The Bangsamoro Conflict in the Philippines: A Historical Overview and Current Developments, Slides of Law

Download The Bangsamoro Conflict in the Philippines: A Historical Overview and Current Developments and more Slides Law in PDF only on Docsity! | Ph ili pp in es 14 2 2017 Radical, IS-aligned armed groups take over Marawi City, displacing 360,000 and killing over 800. Duterte declares martial law in Mindanao. 2016 President Duterte launches a war on drugs. Police kill 3,811 alleged drug dealers in the first year; thousands more are killed by unknown assailants. 2016 Rodrigo Duterte becomes the first president from Mindanao. 2015 The Mamasapano Incident—44 police are killed in a botched counterterrorism raid in Maguindanao, along with 18 Moro insurgents and five civilians. Public outrage derails the BBL. 2014 Several radical armed groups on Mindanao pledge allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro with the MILF. Congress begins debating the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) to implement the pact. 2012 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro with the MILF outlines path to a new autonomous region on Mindanao. 2010 Benigno Aquino III, son of Corazon Aquino, becomes president. 2009 The Maguindanao Massacre—Ruling family in Maguindanao ambushes political rival, killing 58 in deadliest-ever incident of electoral violence. 2008 Breakthrough deal with MILF declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Over 400 people are killed and more than 750,000 displaced in renewed fighting. 2006 President Arroyo declares “all-out war” against the CPP-NPA, leading to 900 extrajudicial killings and 180 disappearances of leftist activists. 2001 People Power II—President Estrada is overthrown by street protests in Manila backed by security forces. Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo becomes president. 2000 President Estrada declares “all-out war” against the MILF. More than 750,000 civilians are displaced, and over 1,000 die. 1996 Final Peace Agreement with the MNLF. Its leader Misuari is elected governor of ARMM. 1987 New constitution calls for an Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created in 1989. 1986 Marcos loses a snap election to Corazon Aquino, millions join the People Power protests to force his resignation, and democracy is restored. 1981 Former MNLF fighters split to form the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). 1976 The Tripoli Agreement—MNLF and the government agree to Moro autonomy, but the deal collapses. 1972 MNLF clashes with Philippine government forces escalate on Mindanao. In the decades-long insurgency that ensues, 153,000 will die. 1972 President Ferdinand Marcos declares martial law. 1969 Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) is founded by Nur Misuari. 1969 Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) is founded and its New People’s Army (NPA) begins a guerilla war. Over the next five decades, 43,000 will die. 1968 The Jabidah Massacre—Moro soldiers mutiny and are killed by their Philippine army officers. 1946 The Philippines gains independence. 1946 2017 | Ph ili pp in es 14 3 Philippines * Rankings are based on the last 15 years and are relative to other Asian countries. National civil war Absent National political conflict Shifted from high to low Transnational terrorism Medium Separatism and autonomy Shifted from high to medium Communal/ideological conflict Shifted from high to medium Local political and electoral conflict High Local resource conflict Medium Urban crime and violence High At a glance Overview President Rodrigo Duterte was elected in May 2016, promising to crack down on crime and pursue peace with communist and Muslim insurgents. The main pillar of Duterte’s efforts to restore public order has been the war on drugs. Since he took office, police have killed more than 3,800 alleged drug dealers. Thousands more are estimated to have been killed by unidentified assailants. The communist New People’s Army (NPA) has waged a low-intensity war for decades. Peace talks restarted in 2011 but sputtered out. Duterte resumed negotiations, but they have made little progress. The parties disagree over a ceasefire and the release of detainees. On the southern island of Mindanao, the long-running peace process to resolve an insurgency waged by the Muslim minority, known as the Moros, continues. Landmark agreements on autonomy were signed with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 2012 and 2014. Congress began deliberating a bill to implement the agreements. Yet popular support for the peace deal proved weak following an incident in January 2015 in which 67 people—including 44 police—were killed in a counterterrorism operation. Duterte supports the revised version of the bill submitted to Congress in mid-2017. Meanwhile, an array of smaller, more radical armed groups that reject the peace process have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS). Despite military operations against them, these groups have been able to recruit locally and are also hosting growing numbers of foreign fighters. In May 2017, they seized Marawi, a provincial capital on Mindanao and a symbolic center for Moros. | Ph ili pp in es 14 6 bombing that killed 116 people, which it carried out with the Luzon-based Rajah Solaiman Move- ment (RSM) of radicalized Muslim converts. The ASG lost strength after Khadaffy Janjalani, the brother of deceased founder Abdurajak Janjalani, was killed in Sulu in 2006. Other ASG figures continued operations. They host extremists from elsewhere in Southeast Asia and draw support from communities that benefit from ransom payments.12 International links, as well as alliances among the smaller, more radical armed groups in Mindanao, have strengthened since the Islamic State (IS) was declared in Syria and Iraq in June 2014. Shortly thereafter, the ASG released several videos with its current leader, Isnilon Hapilon, known as Abu Abdullah, swearing allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. IS subsequently recognized Hapilon as its amir in Southeast Asia. In June 2016, IS released a video urging South- east Asian extremists to go to Mindanao if they could not get to Syria and Iraq.13 The video also featured the first Filipino confirmed to be in Syria, Mohammad Reza Kiram. The recognition of Hapilon’s leadership has forged closer ties among other groups that have pledged allegiance to IS. Most important is the Maute Group (also called IS-Ranao), which is based in Butig, Lanao del Sur, in central Mindanao. The first joint operation carried out by the Maute Group in collab- oration with ASG was the September 2, 2016, bombing of the night market in Davao—the largest city in Mindanao—which killed 15.14 Violence escalated dramatically on May 23, 2017, when an attempted raid by the Philippine military to capture Hapilon prompted a large-scale attack by the Maute Group in large portions of Marawi City, the capital of Lanao del Sur Province and a symbolic center for Moros.15 The ensuing street clashes and bombing have so far killed at least 800 people as the Philippine government has tried to regain control of the city.16 Approximately 360,000 people have been displaced.17 Reports have emerged of foreign fighters—primarily Malaysians and Indonesians, but other nationalities as well—being killed alongside Maute recruits in Marawi. Subnational level Separatism and autonomy Conflict in central and western Mindanao has sporadically pitted Moro insurgents against security forces. Since 1972, an estimated 153,000 lives have been lost. Al- though the Philippine government has been in stop-start negotiations with the two largest insurgent organizations—the MILF and the MNLF—for decades, a political solution to the conflict has proven elusive. State presence is weak, and provincial and municipal governments are controlled by local elites who use patronage and violence to stay in power. Poor governance, clan and ethnic rivalries, and the insurgency are deeply intertwined. | Ph ili pp in es 14 7 Prior to the arrival of the Spanish in the Philippines, Mindanao had a predominantly Muslim population ruled by sultans and datus (indigenous chiefs). When Spain colonized the majority of the Philippines in the 16th century, Muslims resisted conversion to Catholicism. Spain ceded control of the Philippines to the United States in 1898, but the Philippine public was not consulted, and the Moro population never acceded to the new arrangements. The American colonial regime passed a series of land laws18 that favored Christian settlers and private corporations at the ex- pense of the Moros and indigenous peoples. This, along with the implementation of land titling, anchored in a property-rights regime alien to Moro and indigenous customs,19 led to massive dispossession of the Moro people by Christian settlers and investors. After independence, land resettlement programs accelerated, and settlers from the northern Philippines gained power and established land claims. This increased tensions between settlers and Moros due to growing land scarcity. The resettlement policy marginalized the Muslims economically and politically as settlers exploited the natural resources of their homeland. In 1968, at least 28 young Moro military recruits were killed by their superiors when they refused to carry out their secret mission to infiltrate and foment unrest in Sabah, in eastern Malaysia. Sabah was formerly part of the Sulu sultanate and is claimed by the Philippines. The incident, known as the Jabidah Massacre, triggered more unrest and was a key motivation in the formation of armed Moro separatist groups. Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The MNLF was founded in 1969 by Nur Misuari with the initial goal of fighting the Philippine state for an independent Moro nation in Mindanao. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) brokered the Tripoli Agreement, signed in Libya in 1976,20 which was to grant autonomy to Muslim Mindanao. However, the deal quickly BASILAN LANAO DEL SUR MAGUINDANAO SULU TAWI-TAWI DavaoCotabato City Marawi Zamboanga City | Ph ili pp in es 14 8 collapsed. In 1989, President Corazon Aquino signed a law that set up the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) pursuant to the 1987 constitution. The ARMM is composed of two noncontiguous areas: the provinces of Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur in central Mindanao, and the island provinces of Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi off western Mindanao.21 Throughout this period, infrequent armed battles continued between government and MNLF forces. The MNLF did not participate in ARMM’s establishment, and peace negotiations continued. A more significant deal was signed in 1996. The Final Peace Agreement paved the way for Misuari to run for office; he was elected ARMM governor the same year. Around 7,000 MNLF forces were to be integrated into the Philippine military and police; however, implementation was problematic. The MNLF weakened after the peace agreement, but was never disbanded. It splintered into at least four factions, some of which continued to clash with the Philippine military. Misuari has a tense relationship with the MILF leadership, which separately began negotiating with the government in 1997. In September 2013, Misuari’s supporters triggered a siege in Zamboanga City, in western Mindanao. The incident, apparently aimed at thwarting the government’s peace deal with the MILF (see below), paralyzed the city of over a million residents and reduced 30 to 40 hectares to rubble. Fighting lasted for three weeks, leaving 218 dead and hundreds more wounded. Over 100,000 residents fled to evacuation centers. In October 2013, a court charged Misuari and his MNLF allies with rebellion and other criminal charges.22 In mid-2014, the OIC convened a Bangsamoro Coordination Forum as a venue for direct talks between various MNLF factions and the MILF on the peace agreement in Mindanao. Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The MILF, formed in 1981 after a split from the MNLF led by Hashim Salamat in 1978, is the country’s largest Muslim armed group, with an estimated 10,000 to 30,000 members.23 It is dominated by ethnic Maguindanao and Maranao from central Mindanao, and aspires to create a new, self-governing region referred to as the Bangsamoro in Muslim Mindanao. Clashes between the MILF and the Philippine military increased after the 1996 agreement with the MNLF. These occurred intermittently despite a ceasefire agreement that was signed in 1997. Peace negotiations, facilitated by the Malaysian government, culminated in the breakthrough Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain in mid-2008. However, the Supreme Court declared the deal unconstitutional. In the turbulence following the Supreme Court decision, some MILF elements attacked Christian villages. This prompted military retaliation; the fighting in central Mindanao, which lasted until early 2009, displaced 750,000 and killed almost 400.24 In December 2010, one of the MILF commanders, Ameril Umbra Kato, whose fighters had initiated clashes in 2008, broke away to form the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). Amid this sporadic violence, the Philippine government and the MILF agreed to set up a range of domestic and international mechanisms to monitor the ceasefire and investigate violations, as well as to exchange information on criminal and extremist activity.25 Formal negotiations between the Philippine government and the MILF accelerated after President Benigno Aquino held talks with MILF leader Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim in Tokyo in 2011.26 Subsequent talks in Kuala Lumpur, facilitated by Malaysia and supported by the International Contact Group, made up of concerned governments and NGOs, led to the signing of the Frame- work Agreement on the Bangsamoro in October 2012 and the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro in March 2014.27 These peace agreements called for the abolition of ARMM and the creation of a new autonomous region in the Bangsamoro with more powers and territory, a greater ability to generate its own revenue, and new security arrangements (which would include the handover of MILF weapons). Congress began deliberating the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), which would turn the agreements into law. | Ph ili pp in es 15 1 land, marriage, elections, business deals, or personal grudges and often cut across and through families, clans, and insurgent groups. Rido has wider implications for conflict in Mindanao, because it tends to interact with separatist conflict and other forms of armed violence,42 espe- cially when the conflicting parties are aligned with armed groups.43 An inventory compiled by the Regional Reconciliation and Unification Commission in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao listed 228 rido cases in the region, with 64 percent remaining unresolved.44 Survey research has shown that most people are more concerned about the prevalence of clan conflict and its negative impact on their communities than the conflict between the state and rebel groups in Mindanao.45 Local conflict over resources and community rights The Philippines has a long history of agrarian unrest. The Comprehensive Agrar- ian Reform Program (CARP) began in 1988, under Corazon Aquino’s presidency, and promised to redistribute public and private agricultural lands to farmers. The government claims it distributed 89.9 percent of the CARP target (8.25 million hectares out of 9.2 million hectares earmarked for redistribution) to farmers by the end of 2013.46 However, the program has been criticized for its weak implementation and legal loopholes. There have also been numerous reports of farmers being harassed and killed by landlords who disagreed with the program. Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), a militant movement of landless peasants, claimed that 96 farmers were killed during the Aquino administration and more than 500 were victims of agrarian-related extrajudicial killings.47 Another key part of the legal framework governing land issues is Republic Act 8371, known as the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA), which took effect in 1997. It gives indigenous peo- ples—who comprise 10–15 percent of the total population—the right to their ancestral domains. It enables them to obtain special titles, called certificates of ancestral domain title or CADTs. A World Bank study reported that complicated land-management structures and lack of coordination between institutions disadvantage the poor and most vulnerable. They do not understand and struggle to follow procedures intended to protect their rights. Land issues have the potential to become political and to escalate from small-scale boundary disputes to major conflict involving the military and nonstate armed groups. 48 Climate change and natural disasters can be another cause of conflict in the Philippines. Drought caused by El Niño led to a demonstration on March 31, 2016, by at least 6,000 farmers, who blocked the Cotabato-Davao highway in Kidapawan City, demanding government subsidies including 15,000 sacks of rice. Police efforts to disperse the protestors turned violent, causing three deaths and hundreds of injuries.49 Urban crime and violence The Philippines’ national homicide rate in 2014 was 9.9 per 100,000 population, one of the highest in Southeast Asia. Urban crime remains a significant concern in the Philippines. Crime significantly increased in 2013, to 631,406 recorded inci- dents, up from 217,812 in 2012.50 More than 25 percent of crimes were recorded in the National Capital Region, which may be due to more accurate reporting.51 The trend continued, with a slight increase to 714,632 crimes in 2014, but later dropped by 5.34 percent to 675,813 in 2015. In 2016, amid Duterte’s war on drugs, the number of crimes dropped by 13 percent from 2015, to 584,809.52 The Philippine National Police claim that crime has decreased since Duterte took office in July 2016, with 78,941 cases reported between July 1, 2016, and March 24, 2017, com- pared to 158,879 cases from July 1, 2015, to June 30, 2016, under Aquino.53 Theft remains the most common crime, followed by physical injury and robbery.54 | Ph ili pp in es 15 2 Gun ownership is high in the Philippines; the rate of civilian firearm possession—both legal and illegal—is 4.7 per 100 people. This is the second-highest rate of civilian ownership in South- east Asia, after Thailand.55 Over the past fifteen years, between two-thirds and three-quarters of all firearms in circulation in the Philippines have been owned by civilians rather than the government.56 The Philippines both consumes and produces illegal drugs. In 2015, 27 percent of barangays (the smallest administrative district)—more than 10,000 nationwide—were identified as drug affected.57 The country has been identified as a transshipment point and a destination for large shipments of methamphetamine, and it is also a center of money laundering for significant proceeds from international narcotics trafficking.58 President Duterte’s public campaign against drugs has led to many killings of alleged drug dealers and users. According to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency’s official numbers on the government’s antidrug campaign, 70,854 antidrug operations were conducted between July 1, 2016, and August 29, 2017, with a total of 107,156 drug “personalities” arrested and 3,811 killed.59 Thousands more have been killed in operations that were not carried out by the police, but exact numbers are unclear.60 Duterte also planned to bring back the death penalty, even though capital punishment was abolished in 2006. The bill to reimpose the death penalty on heinous crimes pertaining to illegal drugs was approved in the Philippine House of Representatives in March 2017, but has not progressed in the Senate. Domestic and gender-based violence The Philippines is the best performer in the Asia-Pacific region when it comes to gender equality, placing ninth in a global index that ranks 142 countries on their ability to close the gender gap in four key areas: economic equality, political partic- ipation, health and survival, and educational attainment. Based on the Global Gender Gap 2014 report, the Philippines was able to maintain its first-place ranking on two indicators—education and health.61 Reported cases of violence against women have increased in the last decade. From 2006 to 2011, the number of reported cases increased almost threefold, from 4,954 to 12,948. One possible reason for the increase is the introduction and greater awareness of laws, specifically Republic Act (RA) 9262, the Violence against Women and their Children Law, which expanded the definition of abuse to domestic violence and physical, emotional, and economic harm. The law allows third parties to report offenses.62 The national increase in reporting may obscure some variation across the Philippines. The provinces with the highest ranking on the Gender Disparity Index are Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Basilan in the ARMM. In these areas, women, especially migrant workers, are disadvantaged compared to men in terms of standard of living, educational attainment, and life expectancy. In 2014 and 2015, ARMM recorded the fewest incidents of gender-based violence of all regions in the Philippines. Given that a high level of gender inequality is often linked to higher rates of gender-based violence, incidents in Moro areas may be underreported.63 | Ph ili pp in es 15 3 1 Alfred McCoy, “Dark Legacy: Human Rights under the Marcos Regime” (paper presented at the Legacies of the Marcos Dictatorship Conference, Ateneo de Manila University, Manila, September 20, 1999), http://www. hartford-hwp.com/archives/54a/062.html. 2 Charlotte Denny, “Suharto, Marcos and Mobutu head corruption table with $50bn scams,” Guardian, March 26, 2004, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/ mar/26/indonesia.philippines. 3 Paul D. Hutchcroft and Joel Rocamora, “Strong Demands and Weak Institutions: The Origins and Evolution of the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines,” Journal of East Asian Studies 3, no. 2 (2003): 281–282. 4 Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, “The Philippines: predato- ry regime, growing authoritarian features,” Pacific Review 22, no. 3 (2009): 342. 5 Quimpo, “Predatory regime,” 345. Arroyo was consid- ered the “most corrupt” president of the country for the past 21 years, according to a 2007 Pulse Asia survey. 6 Carlos H. Conde, “Toll Rises to 46 in Philippine Election Unrest,” New York Times, November 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/25/world/ asia/25phils.html?_r=0. 7 Manuel Mogato, “Massacre tests judicial reform in the Philippines,” Reuters, June 23, 2012, http://www. reuters.com/article/2012/06/24/us-philippines-impu nity-idUSBRE85N01A20120624. 8 Malcolm Cook and Lorraine Salazar, “The Differences Duterte Relied Upon to Win,” ISEAS Perspective 2016, no. 34 (June 22, 2016), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/ images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2016_34.pdf. 9 More information on Jemaah Islamiya (JI) is available on the National Counterterrorism Center’s website, http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/ji.html. 10 These and other splits among nonstate armed groups in the Philippines are visualized at Stanford’s Mapping Militant Organizations website: http://web.stanford. edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/maps/view/ philippines. 11 Jason Gutierrez, “Philippines: Abu Sayyaf back in the spotlight,” Al Jazeera, October 18, 2014, http://www. aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/10/philippines- abu-sayyaf-201410187641392234.html. 12 International Crisis Group (ICG), The Philippines: Counter-insurgency vs. Counter-terrorism in Min- danao, Report No. 152 (ICG, May 14, 2008), https:// www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/philip pines/philippines-counter-insurgency-vs-counter-ter rorism-mindanao. 13 Randy Fabi and Manuel Mogato, “Southeast Asian Islamic State unit being formed in southern Philip- pines: officials,” Reuters, June 23, 2016, http://www. reuters.com/article/us-philippines-militants-idUSKC N0Z91C5. 14 Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflcit (IPAC), Pro- ISIS Goups in Mindanao and their Links to Indonesia and Malaysia, IPAC Report No. 33 (Indonesia: IPAC, 2016), http://www.understandingconflict.org/en/ conflict/read/56/Pro-ISIS-Groups-in-Mindanao-and- Their-Links-to-Indonesia-and-Malaysia. 15 Carmela Fonbuena and Michael Bueza, “Timeline: Marawi clashes prompt martial law in all of Mindanao,” Rappler, May 24, 2017, http://www.rappler.com/ nation/170744-timeline-marawi-city-martial-law. 16 “Marawi death toll nears 700—military,” Manila Times, August 6, 2017, http://www.manilatimes.net/ marawi-death-toll-nears-700-military/342777/. 17 “Philippines: Marawi Armed Conflict Displacement and Response Overview (as of 31 July 2017),” UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) website, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/ resources/ocha-phl-marawi_conflict_displacement_ and_response_overview_31_july.pdf. 18 These laws included the 1902 Philippine Bill, which effectively upheld Spanish cadastral laws, the 1902 Land Registration Act, which established the require- ment of a “Torrens title” as proof of land ownership, and the 1905 and 1918 Public Land Acts, which deter- mined all unregistered and untitled lands to be owned by the state, and that such public lands might be claimed and registered through the free patent system. 19 This is the Regalian doctrine, which was first intro- duced during the Spanish colonial period and became the basis for all land laws, as established in the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Philippine Constitutions. It stipulates that all lands of the public domain and other natural resources belong to the King of Spain and, later, to the state as his natural successor. 20 The OIC recognizes the MNLF as the sole and legiti- mate representative of the Bangsamoro people, while insisting that any agreement respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Philippines. 21 From 1989 to 2001, only Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi were part of the ARMM. Basilan, which historically had a mixed Christian-Muslim pop- ulation, joined in 2001. 22 “What Went Before: The MNLF siege of Zamboanga City,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 8, 2014, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/635995/what-went-be fore-the-mnlf-siege-of-zamboanga-city. 23 The MILF portrays its forces as much larger than government estimates. The parties mutually agreed on a verification process under the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (2014). 24 Ariel Hernandez, Nation-building and Identity Con- flicts: Facilitating the Mediation Process in Southern Philippines (Leipzig: Springer VS, 2014), 22. 25 These include the Malaysia-led International Monitor- ing Team (IMT), the MILF and Philippine government Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH), and the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG). 26 Murad replaced Hashim Salamat when he died in 2003. 27 The International Contact Group was set up following the breakdown in negotiations in 2008–2009 and com- prised the UK, Turkey, Japan, Saudi Arabia, The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Conciliation Resources, The Asia Foundation, and Muhammadiyah. 28 For the MILF’s account of the incident, see “Full text: MILF report on Mamasapano,” Rappler, March 24, 2015, http://www.rappler.com/nation/87812-full-re port-milf-mamasapano. 29 Carolyn O. Arguillas, “Federalism first; BBL if it fails,” MindaNews, July 9, 2016, http://www.mindanews.com/ peace-process/2016/07/federalism-first-bbl-if-it-fails. 30 William Norman Holden, “The Never Ending War in the Wounded Land: The New People’s Army on Samar,” Notes