Miscarriages of Justice in Ireland: An Examination of the Legal Framework and Case Law, Study notes of Public Law

Download Miscarriages of Justice in Ireland: An Examination of the Legal Framework and Case Law and more Study notes Public Law in PDF only on Docsity! 22 Irish Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 2(1) Miscarriages of Justice in Ireland: A Survey of the Jurisprudence with Suggestions for the Future David Langwallner* This article will examine the legislative scheme under the Criminal Procedure Act 1993 and the case law thereon dealing with miscarriages of justice in Ireland. The article will suggest deficiencies in the jurisprudence and potential areas of expansion and will conclude by also suggesting legislative and constitutional reforms that would better aid the unearthing of miscarriages of justice. It is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.1 I - Introduction The purpose of this article is to summarise the core cases and principles in Ireland flowing from the miscarriage of justice provisions under the Criminal Procedure Act 1993 (Criminal Procedure Act) and to weave together the dicta and observations of the respective courts into a coherent fabric. This is primarily a black letter law article but it also includes critical reflection and comment. In Parts II and III of the article I propose to go through the relevant statutory framework and case law on miscarriages of justice and to collate the essential principles that derive from said case law. It is also proposed to append to the analysis of each important case in Part III a summary of the advance it makes in the jurisprudence. It might be noted that the principles evolve in a discrete and self contained way often in the case law and thus many separate insights in diverse cases will be examined. After the black letter approach in Parts II and III, it is proposed to deal more generally in Part IV with such issues as D.N.A. testing and advances in same which affect miscarriages of justice applications, often at the behest of Innocence projects. The purpose of Part IV is alternately to discuss flaws in the procedure as approached by the courts and to suggest new issues that may emerge as well as general scientific advances which impact on the * David Langwallner is a constitutional and public law barrister who has also litigated several criminal defence cases. He is a practising Irish Barrister and member of Field Court Chambers in Grays Inns, London. He is a graduate of Trinity College Dublin, Harvard Law School and the London School of Economics and is also Dean of Griffith College Law School and Lecturer in Constitutional Law and Jurisprudence at The Kings Inns. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765-1769) Book IV Chapter 27. 2011 Miscarriages of Justice in Ireland 23 miscarriage of justice procedures. This Part will also canvass how we can reform our laws and practices to more easily detect miscarriages of justice. II - Miscarriages of Justice in Ireland: The Statutory Landscape Miscarriages of justice are a far too familiar part of all legal landscapes from Sacco and Vanzetti in the United States2 to the Guildford Four.3 There has even been a suggestion in recent times that the notorious Dr. Crippen was a victim of a miscarriage of justice.4 However, for present purposes, I am not undertaking a historical survey but am confining my analysis to the present position in relation to miscarriages of justice in Ireland. Thus the starting point is the Criminal Procedure Act and in particular section 2 thereof. Section 2 (a) states that a person: who has been convicted of an offence either (i) on indictment, or (ii) after signing a plea of guilty and being sent forward for sentence under section 13 (2) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967 , and who, after appeal to the Court including an application for leave to appeal, and any subsequent re-trial, stands convicted of an offence to which this paragraph applies, and ( b ) who alleges that a new or newly-discovered fact shows that there has been a miscarriage of justice in relation to the conviction or that the sentence imposed is excessive, may, if no further proceedings are pending in relation to the appeal, apply to the Court for an order quashing the conviction or reviewing the sentence. From this it can be appreciated that the engine which motors the Criminal Procedure Act and triggers its application is that a new or newly discovered fact is produced which demonstrates that there has been a miscarriage of justice. 2 Sacco and Vanzetti were avowed Italian anarchists who were convicted of murdering two men during a 1920 armed robbery. After a hugely controversial trial and a series of ultimately unsuccessful appeals, they were both executed on 23 August, 1927 3 They were falsely convicted on 5 October 1974. The ultimate exoneration and release stems from the judgment of the Court of Appeal in R v. Richardson, Conlon, Armstrong, Hill, The Times (20 October 1989). 4 It was suggested in The Guardian that Crippen, who was executed in 1910 for killing his wife, may have been innocent, as the body found at his house –originally believed to be that of his spouse was not that of his wife, M. Hodgson, “100 years on DNA casts doubt on the Crippen case” The Guardian (17 October 2007). 26 Irish Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 2(1) displays discrete additions to the previous corpus of authority and does not necessarily restate general principles. Moreover, the cases often have multiple hearings in the C.C.A. or Supreme Court. For convenience purposes I am generally referring to them as composite litigation and will highlight the various separate hearings where appropriate. The early case of People (D.P.P.) v. Pringle8 is an important milestone in the jurisprudence and illustrates the interaction between the various statutes and is perhaps a convenient point of departure.9 A. People (D.P.P.) v. Pringle: 1995 -1997 The Pringle case has a complicated procedural and factual pedigree.10 In November 1980, the plaintiff was convicted of capital murder and robbery. In May 1995 the C.C.A. quashed the conviction on the grounds that the plaintiff had established a newly discovered fact which rendered his conviction unsafe and unsatisfactory. The Court ordered a re-trial but the Director of Public Prosecutions entered a nolle prosequi. The C.C.A. subsequently refused the plaintiff‟s application for a certificate that the newly discovered fact showed that there had been a miscarriage of justice. This decision was upheld by the Supreme Court on the grounds that quashing of the plaintiff‟s conviction because it was unsafe and unsatisfactory did not, on its own, entitle him to a certificate that there had been a miscarriage of justice.11 However, the matter was referred back to the C.C.A. to allow the plaintiff to renew his application. The plaintiff then instituted proceedings seeking damages. In the Supreme Court hearing, the Court determined in points of general seminal guidance on miscarriages of justice applications as follows: (i) Crucially for the question of the burden of proof under section 9 of the Criminal Procedure Act, that an inquiry as to whether a certificate should be given is not a criminal trial but an inquiry as to whether there has been a miscarriage of justice, the onus being on the appellant to prove that there has been a miscarriage of justice on the balance of probabilities. It is not a situation, the Court indicated, that 8 [1995] 2 I.R. 547. This was followed by People (D.P.P.) v. Pringle (No.2) [1997] 2 I.R. 225 [hereinafter collectively referred to as Pringle unless otherwise specified]. 9 As mentioned supra note 7, cases often have many hearings: a C.C.A. hearing under section 2, a hearing on whether a point of law of exceptional public importance is involved in the C.C.A., a Supreme Court hearing, further applications if the matter is referred back to the C.C.A. I am dealing with the cases globally and with the principles they establish and where necessary I will highlight where they fit into the process. 10 It also illustrates the point made supra notes 7 and 9 of the number of separate hearings that can take place. 11 People (D.P.P.) v. Pringle (No. 2) [1997] 2 I.R. 225 2011 Miscarriages of Justice in Ireland 27 involves the presumption of innocence;12 (ii) The Court also indicated that a newly discovered fact either on its own or in tandem with other facts can demonstrate a miscarriage of justice but that a miscarriage certificate can only issue where the miscarriage has been demonstrated on the balance of probabilities.13 (iii) Further, as aforementioned, the court determined that the mere fact of the appellant‟s conviction having been quashed as being unsafe and unsatisfactory, could not on its own entitle the appellant to a certificate that there has been a miscarriage of justice;14 and (iv) Finally, the primary meaning of miscarriage of justice is that the applicant for a certificate is, on the balance of probabilities, as established by relevant and admissible evidence, innocent of the offence for which he was convicted. It might be noted that O‟ Flaherty J. in the C.C.A. also determined that the grant of a certificate is of wider import than a claim of factual innocence: [f]or example, if in a given case the courts were to reach the conclusion that a conviction had resulted in a case where a prosecution should never have been brought in the sense that there was no credible evidence implicating the applicant, that would be a case where a certificate most likely should issue.15 Thus in substance Pringle establishes where the burden of proof in a miscarriage of justice application lies (on the applicant) and it establishes which standard is applicable (on the balance of probabilities). It also provides that the new or newly discovered fact must in itself or in combination with other facts link to a miscarriage of justice in order for a certificate to issue. B. People (D.P.P.) v. Gannon:16 1996 -1997 In this matter the applicant was convicted of rape and assault. A key issue in his defence was as to the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Following conviction various 12 Ibid. at 237. 13 Ibid. at 237. 14 Ibid. 15 People (D.P.P.) v. Pringle [1995] 2 I.R. 547 at 552. 16 [1997] 1 I.R. 40 [hereinafter Gannon]. 28 Irish Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 2(1) documents came to light, in particular notes from a guidance counsellor to whom the complainant had first reported the rape and a report of a Garda containing details of description. The C.C.A. found that the newly discovered fact did not render the conviction unsafe and unsatisfactory and thus dismissed the application. The Supreme Court found that the discrepancies between the description of the assailant in the newly discovered material and the description given in the complainant‟s statement in the book of evidence and in her testimony were minimal and there was nothing in the newly discovered material which could have assisted the applicant in any way or enabled the defence to present the case to the jury in any different light.17 In reaching its conclusions the C.C.A. noted that they were required to carry out an objective evaluation of the newly discovered fact with a view to determining in the light of it whether the conviction was unsafe and unsatisfactory and that they could not conclude for certain that the advent of a newly discovered fact would have had no effect on the manner in which the defence was conducted at the trial.18 The C.C.A. also indicated that whether a conviction is unsafe and unsatisfactory cannot be determined by having regard solely to the course taken by the defence at trial. Blayney J. opined that: [t]he court could not conclude for certain that the advent of the newly-discovered material would have no effect on the manner in which the defence was conducted. The furthest one could go would be to say that it is possible that it might not have had any effect and this would not relieve the court from examining what the position would have been if the defence had availed of the newly-discovered material and altered its strategy accordingly.19 The C.C.A. also accepted that non-disclosure of evidence which would probably affect the manner in which the defence might meet the case might lead to a quashing of a conviction.20 However, the facts in this case do not support such a conclusion. In the light of all the considerations canvassed the conclusion was reached that there was nothing in the new material to indicate that the conviction of the appellant was unsafe and unsatisfactory. Gannon adds to Pringle in two material respects. First, it stresses that the court will conduct an independent and objective evaluation of a new or newly discovered fact that it is alleged would render a conviction unsafe or unsatisfactory. Second it stresses that the 17 Ibid. at 47. 18 Ibid. 19Ibid. 20 Ibid. 2011 Miscarriages of Justice in Ireland 31 years later, the complainant retracted these statements and admitted that they had been fabricated because of the family animus. In his conclusion Hardiman J. got quickly to the essence of the matter: [i]t is … difficult to know how a person could more clearly and obviously be in the position where a new or newly discovered fact „shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice‟ … than a person whose accuser has, almost a decade after the event, confessed that her allegation was wholly false and contrived.30 The Court concluded that the applicant was entitled to a certificate since a fact which is both new and newly discovered - the complainant‟s confession of having fabricated the allegation - shows that his conviction was a miscarriage of justice.31 However, the learned judge, after citing various dictionary definitions, indicated that the meaning of a miscarriage of justice was broader than the primary meaning of factual innocence. Hardiman J. thus indicates that factual innocence does not encompass all circumstances that might amount to a miscarriage of justice.32 It might be noted that in the earlier case of Wall the Court indicated that an exhaustive definition of the term “miscarriage of justice” has not been attempted by the C.C.A. or by the Supreme Court which had indicated that courts should not attempt such a definition and that examples of circumstances which may constitute a miscarriage of justice include, but are not limited to the following: (i) Where it is established that the applicant was innocent of the crime alleged. (ii) Where a prosecution should never have been brought in the sense that there was never any credible evidence implicating the applicant. (iii) Where there has been such a departure from the rules which permeate all judicial procedures as to make that which happened altogether irreconcilable with judicial or constitutional procedure. (iv) Where there has been a grave defect in the administration of justice, brought about by agents of the State.33 It might be noted that the Court in Wall also indicated that, in determining whether the newly discovered facts show that a miscarriage of justice occurred, their inquiry was not confined to the question of actual innocence but extended to the administration in a given case of the justice system itself. The combined effect of Hannon and Wall is to clarify that 30 Hannon, supra note 7 at 249. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Wall, supra note 29 at 142. 32 Irish Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 2(1) what constitutes a miscarriage of justice is an evolving standard and is not confined to factual innocence. F. People (D.P.P.) v. Kelly34 In Kelly which consisted of two applications before the C.C.A. Kearns J. had this to say about the term „miscarriage of justice‟ in the second application which largely dealt with how an appellate court should evaluate new evidence presented: [w]hile that term has acquired a particular meaning for the purpose of applications of this nature, one which does not require detailed consideration here, it must also be taken as meaning that the material or fact newly discovered must be such as would have genuinely enabled the defence to raise a doubt in the minds of a jury. It does not contemplate remote, hypothetical or fanciful possibilities.35 In Kelly, the Court was very anxious to stress its role in the evaluation of the new evidence presented. The Court also stressed the linkage of fresh evidence on appeal with fresh evidence under a miscarriage of justice application. Kearns J. further indicated, in a crucial set of findings, that it is up to the Court to conduct an objective evaluation of a newly discovered fact to determine inter alia whether there has been a miscarriage of justice. In Kelly, Kearns J. blends the criteria for the reception of fresh evidence on appeal with the criteria for the reception of new or newly discovered evidence on a miscarriage of justice application. In essence, the learned judge indicates that the Court must engage with and evaluate the new evidence to determine whether it would materially affect the decision reached. Was the evidence credible, material and important and would it influence the outcome of the case? The judge indicates that the concept of materiality is read in reference to evidence adduced at the trial and not in isolation and such evidence has to show that it would genuinely enable the defence to raise a doubt such as to render the conviction unsafe.36 The learned judge also indicated that the Court must focus on how the defence would have utilised the fresh evidence had they had it: the court‟s role is not to enquire whether the new material renders the conviction of 34 [2009] I.E.C.C.A. 56 [hereinafter Kelly]. 35 Ibid. at 66 36 Ibid. at 65. 2011 Miscarriages of Justice in Ireland 33 the appellant unsafe and unsatisfactory having regard to the course actually taken by the defence at trial, but rather to ascertain whether the defence could have used the material in such a way as to raise a doubt about a significant element in the prosecution case and the possibility that a different approach by the defence may have led to an acquittal.37 In the earlier C.C.A. judgment in Kelly, which primarily concerned whether new expert evidence could constitute a new or newly discovered fact, the Court drew a distinction between new factual evidence and opinion evidence and indicated that opinion evidence should not constitute a newly discovered fact within the terms of the Criminal Procedure Act. The Court did however also conclude that: [t]here might be cases where a state of scientific knowledge as of the date of trial might be invalidated or thrown into significant uncertainty by newly developed science. There might also be cases where the opinion of an expert at trial might be shown to have been tainted by dishonesty, incompetence or bias to such a degree as to render his evidence worthless or unreliable. Once such „facts‟ were established, expert opinion evidence must be admissible so that such new „facts‟ could be properly interpreted.38 Kelly is an important case in two material respects. First, it determines that is up to the court to conduct an objective evaluation of a newly discovered fact to determine inter alia whether there has been a miscarriage of justice. The court will engage with and evaluate the new evidence to determine in essence whether it would materially affect the decision reached. In so engaging, the court will determine whether the new evidence is credible, material and important and whether it would it influence the outcome of the case. Further, such new evidence has to show that it would genuinely enable the defence to raise a doubt such as to render the conviction unsafe. I shall return to the second important aspect of the Kelly case in Part IV, namely the distinction between new factual evidence and opinion evidence, but it is worth mentioning a criticism at this juncture. In my view there is a timidity and a caution about opinion evidence and only where there is new science or unreliable expert evidence will the court countenance the admission of such evidence as a new or newly discovered fact. This could pose significant difficulties in the area of forensic re-testing of physical or biological evidence, the interpretation of which does rely on the opinions of forensic experts. 37 Ibid. 38[2008] 2 I.L.R.M. 217 at 232. 36 Irish Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 2(1) In Northern Ireland the more sensitive low copy number D.N.A. profiling was originally rejected as evidence in R. v. Hoey;47 however, it was recently accepted under certain conditions in England in R. v. Reed and Reed.48 Another sensitive and specialised D.N.A. profiling technique, Y.-S.T.R. profiling, has also been readily accepted in American courts.49 In Ireland we currently use the standard S.G.M. test; however, our State Forensic Laboratory does not carry out other more advanced and sensitive techniques. Indeed, given the reluctance to embrace expert evidence as new or newly discovered facts in the light of Kelly, it remains to be seen how our appellate courts would accept expert opinion presenting more sensitive D.N.A. profiling that casts doubt on the safety of a conviction. Second, the area of ineffective legal counsel has been brought up in the C.C.A. in People (D.P.P.) v. McDongah50 and D.P.P. v. Murray.51 Although the applicants in these cases were unsuccessful on the facts of their cases, the principle that ineffective legal counsel could be grounds for granting a miscarriage of justice certificate has been accepted. In McDonagh the C.C.A. indicated that, in exceptional circumstances, the conduct of a trial and steps taken preliminary to the trial by the legal advisors of an accused would give rise to an appeal, consistent with the requirement of the Constitution that no person was to be tried on any criminal charge “save in due course of law” and that the conduct of the defence may in certain circumstances either at the trial or in the steps preparatory thereto, be such as to create a serious risk of a miscarriage of justice.52 In Murray Geoghegan J. indicated as follows: [t]here is no doubt that as a matter of law and in exceptional circumstances a conviction may be quashed by the Court of Criminal Appeal on the grounds that a miscarriage of justice may have arisen from incompetent handling of the defence at the trial. Cases in support of that proposition have been cited but it is not necessary to review them. It is well known that that is the legal position.53 Accordingly the issue of ineffective legal counsel may in future become a more prevalent feature of miscarriage of justice cases. Indeed, it is one of the major issues leading to findings of a miscarriage of justice in the United States and is frequently invoked by Innocence projects where, of course, there is also a claim of factual innocence. The dicta in Murray and McDonagh are tentative in nature and do not address what the rather opaque 47 [2007] N.I.C.C. 49. 48 [2009] E.W.C.A. Crim. 2698. 49 See Shabazz v. State 592 S.E.2d 876, 3 .F.C.D.R. 276 (Court of Appeals of Georgia). 50[2001] 3 I.R. 201 [hereinafter McDonagh]. 51 [2005] I.E.C.C.A. 34 [hereinafter Murray]. 52McDonagh, supra note 50 . 53 Murray, supra note 51. 2011 Miscarriages of Justice in Ireland 37 phrase exceptional circumstances entails. It might be noted that the U.S. courts have evolved in a series of cases a test for ineffective assistance of counsel. In the leading case of Strickland v. Washington The Supreme Court indicated that a lawyers assistance is ineffective if it “so undermined the functioning of the adversary process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.” 54 The Court also indicated that the burden of proof is on the defendant to show his lawyer was ineffective and the Court will presume absence proof to the contrary that the lawyer was effective. In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance, a defendant must show that his lawyer‟s performance fell below the required standard and was ineffective due to serious mistakes and that said mistakes prejudiced the defendant‟s case. In this context prejudice means that the result of the trial would have been different but for those mistakes. It is to be hoped that as the Irish case law progresses, our courts will evolve such comprehensive and sophisticated standards. Third, an area which appears not to have been canvassed before the Irish Courts is wrongful conviction as a result of false confessions. The International Innocence Network has long since recognised not only the possibility, but propensity, of false confessions giving rise to wrongful conviction and as such this is as yet an inadequately explored area in our jurisprudence.55 In general several reforms could be introduced to assist in unearthing miscarriages of justice. In this context there is the Criminal Justice (Forensic Evidence and D.N.A. Database System) Bill 2010 (D.N.A. Bill) which is now lapsed and up to the present government to revive. Although the D.N.A. Bill is to be welcomed, there are nonetheless flaws in it as drafted. Although a majority of the provisions in the D.N.A. Bill have been drafted upon the recommendations of a Law Reform Commission (L.R.C.) Report on the establishment of the D.N.A. database, some do not fully accord with the recommendations in that Report. Most importantly, it should be noted that this Report recommended the indefinite retention of biological material from a crime scene: “the retention is principally as a safeguard in the event that an individual convicted of the offence to which the sample relates alleges that a miscarriage of justice has occurred and wishes to challenge the veracity of the original 54 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 55 R.P. Conti, “Psychology of False Confessions” (1999) 2 Journal of Credibility Assessment and Witness Psychology 14. 38 Irish Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 2(1) evidence.”56 However, the D.N.A. Bill is silent on this issue. In this context, it is urged that the D.N.A. Bill reflect the need to indefinitely preserve biological material found at the crime scene. Further, it is tolerably clear that the preservation of evidence remains problematic and the procedures in place by the authorities are piecemeal at best.57 Thus on the facts of the aforementioned Conmey it is evident that the authorities may not retain documentary evidence in a manner which one would expect, and indeed they may be retained in a manner which makes them inaccessible, or in the case of physical or biological evidence might render further testing impossible, or irrevocably tainted. This is an area which begs regulation and reform. Thus, documentary, physical, and other evidential materials must be retained in an appropriate manner, and failure to regulate in this area may well negate any possibility of exonerating a wrongly convicted person. This is a potentially burgeoning area of jurisprudence. One final point of particular concern to Innocence projects is the need for the Irish courts to evolve a right to post-conviction testing as is the practice in many states in the U.S.,58 though it is not sanctioned as a federal right. This issue of post-conviction testing is indeed highly contentious in the American courts. Recently in District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Circuit v. Osborne the appellant was attempting to establish a constitutional right to post-conviction testing under the Due Process clause.59 This putative right was rejected in a highly contentious 5-4 decision but on March 7th 2011 in Skinner v. Switzer, District Attorney for 31st Judicial District of Texas 60 the Supreme Court did establish that a prisoner could challenge as a constitutional matter the adequacy of an individual State‟s provision for post conviction testing. 56 Law Reform Commission, L.R.C. 78-2005, Report on the Establishment of a D.N.A. Database (Dublin: Law Reform Commission, 2005) at para 3.05 [hereinafter L.R.C. Report]. 57 To the best of my knowledge the Garda preserve as a matter of practice all relevant evidence until a prisoner is released but there is no compulsion on them to do so and practices may vary. This is in direct contrast to both the U.S. and the U.K. In the latter, the preservation of material evidence is governed by the Criminal and Procedure Act 1996 where all material may be relevant must be retained at least until the convicted individual is released from custody. In the U.S. there is the Justice for All Act 2004 which allows for greater federal funding for post-conviction D.N.A. testing and hence has promoted the preservation of material evidence by the State for post-conviction testing. 58 It is recognised in 46 states. 59 (18 June 2009, unreported), U.S. Supreme Court, (557 U.S. forthcoming). 60 (7 March 2011, unreported) U.S. Supreme Court.