Download Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy: Understanding Skepticism and Anti-Skepticism and more Slides Philosophy in PDF only on Docsity! NOTES ON DESCARTES’ MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY PHIL 202: Modern Philosophy / Tim Black / Fall 2008 California State University, Northridge BELIEFS EXCELLENT (I.E., THE BEST) SENSORY SITUATIONS SENSES POOR SENSORY SITUATIONS MATH/ GEOMETRY <GOD> <SOME IMPERFECT CAUSE> What leads Descartes from the Excellent-Sensory-Situations box to the Math/Geometry box is this: the dream argument. In Meditation 1, Descartes claims that since God allows us to be deceived about math and geometry on some occasions, it is not inconsistent with God’s goodness that we be deceived about math and geometry on all occasions. Moreover, the supposition that some imperfect cause is responsible for our faculties does nothing to help us overcome the worry that we be deceived about math and geometry on all occasions. It appears, then, that our beliefs are groundless. 1. CARTESIAN SKEPTICISM 1.1. All things that are not completely certain and indubitable are things to which I should not assent. 1.1.1. CERTAINTY has something to do with truth. In particular, a belief is certain if it is not possible for the belief to be false. (CANNOT BE FALSE) 1.1.2. INDUBITABILITY has something to do with doubt. In particular, a belief is indubitable if there is no reason at all for me to doubt the belief. (CANNOT BE DOUBTED) 1.2. Nothing is completely certain and indubitable. 1.3. Therefore, I should assent to nothing. 1 2. CARTESIAN ANTI-SKEPTICISM 2.1. Cogito ergo sum 2.1.1. A thing that is convincing itself that it does not exist cannot fail to exist while it is convincing itself that it fails to exist. 2.1.2. I am a thing that is convincing itself that it does not exist. 2.1.3. Therefore, I cannot fail to exist while I am convincing myself that I fail to exist. (That is, it is certain that I exist while I am convincing myself that I fail to exist.) 2.1.4. If it occurs to me that 2.1.3 is true, then there is no reason at all for me to doubt the belief that I exist while I am convincing myself that I fail to exist. 2.1.5. It occurs to me that 2.1.3 is true. 2.1.6. Therefore, it is indubitable that I exist while I am convincing myself that I fail to exist. 2.2. WHAT IS THIS I? 2.2.1. I am a human being. But what’s a human being? 2.2.1.1. A rational animal? No. 2.2.1.2. Something with both a body and a soul? No. 2.2.1.2.1. I can doubt whether I have a body. 2.2.1.2.2. The soul is a “tenuous” thing. 2.2.1.3. I am a thinking thing, i.e., a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, imagines and has sensory perceptions: “thought; this alone is inseparable from me.” 2.2.2. None of the things grasped through the imagination is relevant to my knowledge of myself. 2.2.3. Imagining is simply contemplating the shape or image of a corporeal thing. 2.2.4. Therefore, it is unreliable (since all corporeal things are in doubt). 2.3. A WORRY, AND DESCARTES’ RESPONSE 2.3.1. WORRY: “The corporeal things of which images are formed in my thought, and which the senses investigate, are known with much more distinctness than this puzzling ‘I’ which cannot be pictured in the imagination.” 2.3.2. RESPONSE: The wax example 2.3.2.1. What features are inseparable from the wax? 2.3.2.1.1. Extension 2.3.2.1.2. Flexibility 2.3.2.1.3. Changeability 2.3.2.2. “[T]he nature of this piece of wax is in no way revealed by my imagination [or by my senses], but is perceived by the mind alone.” 2.3.2.3. Thus, the intellect, rather than the imagination, is responsible for our understanding of the nature of all things, even of corporeal things. 2.3.2.4. Each act of the mind makes it “much more distinct and evident” that I exist. 2
