of French military service to 27 months and recall reservists to duty in February 1956.29 This action would give the French army more than 500,000 personnel to conduct operations primarily in the Algerian countryside (bled**). Approved by a vote of 455 to 76, the Special Powers Act of 12 March 1956 ultimately granted virtually unrestricted power to create policies and programs without oversight. Implementing a program of counterterrorism to defeat the military arm of the FLN before negotiating with its political apparatus, Mollet eventually ceded authority normally reserved for domestic law enforcement to the military. Mollet’s policy was a radical shift from his coalition government’s platform for negotiations with the FLN, as Feraoun’s journal entry reflected. Mollet’s vice prime minister was none other than Pierre Mendès-France who had granted independence to both Morocco and Tunisia during his tenure as Prime Minister. Despite previous plans to reconcile, with more personnel to pursue the fellagha, French forces implemented new tactics to counter the ability of the insurgents to hide amongst the population. Failing to maintain public order during the period from 1 November 1954 to early 1956, the government of France transferred generous civil authority to the military in §The event came to be known as la journée des tomates (the day of tomatoes) in France and Algeria. The date was also significant historically as right-wing riots in Paris had nearly tipped France into civil war on 6 February 1934. **Arabic word for vast open country. 35 order to address the law and order shortcomings in Algeria. Ultimately, the heavy-handed treatment of the population led to unified Algerian nationalism and independence for Algeria despite a losing military insurgency. By adopting the principle of reprisals against the population that they were supposed to protect and secure, the French military alienated the Algerian majority. The French army failed an old adage of war described to Ted Morgan by his supervisor Major de Brissac, “Those who try to impose the Indochina model on Algeria fail to see that this is not Communism, it’s Islamic nationalism. So lesson number one: ‘Understand your enemy.’”30 21st Century Law Ultimately, the French army won the Battle of Algiers militarily but lost the Algerian war morally and politically. The moment the French army adopted a strategy of torture and discrimination, a moral victory was denied. Violations of international laws for war, even when justified by domestic authorization, may have influenced the outcome of the Algerian war after the Battle of Algiers. More recently, the U.S. government redefined individuals captured during combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as “illegal enemy combatants” rather than enemy prisoners of war. Also, the U.S. government redefined, or explicitly omitted from the definition, “torture” methods expected to produce valuable information from these “illegal enemy combatants” in the GWOT. Patriot Act of 26 October 2001 Any investigative or law enforcement officer, or attorney for the Government, who . . . has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such contents to any other Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national 36 defense, or national security official to the extent that such contents include foreign intelligence or counterintelligence . . . or foreign intelligence information . . . to assist . . . in the performance of his official duties. . . .31 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall be lawful for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence . . . or foreign intelligence information obtained as part of a criminal investigation to be disclosed to any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to assist . . . in the performance of his official duties.32 In the days following the 11 September 2001 attacks on America, elected officials overwhelmingly voted cooperative information sharing to prevent the repetition of coordinated terrorist activity on American soil. The full title of Public Law 107-56 enacted on 26 October 2001, was Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, the USA PATRIOT Act. The Patriot Act was approved in the U.S. House of Representatives by 83 percent and in the U.S. Senate by 98 percent. The Patriot Act was contentious even upon its reauthorization vote in 2005. The Patriot Act was approved in the U.S. House of Representatives by 58 percent and in the U.S. Senate by 89 percent. Proponents voting in the majority hailed cooperation amongst government agencies previously unable to share domestic information against international threats and vice versa. Opponents complained it eroded protections against government intrusion protected by the Bill of Rights. The Special Powers Act of 12 March 1956 had passed the French National Assembly by 86 percent despite the fact that, “among other things, [it] suspended most of the guarantees of individual liberties in Algeria.”33 Fundamentally, the Patriot Act changed five earlier U.S. laws: the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 39 state of perception for Algerians released from French authorities after questioning. Perspective for sufficient security therefore faces reflection upon the words of Benjamin Franklin, “Those who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.”37 1Simon Murray, Legionnaire: An Englishman in the French Foreign Legion, (London, UK: Pan Books, 2000), 197. 2Robert D. Ramsey, III, Occasional Paper (OP) 24, Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 135. 3International Committee of the Red Cross, The Mission (Geneva, Switzerland: International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009), http://icrc.org/HOME.NSF/ 060a34982cae624ec12566fe0032612/125ffe2d4c7f68acc1256ae300394f6e?OpenDocum ent (accessed 3 November 2009). 4Henry Dunant, A Memory of Solferino, (Geneva, Switzerland: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1986), 2. 5George B. Davis, “The Geneva Convention of 1906,” The American Journal of International Law (Washington, DC: American Society of International Law 1, no. 2, 1907), 410. 6Ramsey, OP 24, 135. 7Ibid., 136. 8Ibid. 9Ibid., 139. 10Alexis de Tocqueville, 1841-Extract of Travail sur l’Algérie, in Œuvres complètes (Gallimard: Pléïade, 1991), 704 and 705. 11Lucien-François de Montagnac, Lettres d'un soldat (Paris: Christian Destremeau, 1998), 153. 12Samuel Clemens, Interview, New York Herald, 15 October 1900. 13Ramsey, OP 24, 138. 14Ibid., 145. 40 15Thomas Bruscino, “‘Its Officers Did Not Forget’ The Philippine War, the Press, and the Pre-World War I U.S. Army” (paper presented to Military History Symposium, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 August 2009), 5. 16Messali Hadj “Fight Against French Imperialism!” http://www.marxists.org/ archive/messali-hadj/1928/fight-french.htm (accessed 3 November 2009), 1928. 17Victor T. Le Vine, Politics in Francophone Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 48-51. 18Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1977), 63. 19Ramsey, OP 24, 159. 20Hague Conference, “Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV),” (The Hague, Netherlands: 18 October 1907), Annex to the Convention, Article 23. 21Hague Conference, “Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II & IV),” (The Hague, Netherlands: 29 July 1988 and 18 October 1907), Annex to the Convention, Article 4 (both). 22Ramsey, OP 24, 136. 23United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Reprint of 1940 Edition), (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 2. 24National Assembly of France, Preamble to the Constitution, (Paris: National Assembly of France, 4 November 1946), http://conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil- constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/cst3.pdf (accessed 3 November 2009). 25Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 147. 26Ibid., 151. 27Mouloud Feraoun, Journal 1955-1962: Reflections on the French-Algerian War (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 73. 28Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 65. 29Ibid., 151. 30Ted Morgan, My Battle of Algiers: A Memoir (New York, NY: Smithsonian Books, 2005), 126. 41 31USA PATRIOT Act, Section 203(b)(1)(6) (Washington, DC: 26 October 2001), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin.query/z?c107:H.R.3162.ENR (accessed 3 November 2009). 32USA PATRIOT Act, Section 203(d)(1) (Washington, DC: 26 October 2001), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin.query/z?c107:H.R.3162.ENR (accessed 3 November 2009). 33Benjamin Stora, Algeria, 1830-2000: A Short History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 47. 34Military Commissions Act (Washington, DC: 17 October 2006), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c109:3:./temp/~c109lVsy2P (accessed 3 November 2009). 35 Patrick Rotman, stated by Paul Teitgen in “L’ennemi intime [The Best of Enemies],” episode 3, “États d’armes,” 2002, documentary film (disc 3, “The Battle of Algiers,” The Criterion Collection, 2004). 36Scott Shane, “A Detainee’s Case Shows the Hurdles That A Release Poses,” New York Times, 4 October 2009, 1. 37Benjamin Franklin, Memoirs of the life and writings of Benjamin Franklin (London, UK: British and Foreign Public Library, 1818), 270. 44 in charge of military operations within the Autonomous Zone of Algiers (ZAA§), enlisted Ali la Pointe for his knowledge of the Casbah and its less savory inhabitants. General Massu moved his forces into Algiers quickly (see figure 4). Noteworthy was the fact that Massu’s 10th Parachute Division had recently returned to Algeria from the failed Suez Crisis operation with British and Israeli forces. Additionally, the French established a new school known as the Center for Training and Preparation for Counter- Guerrilla Warfare (CIPCG) for the expanded military presence in Algeria at Arzew east of the city of Oran (see figures 2 and 3). General Massu divided the city and assigned his four regiments to control communities in a system known as quadrillage or the block warden system. Colonel Marcel Bigeard, commanding the 3d Colonial Parachute Regiment (Régiment Parachutiste Coloniale, or RPC) was given control of the Casbah. Bigeard established checkpoints at every entrance and instituted a census of the Casbah complete with identification of the houses and alleyways with numbering. Most significantly, the paras collected all police files and began arresting all known and suspected FLN agents and supporters. Paul Teitgen, the general secretary of the Algiers police, documented each arrest. Copies of the arrest documentation would be central to determining the extent of the military’s operations and their terminal effects.3 Coinciding with the arrival of the 10th Parachute Division, the FLN coordinated a general strike to publicize its control of Algeria to the UN General Assembly. While most of the FLN’s leadership advocated indiscriminate terrorism, Larbi Ben M’Hidi “criticized §Zone Autonome d’Alger. The FLN divided Algeria into six sectors known as Wilayas in Arabic. Algiers represented a special revolutionary location and as such was one of two autonomous zones discrete from the other Wilayas. 45 [sic] ‘useless bloody operations’ that made a bad impression on public opinion.”4 He proposed: to demonstrate in the most decisive manner the total support of the whole Algerian people for the F.L.N., its unique representative. The object of this demonstration is to bestow an incontestable authority upon our delegates at the United Nations in order to convince those rare diplomats still hesitant or possessing illusions about France’s liberal policy.5 The French army broke the strike using tactics that ultimately estranged many who lived and operated in the Casbah but had to participate out of fear of the FLN. Highlighting the ability of the FLN to hide amongst the population, one citizen requested that the paras “Call two gendarmes so that they can rough me up a bit, and I’ll open.”6 Mouloud Feraoun, who kept a day-by-day account of the French-Algerian War, recorded “In the evening there was a large procession of compatriots who were being brought back from the villages, namely the owners of the stores who will remain here like prisoners behind their counters.”7 The presence of the paras did not assuage the population’s fear of the FLN when their actions were not directed at the criminals. Once again, Feraoun observed, “the FLN is notorious for not being amused when its orders are not respected . . . a half-dozen primary school teachers have already been executed by the so called FLN for various reasons . . . because they are traitors.” Notwithstanding the fear of the FLN in the Casbah, the paras measured self-defined success: “[Colonel Yves] Godard [Chief of Staff to General Massu] claims that, whereas only seventy [Muslim students] attended at the end of January, numbers had risen to 8,000 a fortnight later.”8 The strike failed for the FLN in the short term. The French army was stronger and more unified in action from training and consistent command messages to break the strike regardless of the cost. The strike succeeded for the FLN in the long term as the ethical 46 and moral costs from placing results ahead of perceptions exceeded the domestic French, international, and Algerian public’s willingness to endure. The army broke the strike but forged the resolve of the FLN and more importantly, public perception at home and abroad. Saadi Yacef and the FLN resumed terrorist attacks but the army continued to glean information from the citizens through intense interrogations. Through use of a systematic census of the Casbah and efficient reporting through the 10th Parachute Division’s intelligence section, terrorist activity steadily declined (see figure 5). There was a dark side to the system, of course. Counterterrorism conducted by the paras terrorized the general population as much as the terrorist cells captured by the paras. The number of Algerians detained was significant: “between thirty and forty per cent of the entire male population of the Casbah were arrested at some point or other during the course of the Battle of Algiers.”9 Paul Teitgen documented and recorded a majority of these arrests. The discrepancy of over 4,000 between those detained and those released or imprisoned demonstrated the extent of the dark work. Everyone was a suspect and subjected to the questioning later described by Colonel Trinquier’s theory of Modern Warfare; even French citizens and French soldiers such as Maurice Audin, Henri Alleg, and Ted Morgan were to discover. Ultimately, the actions surrounding Ali la Pointe, Saadi Yacef, and his girls became the bookend acts for the Battle of Algiers. Their capture and deaths at the hands of General Massu’s paras were the final acts of the battle. From Mayor Amédée Froger’s assassination on 28 December 1956 to the death of Ali la Pointe on 8 October 1957 only nine months had elapsed. The French-Algerian War endured another four and a half 49 politically despite repeated military successes. In particular, the image of German members of the Foreign Legion interrogating suspects outraged French public opinion, which had suffered similar torture during the German occupation of 1940-1944.12 Nevertheless, Trinquier was not the sole advocate for a military strategy in the French army. Two French army commanders at the highest echelons helped shape counterinsurgency and pacification. Of note: The French command and control structure in Algeria at the time was well suited for counterinsurgency. It duplicated the existing French system of civil administration to help ensure unity of command in support of operations. Algeria’s three main sectors (igamies‡‡) corresponded to the three French Army corps, its 15 departments to France’s 15 divisions, and its 72 districts (arrondissements§§) to 72 regiments.13 Even before the stunning success of the Battle of Algiers, in early 1956 General Jean Olié, the military and civil governor of Kabylie and subsequently the corps commander for the Army of Constantine (see figure 3), used the newly created Special Administration Sections (SAS***) to coordinate the responsibilities of reliable Berber elder councils in the Kabylie region. The Berbers were the original inhabitants of Algeria, predating the arrival of Carthaginians, Romans, Arabs, and eventually French colons. Many Algerians, especially the Berbers although having adopted Islam previously and subject to Sharia, nevertheless had a culture distinctive from the Arab culture. General ‡‡An igamie was the jurisdiction of an igame, which is an acronym for inspecteur général de l’administration en mission extraordinaire (administrative inspector general on special mission). Each igamie corresponded to one of the original three departments. From 1955-1957, France elevated a number of subordinate districts to department status but maintained the three original department boundaries for administrative control. §§The equivalent of a district; a collection of a number of cities within a department of Algeria. ***Section Administrative Spécialisée. A civil-military detachment. 50 Olié’s adaptation of local councils served as a beacon for pacification that David Galula and Jean Pouget practiced later. Olié eventually replaced General Maurice Challe as the commander in Algeria following Challe’s unsuccessful military coup to wrest power from President Charles De Gaulle.14 To the east of General Olié, division commander General André Beaufre divided the Constantine area in three parts: zones of pacification, zones of interdiction, and zones of operations.††† Each zone was distinctive. The zones of pacification received the greatest concentration of French forces and the greatest economic support. Zones of interdiction were cleared of inhabitants and became areas where any presence was eliminated, and zones of operations were the areas “where F.L.N. bands were relentlessly pursued and harried by Beaufre’s élite mobile forces . . . he was the first senior commander in Algeria to show tangible success in beating the rebels on the purely military level.”15 Both Trinquier and Beaufre shared similar experiences in Indochina. General Beaufre’s strategy evolved through Trinquier into the Modern Warfare strategy adopted throughout Algeria despite the successes of General Olié with different methods under different cultural circumstances. General Olié and General Beaufre as well as Colonel Trinquier were supported by subordinate officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) trained at the French Army Center for Training and Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare (CIPCG) at Arzew. The CIPCG provided instruction on cultural specifics and tactical characteristics of fighting in Algeria. In his essay on the CIPCG, Lieutenant Colonel Guelton described its mission: †††Zones de pacification, zones interdites, zones d’opérations. 51 [the centre has to] provide teachings that are as concrete as possible about Muslim psychology and sociology, as well as about the political bases of the Algerian rebellion. It must do so with a view to giving the cadres the essential fundamentals they will require to carry out pacification activities with success, in accordance with the directives of the minister for Algeria. [It must, furthermore] provide instruction in counter-guerrilla methods that will enable these cadres to conduct, at different levels and in any type of terrain, at night as well as by day, nomadic actions as well as offensive or defensive operations.16 Instructors from the field rotated into the center to provide accurate and up-to-date information for newly posted officers and NCOs. Eventually, the commander of Algiers, General Raoul Salan, transformed the CIPCG into a psychological warfare school following the success of tactics employed in the Battle of Algiers (see figure 5). Pacification On March 7, Massu [Commander of the 10th Parachute Division in Algiers] ordered Bollardière [Commander of a brigade of paratroopers reinforcing Massu] in writing to give priority to police actions over pacification, since he was getting reports that Bollardière’s sector was overrun by the FLN, and that he was more interested in building roads and digging irrigation ditches than he was in fighting the rebels. On March 8, Bollardière resigned his command and asked General Salan for a transfer. Salan agreed, on condition that he keep his reasons to himself and refrain from writing articles.17 While Trinquier practiced his tactics in Indochina and orchestrated the military’s strategy during the Battle of Algiers, Galula actually used Trinquier’s tactics at the company level. However, Galula’s own experiences of religious discrimination and first hand analysis of Chinese revolutionary warfare may have led him to advocate less politically volatile techniques of counterinsurgency. Because he was Jewish, the French army expelled Galula in 1941 after the defeat of France in 1940. Later, he observed the Chinese communists prior to their defeat of the Nationalist Chinese forces. From August 1957 through April 1958 Captain Galula commanded an infantry company in the Algerian counterinsurgency. In his own interpretation of Trinquier’s model in 54 guest. By contrast, the counterterrorists-counterinsurgents in Algiers extracted information with intense methods of questioning, and by individuals other than “specialists perfectly versed in the techniques to be employed.”22 Small Wars of turning former insurgents and intimately understood the futility of humiliating prisoners. Interestingly, Pouget also wrote many of the concepts later captured in the U.S. Army’s Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency. The idea that some of the most effective weapons against insurgents or terrorists do not shoot is among the counterinsurgency paradoxes. Pouget reflected upon a very effective counterinsurgent from the 584th, Private Jean-Claude Veber. Private Veber became a schoolteacher in a village, “Veber was unarmed, dressed in civilian clothes, and his only contact with the rest of the battalion was at meal times. Otherwise he lived outside the post.” 20 Despite not using information he was able to gather from both his students and their parents, the fellagha understood that Veber represented the authority of the government providing education and security to the population. However, when the fellagha assassinated Veber, the population turned upon the attackers. The 584th was restrained once more as: Major Pouget made sure that no reprisal was taken against the village, which had nothing to do with the murder. The fellaghas were expecting, and hoping for, a violent French reaction. None was to come. The rebels had pushed the villagers into the hand of the 584th by committing a crime in their village where the schoolteacher [Veber] was a 21 from then on it just becomes a matter of time. How much time is another thing.23 This type of guerrilla war is won or lost by the relationship one has with the local population: once their support is lost, then so is the war and 55 Half a world away from North Africa, the U.S. Marine Corps had developed its own counter-guerilla tactics. These evolved largely from experiences during the Banana Wars from the 1890s through the 1930s. The Small Wars Manual became the basis for irregular warfare operations. American anti-colonial values formally expressed in the Monroe Doctrine received greater international scrutiny with the adoption of the Roosevelt Corollary for Western Hemisphere policing by the United States, frequently using the U.S. Marine Corps. During the Banana Wars, critics from Latin America and Europe asserted that the Roosevelt Corollary was an excuse for the United States to install friendly governments or client states under the guise of stability. Regardless of national policy, the experiences with local populations led the U.S. Marine Corps to conclude “tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass of the population.” Furthermore, in dealing with the difficulty of distinguishing between insurgents and the general population, “[The military individual] will rarely fail to receive support if he has acted with caution and reasonable moderation, coupled with the necessary firmness.” 24 The U.S. Marine Corps determined the necessity of maintaining balance of legitimacy with the population both domestically and internationally. From the example of effective application of similar techniques used by the U.S. Marine Corps and Galula, the role of Trinquier’s personal experiences in Indochina as a counter-guerrilla may have influenced inclusion of a negative aspect that otherwise could have been omitted or compromised in his military revolution for the French Army. All three focused on denying safe havens to enemy insurgent forces. Trinquier was the only theorist that allowed for and justified the use of brutal techniques to identify the location 56 of those enemy forces and eliminate them quickly. The tactics were sound but alienated the population and provided the basis for further development of anti-government support. The U.S. Marine Corps and Galula, in contrast to Trinquier, identified the population’s security as key with removal or denial of the enemy forces as critical but subordinate in priority. 1Ted Morgan, My Battle of Algiers: A Memoir (New York, NY: Smithsonian Books, 2005), 127. 2Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1977), 28. 3Paul Aussaresses, The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria 1955-1957 (New York, NY: Enigma Books, 2002), 84. 4Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 144. 5Ibid., 190. 6Ibid., 191. 7Mouloud Feraoun, Journal 1955-1962: Reflections on the French-Algerian War (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 174. 8Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 191. 9Ibid., 199. 10Morgan, My Battle of Algiers, 238. 11Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 204. 12Ibid., 196 and 198. 13Philippe François, “Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria: A French Point of View,” Military Review (September-October 2008): 64. 14Unattributed, “Algeria: The Third Revolt,” Time, 28 April 1961. 15Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 166. 59 and granted authority to the French military to conduct domestic police functions in Algeria. Open insurrection began on 1 November 1954. To suppress this insurgency, the French military leadership used lessons not only from their recent conflict in Indochina (1946-1954) but also from their experience at the hands of German occupation forces during the Second World War. By adopting techniques employed by both communist and fascist opponents, the French military and government violated French moral principles as well as accepted laws for war. These lapses of moral judgment were justified by many methods including the rationalization by French military leaders that, as they themselves had been subjected to intense interrogation techniques and the French government authorized their intentions, these techniques were for the greater good. Another rationalization was that international laws did not apply domestically when rule of domestic laws authorized the actions and activities, “the legitimization of torture does not occur in a vacuum. It is usually accompanied by a restriction on civil liberties.”4 As Benjamin Franklin noted, liberty and security are not mutually exclusive. Terrorism Roger Trinquier’s theory of modern warfare included the idea that terror was merely a weapon system and therefore study of its operational employment was valid. He asserted that due to the illegitimate conduct of terrorists, they could not expect protection of international laws of war or domestic law enforcement rules. He advocated methods of interrogation that included “the suffering, and perhaps the death” of prisoners for acts they may or may not have committed or merely observed.5 In effect, Trinquier intended 60 to bring terror to the terrorist despite acknowledgement of the breaches of both international laws for war and domestic laws against crime: [the terrorist] must be made to realize that, when he is captured, he cannot be treated as an ordinary criminal, nor like a prisoner taken on the battlefield. What the forces of order who have arrested him are seeking is not to punish a crime, for which he is otherwise not personally responsible, but, as in any war, the destruction of the enemy army or its surrender.6 As justification, Trinquier clearly demonstrated the magnitude of the FLN’s activities through his description of its military tribunals: In the month of September, 1958, the forces of order took possession of the files of a military tribunal of one of the regions of the F.L.N. In the canton of Michelet alone, in the arrondissement (district) of Fort-National in Kabylie, more than 2,000 inhabitants were condemned to death and executed between November 1, 1954 and April 17, 1957.7 Ultimately, the full scope of terrorist activity in Algiers alone was demonstrated by the so-called smallpox chart for the period November 1956 through April 1957 (see figure 5). As implied by the far-ranging incidents of terror, there were a variety of terrorist activities used by the FLN. The 70 coordinated attacks on 1 November 1954 which initiated the French-Algerian War included conventional hit-and-run tactics of guerrillas against public officials and government facilities.8 The FLN used religious courts to sentence Algerians to disfigurement, cutting noses and lips from those accused of smoking tobacco or drinking alcohol. The FLN also murdered those who refused to pay tribute fees or brutalized children and their families if they continued to attend European schools. The terror of the population was palpable and the people sought security just as Trinquier theorized, “When the country begins to fear and detest you [the FLN], you will no longer amount to anything. You will be nothing more than bandits, just as you are already called, or criminals who deserve to be hanged. And when they execute you, the 61 country will breathe a sigh of relief.”9 Unfortunately for the population, the French brought just as much terror to those who desired security as to the terrorists themselves. “The result is that the army is spreading terror throughout the villages. This is splendid pacification!”10 Reprisals The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the hostile government an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any captor, any more than the modern law of peace allows such international outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage. The sternest retaliation should follow the murder committed in consequence of such proclamation, made by whatever authority. Civilized nations look with horror upon offers of rewards for the assassination of enemies as relapses into barbarism.11 The interrogators must always strive not to injure the physical and moral integrity of individuals. Science can easily place at the army’s disposition the means for obtaining what is sought. But we must not trifle with our responsibilities. It is deceitful . . . to refuse interrogation specialists the right to seize the truly guilty terrorist and spare the innocent.12 At the dawn of the Battle of Algiers, the internecine nature of war in Algeria became clear in two unrelated incidents. On 8 January 1957, Mouloud Feraoun recalled his colleague’s reports of events in his hometown: . . . we cannot dispute the truth about the atrocious crimes and systematic rapes that have taken place in the Ouadhias. Soldiers were free to defile, kill, and burn. The maquis [fellagha], for their part, found it necessary to overwhelm and terrorize the population in order to prevent them from rallying around the French. It is as if the fellagha and the French soldiers were competing to see who could be the most cruel.13 Further defying logic, pieds noir attacked the commander of all French forces in Algeria, General Raoul Salan, using two bazooka rounds after the army had been ordered to eliminate the FLN terror network in Algiers.14 The army represented the only method to 64 15-16, 1957.19 Regarded as the mastermind for the general strike at the beginning of the Battle of Algiers and for the various terrorist attacks in the FLN’s ZAA, Major Paul Aussaresses assassinated Ben M’Hidi on 4 March 1957 after discussions with General Massu and Colonel Trinquier reached consensus that a trial for a leader of the FLN was not a good idea.20 The aftermath of the assassination, committed as a masquerade of a suicide, validated the tactics from the perspective of the French army. “The death of Ben M’Hidi was a decisive blow to the FLN in Algiers. The attacks died down and the bulk of the rebels began retreating toward the Atlas Mountains near Blida.”21 Despite success tactically, Feraoun was unconvinced of the security provided from the French army or of the (un)civilized behavior of the French government: [T]he daily [newspaper], reports the death of Mehidi [sic], an arrested FLN leader who had just ‘committed suicide’ in his cell . . . L’Express is publishing its first comments of Servan-Schreiber.* It is fantastic. But censorship will bring down its implacable claw upon the daily. That is to be expected.22 Ultimately, in much the same way that grands pieds noir imposed funding of colon public work projects upon the indigènes through prestation, the French army imposed reprisals upon the population to discover the location of the fellagha. Torture ‘Now listen,’ he said, in his North African accent. ‘The lieutenant is giving you time to think, but afterwards you’ll talk. When we have a European we look after him better than the “wogs”. Everybody talks. You’ll have to tell us everything--and not only a little bit of the truth, but everything.23 *Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber was the founding editor of the weekly newspaper L’Express and the author of the controversial book Lieutenant en Algérie (Lieutenant in Algeria) published in 1957. General Jacques Pâris de Bollardière publicly supported Servan-Schreiber’s ideas in a letter published in L’Express on 27 March 1957 resulting in a military sentence of 60 days arrest. See Horne, page 203. 65 he end of the battle. The French army arrested more than 24,000 residents of Algiers in 1957 as documented by records maintained by Algiers Police Chief Paul Teitgen.24 Notably, more than 4,000 of those arrested simply disappeared. These people were likely killed during interrogations, which could be severe, as demonstrated by the treatment of Henri Alleg described in detail in The Question.† While Alleg was not killed during interrogation, nor made to disappear like other crevettes Bigeard‡ (victims thrown into the sea weighted down with concrete blocks affixed to their feet), Alleg’s treatment demonstrated the French military’s willingness to use intense and extreme methods of coercion not even allowable against enemy combatants let alone domestic citizens accused of a crime. Teitgen eventually resigned in protest of the methods employed by the military near t Interestingly, among the first official protests against the use of torture came from the military itself. General Jacques Pâris de Bollardière, one of the brigade commanders deployed to Algiers from the bled in 1957 to restore civil order, observed that after the debacle of Dien Bien Phu, the professional army “instead of coldly analysing [sic] with courageous lucidity its strategic and tactical errors . . . gave itself up to a too human inclination and tried--not without reason, however--to excuse its mistakes by the faults of civil authority and public opinion.”25 This same reflection later found voice in the U.S. Army following the departure of American forces from Vietnam and the eventual fall of South Vietnam in 1975. Among the strategic errors General Bollardière could have †Henri Alleg, The Question, University of Nebraska Press, 2006. ‡Bigeard’s shrimp; referring to Colonel Marcel Bigeard, the commander of the 3d Colonial Parachute Regiment of General Jacques Massu’s 10th Parachute Division. 66 pointed out was the divergence from protection of the population to reprisals against the population. Ostensibly, “The French used two methods of interrogation to collect intelligence- -torture when they needed information quickly, and standard questioning when they did not.”26 During the Battle of Algiers, time was critical to prevent terrorists from continuing their wanton destruction of life and infrastructure. As a result, and imbued with the authority of police control during a state of emergency where individual rights were ignored, nearly every interrogation included torture even when it involved Europeans. Notwithstanding the explanation of torture necessitated by timeliness, the military arrested Audin and then Alleg on 11 and 12 June 1957, respectively. Both men were members of the Algerian Communist Party (PCA§) and the military suspected them of providing support to terrorist cells in Algiers. The paranoia of the military against external support from international communists was endemic following the defeat of the army at Dien Bien Phu and the failure of military operations during the Suez Crisis. Alleg was tortured immediately and intensely. At one point, the interrogators brought the two men together and instructed Audin to “tell him what’s in store for him.” Audin answered “It’s hard, Henri.” 27 Alleg was tortured non-stop for six days and then subjected to a sodium pentothal injection to induce him to talk. The questions were simplistic, “Where have you been hiding? To whom have you spoken?” The methods of extracting answers to these questions were savage. §Parti Communiste Algérien. 69 14Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1978), 180-182. 15Feraoun, Journal, 167. 16Ted Morgan, My Battle of Algiers: A Memoir (New York, NY: Smithsonian Books, 2005), 91. 17Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 173. 18Ibid., 174. 19Paul Aussaresses, The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria 1955-1957 (New York, NY: Enigma Books, 2002), 133. 20Ibid., 137-140. 21Ibid., 141. 22Feraoun, Journal, 191. 23Henri Alleg, The Question (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 41. 24Patrick Rotman, “L’ennemi intime [The Best of Enemies],” episode 3, “États d’armes,” 2002, documentary film, (disc 3, “The Battle of Algiers,” The Criterion Collection, 2004). 25Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 176. 26Philippe François, “Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria: A French Point of View,” Military Review (September-October 2008): 65 27Alleg, The Question, 46. 28John Talbott, “The Strange Death of Maurice Audin,” Virginia Quarterly Review (Spring 1976), http://vqronline.org/articles/1976/spring/talbott-strange-death/ (accessed 3 November 2009). 29Morgan, My Battle of Algiers, 258-262. 30Trinquier, Modern Warfare, 22. 70 CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND FINDINGS The French have not been very subtle in their treatment of Arabs in the towns either. The Battle of Algiers in 1957 must have lost them many friends. – Simon Murray, Legionnaire1 Comparison to the Global War on Terror--The Long War In Algeria, Afghanistan or Iraq, limited insurgencies challenged the capabilities of a world-class military. The French-Algerian war lasted from 1954 to 1962 and ended with Algerian independence. The GWOT, begun in 2001, continues today despite a much-publicized public message of mission accomplishment in Iraq in 2003. While the casus belli for war in each location was distinctive, the insurgencies in each country brought terror to the populations while also targeting infrastructure and institutions. Similarly, counteractions against the insurgencies by the French and U.S. militaries, perceived or publicized as reprisals, served to alienate the populations involved further from the existing governments. Most significantly, the unwillingness to reject torture and provide sufficient security has been and was the greatest shortcoming in each case. In both France and America, the rule of law is a strong component in the culture of morality and ethics. Legitimacy of each government is balanced among all three elements. Unethical or immoral laws do not long endure. Immoral or unethical behaviors are punished, often in both professional organizations and in courts of law. Laws, ethics, and morality are dynamic and evolving. In order to maintain legitimacy, a government must ensure laws keep up with changing ethics and morals when society progresses beyond previously held beliefs. Similarly, legitimate governments pass laws to prevent erosion of morals and ethics in order to preserve society. This dynamic balance and 71 cooperative process is critical for maintenance of legitimate authority of a government that calls upon the blood and treasure of its citizens for defense and in order to flourish. The French war in Algeria was simultaneously a domestic effort to maintain a dwindling empire and an internal war against international communism waged on home soil. From the Algerian perspective, the war was an effort to achieve independence from non-representative and despotic French rule. In contrast, the U.S. led invasions of both Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 represented a strategic foreign policy to prevent war on American soil. The specific aims were to overthrow the governments of the Taliban and of Saddam Hussein, respectively, and to protect American territory and lives from foreign adversaries using these countries as safe-havens, and both as training and launching sites for attacks on America. From the contrarian perspective, critics argued that the GWOT was a dual effort to impose Western-style hegemony and misappropriate rich Persian Gulf states’ oil resources. Whether because of conquest or liberation, the war against the U.S. and its coalition by the remnants of the Taliban in Afghanistan; the Ba’ath government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, other Iraqi elements, and other foreign fighters, whether aligned with al Qaeda or not; was very different from the Algerian insurgency or independence movement against France. Nevertheless, there were similarities between the Algerian insurgency and that which the diverse international combatants waged in the GWOT. Understanding these similarities and differences is necessary to wage a successful and, most importantly, effective counterinsurgency. Critical to success is explicit compliance with international land warfare laws regarding prisoners of war status for legitimate combatants or prosecution under established criminal law with disclosure and the myriad 74 measures have not protected the residents. An insurgency in Afghanistan may endure as long as Afghanis do not feel secure from a return of the Taliban and al Qaeda or if they fear an attack from U.S. unmanned drone aircraft, bombs, or artillery. Of primary importance in all aspects of GWOT is the righteousness of U.S. ideals and principles. “American leaders must understand that in counterinsurgency war, the moral component can be strategically decisive.”2 Whether persons are detained at Guantánamo Bay or in the U.S., whether they have better accommodations than criminals--in their home countries or not--it is vital that the international community not lose confidence in U.S. adherence to international law. The international community’s support is necessary for continued operations in the GWOT just as the support of the French population of 1954-1962 was necessary to pay for a large force in Algeria. The addition of forces and extension of duty allowed the French to pursue fellagha as never before. By adopting immoral and unethical tactics, their initial successes proved counterproductive. The U.S. must maintain strict adherence to existing international law regarding torture and treatment of both prisoners of war and criminals detained on the battlefield in the GWOT or risk either widening the fight or losing support. Both prospects place U.S. security at greater peril. Ultimately, any forces employed are rightly cautioned to heed Galula’s advice regarding outward professionalism and inward wariness. Despite the differences in justification for war in Algeria and either Afghanistan or Iraq, the conduct of counterinsurgency by French forces and terrorist activity targeting civilians, infrastructure, and institutions provided U.S. forces a vital education in unexpected consequences. Even a small insurgency may challenge the capability of a 75 world-class military. Providing security to the population and yet avoiding reprisals becomes a daunting task. Whether the threat is political instability, economic exploitation, or criminal activity, it is vital that due process and rule of law be maintained as a primary consideration for both political and military leaders. Legitimacy and effectiveness are equally important to the counterinsurgent. The study of historical lessons, even when under different circumstances, provides examples of both good and bad, right and wrong, providing insight for success and, just as important, foreshadowing failures to avoid. 1Simon Murray, Legionnaire: An Englishman in the French Foreign Legion (London, UK: Pan Books, 2000), 63. 2Lou DiMarco, “Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Revolutionaire in the Algerian War,” Parameters (Summer 2006): 76. ILLUSTRATIONS Figure 1. New York Journal cartoon Source: “Kill Every One Over Ten,” New York Journal, 5 May 1902. 76 Figure 4. Map of the city of Algiers Source: Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1977), 12. 79 * Figure 5. The Victory Over Terrorism-The Smallpox Chart Source: Jacques Massu, “La Victoire Sur le Terrorisme” (La Vraie Bataille d’Alger, Librairie Plon, 1971), photo inserts between 332 and 333). *La Victoire Sur le Terrorisme. 80 81 TABLES Table 1. Guilty Verdicts from August 1957 (Algiers Military Tribunal)† Rebel Activity Political Military Charges Nature of sentences V io la tio n of th e sa fe ty o f t he S ta te C rim in al a ss oc ia tio n Po ss es si on o f i lle ga l ar m s C on sp ira cy to a tte m pt as sa ss na tio n A be tti ng as sa ss in at io n A tte m pt ed as sa ss in at io n A ss as si na tio n Conceal- ment of criminals (those who gave asylum to the Chiefs of the rebellion) Acquittals Prison: 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 3 3 5 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 3 2 2 (a) Forced labor and : - 5 to 10 years 10 to 20 years Life 0 0 0 3 5 0 11 15 1 1 2 3 1 Death 0 0 0 3 6 6 12 2 (b) Total Death Sentences Zero Twenty-nine (a) For the record, these individuals who were faulted in point of fact were not making an attempt. (b) The two condemned attempted to give asylum to the two chiefs: AMAR Ali alias <ALI-la-POINTE> and YACEF SAADI. Source: Jacques Massu, La Vraie Bataille d’Alger (La Vraie Bataille d’Alger, Librairie Plon, 1971), 379. †Condemnations de Mois d’Aout 1957 (T.P.F.A d’Alger), where T.P.F.A. is the shortened version of Tribunal Permanent des Forces Armées. 84 Roy, Jules. The War in Algeria. New York, NY: Grove Press, 1961. Stora, Benjamin. Algeria, 1830-2000: A Short History. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001. Trinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1985. Windrow, Martin. The Algerian War 1954-62. New York, NY: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2005. Government Documents Cavaleri, David P. Occasional Paper (OP) 9, The Law of War: Can 20th-Century Standards Apply to the Global War on Terrorism? Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005. France. National Assembly. Constitution. 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