Verification Theory of Meaning: Synonyms, Definitions, and Criticisms, Study Guides, Projects, Research of Holism

Download Verification Theory of Meaning: Synonyms, Definitions, and Criticisms and more Study Guides, Projects, Research Holism in PDF only on Docsity! Essay Title: Meaning (verification theory) Author: Markus Schrenk Junior Research Fellow and Lecturer in Philosophy Worcester College, University of Oxford Walton Street Oxford OX1 2HB Great Britain ESSAY MEANING (VERIFICATION THEORY) SYNONYMS Verifiability Theory of Meaning, Verificationist Theory of Meaning, Verification Principle, Verification Criterion, Verificationism DEFINITIONS The verification theory of meaning aims to characterise what it is for a sentence to be meaningful and also what kind of abstract object the meaning of a sentence is. A brief outline is given by Rudolph Carnap, one of the theory's most prominent defenders: If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. [...] thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. [4: 420] In short, the verification theory of meaning claims that the meaning of a sentence is the method of its verification. DESCRIPTION OF THE THEORY Historical Background. Verificationism can only be fully appreciated in the larger context of the philosophical credo it emerged from, namely 20th century logical empiricism (also known as logical positivism) [2]. An empiricist subscribes at least to the following doctrine: no oracle, intuition, pure reasoning, etc., can reveal what the world is like. All factual knowledge has its sole source in sense experience. For example, if you want to understand how the human brain works there is no other way to knowledge than via observation, especially via empirical experiments. This epistemic doctrine (see epistemology) about the nature and source of factual knowledge had already been put forward by the classical empiricists in the 17th and 18th century. The novelty of 20th century logical empiricism is a shift in focus from this doctrine about knowledge to a doctrine about (scientific) language. More exactly, the logical empiricists tried to underpin the validity of the doctrine about factual knowledge with a doctrine about sentence meaning. This is where the verification theory of meaning has its place. Suppose we stipulate that the meaning of a statement (a sentence, a proposition) is given by the actions performed to find out if it is true. Or stronger, that a sentence has to be discarded as meaningless unless one can offer a description of what fact or state of affairs has to be observable so that this sentence can be said to be true or false. That is precisely what the verification theory of meaning demands: "The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification." [10: 148] Suppose furthermore that all factual knowledge is expressed in meaningful sentences. Then, together with the verification theory of meaning, we arrive back at the epistemic doctrine from above: factual knowledge has its justification in observation. Thus, verificationism is a linguistic counterpart of the empiricists' doctrine about knowledge. Both logical empiricism and the verification theory of meaning are, however, outdated theories. This is not because the general idea behind them—that empirical knowledge depends on sense experience—has been given up by philosophers. Rather, verificationism faced a few unsolvable technical difficulties. A closer look at the verification theory of meaning as well as applications of the theory will unveil some of these problems. was to claim that the verification criterion is prescriptive rather than descriptive in character. It is meant to be a recommendation to scientists of what is best to be counted as proper scientific language; it is not meant to be a factual statement. Note that a similar answer has been offered for other indispensable non-factual claims, like mathematical or logical statements, or sentences which state conceptual truths. (See necessity; necessity, conceptual.) Verificationism and Meaning Holism. Still more problematic for verificationism is a thesis called meaning holism. Take again the sentence "if a mercury thermometer is placed into this fluid the mercury will raise (or fall) to mark 100". Suppose your observation speaks against its truth. The mercury does not move at all. Unsurprisingly, it is possible to make adjustments at various other points in our belief-system such that we could, in principle, nonetheless stick to the sentence: we could, for example, doubt that liquids always extend when the temperature rises and the pressure remains constant; we could suppose that the thermometer is broken; we could claim that thermometer's scale has been wrongly calibrated, etc. The upshot of this thought experiment is that the verificationists' assumption that isolated sentences alone face the tribunal of observational evidence is not justified. It is always a whole bunch of interrelated sentences—a whole belief system—which is tested by observation. This is a thesis which came to be known as meaning holism and was argued for by W. V. Quine [9]. Single sentences are too small a unit to be verifiable by experience. Instead "the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science." [9: 42]. But if this is so the verification theory of meaning which is defined for single sentences is false from the outset. Verificationsim rejected. The prima facie attractive verificationist doctrine proves to be untenable for various reasons: (1) It turned out to be difficult if not impossible to apply the verificationist theory of meaning in a concrete case: this has been shown in the example from behaviourism. Endless lists and regresses threaten the success of an analysis. (2) It was necessary to rewrite the verificationist doctrine several times, as underlined by the example of law statements which would otherwise have to be discarded as being nonsense. (3) The self- application of the doctrine reveals its own non-empirical status; and finally, (4), the hidden presupposition that sentences are the units of observational verification had to be dropped and so verificationism as a whole. The Remnants of Verifictionism. It should be mentioned that some verificationist ideas still live on and are indeed worth pursuing. For philosophical theories of sentence meaning it is essential to hold on to the strong link between truth and meaning: some philosophers claim that giving the truth conditions of a sentence (not the verification conditions for its truth, though) is giving the meaning of that sentence [6]. The philosopher Michael Dummett even revived a verificationism which is, in some respects, akin to the logical empiricist's doctrine. As a result, Dummett had to adopt anti-realist positions (compare realism) when it comes, for example, to statements about laws of nature or the past: he claims that statements whose truth cannot decisively be verified are neither true nor false [7]. REFERENCES 1. Ayer AJ (1936) Language, Truth and Logic. Victor Gollancz, London (repr. Penguin, London 2001) 2. Ayer, AJ (ed) (1959) Logical Positivism. Free Press, New York 3. Carnap, R (1932b) Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache, Erkenntnis 2: 219–41 (English translation in [2]) 4. Carnap, R (1936) Testability and Meaning I. Philosophy of Science 3: 419- 471 5. Carnap, R. (1928) Der logische Aufbau der Welt. Weltkreis, Berlin (repr. Meiner, Hamburg 1998) 6. Davidson D (1984) Truth and Meaning. In Davidson, D (1984) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Clarendon Press, Oxford, p 17-36 7. Dummett, MAE (1993) The Seas of Language. Clarendon Press, Oxford 8. Hempel, CG (1950) Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning. Revue internationale de philosophie 4: 41-63 (appears slightly modified as Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance: Problems and Changes. In Hempel, CG (1965) Aspects of Scientific Explanation. Collier- Macmillan, London; Free Press, New York) 9. Quine, WVO (1951) Two dogmas of empiricism. The Philosophical Review 60. (repr. in Quine, WVO (1953) From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA) 10. Schlick M (1936) Meaning and Verification. The Philosophical Review 45: 339-369