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Legal Analysis of Liability in Two Cases of Personal Injury and Wrongful Death, Exams of Law of Torts

An analysis of two cases involving personal injury and wrongful death lawsuits. The cases, jason v. Lacopo and creighton v. Briggs estate, examine the liability of parties in relation to their duties of care and potential breaches. The concepts of negligence, proximate cause, but-for cause, legal cause, and damages, providing valuable insights for students studying tort law.

Typology: Exams

2012/2013

Uploaded on 02/19/2013

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Download Legal Analysis of Liability in Two Cases of Personal Injury and Wrongful Death and more Exams Law of Torts in PDF only on Docsity! TORTS I PROFESSOR DEWOLF Summer 1994 July 8, 1994 MID-TERM SAMPLE ANSWER QUESTION 1 I would consider claims against Larry Lacopo ("LL") and the Azure Shores Country Club. To establish liability, it would need to be proven that one of the parties breached a duty to Jason, either by being negligent or engaging in an activity for which strict liability is imposed, and that such a breach of duty was a proximate cause of injuries to him. Lacopo's Potential Liability We would argue that LL was negligent in striking the ball so hard without shouting "Fore!" To establish negligence, we would have to persuade the jury that a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances would have behaved differently. Perhaps reasonable golfers are aware of the need to avoid shots like the one that LL made; on the other hand, perhaps LL could convince the jury that he reasonably believed that the golf course had been designed so that shots would not pose a danger to anyone else. If the jury found LL negligent in hitting the ball so hard without having the skill to control it, then it would be easy to establish proximate cause. On the other hand, if the jury found that he should have shouted "Fore!" then it would still need to be shown that that failure was a proximate cause of injury. A jury would have to find that, more probably than not, the injury would not have occurred but for LL's negligence. Perhaps Jason or his grandfather would testify that, had someone shouted "Fore!" they would have at least kept an eye out for stray balls. I don't see any difficulty in meeting the legal cause test in addition to establishing but-for cause. Jason v. ASCC ASCC is a more promising defendant because they probably have more resources with which to pay a judgment. Also, if LL testifies that he assumed the course had been protected against the danger of stray balls, then it would help establish ASCC's responsibility toward Jason. We would argue two different ways in which ASCC breached their duty toward Jason: first, that ASCC was negligent in the way they designed or laid out the course; second, that they are strictly liable for maintaining a nuisance. Negligence. ASCC had a duty to use reasonable care to prevent injury to someone like Jason. Learned Hand's test for negligence, i.e., whether the burden to prevent the injury was less than the expected frequency of the accident and its probable magnitude, might help us here. The cost to redesign the course to avoid stray balls flying in that direction might be less than the risk of injuries like this. Another avenue we might pursue is to examine the standards followed by other members of the "industry"—other golf courses. If this kind of risk is minimized by preventive measures in other golf courses, it would help persuade the jury that it was negligent not to do so here. On the other hand, even if golf courses routinely impose this kind of risk on neighboring property owners, we could still persuade the jury that the entire industry had failed to use reasonable care. Strict Liability. Even if ASCC used reasonable care, they might still be liable if their activity constituted a private nuisance. A property owner is entitled to compensation if his reasonable TORTS I, Summer 1994, Sample Answer to Mid-Term Exam Page 2 expectations to enjoy his property have been violated by the defendant's failure to restrain some activity on his property. Even if it is so expensive for ASCC to prevent this kind of injury that it is not negligent to continue to engage in it, the invasion may still constitute an invasion of the Medleys' property rights. Unfortunately, there are a couple of complications here. First, Jason himself doesn't own the property; he apparently is a visitor, and perhaps his rights to enjoyment of the property would be more limited than those of the owner. Second, the Medleys bought the property next to the golf course. If the golf course was already in existence when the house was built, perhaps it would dilute the idea that the Medleys had a reasonable expectation to be free from stray golf balls. If a plaintiff is found to have "come to the nuisance," it may defeat an otherwise valid claim to be free from the particular offending activity. If either negligence or a nuisance is established, there is no difficulty showing that the failure to prevent this kind of injury proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Damages If liability can be established against either party, Jason would be entitled to extensive damages. His past and future medical expenses, including whatever treatment is necessary for his brain damage, would be recoverable. In addition, to the extent that either the scarring or the brain damage interfered with his ability to earn money, that lost income potential would be compensable. (Any future payments would be due to the plaintiff at the time the judgment is entered, but dollar amounts projected into the future would have to be reduced to present value). Most significant would be a pain and suffering award. If the scarring or brain damage would be a source of pain, embarrassment or emotional loss, Jason could ask the jury for an amount of money that would fairly compensate him for his inability to enjoy life as he would have been able to absent the injury. QUESTION 2 Creighton ("CC") would face liability from the estate of Briggs ("EB") either for negligence or for a potential strict liability claim based upon the release of his horse from his property. To prevail, the estate would have to show that there was negligence (or other breach of duty) that proximately caused Briggs' death. Negligence. CC could be found negligent if he failed to use reasonable care, which is what a reasonable person would have done in the same or similar circumstances. CC may have been negligent in a variety of different ways. First, although the barn-corral enclosure appears to have been securely fastened, it may not be reasonable to leave animals on a regular basis without human supervision. Although CC hired McDaniel to feed the horses during the day on weekdays, a jury might find that more supervision would be required. One thing we might check out is the standard used by other people in the area who own animals. If we could find someone who would testify that they considered it negligent to leave animals unattended for long periods of time, that would help us convince the jury. Another avenue to establish negligence would be to find out if any statutes impose a duty on owners of domestic animals to prevent them from getting loose. If a statute intended for the prevention of this kind of injury was violated without excuse, then some jurisdictions would impose negligence as a matter of law; that is, the jury would not have to rule on whether a reasonable person would have obeyed the statute. On the other hand, CC might argue that he was excused because he was not aware of the occasion for compliance (he didn't know until after the accident that the horse had gotten loose).
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