Political Systems Theory: A Human Sciences Approach, Study notes of Political Systems

Download Political Systems Theory: A Human Sciences Approach and more Study notes Political Systems in PDF only on Docsity! POLISH POLITICAL SCIENCE YEARBOOK VOL XLIII 2014 PL ISSN 0208-7375 POLITICAL SYSTEMS THEORY AS A CONTRIBUTION TO HUMAN SCIENCES by Andrzej Antoszewski When I  was approached with a  proposition to present a  lecture, I scratched my head wondering what to discuss and then an old Yugosla- vian textbook fell into my hands. It was on political systems theory, which a subtitle “contribution to human sciences”. It was then quite justifi ed, the Yugoslavians put strong emphasis on their self-government ideas, on looking at the subjective side of politics and less on the institutional one, which, I my opinion, constitutes the main object of our interest. It is not an accident that our conference of chairs of political systems is held for the third time and there have been plenty of constitutional law conventions. It is not an accident that textbooks on the subject of “political systems” in Poland are mainly textbooks on constitutional law. It has it merits, espe- cially in the case of multiple-choice exams, because if we are ask students such questions, we can easily “harass” them by asking such questions as where the president can turn to electors with the proposal to dissolve the parliament: A. in Belarus, B. in Russia, C. in Latvia, D. in Estonia. And if they choose any other answer than C, they fail. Th is harassing of students is quite enjoyable, but it is my belief that probably we oft en pay too much attention to the analysis of rules themselves, to learning some formulas by heart, in which case the subjective side of politics is lost on us. 378 ANDRZEJ ANTOSZEWSKI Please consider that in analysing, for example, the contents of a con- stitution – and this is usually a starting point, from which we most oft en begin – we deprive ourselves of the possibility to learn about some aspects of reality. For example: we are in the area of civil rights – the regulations in the Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian constitutions on manifesting views, freedom of organising rallies, demonstration, and pickets are actually identical; in addition, the Ukrainian one is probably the strictest, because it has a constitutional requirement of notifying the authorities of such an intention. Th is is not present in the Russian and Belarusian constitutions. But if we consider where people are rebelling, they are rebelling exactly in the place where this provision is the strictest. As a matter of fact, this regulation alone will not tell us whether people are rebelling or not, and all the more so it will not tell us about what should interest us the most, that is: why are they rebelling. And of course I can multiply such examples. If, for example, we focus on the structure of an institution, on the func- tions of an institution, on the relationships between institutions (it is also possible to harass students on this subject very easily), we are losing that which constitutes a human side of this subject, that is, in what conditions people initiate a decision-making process, in what conditions people participate in debates on solutions, in what conditions they decide on these solutions, and when, for example, they oppose these solutions. Th ese are the issues that we will not fi nd in any constitution, here the analysis of practice is essential, but with paying attention to such matters which are not simple and accessible to cognition, such as motivation for human actions or the intentions that politicians or the ones fulfi lling political roles try to act on. For example, if we take into consideration a doctrinal structure such as O’Donnell’s delegative democracy, in no constitution we will fi nd a trace that would lead us to it, so again a question arises: when and in what conditions is this democratic model which we are able to describe, applying this or any other defi nition, or a model of democracy built one way or another, created. In other words, when the possibility of transforming a democracy formally understood in terms of O’Donnell’s delegative democracy, where public supervision disappears, where the possibility of the abuse of power emerges, and where this abuse of power fi nally surfaces. However, the question: when do people agree to it, and 381Political Systems Th eory as a Contribution to Human Sciences political and in what way; this directs our attention to the essential, from the point of view of political systems theory, issue of political subjectivity. Of course, classical institutionalism leaves man, his motivation, interests, needs, and benefi ts somewhere on the side of this analysis. We sanctify these institutions, trying to capture their specifi city in all way possible and trying to study the relationships between them, thinking how it is possible to improve them if necessary. But this is the classic approach that today seems to be not enough. Neoinstitutionalists approach it in a more complex way, saying: we can- not (as functionalists did once) disregard the institutional infrastructure of political life. It exists, but the problem with it lies in noticing what is creat- ing stimuli or, more oft en, limitations of human or politicians’ actions. And we should give some thought to why politicians in stabilized democracies try not to make decisions that could be subject to fundamentally negative assessment. For example, why are they more radical in election campaigns, when it is possible to promise a lot of things, and more reserved when they win? It is possible to formulate diff erent replies to this question, but probably we will notice such a regularity. In young democracies is appears to a lesser degree. Politicians do not hesitate to take radical actions, even actions opposing the public opinion, driven by other motivation. If we are looking for diff erences between stabilized or consolidated democracies, it is worthwhile to take this aspect into consideration. Th us, we cannot disregard the cultural environment of a political action, because these are also certain restrictions; we seek restrictions of human actions not only in the provisions of law. Th ese include also regard for tradition and can result also from a peculiar structure of social confl icts; we need to consider the surroundings, which, generally speaking, are the subject of the research of such sciences like sociology, economics, law, and cultural studies. Th ese surroundings are – just as it is oft en defi ned in political systems theory – an environment in which political system, political institutions, and, fi nally, politicians, who fi ll these institutions with life, function. Th ere is still one moment that I would like to pay attention to. If we talk about man as the subject of politics, it is characteristic that we most oft en understand man as an “object of protection.” For example, the civil rights – we are interested exactly in an object of protection against abuse 382 ANDRZEJ ANTOSZEWSKI of power, state, institutions, etc. We take lass care of man in the role of a politician, that is creator of decisions, initiator of decisions, and the one who appears in the role of an authority. Tomorrow Professor Godlewski will tell us about the relation between the ruling and the ruled, so I do not want to deal with it, I would like to only comment that, generally speaking, the issues of civil rights seems of little interest to experts on political systems, it is still the domain of constitutional law specialists. Th e doctrine which accompanies the discussion on civil rights is above all the doctrine of constitutional law, even though it of course reaches also to other science disciplines. However, from our point of view, the most important question is: in what conditions do people equipped or not equipped in constitutional protection of their freedoms and rights decide on rebelling against the authorities? Th e question that Ted Gurr asked in the 1970s in his book entitled Why Men Rebel, in my opinion, is a question to which we have not found an answer yet. Moreover, recent developments bring us or open new paths to the answer to that question, although perhaps it will never be possible to give such an universal answer. If we are observers of what is happening in Ukraine, of course it is possible to ask oneself why in similar, although obviously structurally diff erent, political systems of Russia and Ukraine the relations between the ruling and the ruled are structured in diverse ways. Why Russian presidentialism, as it oft en happens, turned into a dictatorship, which today generally functions in a way that makes a successful confrontation impossible, and in Ukraine a system also based on strong presidency, even in the constitution from 1996 that has already been twice repealed, did not cause such eff ects. Th e phenomenon of “Colour Revolutions” – which are inaccurately named as a matter of fact (I refer to these rebellions that occurred in new democracies in Centre and Eastern Europe and also in Asia) – is again a rich source of questions, problems, and research subjects. Why is Ukraine going through a third democratic opening? Why do electoral frauds provoke social rebellion in some states, while in other states they do not? How can it be explained? And I will say once again: certainly not with a diff erence in legal regulations or institutional arrangements; it is 383Political Systems Th eory as a Contribution to Human Sciences certain that their analysis will not produce a desired result. Th e common feature of the fi rst wave of Colour Revolutions starting from Belgrade in 2000 (I do not know why in literature it is treated as a colour revolution, since it was named the “Bulldozers Revolution”, which has little to do with any colour) was that these fi rst social rebellions did not result from, did not grow out of resistance against dictatorship, wanting to change the existing system, its principles, norms, or institutions, but they resulted from a demand that they work the way it was imagined and promised they would. Th ey wanted these provisions and norms which referred to civil rights, freedoms of choice, the right to elect and be elected to work in practice. In short, they demanded the authorities to fulfi l their promises. And these promises were indeed fulfi lled in Belgrade in 2000 and they were fulfi lled in Ukraine indeed, to a lesser degree it concerned the Rose Revolution and Tulip Revolution in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan respectively. But what happens next? Once again we ask ourselves why some state smoothly fell back into the same old rut of authoritarianism, while the others did not. Further, if we study these colour revolutions and demonstrate their characteristic features, we observe that the literature to date neglected an unintentional negative eff ect, concerning the fact that autocrats in other countries learn to prevent occurrences of this type and that Russian and Belarusian leaders drew conclusions from what happened in Ukraine and continue in their eff orts so that this epidemic does not outbreak in their countries using other methods and this diff erence in methods is also worthy of our attention. Rebellions of citizens, who consider that declarations of democracy made by political leaders in these states should be kept, had characteristic features that included: a lack of the violence, using elements I would call entertainment, e.g. the role of songs, happenings, and bands that played in the fi rst Maidan, similarly to what happened for example in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. In these states the imperfections and the leakiness of authoritarianism were used. For example, the media acted at least in a cer- tain scope as free media. In these states the neutrality of the apparatus of repression was used; it was expected that its reaction will not be sup- porting the authority in order to destroy this rebellion. If we look at the fi rst and second Maidan, at once a number of questions is born on what 386 ANDRZEJ ANTOSZEWSKI Th e fi rst one is that it will not be possible to make common assessment of these recent events in Ukraine, if we appeal to the constitutional order. Here constitutional order settles nothing, since it is very easy to show that every action actually infringed upon some norm. Was the president of Ukraine dismissed according to the constitution? No, the only question is how could he be removed according to the constitution if he had escaped. Was the government appointed according to the constitution? Well no, because there was no president who had been kind enough to escape. Th is way, we can go all the way to the Crimea, thinking what norms of the international law were violated, showing which ones they were, but this will not change the normative force of the fact that the currency in the Crimea are roubles, the language – Russian and that the authorities in Kiev have no means to act there. Th is is one important conclusion, the second important conclusion is that if institutional mechanisms of democracy fail – and I do not have in mind only state institutions such as the parliament, the government or the president, but also, for example, the struggle between the ruling party and parliamentary opposition – then the power may indeed be passed onto the street, which amazingly complicates the situation. In the latest issues of “Journal of Democracy” there is an article by Venelin Ganev on the year 2013 in Bulgaria. As you remember, in May 2013 in Bulgaria election was held in the result of the resignation of the unpopular government, early election was the only solution in this situation, and the possibility alternation of power arose. However, this alternation did not take place on the election arena because the previously ruling party won the election, remaining the strongest party. But as it oft en happens, especially in young democracies, a particular coalition of losers was born and they took over the executive power. It gave an opportunity for a change of policy, but this change either did not take place or was negatively assessed by the society and three weeks aft er the election demonstrations started and lasted throughout the entire 2013. We are dealing with a situation in which some ruling group exists, in this case a coalition of political parties, and a parliamentary opposition exists, but neither have the trust of the people. Th erefore such a Bulgarian Maidan appears. It was neither institutionalised nor as extensively present, for example, in the Polish television in order to 387Political Systems Th eory as a Contribution to Human Sciences grant it this name, but we are dealing with a similar situation when people rebelled, recognizing that democratic mechanisms that should guarantee social peace, such as alternation of power when the authorities fell short of expectations, had completely failed. Similarly to the situation in Ukraine, we are dealing with a three-sided hierarchy: the authorities, the opposition, and the street which does not trust either. And similarly to Ukraine, the street does not have a leader, it is not able to organize itself, transform into a political movement that could in the future become a political party involved in the rivalry for power. Here these mechanisms were disrupted. We do not know what the future holds for either Bulgaria or Ukraine. Ukraine, which probably wasted these 25 years in many aspects is in a much more diffi cult position in terms of economy, but most of all poli- tics. All attempts to establish an effi cient political mechanism have failed. Until 2013 in Bulgaria the mechanism of alternation of power, and I will remind that Bulgaria is a state in which every election resulted in change of authorities – for some it is a manifestation of destabilization of political power, for others it is a sign of political health (people do not like the ruling party, so they reject it), worked so far and it stuck only in 2013 and why? It was the eff ect of an ill-considered personal decision that even did not pertain to fi rst-rate politicians. Th us, the reasons people become angry can be very diff erent. Of course, the question is: what does this reaction consist in and what organizational forms does it take. If it does not take any organized form, it increases the threat of a political chaos; on the other hand, however, it would entail leaving the political games for politicians who seem to have brought disappointment and this refers to both states, Bulgaria and Ukraine. To recapitulate, there are states that draw conclusions from such occur- rences and there are politicians who draw conclusions, which means only more repressive measures, as it is possible to observe in Russia or Belarus. I will remind you once more that the fact that Russian and Belarusian constitutions grant the freedom of demonstrating and picketing is quite important. We know what happens to the ones who want to exercise these freedoms, because it was recently that the sentences for demonstrations in the Bolotnaya Square aft er the election in 2012 were announced. We also know how the Belarusian opposition looks like and we also know 388 ANDRZEJ ANTOSZEWSKI enough about how autocracies try to strengthen their bastions so that this democratic virus does not spread, with much successes at the moment. Ladies and gentlemen, my fi nal refl ection also comes from a book, this time not Yugoslavian but the book of Max Weber, i.e. Economy and Society, or, more accurately its subtitle An Outline of Interpretative Sociol- ogy, because it seems to me that it should be an inspiration for creating interpretative political science. To create political science that will be able to surpass the level of analysis of this institutional background, in which all political action is of course taken, that through attempting to give mean- ing to events, facts, phenomena, and processes, not seeking an objective meaning in them, because, as Weber says, the main diff erence between empirical and dogmatic sciences is that they do not look for meaning that is supposed to be somehow metaphysically real or objective, only giving meaning to concrete actions which can be an object of our observation that can arrange themselves in sequences connected with one another. It is a task that also stands before political systems theory. And the things we call political systems are in fact structures built by man, structures sup- ported by man, structures evaluated by man, and structure used, in various meanings of this word, by man. So if we maintain man in our perspective then our knowledge about such occurrences as acquiring power, executing power, enforcing political responsibility becomes much fuller. SUMMARY Th is text is a record of a speech given during the Th ird Polish Conference of Chairs and Departments of Political Systems. Th e main subject of this paper is the need to carry out research on political systems using diverse methods and takes, both legal and “humanistic”. Th e paper shows how important in terms of methodology it is to compare particular legal status with reality using examples when legal analysis is not suffi cient, for example, on the account of social rebellion. Th e text identifi es challenges that researchers of political systems face due to that fact. In this context is also discusses the problems related to studying such institutions as, for example, the Ukrainian Maidan. Keywords: political system, political science research methodology, constitutional law