Britain's Political Crises in the 1970s: Conservative and Labour Party Challenges, Lecture notes of Economics

Download Britain's Political Crises in the 1970s: Conservative and Labour Party Challenges and more Lecture notes Economics in PDF only on Docsity! 1 REVISION GUIDE Making Of Modern Britain, 1951-2007 2 BRITAIN IN 1951 POLITICS Three key turning points during this period  1951 election > start of 13 years Conservative rule  1979 election > start of Thatcher dominance lasting 11 years  1997 election > start of New Labour dominance (so far 13 years) 1951 saw end of Labour and Attlee in government – had achieved all promises outlined in 1945 election manifesto and legacy remains for (arguably) twenty years. Impact on society and politics until mid 1970’s despite Conservative dominance, and Welfare State and NHS continue to date. 1951-1997 – Conservatives ‘natural party of government’ for 35 of the 46 years. Labour Party showed a mentality of an opposition party rather than governing party (even when in power) until Blair arrived. Two party electoral system 1951 onwards: Labour and Conservatives enjoy near total dominance of politics. Due in part to the FPTP electoral system effects as well as the insignificance of Liberals, lack of parliamentary support for nationalists, and negligible impact of other smaller parties. Rise of consensus politics – political gulf between major parties narrower than ever before. Labour moderate and patriotic (not extreme socialism as expected) and key policy makers in Conservatives were ‘One Nation Tories’ (reformist) keen to build on national cooperation to maintain an essential post war consensus. ECONOMY Contradictions: a curious mixture of difficulties and decline versus optimism and growth Huge difficulties – damaged infrastructure, saddled with massive debts, pre-war markets lost, old staple industries in decline, Britain reliant on US to begin economic recovery, key industries (coal, steel, rail) had been nationalised by Attlee (hopes of faster modernisation), many consumer goods scarce and expensive, rationing only just coming to an end. Britain sliding down the league tables of the world economy 1951-2007 – economic growth slower than competitors, successive attempts by British governments for economic modernisation (improve productivity, competitiveness) were never fully realised. Optimism – still one of leading economic powers in world, British companies still at forefront of key sectors (oil. Chemicals, shipping), British firms major manufacturers and exporters, other European competitors had suffered more during the war. Living standards were rising, people better dressed, owned more consumer goods. By 2007 ‘poverty’ very different from version in 1951. SOCIETY Most towns and cities dominated by heavy industry, female employment restricted to mainly single women, and shortages of consumer goods. Sense of national unity fostered by war years, however class divisions remained clear cut. NORTH-SOUTH divide easy to recognise with Establishment dominating public life  property owning middle class lived in the suburbs voting Conservative  areas of heavy industry (e.g. north, West Midlands) saw working classes living in urban areas close to factories, loyal to TU’s, generally voting Labour. Social mobility had been increased by some extent by impact of war but Britain remained very class conscious and deferential society – class system had to break down. FOREIGN POLICY Deceptive position in the world  Outwardly: still a world power: part of the Grand Alliance that had won the war, possession of a great empire, pride of war victory amongst public, 1 of 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council, key ally to US in Cold War (e.g. Korea), vast stretch of Navy, independent nuclear power, British expectation to remain at the ‘top table’ of international affairs 5  Importance of trade unions – Conservatives wanted a cooperative relationship  Welfare State – implementation of Beveridge Report. NHS iconic and Conservatives had warmed to it  Conservative majority was slender in Parliament – did not feel strong enough to dismantle Attlee legacy  Mixed Economy – left most of Labour’s nationalisations alone Why did the Conservatives continue Labour polices? • There could be no outright rejection of the welfare state • There could be no total reversal of nationalisation • Experience of war had meant that people were far more ready to accept the need for state intervention and planning – attitudes towards industry, the trade unions and social policy were going to have to be very different from that of the 1930’s • NHS had already become iconic Just as Labour had moved to the right by accepting capitalism and the mixed economy, so the Conservatives moved to the left by accepting Keynesianism and the managed economy. Consensus is rather difficult to define – there were sharp policy differences, but also broad lines of convergence Was there a post-war consensus? Supports consensus • Addison - soil was right for coalition. There was a collective age of politics due to a shared experience of World War One. • Seldon – broad agreement on the fundamentals of economic, social and foreign policies Against consensus • Pimlott – “we need to consider the possibility that the consensus is a mirage, an illusion that rapidly fades the closer one gets to it. Evidence includes: Conservatives denationalised the steel industry and road transport, Conservatives were dealing with the evils of poverty as opposed to seeking consensus with Labour Historical opinions on post-war consensus:  Hennessey – Attlee set foundation stone of all that is best about post war Britain ‘the fusion of myriad hospitals and private practices into a National Health Service, the transfer of a workforce of 2.3 million people into nationalised industries, the Attlee government also took the first steps towards changing an empire into a Commonwealth  Lawson – ‘Attlee government of 1945-51 set the political agenda for the next quarter century. The two key principles which informed its actions and for which it stood, big government and the drive towards equality, remained virtually unchallenged for more than a generation, the very heart of the post-war consensus.’  Coates – Attlee failed to bring about true socialism and lost an opportunity.  Barnett – post war consensus was a mistaken policy, Conservatives should have broken from it sooner as it produced a ‘nanny state’ Britain overly dependent on welfarism. Thatcherism was a necessary correction of this problem. ‘Illusion and the dreams of 1945 faded away one by one – the imperial and the Commonwealth role, the world power role, British industrial genius and the New Jerusalem itself, a dream turned to the dank reality of a segregated, sub-literate, unskilled, unhealthy and institutionalised working class, hanging on the nipple of state paternalism’ POTENTIAL EXAM QUESTION: Explain why there was a post-war consensus This is only a suggested idea of how you could approach the question Introduction: outline key words and period, list factors to be discussed Paragraph One: Attlee’s legacy and the feeling of national unity • Popularity of NHS – couldn’t revoke it (political suicide), One Nation Conservatism meant that it was more acceptable to Tory ideology – acceptance of popularity and ability to weave it into their own policies, less hostile to it • Could not be an outright rejection, and instead some tinkling like nationalisation • Tories recognised that the experiences of war had made people want state intervention and planning Paragraph Two: Reorganisation of Conservatives post 1945 election 6 • Rise of One Nation Conservatism – more pragmatic and willing to accept realties of politics post WW2 – Nigel Lawson’s ‘big government’ • Change in composition of Tory Party by Butler and Woolton saw younger, dynamic characters • Realised the importance of positive trade union relations Paragraph Three: Election result of 1951 (slim majority) • British politics is prone to a pendulum effect – fear that any changes would swing the electorate back towards Labour, did not feel strong enough to dismantle the legacy • Commitment to full employment came as a result – keen to avoid a repeat of 1945 when they were seen as the party of unemployment and lost the election Paragraph Four: Was there a post-war consensus? • Kerr – a ‘mirage’ versus Addison ‘there was real consensus’ • Denationalisation of steel shows that this was necessity rather than conviction? • Attempts to chase the electorate following 1951 slim majority rather than agreement? Conclusion – outline key points, and most significant reason CONSERVATIVE DOMINANCE – WHY DID IT OCCUR 1951-64? 1. Reorganisation of the party machine led by Lord Woolton after the dislocation caused by the war and shock defeat of 1945 (new Conservative MPs with new ideas) 2. Conservatives recognised the extent of public approval for the legacy of the Attlee governments (post-war consensus politics) 3. 1951 marked the end of ‘austerity’ and the start of the long post-war boom 4. The role of individuals in power - ‘SuperMac’! 5. Infighting between the Bevanites and Gaitskellites which weakened the Labour Party To repeat then: themes the Conservatives continued during 1951-1964 as part of the post-war consensus  Mixed economy (Labour accept private enterprise and capitalist, Conservatives left most nationalisations alone although they did denationalise steel and road transport 1951)  Legacy of national unity  ‘Big government’ - Conservatives convinced of need government intervention in social and economic policies  Full employment – post WW2 fears and didn’t want to be seen as party of unemployment  Importance of trade unions – Conservatives wanted a cooperative relationship due to their power and influence  Welfare State – implementation of Beveridge Report. NHS iconic and Conservatives had warmed to it  Conservative majority was slender in Parliament – did not feel strong enough to dismantle Attlee legacy ROLE OF PERSONALITIES Churchill: PM from 1951-55. Not considered to be the greatest post-war PM. Some people argue that the man who really led the Conservatives was Anthony Eden (acting PM) and key ministers such as Butler and MacMillan. Inactive in politics but visions of himself as an international statesman. However, Hennessey argues: One has to be careful not to overdo the depiction of the old warrior in his premiership as a kind of walking off licence-cum-pharmacy Day to day running of government left to key ministers. Eden: 1951-1955 roles as acting PM, actual PM 1955-57. Butler: ‘best PM Britain never had’ Macmillan: Successful housing minister under Churchill > achieved ambitious target of 300,000 houses per year. 1957 became PM. Tensions existed between Butler and Macmillan, as well as between Eden and Churchill. AGE OF AFFLUENCE Conservatives lucky in timing as they came to power at time of beginning of economic recovery: men’s weekly wages were going up (£8.30 1951 £15.35 1961), massive increases in personal savings, boom in car ownership and home ownership, Macmillan achieved 7 300,000 homes target, arrival of new towns such as Corby in 1940’s saw them expand in 1950’s, farmers did well (state subsidies), end of rationing 1954. Surge in ownership of consumer goods > TVs, white goods, furniture. Symbol of affluence. 1955 GENERAL ELECTION - Why did the Tories win? Win by healthy majority: 68 seats (Conservative 49.7% vote, Labour 46.4%)  Butler boosted Conservative election prospects with a ‘give-away’ budget that provided the middle class with £134 million in tax cuts  Affluence – ‘feel good factor’ most voters were happy with their rising living standards.  Eden called the election immediately after Churchill retired – relaxed and low key and gave Eden the chance to get a mandate to govern before the electorate could judge him on actual performance as a PM.  Support of national press and media  Continued splits within Labour – conflict between Gaitskellites and Bevanites from 1951 continued to cause trauma (long running split) Attlee retires as Labour Leader, they hadn’t expected to win. However, 1955 not a crushing defeat of Labour as they still help up their share of the vote. EDEN TO MACMILLAN EDEN BECOMES PM IN 1955 > high sense of optimism. Hailsham – ‘a real post-war government, led by a PM who represented contemporary manhood, rather than the pre-First World War generation.’ Optimism about: progressive ideas in domestic affairs, his belief in property owning democracy and industrial partnership. However, all Eden’s career had been foreign affairs and not domestic politics. Ironically his downfall was foreign affairs! > Suez Crisis 1956. Ends in disaster, military operation called off in humiliating circumstances as Britain withdraws due to American pressure due to economic reasons. Outcomes:  Diplomatic and military fiasco > turning point for Britain’s illusions of imperial power.  Political crisis – Eden seemed weak, lost in a policy he was supposed to be the master of. Came under heavy attack from Labour in parliament and sections of national press e.g. Manchester Guardian. By lying to Parliament about collusion with France and Israel, Eden had tarnished his image and prestige.  Split the Conservative party: Nutting (Colonial Minister) resigned from cabinet, rebellion of 40 MPs. Heath (chief whip) was responsible for keeping the party in line but even he was strongly opposed to Eden’s actions. Government weaknesses unveiled by pressure from US as it exposed Britain’s financial weakness and started a run on the £  Economic – run on the £ (rapid fall in value of £), Britain exposed as financially weak > Chancellor Macmillan leading the campaign with Eden’s cabinet for Britain to abort Suez  Demise of Eden – never recovered from Suez (though resigns due to poor health in 1957). Replaced by Macmillan. MACMILLAN TAKES OVER AS PM 1957 > Conservative survive Suez although Eden doesn’t. Macmillan takes strong grip. Why?  Conservative Party recovers quickly from Suez Crisis. Macmillan emerged as PM and party unity was restored without lasting splits.  Economic prosperity continued to gain approval from voters – continuing affluence kept voters happy  Reputation of Macmillan – nicknamed ‘Supermac’, success as housing minister (300,000 new homes as promised during 1951 election manifesto)  Labour Party under Gaitskell had problems of its own  Remarkably ability of Conservatives to manage changes of leadership without too much blood being split in power struggles. Macmillan was a safe choice, especially compared to the alternative Butler, and so with few enemies the party stayed united.  Eden, the main cause of the crisis, had disappeared and so did the crisis with him. Suez hung over British foreign policy for another 50 years, but did not really dent Conservative political dominance at home. Wins election comfortably in 1959 – key reason for this was a rise in consumer prosperity........ MACMILLAN 1957-63 Initial period of confidence and political master leading to 5 years where Supermac appeared to be in control of affairs: 10  All exports rose between 1952 and 1962: Britain +29%, France +86%, Germany +247%, Japan +378%!  Britain falls behind in productivity per person.  1961 – concerns about over-heated economy led to ‘pay pause’ to hold down wage inflation and to ask for loan from IMF  1962 saw BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM, economics of stop-go > Macmillan sets up NEDC (National Economic Development Council) in attempt to get economic cooperation between government, employers and unions.  1962 also saw the Night of the Long Knives reshuffle of 1962 > Lloyd replaced with Maudling as Chancellor. Maudling attempts to avoid rising unemployment through tax concessions and a policy of ‘expansion without inflation’ = BALANCE OF PAYMENTS continued to deteriorate with imports running ahead of exports and rising inflation. EUROPEAN OUTLOOK 1959 – Britain took the lead in forming the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) > No match for the EEC! 1961 – Macmillan does a British volte-face and submitted Britain’s application. Why? 1. Hope of boosting industrial production for a large-scale export market 2. Hope that industrial efficiency would be increased by competition 3. Hope that economic growth would be stimulated by the rapid economic expansion already racing ahead in the EEC = 1961 application seen as failure in bringing about economic modernisation Government no longer surfing on a wave of prosperity and economic success Economic decline? Golden age? Decline? 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 Formed EFTA Slipping behind US, Japan and West Germany Application to join EEC Stop-go economics Economic growth led to overheating – expensive imports and rising wage demands Economy still growing, living standards up – up 30% Thorneycroft and Powell resign ‘pay pause’ introduced to hold down wage inflation Asked for loan from the IMF Balance of payments problem Economics of stop-go causing problems Feb – set up NEDC ‘Night of the Long Knives’ tax concessions policy of ‘expansion without inflation = rising inflation Rejection from EEC Beeching Report – British Rail cuts Reductions in purchase tax – from 100% in 1951 to 25% in 1963 Rising wages Sterling regains value against dollar Tax cuts £370 mio Reductions in income tax – fell 5 times 1957-64 Growing range of goods in shops 5 million employed in service industries Memories of austerity laid to rest Building societies provided 326, 125 new mortgages Home ownership doubled Consumer spending up from £16mio end of 1959 to £16.75mio by end of 1960 11 CONSERVATIVE ECONOMICS – GOLDEN AGE OR PERIOD OF ECONOMIC DECLINE? Barnett – Economic Decline! • 1970’s inevitable culmination of long term economic decline • Failed to control spending or face down wage demands from unions • British industry failed to modernise • Britain’s world trade – ¼ 1951 to 1/10th 1975 • Technical education neglected • Low productivity vs. US, Japan and W. Germany • Nationalisation a mistake • Too much emphasis on full employment which had led to problems with inflation THE FALL OF MACMILLAN Command over government faltered from 1962 1) Night of the Long Knives 1962 – Cabinet reshuffle. Macmillan’s purge of the cabinet was intended to rejuvenate the government but actually weakened it. Macmillan appeared clumsy and out of touch but damage was not fatal. 2) Profumo Affair 1963 – scandal which was a personal disaster for Macmillan. Given sensational treatment by the press. Political impact of the affair was actually short lived but the image of Macmillan as old and out of touch was reinforced 3) Serious illness 1963 - Macmillan had not paved the way for anyone to succeed him > strong opposition between two most obvious candidates ensued – Butler and Hailsham. DOUGLAS-HOME, compromise candidate, selected. Whole process made Conservatives appear to be trapped in a bygone era > sharply contrasted with the new Labour leader and his promises to take Britain into the ‘White heat of technology’. GENERAL ELECTION 1964 Close run contest with Labour squeezing to victory by 4 seats. Why? Hennessey – Golden Age! • Golden age did exist and progress was made • Living standards rose steadily • Rate of economic growth was consistently higher than it had been between 1900-1939 • Unemployment 2% • Year by year, more prosperous and equal • Comparisons with other countries misleading – Germany and Japan had no choice in completing restructuring their economy and infrastructure and had not been allowed to spend on defence (Britain spent 7% of GDP on this) Conservative Economic Policy Methods Target Results Persistent Problems - maintaining the - attack on inflation - stop-go - slow growth of GNP mixed economy - stagflation - high defence costs - operating mild Keynesian - budgetary politics - limited R & D policies - spreading affluence Macmillan’s characteristics as Leader: Supermac image Summary: Macmillan’s government 1957-63 Living Standards  Never had it so good years  Consumer boom  Housing boom  Property-owning democracy  Unemployment  Education  Class shifts Social tensions  Immigration  Riots 1958-9  Youth subculture Macmillan and Empire  Acceptance of ‘wind of change’  Decolonisation 1957-68 12  Run of scandals and ‘events’ 1962-3 e.g. Profumo, Vassall affair, spy scandals  Government embarrassed by French rejection of EEC application  Sense of a power vacuum following the resignation of Macmillan and doubts over choosing a successor  Sense of growing impatience with the old ‘Establishment’ and desire for generational change > showed through Private Eye and That Was The Week That Was.  Increased support for Labour. Wilson was a strong campaigner > confident in dealing with media and more focused that Gaitskell  Split between Bevanites and Gaitskellites was over, both key personalities dead  Labour could exploit the powerful public mood that it was ‘time for a change’ – Labour election slogan “Thirteen years of Tory misrule’ proved very effective  ‘Liberal revival’ – seemed dead with only 2.5% vote through post-war era. However, in 1960 there were signs of life under Grimond’s guidance. Won 11.2%vote/9 seats in 1964 > evidence of softening of Conservative vote and pre-echo to the revival post 1964. It is possible that votes taken by the Liberals from the Conservative candidates au have just tipped the balance in such a close election race. WHY DID THE CONSERVATIVES DOMINATE BRITISH POLITICS 1951-1964? 1) Age of affluence and consumer confidence 2) Labour divisions 3) Post-war consensus politics and continuation of popular policies 4) Supermac 5) Ability of Conservatives to survive splits and leadership struggles 6) Good election timing and campaigning SOCIETY Post War Legacy > Britain in 1950’s still country moulded by WW2. Still widespread visible signs of war damage, national service, regional and class loyalties still strong. Class and geographical attitudes were reinforced by films of the time. However, British society 1951 not static or frozen in time > war had caused significant social change, as had the welfare state. The Festival of Britain 1951 showed people that they were on the verge of a new, modern world and in the years to 1964 there would be significant social shifts, population changes and growing social tensions. DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE, 1951-64 Three key factors created demographic change in the UK. 1. Health and Life expectancy. Birth rates out stripped death rates, medical improvements were seen under the welfare state. 2. Inward Migration. Continuing influx of immigrants from Irish Republic > 1948, 250,000 arrived. Although many countries sent immigrants to the UK, we also lost many as there was a steady flow of immigrants to North America and Australia. 1950’s Britain received 676,000 immigrants but lost 1.32 million people. In the 1960’s the inward migration was 1.25 million but outward, 1.92 million. 3. The difference between town and country was now much sharper. Countryside still dominated by agriculture. Rural areas had not yet been threatened by creeping urbanisation that is eventually seen. Most people lived in strong, small communities. This situation was about to change > mass car ownership and social mobility, people began to move away from city centres. INFRASTRUCTURE: Britain’s infrastructure was badly run down, desperate need for housing to replace war damaged ones. 1951 > Conservative government set ambitious target of building 300,000 new homes every year > local government spent millions on clearing pre-war slums and building new towns such as Harlow and Kirby. 15 Historians disagree about how and why Britain's empire declined and ended. However, most agree factors like war and changing world economy played a key role in the decline of the British Empire. • Pre WW1 > one of richest countries in world. Strong finance and industry - everyone owed Britain money! After 4 years of fighting, Britain's wealth was virtually all gone. Most of Britain's debts were with the USA. Britain was greatly weakened by the war. • Bankrupted by end of WW2. Debts were even greater > needed huge loans and grants from USA. Empire and its peoples played crucial role in Britain's survival and victory in both world wars. • End of WW2 - most British people felt that rebuilding their own country was more important than holding on to distant lands. At same time, Britain's economy was changing. Trade with Europe and America became more important than its trade with the empire. • Britain did not lose all links with former colonies. British empire became BRITISH COMMONWEALTH. All former members of empire invited to become members of Commonwealth. Majority did (Ireland didn’t and South Africa left Commonwealth later) The Commonwealth was voluntary organisation mainly aimed at promoting friendship and harmony between the nations of the former empire. However, were other benefits such as sporting and cultural links, and special agreements in terms of trade and security. 5 KEY REASONS FOR DECLINE OF EMPIRE • Rise of Superpowers – Britain affected economically, strategically (fall of Singapore) and politically by WW2. USA, USSR and China all took on more important roles and economic miracles that occurred in Japan and Germany impacted upon Britain’s economy. • Growth of Independence Movements – Throughout WW2 there were significant developments in the independence movements in India and African territories. Strikes, boycotts, individuals and political protests all moved countries towards independence. • Economic decline – Cost of two world wars and damage caused to British overseas trade took their toll. By 1945 Britain was reliant upon the USA for support. • Change in political opinion in GB - Labour government elected in 1945 focused upon improving conditions in Britain – going on to establish WELFARE STATE. Attlee allowed Indian independence and moved towards African decolonization because British attitudes had changed. The British left some areas because they felt the country was ready to rule itself democratically, for example India. • Reduced strategic role – Britain no longer had financial or military strength to dominate territory within Asia. The British wanted to leave some countries because the area was causing them problems. Britain and empire post 1945……GLOBAL DECLINE.  By 1951, Britain had to accept that imperial decline was inevitable. • WW1 had started decline, WW2 and the emergence of two superpowers sped up the process. • 1947, Britain had to inform the US that she was close to bankruptcy. Britain had to relinquish its commitments in Greece, Turkey and Palestine. The same year independence was granted to India and Pakistan. • Illusions > long time to die and political and public opinion was slow to recognise the UK’s demise. Nor did they see implications for the future. Britain continued to “punch above it’s weight”. Delayed British integration in Europe until 1973, when it could easily happened twenty years earlier as a result of imperial illusions. • SUEZ that showed British people that Britain was no longer a global superpower. • Imperial illusions also held back decolonization. Only in Harold Macmillan’s WIND OF CHANGE speech in 1960 did people come to terms with losing overseas colonies. Even after 1960, these illusions kept Britain’s defence spending high by holding a nuclear deterrent. Also the ‘special relationship’ with the USA was exaggerated as was Britain’s role in the Cold War. • By 1964 however, must of these myths of British importance had been blown out of the water. ADJUSTING TO THE POST-WAR WORLD • 1951 Britain’s retreat from Empire well under way. 16 • 1950’s, pressure from colonies wanting independence got too much to cope with > British forces found themselves fighting against independence movements in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus. Other ex-colonial powers were facing the same issues, France and Belgium fought wars in former colonies. • In the early 1950’s Britain’s rulers felt they could move from Empire to Commonwealth. • Nobody saw the sudden rush for independence that would follow e.g. Malaya. Kenya THE SUEZ CRISIS, 1956 (EDEN)  Importance? Suez Canal a key stone of Britain’s overseas empire and trade routes > Main artery connecting trade routes from the Mediterranean to countries even beyond Asia. Vital route for oil shipments > 80% Western oil imports passed through the canal.  Response to threat of Nassar’s nationalism and independence = military action rather than diplomacy. WHY? - Response fuelled by Eden’s personality (a man who prided himself on mastery of foreign policy) and belief that Britain was a still an imperial power. Saw Nasser as ‘an evil dictator who could not be allowed to get away with unprovoked aggression.’ - Eden had little faith in diplomacy - Need to act quickly as they felt Nasser threatened African stability - Most of Eden’s cabinet, including Macmillan, were minded to take drastic action and not wait for a slow, diplomatic process. Macmillan, 1956: ‘The Suez situation is beginning to slip from our hands. I try not to think that we have missed the bus – it has taken such a long time to get our military arrangements into shape. But we must win this struggle by one means or another. Without oil, and the profits from oil, neither the UK nor Western Europe can survive’ - Eden was supposed to be an expert in foreign policy so the Cabinet felt unable to challenge such expertise  PROBLEM: kept Suez arrangements secret from most of Cabinet and US! > US annoyed at lack of consultation and fear that Nassar may now turn to USSR for help  Failed! Political protest in Britain but more importantly due to US pressure > Eisenhower shocked at British gunboat diplomacy. Britain was not strong enough to stand up to US pressure due to financial crisis = Macmillan realized it was essential to pull out despite having to accept failure and humiliation.  Impact? - Eden’s career finished on a painful anti-climax - Britain caught acting like an imperial power in a post-imperial world that would not tolerate it. End of ‘world policeman’ role – ‘last throw of imperial stone’ - Britain’s position in the world now had to go through a fundamental reassessment – illusions of imperial grandeur were lessened and lessons began to be learned. - Change in relations between US and Britain - Britain now realized the importance of diplomacy rather than military intervention - Last independent military intervention by Britain > any future conflict was part of organization or with US > realized it no longer had the power to act alone! - Acceptance of Britain that two superpowers now existed – Britain was not one of them. THE WINDS OF CHANGE 1960 (MACMILLAN) • Suez fiasco > reconsidered the position in Africa. Pre-1960 central aim of British imperial policy was to defeat nationalist revolts and to maintain control over colonies. • In 1957, Ghana = Britain’s first African colony to be granted independence > Rush of others. Nigeria and Cyprus in 1960. Sierra Leone in 1961. Uganda in 1962 and Kenya in 1963. • Wind of Change Speech 1960. SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN POLICY! Recognition of independence movements and move to DECOLONISATION. • Macmillan was addressing a mainly white audience in Cape Town who believed in apartheid, convince them of the need to face reality > main audience however was not present; he was really talking to Head’s of state from around the Commonwealth and to public opinion back home. 17 • Why did he think change was needed?: argument that if the next 20 years were to be spent teaching them democracy and learning administration then it would be best to wait, but in reality they knew this would never happen and the intelligent ones would become frustrated and rebel leading to violence, repression and hatred > they’d better start learning to rule themselves at once. Basically, grant independence (and lead the process) in order to look strong or led empire fester on and have nationalist groups overthrow you making you look weak Final proof that change was needed........ • Britain had had a difficult time in containing Mau Mau rebellion > showed Macmillan that wind of change idea was correct. • Iain Macleod (Macmillan's Colonial Secretary) wanted to speed up this independence procedure. • In retrospect the policy was very successful. • The process did not always go to plan, but British decolonisation was completed with a lot less violence than powers such as Belgium or Portugal. • By 1964, the transition from Empire to Commonwealth was significant achievement. BRITAIN AND EUROPE • The vision: EEC > closer ties to prevent future conflict e.g. Schuman Plan of 1950 (proposals for a Coal and Steel Community that would integrate French and German heavy industry) > would promote rapid economic reconstruction and bind the two historic enemies together. The open door, 1951-1957  The decision not to enter in this period did reflect a national consensus. - Labour Party: suspicious of free-market principles behind the Common Market. - Conservatives wanted trade links with countries like Australia, Canada and New Zealand more than Europe. - Many people could not get the war out of their heads. We won. Germany were our enemies. The French rolled over and were occupied. - Leaders were ex-wartime leaders > many still had the perceived idea that Britain was top of the tree.  The economic advantages of the EEC were disregarded.  British foreign policy = encourage European integration from sidelines but not get involved. Liked idea of integration, just not for Britain.  The agreements made at Messina were solidified in the Treaty of Rome in January 1957.  The EEC was born without the UK > Britain not worried. At this time its foreign policy was focused on the Cold War, the Commonwealth and the ‘special relationship’ with the USA.  HOWEVER after Suez, British political attitudes began to shift. Locked outside, 1958-1963 – Missed the European Bus? • The fundamental reason why Britain changed its mind about the EEC was ECONOMIC  realised that the old patterns of trade that had kept Britain at the top of the tree, were no longer as strong  nor had they factored in the ‘miracle’ that was happening in West Germany.  1959 – EFTA (European Free Trade Area) Moderate success.... but not the same as EEC • However, there were FOREIGN POLICY reasons why the British asked to join.  The USA keen to see Britain join for as Britain was a vital link between them and Europe (especially with the Berlin Crisis of 1958) – Britain to act as a ‘Trojan Horse’ for America  The shift in British prestige was already seen with Suez and decolonization alongside establishment of EFTA. • Terms of Entry a problem! EEC had already developed many procedures e.g. Common Agricultural Policy which Britain could not see itself accepting > Heath tried to negotiate special trade exemptions for Imperial nations (e.g. Lamb from NZ) • De Gaulle used France’s veto to block Britain’s application, determined to save EEC from ‘les Anglo-Saxons’ = political bombshell. • His intervention caused very bad feeling between Britain and France for some considerable time. BRITAIN HAD ‘MISSED THE EUROPEAN BUS’ EEC This way... Whoops... 20 THE END OF CONSENSUS, 1964-1975 POLITICS Why did Labour win in 1964? • Role of Conservatives and scandals - Tired of Establishment • Douglas-Home no match for Wilson? • Labour party reunited • WHITE HEAT OF TECHNOLOGY • Disillusioned by affluence • Luck? • Liberal third party effect? Why did they win in 1966? • Heath no match for Wilson - Unable to connect with voters • Wilson an experienced campaigner • More in tune with popular culture and society • Had created dept of technology and strengthened science and education – 7 new uni’s by 1966 • Scientists employed as gov advisors • Liberalisation laws under Jenkins – Race Relations Act, capital punishment abolished LABOUR’S ECONOMY  MODERNISATION key focus for Labour 1964 > Britain lagging behind more advanced economies e.g. West Germany, Japan, affluence of post war boom not reflected in productivity or growth rate, trying to break out of cycle and reorganise the economy was key aim of Wilson’s government,  Which economic problems contributed to this focus? Trapped in stop-go cycle, bursts of prosperity always leading to inflation, pressure on the pound and regular crises over the balance of payments, balance of payments crisis awaiting Wilson when he came into power (deficit was £400 million – choice of devaluation of deflation)  Devaluation or deflation? Devaluation: might have been a good idea as the exchange rate in 1964, $2.80 to the £, was too high but Wilson desperate not to be seen as the party of devaluation – Attlee had to devalue in 1949. Wanted policies for ECONOMIC GROWTH to catch up with foreign competitors Deflation: wanted to escape the old problems of ‘stop go’ Wilson chose not to devalue – he thought modernisation, spending on science and economic management would resolve problems with the economy.......  DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS created to modernise the economy and resolve economic problems. This failed. WHY? Labour in Power 1964-1970 Wilson into Downing St 1964 1966 Consolidates position in election victory 47.9% votes/98 seats Heath no match for Wilson – couldn’t connect with voters and Labour played on’13 years of Tory misrule’ Policy programme became disappointing 1970 Conservatives back in power, Labour in political wilderness Wilson returns to power in 1974 Country is facing huge economic problems and social divisions Optimism and goodwill – in touch with 1960’s social and cultural trends ‘White heat of technology’ Sense of fresh start Concerned about small majority and BBC coverage so calls an election to consolidate position Economics in trouble: Devaluation in 1967 Opinion polls: lag behind Conservatives Frustration – Labour ‘blown off course’? Many blamed Wilson for indecisive leadership and wasting a golden opportunity 21 - DEA overlapped with the Treasury and the role of Chancellor, Callaghan – didn’t know which boss to listen to – Brown/DEA in competition with chancellor Callaghan and the treasury - Brown – impulsive and lacked consistency (drink problem). Came up with National Plan – created in unison with trade unions and industry but did not have support of united government. - Potential third problem: Wilson trying to keep everyone happy rather than pick best team for the job.  Prices and incomes policy introduced: aim was to keep down inflation. Government intervention to set limits on price rises and to call for wage restraint in negotiations between unions and employers. In 1966, the Wilson government set up the Prices and Incomes Board to implement this.  Key events which led from inflationary policies to the decision to DEVALUE: - Sterling crisis in 1966 – due in part to strike by National Union of Seamen - 1967 – major docks strike = Nov 1967 – decision to devalue: pound dropped by 14% to $2.40, ‘POUND IN YOUR POCKET’ speech  Britain was rejected from the EEC in 1967 on basis of economics > Devaluation crisis damaged Labour’s credibility (‘pound in your pocket’ speech), rejection from EEC by De Gaulle was made on ECONOMIC GROUNDS despite Britain’s own lukewarm feelings, rejected after devaluation crisis.  Jenkins becomes Chancellor – Used deflationary methods > raised taxes and tightened up government spending of the economy, top priority to improving the balance of payments > Although unpopular measures they achieved a balance of payments surplus and economic situation had improved by 1969 = Labour confident about 1970 election due to improved economic situation. Sum up Wilson’s economic record in one paragraph: Peaks and troughs – inherited a bad situation but indecisive as to how to deal with it. Concerned with electoral wins as to what was best for the economy – dithered over devaluation. LABOUR AND TRADE UNIONS • Trade Unions had come to wield such influence due to post war consensus politics - importance of maintaining full employment • Favourable with general public > Opinion polls in the 1960’s showed 60% people had favourable view of them • Macmillan and Wilson tried to court trade unions > Relied on union cooperation when bringing in prices and incomes policies, Wilson made Cousins (trade unionist) minister of technology > tried to maintain good relations with TUC • Wild cat strikes broke out and this presented issues for both governments and trade union bosses 1966-67 > cosy relationship with unions began to decline Strikes showed that union bosses were losing control – wild cat strikes by local activists who would not take orders from the top • ‘IN PLACE OF STRIFE’ 1969 –necessary to curb unions who were getting out of control and for good of British economy.  Would strengthen the union in dealing with employers  28 day cooling off period before a strike went ahead  Government could impose a settlement when unions were in dispute with each other in ‘demarcation disputes’  Strike ballots could be imposed  Industrial relations court would be able to prosecute people who broke the rules = Upset TU’s and Labour > storm of protests including the National Union of Mineworkers, Callaghan and Gormley, 50 MPs ready to rebel, concerns over splits. Arguments that IPOS had compromised Labour values. • One of many setbacks (Rhodesia, Northern Ireland), Wilson gave in after many months by striking a compromise with TUC > humiliating climb down by government • Pimlott’s perspective on Wilson and his government: Argues that 1964 socialism collapsed – all the hopes and dreams. They had been unrealistic from the off in terms of economic theory and now the reality was kicking in. Abandoning this theory meant that Labour successive leaders could not bring the party back together – too much of an ideological gap. • Wilson felt confident at the polls 1970 due to improvements in economy (Jenkins’ measures) and the calming of trade unions tensions STRENGTHS OF LABOUR 22 • COMPREHENSIVE SCHOOLS/OPEN UNIVERSITY – Increase in numbers of comprehensive schools in order to break down class barriers of tripartite system, inauguration of the Open University 1969, increase in number of universities • LIBERALISATION OF LAWS – Abortion Act 1967, Sexual Offences Act 1967, creation of Ombudsman 1967 (protects ordinary citizen), Theatres Act 1968, Abolition of death penalty 1969, Divorce Reform Act 1969 • ECONOMICS – by 1970 Jenkins had began to tame economic problems using deflationary methods=balance of payments surplus by 1970 • WILSON’S IMAGE – “one of us”, modern breed of politician, in tune with current culture, state school educated, PR first doctor of spin. • ‘WHITE HEAT OF TECHNOLOGY’ • 1966 GENERAL ELECTION – decisive victory, majority of 98 seats, % of vote biggest share since 1945 WEAKNESSES OF LABOUR • BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (inherited) - £400 million deficit and cycle of stop-go, manufacturing industries shrinking, service and finance expanding • ATTEMPTS TO RESTRUCTURE THE ECONOMY e.g. National Plan (dropped 1967), creation of DEA (and subsequent failure 1966), growing inflation, rising unemployment • DEVALUATION – failed to take initiative and devalue in 1964 when this measure could have been passed off as a necessary hiccup resulting from inherited problem. Stalling meant that by 1967 devaluation was seen as failure, “pound in your pocket” • CRITICISM AND PARANOIA OF BBC – led to him calling 1966 election • PERMISSIVE SOCIETY – age of Jenkins and Liberalisation laws ushers in criticism of a permissive society • SOCIAL UNREST – government responds to racial violence with restrictive Commonwealth Immigration Act 1968 (immigration controls) • CRITICISM WITHIN THE PARTY – leadership, Europe, direction of party, kitchen cabinet (reinforced Wilson’s suspicions of party rivalries and prevented ministers from having access to him) • FAILURE TO ASSERT AUTHORITY • TRADE UNIONS – Seaman’s and Dockers strikes, In Place of Strife 1969, humiliating climb down compromise with TUC • FAILURE TO GET INTO EEC – devaluation and economic situation led to veto by De Gaulle • OVERSEAS – costs and changing attitude to policeman role leads to abandoning of Britain’s East of Suez position LABOUR’S DEFEAT 1970 Shock result - Wilson government had seemed like it had overcome its difficulties of 1967-69 Jenkins had improved the economy producing financial stability Labour had chosen the time to call the election (thought it was a ripe time) Wilson a master campaigner compared to inexperienced Heath However..... • Heath had greater strengths than expected • Labour’s position in 1970 was actually quite fragile setbacks 1966-69 (Trade Unions, devaluation, empire, EEC) – Labour also did not produce distinguished economic policies Conservatives ahead in opinion polls despite a rise in ratings for Labour in Spring of 1970 Conservatives did well in local government elections • Special polls showed a narrow Conservative lead in 1970 • Heath did not include immigration in campaign (sacked Powell 1968 following rivers of blood speech) and refused to have Powell in the campaign despite his popularity in certain constituencies = Heath came to power expecting a strong government committed to modernising Britain. Did not foresee the economic and political earthquake about to hit Britain 1973-74 ELECTIONS ARE LOST AS WELL AS WON…… Conservative strength or Labour weakness that led to their defeat? Reasons why Conservatives won: 25 SUNNINGDALE AGREEMENT 1973 (complex plan for power sharing parliament) FAILED! Heath preoccupied by economic and political crisis at home (Miner’s Strike, Emergency Measures). Heath’s persistent negotiating style, could have resolved problem had it not been for the economy ECONOMICS Why did the British economy face such difficulties in the early 1970’s? SUMMARY • End of post war boom during Heath’s premiership – rapid inflation made holding down prices impossible • Left out of Europe and collapse of EFTA • Decline of Empire and failure of Commonwealth to yield enough trade • Growing power and tensions of TU – 3 day week = people thought government had lost control • Strikes had led to decline in productivity • Unemployment reached new levels • Britain had not modernised – out of date • No decisive action had been taken in Macmillan’s/Wilson’s years = culmination of dithering and indecisiveness • OPEC oil crisis Problems of Economic modernisation under Heath: • Politics and economics Heath’s strengths, yet they were the problems that led to his demise • Well prepared and experienced - genuine commitment to economic modernisation and had formulated detailed plans Problems from the start...... Problem One Hoped that his first choice for chancellor McLeod would be the equivalent of Jenkins to Wilson. McLeod’s sudden death in 1970 = key asset had been removed from Heath’s team Problem Two The new chancellor Barber introduced tax cuts and cuts in public spending including the end of free school milk. Thatcher threw herself to the fore in this disagreement and came to be known in the public eye Problem Three The ‘Barber boom’ began with a rapid rise in wage inflation (steep rise in wages) Problem Four Many blamed steep rise in wages on the power of the trade unions and their willingness to hold the government to ransom through strike action Problem Five Inflation was not accompanied by economic growth. Unemployment went up, unusual during times of inflation. This led to ‘STAGFLATION’ – unusual combination of inflation and stagnant economic growth (often produces unemployment) occurring at this time. = This led to Heath’s famous ‘U-turn’ – the government had wanted to reduce state intervention in industry but now felt compelled to take action e.g. Rolls Royce nationalised in 1971, government financial aid to Upper Clyde Shipbuilders Problem Six Industrial Relations Act 1971 (similar to Castle’s In Place of Strife) • Set up Industrial Relations Court (Ineffective at settling disputes) • Strike ballots • ‘Cooling off period’ before official strikes began Trade Unions Congress (TUC) and Confederation of British Industry (CBI) were opposed to it Problem Seven 1971 Unemployment rose above 1 million – first time since 1930’s Problem Eight • 1972 – major strikes 26 • Miners strike. Virtually stopped movement of coal around the country. Industry nationwide placed on a 3 day week to conserve energy supplies • NUM leader Gormley negotiated a generous wage settlement accompanied by other concessions = looked like victory for miners against employers and government encouraging left wingers to see industrial action as a political weapon, not just a way of bargaining for better pay and conditions • Right wing backlash against excessive union power • Railway workers strike in April 1972 was a write off but 1973 looked better Jeffrey’s argues that: • There was wide support for stages one and two of his prices and incomes policy: limits on wage increases imposed by the government’s pay board in line with rises in cost of living • The number of working days lost through strike action was cut in half compared to 1972 • There was a lot of government investment to boost the economy • Unemployment dropped sharply, to about 500,000 • North Sea oil was due to come on stream in the next few years • The government started to become more popular, drawing about level with Labour in the opinion polls 1973 confirmed the ‘FAILURE OF CONSENSUS’ • FOR: couldn’t control unemployment, challenged post-war Keynesianism at Selsdon speech – going against idea of ‘big government’, trade union traumas – end of positive relationships, retunred to wage bargaining and market forces • AGAINST: Heath nationalised Rolls Royce and allowed state to intervene, Heath a consensus PM • No choice in end of consensus? Heath was a consensus man. Lack of choice? Didn’t want high unemployment or trade union trauma! END OF POST-WAR BOOM: OPEC Oil Crisis 1973 • OPEC A Saudi Arabia cartel to protect the interests of oil exporting countries from the power of advanced industrial economies. Fixed levels of oil production • October 1973 – Yom Kippur War • War prompted OPEC to declare an oil embargo exports suddenly stopped price rocketed to 4 times usual price long queues outside petrol stations • NUM then demanded a huge pay rise in November 1973 By 1973 Heath was faced with: 1. Oil supply concerns 2. Economic concerns – STAGFLATION and unemployment 3. Concerns over prices and incomes policy 4. Attempts at a political settlement in Northern Ireland 5. Imposition of a 3 day week = Dramatic struggle between NUM and the government ‘Who governs Britain?’ – Heath, 1974 • 1972 victory in strike convinced many in the NUM that its industrial muscle was strong enough to get its own way against government and employers – fuelled by moderate Gormley, communist McGahey, and radical Yorkshire miner Scargill End of post war boom Ceased to be an industrial struggle over wages and conditions and instead becomes a question of ‘who governs Britain?’ Answer turned out to be: ‘Not Heath’ Political Crisis Coal crisis turns into a confrontation between the NUM and the government Economic Crisis OPEC oil price crisis 1973 = lengthy period of political turmoil leading to two general elections in the same year 27 • Government was equally determined – sense the unions were challenging a democratically elected government and so moved Whitelaw into position as minister of employment to make use of his ‘powers of persuasion’ on Gormley this failed = Jan 1974 the NUM called a national strike • Massive support for the strike among miners but Heath wouldn’t budge - wanting to impose stage 3 of the prices and incomes policy • Oil Crisis and shortage of coal = balance of payments crisis =Heath calls general election Feb 1974 ‘ WHO GOVERNS BRITAIN?’ 1974 February Election For most of the campaign the polls favoured the Conservatives BUT the final result showed small swing against them – Labour won by 5 more seats, Indirectly, the Miners Strike had brought down the government Inconclusive outcome – ‘hung parliament’ (no party had an overall majority) = reinforced idea that 1974 was political as well as economic crisis Labour biggest single party but by only 5 seats What happened? • Increase in representation for other parties: Liberals back from political dead 14 seats Nationalist parties (Scot, Wales, Ireland) 23 seats • Heath needed support of other parties to stay as PM – had the Ulster Unionists supported Conservatives they would have won anyway but Powell had joined the Unionists and campaigned against Heath Heath attempts to forge a deal with Liberals but fails Was Heath a disaster? YES: • The attempt to abandon an incomes policy and his big ‘U-turn’. • The outcry over the withdrawal of free school milk • The problems with trade unions: the miners’ strike and the 3 day week • The apparent ‘lack of control’ by 1974 and Heath’s election loss NO: • The local government reforms • Britain’s entry into Europe =Labour back in government in March 1974. Won only a 5 seat majority. No 1964 optimism: • Much less promising position than in 1964 • Little chance of free hand in Parliament because Labour had to depend on support from other parties to get legislation through parliament due to 5 seat majority • Economic situation was poor (end of post war boom) • Labour Party less united than ever (ideology, Europe) • Wilson older and less energetic and less certain of the way he wanted to govern – planned to have less personalised style = anxious to call another election as soon as possible in order to obtain a working majority Wilson : ‘No presidential nonsense this time, not first one hundred days, and no beer and sandwiches in No 10 to solve crises – sweeper in defence, not striker in attack’ – government was not about survival and ‘sweeper in defence’, not dynamism and ‘striker in attack’ • Wilson decides not to strike a deal with Liberals in March 1974 to obtain a working majority – didn’t want to compromise or make a coalition • Economic problems meant he needed to act quickly > Industrial Relations Act and pay board abolished Party Seats Votes % Labour 301 37.1 Conservatives 297 37.9 Liberal 14 19.3 30 In what ways did environmental issues influence society in Britain between 1964 and 1975? • Growth of demonstrations e.g. CND • Development of pressure groups • General increase in the natural environment and the need for conservation • Culture – TV programmes (BBC Natural History, Attenborough’s Life on Earth) • Carved a place on the political scene by end of 1970’s– parties now had to consider and discuss environmental issues • Creation of the word ‘ecology’ – change in attitude of society and questioning of traditions such as fox hunting as well as energy creation and consumption 5 key aspects of economic change caused social tensions in the later 1960’s and early 1970’s 1. Rising inflation and the decline of affluence – end of post war boom under Heath 2. Growing unemployment 3. Change in nature of TU movement (union militancy) - Unions collective industrial power and disputes which took on a political nature 4. Modernisation – clearing of slums and urban redevelopment, new roads 5. Oil crisis and strikes leading to 3 day week Summary:  1975 – post war consensus was breaking down  Age of affluence had (temporarily) come to an end  Britain seemed to be losing it’s social cohesion  Rising crime levels  Sociologists studying the ills of society  Increased militancy of trade unions due to new breed of union activists looking for Arthur Scargill type political confrontation FOREIGN POLICY Situation in Britain at time: Wilson’s Labour government – attempt to focus on modernisation of Britain, pro-American but did not want to be drawn into conflict in Vietnam, realised the economic potential of European entry but dogged by a party disunited on EEC issue Heath’s Conservative government – wanted to continue economic reform but struck by trade union tensions and a series of economic problems. Wanted to resolve Irish issue and to gain EEC entry • Decolonisation was a process which began post WW1 and more noticeably after WW2 – this process could not be abandoned following success in India, crisis in Suez, and Macmillan’s Wind of Change speech • Economics – Britain still reliant on US loans and had to ask for IMF loans = dawning realisation that it was no longer the leading power in the world • Attitudes were beginning to change – Britain wanted to focus on resolving issues at home (Welfare state, new housing), no longer wanted to be seen as an old fashioned colonial power being caught acting imperially in a modern, democratic era 1964-1975 EMPIRE EUROPE AMERICA NUCLEAR WEAPONS • Winds of Change’ speech of 1960 had the result that by 1964, 18 New Commonwealth states had been granted independence. • Had been a relatively smooth process so far and Wilson hoped to continue this retreat peacefully. • This would involve: granting independence to colonial persons who had not yet achieved it, and reducing military responsibilities e.g. East of Suez • However, political and public opinion still clung to the illusion that Britain had an important world role. •attempted to join 1961-63 - vetoed • Wilson wanted to attempt again 1967 Reliant on US loans Suez Crisis scars Johnson urging Britain to get involved militarily in Vietnam Labour confused over nuclear stance – some rifts had been mended CND marches Britain disengaged from overseas De Gaulle left the political scene in 1969 Britain’s accession to the EEC Influence of CND waned and Labour continued its acceptance of nuclear deterrents Britain had avoided involvement in Vietnam 31 Britain’s objectives 1964-1975 1. Continue decolonisation – gradual process to those countries ‘responsible’ enough to be independent 2. Gain entry into the EEC 3. Try to ensure Britain was still a prominent power on the world stage 4. Continue presence in NATO and UN 5. Maintain special relationship 6. Ensure Commonwealth success Britain’s concerns 1. Nationalist intentions and the economic impact of granting independence to countries 2. Economic conditions in Britain 3. Position in the Atlantic Alliance – bond of trust had been affected by Suez 4. The future of British foreign policy - America or Europe? 5. How to maintain Commonwealth and would it be successful? Britain and Rhodesia, 1964-75 • Biggest challenge during this time was not De Gaulle or Johnson, but Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia • ‘Winds of Change’ speech –seen as a challenge to south > Main target was white minority regimes who were resistant to change  They weren’t persuaded! = 1961 South Africa left Commonwealth and moved faster towards apartheid. Causes of tension in Southern Rhodesia: • Rise of white nationalism • Britain’s attempted withdrawal • Britain’s intervention efforts • Intrinsic problems within the country EVENT HOW DID BRITAIN ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION? IMPACT AND OUTCOME? Britain and Rhodesia  1961 S.A. left the British Commonwealth moving closer to apartheid.  1964 – Zambia and Malawi independent but not S. Rhodesia due to political domination of the white.  Ian Smith becomes PM 1965 Smith rushed into UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) for Rhodesia (commitment to white rule)  Direct challenge to Wilson’s government who had other priorities. Thought it would be resolved in weeks not months shouldered on for 14 years at Lancaster House Conference 1980  DIPLOMACY! Wilson met Smith HMS Tiger 1966 – seemed to make progress but Smith disavowed everything he said as soon as he got back home.  SANCTIONS! Oil sanctions – no effect (got supplies elsewhere – Mozambique and oil companies disregarding sanction)  HMS Fearless 1968 – talks again but Smith feeling stronger rather than weaker and felt he could rely on Conservatives (wait for Britain to give in)  Diplomacy got Wilson nowhere  Diplomacy got Wilson nowhere – upset Commonwealth and many on Labour left and Britain looked weak  Other countries had shown a lack of respect for British authority by flouting sanctions and ignoring diplomacy > underlined Britain’s position in the world at this time  Small farmer able to hold country to ransom  Britain unwilling to risk upsetting America and UN like Suez  But, showed that Britain was changing and becoming more responsible by using diplomacy, a big change from Suez in 1956 Biafra Crisis 1967  Ibo people tried to create independent state in own right in Nigeria in place called Biafra = bitter civil war  Press and public opinion supported Biafra and Colonel Ojukwu  Britain felt bound to support the official government of Nigeria and the idea of territorial integrity  Defeat for Biafra  Wilson on wrong side of press and public opinion  Difficult time during difficult government South African relations 1970  Relations deteriorating  SA cricket tour of Britain abandoned  Heath continued sanctions despite being ineffectual and being opposed by many on the Conservative right  Heath saw divides in party  Britain continues to look weak  Smith’s position strengthened by a Empire and Commonwealth: Britain and Rhodesia, 1964-75 32 Withdrawal East of Suez Wilson’s overseas commitments 1964: ‘slow and long term’ • Would have to be reduction in military commitments • Denis Healey (Minister of Defence) started a process of spending cuts to bring defence budget below £2million by 1970 • 1967 White Paper (Healey) – timetable for troop withdrawals from Aden, the Middle East, Malaysia and Singapore • Criticised for not going far or fast enough due to his beliefs in the Atlantic alliance and Britain having a continuing world role. • No real debate over giving up the expensive British nuclear deterrent. Would continue to deploy its Polaris missiles with a commitment in 1967 to upgrade at great expense Heath as PM 1970 > Discussion about delaying or reversing some withdrawals especially Gulf due to oil ties. Withdrawal of troops not complete by 1971, not occur until late 1970’s. No more far-flung chains of British bases – Europe and the Med would now be the furthest reach. Arguments for and against Heath reversing Wilson’s policies when he came to power in 1970  FOR: needed oil supplies, prestige, unsure economic situation, lack of speed in process so far, having to finish what predecessor had started  AGAINST: military costs, process was already underway and could not be halted, economic situation of Britain, what was the alternative? HISTORICAL OPINION ON EMPIRE……. Marr argues by 1975 the ‘Empire was formally over.’ WHY?  Sweep of countries that had become independent  Britain had accepted it was over – end of illusions due to threat of anti-apartheid activists such as Hain  SA moving towards sporting isolation  SA giving support to Smith’s Rhodesia such as the Monday Club and big business and trade interests in SA.  Douglas-Home sent to Rhodesia in 1971 for unofficial talks – pessimistic report without any signs of resolution. surge in white immigration to Rhodesia in 1960’s  Rhodesia issue stagnated  Britain looked ineffective and did not try to effectively end apartheid Bush War 1972  Marxists insurgents started a guerilla war  Smith’s regime could cope with this as long as they had support from SA but SA had opted for a less confrontational approach to its black neighbours in 1974 = reduced flow of oil and armaments into Rhodesia  1976 Smith accepted the Kissinger Plan drawn up by US and approved by SA and Britain – set out the steps for majority rule.  Pressure from SA and US had done what British diplomacy and sanctions had failed to do.  1979 – Zimbabwe-Rhodesia held multi- racial elections  For 15 years the British government had been made to look futile by Smith and his ability to defy them. OUTCOME What impact did African tensions have on Britain?  Divided parties  Made PMs and Britain look weak  Split governments from press and public opinion  Distracted parties from other events in Britain  Continued to be a drain on money and effort Why does Rowe argue that Smith endured the biggest failure?  Had he negotiated a reasonable settlement in 1966 then the later history of Zimbabwe under Mugabe might have taken a less disastrous course than it did January 1968: ‘acceleration due to costs’ • Roy Jenkins’ spending cuts after 1967 devaluation crisis – withdrawal from east of Suez was accelerated rapidly - troops to be pulled from Aden, the Arabian Gulf and Malaysia by 1971 - development of new high-tech warplane, the F111 abandoned due to cost 35 Why was Britain in decline by 1975? • Retreat from empire • Impact of economic crisis at home – end of post war boom, trade union tensions, • US perceived to be weakened by Vietnam War and special relationship was under strain as Britain had not helped US during this conflict and in the Middle East of 1973 THE THATCHER REVOLUTION, 1975- 1990 POLITICS The Labour Government, 1975-79 Emergence of Thatcher did not help Conservative chances of beating Labour in short term. Tories linked with industrial unrest and three day week. Wilson and his government seemed to be in a strong position. However, the years 1975 – 79 began a slow Labour decline that resulted in 18 years of Tory rule. Problem 1: Economics • There was a surge in inflation due to the increase in wages needed to sort out the industrial disputes. • Some settlements as high as 30%, government was in no position to barter. • Overall inflation running at 20% - consequence of oil price rise of 1973 • Decline in value of money and growing debit in its trade balance threatened to make Britain bankrupt • Healey decided that inflation had to be brought under control and that public spending had to be curtailed. • 1975 budget imposed large tax rises > 1976 budget tried to limit wage rises to 3%. • March 1976 - £ dropped below $2 in exchange value Problem 2: Divisions • Left wingers in Labour like Foot and Benn did want so much pressure put on the unions. • Government caused controversy by nationalising British Leyland > accused of saving ‘lame-duck’ industries. • STAGFLATION was also back again. Problem 3: Trade Unions • Cuts in public expenditure and rise in unemployment that followed the IMF agreement embittered the TU’s and weakened their traditional loyalty to Labour • Credit gained by repealing Heath’s Industrial Relation’s Act in 1974 • Hopes of positive relations: Wilson on good terms with Jones (TGWU leader) and talk of a ‘social contract’ (wage restraint policy in return for pro-worker industrial policies) • However, few examples of unions actually restricting wages and seemed to be a repeat of problems that had plagued Heath Problem 4: Change in Leadership • 1976 Wilson resigned • Callaghan was seen as a safe pair of hands to take over: good links to the unions and was seen as perfect to unify the party, even though they were losing by-elections > had to deal, quite quickly, with the Irish issue and the economy. CALLAGHAN AS PM – WHAT DID HE ENCOUNTER? The IMF loan • 1976 Healey had to go to IMF for emergency loan > £3 billion. • Terms of the loan: the country had to cut public spending. 36 • Labour Conference 1976 – Healey gets rough reception. Showed long running feud between left (thought they were Conservative policies) and centre right(claimed party looked feeble when dealing with TU’s and were losing power) of party was a fierce as ever > seen by opponents as a humiliation. • However, Callaghan handled the IMF crisis well, but it did reinforce that the UK was in economic decline. • Arguments from Tories that it was giving away Britain’s independence & from Labour that capitalism was being given in to. Callaghan began to see a growth of left wing union militancy, but was able to deal with this. THE LIB LAB PACT • Overall majority throughout 5 years in government was never more than 3 seats • To strengthen position >Callaghan made Lib-Lab Pact. By this deal, 12 Liberal MP’s voted for the government in parliament and in return Callaghan would go ahead with devolution for Scotland and Wales. = Gave the Liberal Party influence The economic situation also got better as North Sea Oil came on stream (1978 - 9 oilfields in production) Inflation fell but at cost of increased unemployment (1.6 million by 1978) Some economic historians see this as a genuine improvement, others see it as a blip on an economic decline. 1978 – economic recovery took the heat out of the agonising about Britain’s role as the ‘economic sick man of Europe’ But 5% ceiling on wage rises had angered TU’s leading to strikes in 1977 (firemen), 1979 (Ford Motors, lorry drivers) DEVOLUTION • Liberals demanded this issue to be dealt with as part of the Lib-Lab pact agreement • Referendum - Wales voted 4:1 against devolution. • In Scotland more people voted for rather than against devolution. Nowhere near the 40% of all those eligible to vote. • People too distracted by the ‘Winter of Discontent’ of 1978-79 LABOUR’S WINTER OF DISCONTENT 1979 • Industrial disputes 1978 79 were not serious challenge to government of the day. • But the psychological effect of the winter of discontent had a devastating effect on the public mood, and thus on James Callaghan’s government. • Wave of industrial action by all spheres of the work force including lorry and train drivers, refuse workers, and grave diggers = Fuelled the idea that ‘Labour isn’t working’ Consequences: Thatcher led Conservatives in outright condemnation of devolution which in the long run, this policy had a dramatic effect on the Tory party > 1970 they had 36 seats in Scotland, by 1997 they had none. RISE OF THATCHER: Many people saw a different Thatcher between 1975-79. She had not yet fully moulded her political beliefs or her political style. There were four key factors that helped her do this during her time in opposition: Factor 1: Personality • Force of personality, drive and confidence in her party and own abilities (contrast to pessimism of party and country at time) • Cultivated political presentation skills - worked hard at how to present herself and used the PR firm Saatchi & Saatchi to help her with this. • She gave off positive vibes throughout the period. Factor 2: Deputy Leader Willie Whitelaw To sum up... UNDERLYING PROBLEMS •Small Labour majority in the Commons •The grim effects of the oil price crisis of 1973 •The struggle with the combative trade unions CALLAGHAN SUCCEEDED WILSON IN 1976, BUT.... •1976 IMF crisis deepened divisions in government and party •Growing number of strikes 1977-79 •Industrial action by the public sector unions led to ‘winter of discontent’ •Labour government badly weakened by its failures to control the crisis •End of Lib-Lab pact proved disastrous for Labour •Door opened to Mrs Thatcher’s Conservatives 1975 EEC referendum confirmed UK’s membership of EEC 37 • Keen to impress on the party the importance of unity. • He was totally loyal and he was key in winning over Heath’s supporters to the new leader. Factor 3: Economic Policy • Her natural instincts were against ‘big government’ and consensus politics. • She was influenced by people like Powell and Joseph > began to adopt a policy of MONETARISM (not at forefront until after 1979 election) Monetarism – control inflation by reducing spending and borrowing including, most importantly, strict curbs on the money supply • Advocated a low level of spending and a close control of money supply to the country. Factor 4: Political Savvy and Skill • Keep your options open. • As they moved towards the election, the Conservative polices were deliberately vague so that she could decide on the best course of action at any given time. Conclusion: It is wrong to think that Thatcher swept into power with massive public support. Most of 1975 – 79 she was behind Callaghan in ratings. Genuine fear. she said to a friend, ‘I shall be remembered as the woman who was allowed one go – to lead the party to defeat.’ 1979 ELECTION The mistake: One key historical question about the 1979 election is why didn’t it happen in 1978? During that year, before the winter of discontent, Labour was doing fine, Thatcher was behind in the polls and seemingly unlikely to have her turning point election. By time Callaghan belatedly called the election in 1979, his government had been damaged by: • Economic and financial crises • Rising unemployment 1.6 million • Belligerent trade unions – lowest ebb since war • Political misjudgements (mistreatment of minority parties upon whom their continuation in office depended on – 1978 Lib-Lab pact lapsed, SNP walks away after devolution is abandoned ) and the impact of the Winter of Discontent Then, in March 1979, the government lost a vote of no confidence in parliament. • The government was forced to resign (first time since 1924 that a government had been forced to do this) • It now meant that a general election would happen in mid 1979 – just when he didn’t want one > entered the election campaign in a low state of morale. Even with all of these negative vibes, the outcome for Labour was not a foregone conclusion. • The Conservatives main tactic was to hammer away at unpopularity of government – “LABOUR ISN’T WORKING” campaign poster playing on unemployment and law and order • In reality, the popular vote for Labour held up quite well, dipping by only 3%. • However, the Conservatives benefited greatly from a drop in support for the Liberals and the SNP. = The result was by no means a landslide, but gave Thatcher a workable majority. • Con: 339 seats. Lab: 269 seats. Others: 27 seats (majority of 43) Con % share: 43.9%. Lab % share: 36.9%. Others % share: 19.2% POTENTIAL EXAM QUESTION: ‘Industrial Discontent was the main reason why Labour lost the 1979 election’ Assess the validity of this view  Factor 1: Winter of Discontent - psychological impact, idea that Labour was ahead in the opinion polls in Autumn 1978, showed Labour was unable to curb TU power due to their left/trade union roots  Factor 2: Divisions within Labour – IMF loan, ideology and direction of the party, what relationship they should have with TU’s, here were begin to see how divisions would lead to later breakaways  Factor 3: Loss of the Lib Lab pact and the impact of devolution – loss of Liberal coalition over devolution issue meant they lost working majority in government > struggle to get majority in parliament = weak government. Failure to get devolution on the go meant rise in voters supporting nationalist parties such as SNP 40 = led to infighting in Labour (did not start immediately). Callaghan did not resign until 1980 so the party stayed strong > new leader emerged as Bevanite MICHAEL FOOT, a strong leftist Labour politician > showed a Labour tendency to turn inwards and ignore the issue that might stop them winning the next election, SDP LIBERAL ALLIANCE • Revival of Liberals began under Thorpe > increases in voting % Liberal 1970 and 1974 did not result in more seats in Westminster (due to FPTP system) but monopoly of two leading parties was loosened • Liberals and other nationalist parties did well > Scotland, parts of Wales, south-west England – voters rejecting Conservatives and Labour? • Thorpe replaced by STEEL > modest revival of Liberals continued • Collapse of support for Labour after 1979 gave Liberals biggest political opportunity for 50 years - successful strategies for fighting by-elections and local council elections - good at pavement politics (local issues) • Rise in Liberal vote came in tandem with steep decline in Labour vote. However, FPTP system worked against the Liberals, whose increased share of the total vote was not matched by any increase in seats in parliament • SDP and Liberals formed SDP LIBERAL ALLIANCE. • Relations between the Liberals and SDP were often tense 1) personality differences between the Two Davids 2) differences in ideology (dislike of Thatcher was not enough of a uniting factor) 3) Some within both parties had not wanted a merger at all • But! Still possible to argue they took over from Labour as the credible opposition to Thatcher....until the Falklands 1983 ELECTION • Falklands > increased self confidence and grasp of the party, led to Conservative rise in opinion polls and a patriotic mood washing through Britain. • She had, however, the economic record of 1979-82 threatening to derail her success. She had however slackened monetarist policies 1982-3 softening unemployment hardship (at 3 million) • Labour was experiencing political wilderness as a result of internal divisions and the break away of the SDP. • The SDP-Liberal alliance was gaining support and experiencing small successes, even becoming the official opposition party in some areas of Britain Outcome: 1951 1983 Labour 48.8% vote (14 million) Labour 27.6% vote (8.4 million) Liberal 2.5% vote (less than 1 million) Liberal 25.4% vote Conservatives 48% (but still won!! FPTP system) Conservatives 42.4% vote Conservatives secured a 144 seat majority. Labour looked less and less like a party of government than before. SDP Liberal Alliance experienced a rise in support, but not as much as they had expected in 1982 1983 election was another example of the distorting effect of the FPTP system • The Alliance had only got ½ million votes less than Labour but were 186 fewer seats than them in parliament • The amount of non-Conservative votes was 16 million compared to the total of Conservative votes at 13 million Why did they win the 1983 Election? 1. Falklands factor – rise of patriotism and support of the government. However this must not be overstated and is often used by Labour sympathisers as an alibi. Conservative success was not due to mass approval of Thatcher. 2. Splintering of political opposition 3. Labour lacked credibility – Foot acted as a principled opposition party but no one could imagine If you look, the Conservatives % of vote is actually less than 1951 so it’s not that they are the more popular party. It’s that Labour has lost 20% of their vote to Liberals. Did the Conservatives only win because Labour was so unpopular? 41 him actually being the leader of the government of the day. 4. Labour’s election manifesto – ‘the longest suicide note in history’ - a mish mash of left-wing promises including UND and the abolition of foxhunting. 5. First past the post voting system – distorting effect on results including the Alliance’s lack of seats in Parliament and the total non-Tory vote exceeding the total Tory vote by 3 million POTENTIAL EXAM QUESTION: ‘Success in the Falkland’s War ensured Margaret Thatcher’s election victory of 1983’ A successful answer to this question will balance the effects of the Falklands War against other factors contributing to Thatcher’s electoral victory of 1983. Factor Importance of the Falklands War  Overwhelming victory increased her popularity with the public and press • The victory weakened the position of those who opposed military action • Victory undermined the authority of Kinnock and Foot who appeared pacifist and unpatriotic • Victory derailed the SDP Liberal Alliance successes Other factors (each factor will need a paragraph) which may have contributed to Thatcher’s success at the polls: • Divisions of Labour – internal disputes over direction of the party regarding nationalisation and UND, SDP break away • Labour leadership – unable to inspire party or engage public, lurch to left and socialist objectives, ‘longest suicide note in history’ compounded by loss of traditional support bases, haunted by previous government’s failures • Thatcher’s ending of the post war consensus • ‘Thatcher’s economic revolution’ • Conservative party unity and presentation • FPTP Electoral system POTENTIAL EXAM QUESTION: Use a combination of strengths and weaknesses to answer these questions! 1. Reasons why the conservatives were so politcally dominant 1979-87? 2. why was political opposition towards thatcher so ineffective? The Thatcher Revolution Stage 1: 1979-86 THATCHERISM Conviction politics INFLUENCES • Keith Joseph and the new right • Von Hayek’s free market ideas METHODS • Monetarism • Trade union reform • Local government reform SHORT TERM CONSEQUENCES • Recession and rising unemployment • Social unrest AIMS • End the post-1945 consensus • Reverse Keynesianism • Cut government spending • Cut taxes • Restrict bureaucracy • Take government off the backs of the people Thatcher’s aims for 1979-87  End the post war consensus  Reverse Keynesianism  Cut government spending  Cut taxes (on income/housing)  Restrict bureaucracy and big government 42 THE FALKLANDS FACTOR  Turning point in Thatcher/Conservative popularity – saw opinion polls alter  Gained support of press e.g. The Sun  Led to increase in Thatcher’s self confidence and grasp on the party – began to dominate  ‘forgiven’? for earlier economic traumas  Unleashed a wave of patriotism  Seen as a bold leader  Galvanised grass root Conservative supporters  Springboard for election victory of 1983 THATCHER’S ECONOMIC REVOLUTION  3 policies: reverse economic decline, cost all policies and if they could not be accommodated within public expenditure plans they would not be approved, and to introduce a new change in direction no matter the costs along the way – offered a new approach: stimulation of free enterprise through tax cuts and regulation  Restoration of free market principles to replace Keynesianism –deregulation of financial markets  Tackle inflation through monetarism leading to government spending cuts. Unpopular and led to unemployment of nearly 3 million, but successful in it’s primary objective to cut inflation: 19% in 1979 to 5% in 1983  Trade union reform – Miner’s strikes saw her smash unions and Scargill  Local government reform and ‘taking on’ of left wing local councils – Local Government Act 1986  Privatisation of industry – “rolling back the frontiers of the state’ BP 1979, British Telecom 1984  Sale of council houses – Housing Act 1980 ‘right to buy’ ENDING OF THE POST WAR CONSENSUS  End consensus which had allowed Britain to slip into harmful social and economic habits  It was false economic and bad social practice  The state had played too large a part in peoples lives and there needed to be a return to the principle of individual accountability  Labour glorified in planning, regulation and controls and subsidies, trying o forge a third way between European collectivism and American capitalism. The Tory party had been more abivalent and at the level of principle had opposed these doctrines. But in the fine print of policy, the Tory Party merely pitched camp in the long march to the left. It never really tried to reverse it.  Thatcher arrived and outwardly rejected this, including criticising Heath. This heralded a change that the electorate needed. PARTY UNITY AND PRESENTATION  Whitelaw as deputy – won over Heathites and ensured party unity. Different in background, style and policy ideas  Use of Saatchi and Saatchi for PR and campaigns – ‘Labour isn’t working’.  Mastery of the press using Bernard Ingham  Cabinet composed of ‘wets’ and ‘dries’ . When party divisions opened wider and several ‘wets’ were sacked or driven to resign Thatcher still managed to maintain party unity and marginalized wets  Secured grip and control of the Party post- Falklands ensured party unity  Momentum – Thatcher had built up momentum and became an unstoppable chuggernaught OTHER POTENTIAL FACTORS.......  FPTP system  Rise of nationalist parties and SDP which split votes THESE FACTORS SUGGEST IT WAS CONSERVATIVE STRENGTHS THAT LED TO DOMINATION! 45 Enemy 3: State Controlled Industry Why a problem? • Thatcher regarded state owned/public sector industry as inefficient and costly • Thatcher thought: ‘private good, public bad’ Action taken? > DEREGULATION AND PRIVATISATION 1. DENATIONALISATION Denationalisation key aim of Thatcherite economic policy – “pulling back the frontiers of the state” by privatisation of state controlled enterprises. Over 50 enterprises sold off! • Privatisation driven by anti-socialist ideology. Most privatised industries were sold off cheaply to ensure all shares were taken up. The government acquired huge amounts of money from this • First term – some steps taken 1979 BP nationalised, 1980 British aerospace • Momentum picked up with the sale of British Telecom in 1984. This was followed by... British Airports Authority, National Bus Company, British Gas and British Airways (1986), Rolls Royce (1987), British Steel (1988), regional electricity and water boards • Plans were thought up to privatise parts of the NHS but were not pursued until 1990s 2. HOUSING ACT 1980 • Sale of council houses and a tenants ‘RIGHT TO BUY’ homes and shares to try to make Britain a ‘property owning democracy’ and foster a shareholder mentality 3. FINANCIAL DEREGULATION • City of London and financial markets freed from the tight controls regulated by Bank of England • ‘Big Bang’ 1986 – blew away old traditions and internationalised the stock market • New breed of dealers and speculators (yuppies!!) – City became place of bigger risks and bigger fortunes made faster • Education: schools could not opt out of the state sector Success? • Marked a significant shift in the British economy – signalled end of the post war consensus about economic management • Thousands of people took advantage of the ‘right to buy’ scheme and bought their homes • 1979-1990 shareholder numbers rose from 3 million > 9 million • However, shares in privatised industries were mainly bought by big commercial concerns, not the “little people” as government advertising had predicted. Other economic steps taken: • Shift in emphasis of economics - Monetarism sidelined in place of ‘supply side economics’. This involved curbing TU power, encouraging competition to lower prices, and cutting wasteful welfare payments • Thatcherite agenda also included lower taxes and more incentives for people to generate wealth (reduced income tax provided employees with an incentive to work) • Lawson’s budget 1987 – basic rate of income tax cut from 29% to 27% (cut to 25% by 1988) • Personal pensions launched encouraging people to save for themselves rather than rely on state on state or company pensions • North Sea Oil sold off – Labour had established BNOC as a means of keeping North Sea oil under public control. Government revenue derived from privatisation: 1979-80 £377 million 1985-6 £2600 million 1988-9 £7000 million SUMMARY Thatcher Economics 1983-87 Aim To create economic growth by: •Reducing taxation •Providing incentives •Encouraging competition •Limiting trade union powers •Cutting wasteful welfare payments •Creating accountability Methods •Deregulation •Decentralisation •Privatisation Key areas affected: •Local government •Social services •education Consequences : •Unemployment in some areas •Job creation in others •No real reduction in taxation •Growth in GDP •Increase in real wages •Large increase in inflation 46 However, in 1982 Thatcher sold majority shares to the private sector arguing that world oil prices were in long term decline Critics argued the government had squandered a national asset for short term gain and were destroying Britain’s industrial economy THE DIVIDED OPPOSITION 1983-1987 RECAP: Callaghan PM until 1979 (lost election to Thatcher) and Labour leader until 1980. In November 1980, however, Foot became leader > “lurch to the left” (‘Loony Left’) including the “longest suicide note in history” election manifesto of 1983. A gang of four had broken away with other key members of Labour to form SDP in 1981 as they wanted a more centrist party, enjoying some by- election successes e.g. Warrington. They formed an initial informal alliance with the Liberals, which then became formal > SDP LIBERAL ALLIANCE. This enjoyed limited success at local and by-election level, however infighting between two leaders of the SDP and Liberals (Two Davids), ideological differences (disliking Thatcher not enough to unite them), and the Falklands derailed their success…… Labour’s Difficulties 1. Took time to live down the memory of the ‘Winter of Discontent’ 2. Internal divisions between left and right a continual source of weakness 3. Foot a disappointment as leader – unable to inspire the party or engage the electorate 4. Angered by the prevailing influence of CND, Militant Tendency and the unions, which had caused the SDP split 1981 5. Party came out badly from Falklands War – objection to military intervention was read by the electorate as a lack of support for those fighting in the war 6. Disastrous performance in 1983 – party out of touch > KINNOCK BECOMES LABOUR LEADER 1983 Beliefs: • Changed mind on key left-wing causes e.g. unilateralism, nationalisation, Europe (criticised for abandoning principles) Aims: • To silence the hard left of Labour • Move the Labour Party back towards the political middle ground • Modernise the Labour Party organisations and improve party discipline Outcome: • Lost elections 1987, 1992 • Did much to restore Labour’s political credibility • 1985 speech was landmark in the evolution of New Labour What problems did Kinnock face during his time as leader? Problem One: Left Wing Activists in unions and local government who had great prevailing influence • Hard left Militant Tendency group infiltrated many local councils • Livingstone, left wing leader of GLC, engaged in running political battles against the government • Scargill’s leadership of miner’s strike fuelled a lot of anti-Thatcherite radicalism How did Kinnock attempt to solve the problem? • Post 1985 Miner’s Strike Kinnock attempted to assert control over the party and to regain the initiative from hard left activists • 1985 Bournemouth party conference – outspoken attack on the actions of the Militant Tendency and on the leaders of the city council in Liverpool for their policies • Less directly, Kinnock distanced himself from the supporters of Benn and Scargill Problem Two: Labour’s lack of credibility and series of defeats • Parliamentary party had been weakened by its heavy defeat in 1983 • 1987 Kinnock had already done a lot to restore party discipline and to make the party organisation more efficient but still lost heavily in 1987 election How did Kinnock attempt to solve the problem? • From 1987 modernisation of the party was given top priority 47 • Labour’s image became much more moderate (using reassuring shadow chancellor Smith and by recruiting talented younger politicians such as Mandelson, Blair and Brown) • 1990 – Labour revival progressed far enough for the party to have serious hopes of winning the next election SDP LIBERAL ALLIANCE 1981-1982 Enjoyed moderate levels of success in by elections due to pavement politics and local council election strategies 40% vote pre-Falklands War What went wrong? 1987 – dropped to 24% vote The SDP began to shrink Why did it go wrong? 1. 1983 - Loss of momentum meant that they found it hard to maintain the same levels of support 2. Two Davids infighting - partly due to ideological differences; opposition to Thatcher was not enough to provide unity by itself - partly due to personal differences 3. Revival of Labour – the only reason the SDP formed was because Labour was a political basket case in 1981. As Kinnock established his grip on the Labour party, it seemed that moderate socialism was back in business and the SDP had no real identity or purpose. Former Labour MP’s that had deserted began to turn back to the party. Outcome: • Many Labour MPs switched their allegiance back to Labour • SDP Liberal Alliance merged to form the Liberal Democrats in 1988 and remained a force in politics through their slick campaigning in by-elections but the hopes of ‘breaking the mould’ melted away Recap: Why were the Conservatives so dominant during the period 1979-1987? 1. The Falklands War 2. Divisions in Labour and lack of political credibility 3. Ideological and personality differences between SDP Alliance 4. Leadership of Thatcher 5. Removal of Thatcher’s economic and trade union enemies 6. Economic policies of Thatcher 7. First Past the Post Electoral System THE DOWNFALL OF THATCHER Reason 1: Economics (long term factor) • Economic recession of 1987 began to bite by 1990 • Great stock market crash 1987 – came a year after the Big Bang deregulation of the London Stock Exchange in 1986 which saw the advent of computer screen trading in tandem with free competition replacing the ‘old boys’ network • Lawson boom – Thatcher’s new chancellor Lawson (especially in the 1988 budget) introduced policies resulting in the rapid expansion of the economy (Lawson boom). However, this also resulted in a balance of payments problem. • Inflation – 1990 had risen to 10.9%, higher than in 1980. An important reason why Britain entered the Exchange rate mechanism Reason 2: Political • After 11 years in office Thatcher was losing her political touch • Westland Affair 1986 – resignation of Heseltine drew disaffected MP’s to his cause. • Came at a time when many previously loyal MP’s felt pushed to the sidelines so began to turn away from Thatcher, leading to her increasing isolation. Year Election Result 1979 Conservative 43.9% Labour 36.9% Liberal 13.8% 1983 Conservative 42.4% Labour 27.6% SDP Liberal 25.4% 1987 Conservative 42.4% Labour 30.8% SDP Liberal 22.6% 50 • National Front became very active in parts of London where immigrants had settled e.g. Brick Lane, Southall • Key factor (alongside unemployment) for urban violence 1981-1985 • Thatcher government of the opinion that immigration was a growing problem • Immigration Act (1981)  Realistic: • Clear that British life could not function without contribution of migrants (needed for transport system, hotel industry, as well as communities needing restaurants and corner shops) 2. Continuing shift of population from rural to urban areas 3. Sharpening of the north-south divide (inaccurate view of prosperous south and less prosperous north) SOCIAL TRENDS, 1975-1990 By the 1970s – massive decline in demand for British goods • Reasons? – Cost (cheaper elsewhere) – Inefficiency • Decline continues into 1980s Actions taken by Thatcher (1979-90) • Top income tax rate reduced >Benefits rich, not poor; widens gulf between rich & poor • Unemployment benefits for 16-18 yr olds stopped >Disaffected, unemployed youth • Level of unemployment benefits linked to prices & not wages > Low prices would mean low benefits • Privatisation of industry > Private companies – may close down/reduce workforce • Child benefit payments frozen for a no. of years > Women/families less income • National insurance payments increased > Poorest working classes most affected Changes in government policy Main aim……. POST-1945 KEEP UNEMPLOYMENT LOW (Keynesianism economics) MID-1970S ONWARDS CHANGE KEEP INFLATION LOW (Von Hayek’s free market economics) Why? Look at the statistics below: • What do these statistics reveal? 1979 1988 Percentage of total national income earned by top 20% of wage earners: 37% 44% Percentage of total national income earned by poorest 20% of wage earners: 9.5% 6.9% •During 1980s: •Poor became poorer •widening gulf between rich and poor Overall Impact Positives • Taxes reduced • Inflation reduced Negatives • Poverty & unemployment leading to • Homelessness • higher rates of divorce; suicide & mental illness • Very high crime rates • Riots • Conflict: – North vs South – Rich vs poor – Socialism vs conservatism 51 • VAT (paid on consumer goods) reduced > Easy for rich, difficult for poor • Cut in government expenditure in order to control inflation > Less money spent on welfare = detrimental to poor Sale of Council Houses The social impact of Thatcherism – Impact of privatisation and the sale of council houses Key aim: Turn Britain into a property owning democracy in order to “roll back the state” and place emphasis on self-reliance and the private sector Action: Intensive public campaigns designed to increase share ownership by ordinary people 1979-1990 – individuals owning stocks and shares rose from 3 to 9 million Impact on communities of industrial disputes Recap: Miner’s Strike 1984 LONG TERM CAUSE: • Scargill launched miner’s strike in a bid to prevent the downsizing of the coal industry (not only taking on Thatcher but the forces of history!) 1979 coal industry employed 200,000 1980’s King Coal was supplying only 20% of Britain’s energy needs (far less than oil or gas) 1990 down to 60,000 and still falling CENTRAL QUESTION: • Did British coal have a future? • Future was ‘clean’ nuclear power, not ‘dirty’ coal • Strike was highly politicised with numerous confrontations between miners and police e.g. Battle of Orgreave Outcome: POSITIVE IMPACT • Privatisation = lot of revenue for the government and popular with middle class • Housing Act (1980) giving people the right to buy was enormously successful with huge numbers opting to buy their home. Due to generous discounts (purchase price lower than on open market) • ‘Right to Buy’ considered to be key success of Thatcher – step towards social mobility and ‘property owning democracy’ • Labour forced to drop opposition due to popularity of scheme with public NEGATIVE IMPACT • Life less secure to employees – some lost jobs as the privatised industries cut back on staff whilst others could no longer rely on long term job provision and pension provision • Enterprise culture aroused hostility amongst working class in the public sector > unions become more militant as a result (COHSE and NUPE) including teachers union in 1980’s • Right to Buy – sale of council houses was in predominantly better off areas and so did not have big impact in less desirable estates • Money gained from selling council houses was used by councils to reduce debts, not build new council housing and the number and quality of homes for rent was greatly reduced. With no programme to rebuild the stock of council housing, waiting lists for rented homes got longer • Result was many had to live in emergency B&B accommodation which was expensive for councils to provide and not always suitable for families Industrial Action Pre-1975 • Ran by old traditional union bosses and moderate union leaders • Pulled rank over membership • Rights of workers first and foremost 1978 onwards • Old bosses losing their control over their membership • Local wild cat strikes becoming more and more common • Younger radical activists causing pressure • Political element • 1977 Grunwick photo lab strike over attempts to exclude union leaders SYMBOL OF CHANGE WINTER OF DISCON TENT 1978-9 LONGEST AND SYMBOLI C EPISODE MINERS STRIKE 1984-5 TRENDS INTENSIFIED AS THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF THATCHERISM WAS FELT AFTER 1979. WORKERS FOUND THEIR TRADITIONAL SKILLS WERE NOT IN DEMAND – RENDERED OUT OF DATE BY MECHANISATION OR BY FLEXIBLE WORKING PRACTICES OUTCOME • Painful adjustments in areas that only knew traditional industry life • Old certainties of working class and way of life in communities eroded • High male unemployment • Many homes saw women as breadwinner • Increased problems: ill health, depression, alcoholism, drugs • Some forced to move • Young people could no longer expect to follow their fathers into work 52 • Failure for Scargill and the miners as the strikes led to a greater number of mines closing than had been previously planned at the outbreak of the strike. Demanding social issue.... • Painful adjustments in areas that only knew coal mining as life • Old certainties of working class and way of life in communities eroded • High male unemployment • Many homes saw women as breadwinner • Increased problems: ill health, depression, alcoholism, drugs • Some forced to move • Young people could no longer expect to follow their fathers into work Urban Crisis • Industrial changes fed into social trends in the 1980’s • Urban decay of many inner city areas • Intensification of social problems e.g. Youth violence • Problems exacerbated by high unemployment • Miner’s Strike came during a period of many violent urban disturbances which had seemed to indicate social cohesion was breaking down • Crisis in relations between the police and the communities they served Society versus the police and government • 1980-1981 serious riots in Bristol, Liverpool, London • Public enquiry produced Scarman Report: criticised both police and government >highlighted the issue of race relations need for more community policing! • 1985 - Further outbreaks of violence against police (Brixton, Tottenham) including the murder of PC Blakelock • Football hooliganism (Birmingham, Brussels 1985, Hillsbrough 1989) a major national issue in the media leading to calls for police intervention THE EMERGENCE OF EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY PROTEST MOVEMENTS • CND > had been most significant protest movement since 1958. Attracted a lot of support and new lease of life during Thatcher’s backing for the policy of deterrence and stepping up the arms race against the USSR in the New Cold War. • 1980’s saw growth in Charities > (Shelter, Age Concern), Church of England ‘(interfering in politics’ and intervenes in public debate over social breakdown, Faith and the City), Catholic and Anglican Church (Worlock and Sheppard active in campaigning for more action to help the poor) Protest movements began to spring up that worked outside traditional framework of parliamentary politics and tried to involve people in direct action. Some of this reflected the polarization of attitudes in response to Thatcher; perception that the weakness of the position of political parties had left a void that needed to be filled by direct action. • Animal Liberation Front non violence switched to ‘ecoterrorism’ in 1982 (arson, letterbombs) • Environmental groups (Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth) saw increases in support The Miner’s Strike 1984-5 Long term cause Decline in marketability of British coal Central question Did British mines have a future? Responses NUM Yes: with proper government investment NCB Yes, but only in selected areas: government unwilling to subsidise unprofitable mines Demanding social issue Closure of mines would destroy whole communities Intransigent attitude of key players Decline in marketability of British coal Scargill McGregor Marxist revolutionary unflinching managerial enforcer Why strike failed •Not well led tactically by Scargill •NUM not backed by key unions •Government backed by NCB •Employment Acts weakened NUM’s legal position •Violence accompanying the strikes lost miners public support 55 FOREIGN POLICY Empire and Commonwealth Triumph 1: Rhodesia When Thatcher came to power she was lucky in her enemies – Ian Smith (had frustrated British governments for 15 years) was on the point of giving up fight in Rhodesia. • 1976- Smith had accepted the Kissinger Plan which set steps leading to majority rule in Rhodesia. • Lord Carrington (Thatcher’s foreign sec) brought about a final settlement at Lancaster House conference in London in 1980. • Smith was forced to accept defeat BUT! Settling of Rhodesia question did not remove all concerns about southern Africa. Negative - Issue of what to do with the apartheid regime in South Africa caused many rows in the Commonwealth - Thatcher frequently accused of failing to put enough pressure on South Africa. Positive - Resolving of Rhodesia represented a big step towards finally disposing of Britain’s legacy of empire Triumph 2: The Falklands War • Gamble that paid off and was seen as a vindication of Thatcher’s bold leadership and had unleashed wave of patriotism across Britain • Contrasting opinions: some disliked the vulgarity of gloating seen by Thatcher and the press some see this as her defining moment – bold and decisive leadership How and why did Britain react? Thatcher decided to immediately announce that a naval task force would be sent to remove the Argentine forces and assert the Islanders right to self determination. “Our men risked their lives for the British way of life, to defend British sovereignty” Making of Thatcher and she successfully avoided the Falklands turning into another Suez GOTCHA! • While the task force was on route to South Atlantic, there was frantic diplomatic activity – attempts to get Argentina to accept UN Resolution 502 and to pull troops back – SHOWED BRITAIN BEING REASONABLE AND DIPLOMATIC • Also need to get US support assurance – given green light which strengthened relations between US and UK, Reagan and Thatcher • 2nd May last chance of peace disappeared when a British sub sank the Argentinian ship General Belgrano – CONTROVERSIAL!! • Victory was quick but close run - Argentina was only 400 miles from battle zone, not 8000 - Exocet missile destroyed British warship HMS Sheffield –had Argentina owned a few more Exocets the rest of the task force could have gone the same way - American diplomatic intervention was crucial in preventing them from obtaining more missiles • British troops hit shore and the Argentine forces surrendered 14th June Summary diagram REASONS FOR WAR •Disputed sovereignty over the islands •Failure of leaseback proposal •Argentinian invasion August 1982 MRS THATCHER’S RESPONSE •Sovereignty no longer negotiable •A matter for the UK not UN to decide •Democratic right of islanders to be protected •Task force dispatched •Exclusion zone imposed •Ordered sinking of Belgrano OUTCOME OF MILITARY STRUGGLE •Naval supremacy gained •Islands retaken by task force •Islands permanently garrisoned POLITICAL OUTCOME •Upsurge in Thatcher’s popularity in country at large •Wrongfooted the opposition •Prepared the way for 1983 election success WIDER OUTCOME – ‘blip in foreign affairs’ •FW made it less likely that Britain would force the people of Gibraltar to accept being handed over to Spain •Did not stop the continued tidying of up of Britain’s imperial legacy e.g. Planning for hand over of Hong Kong in 1997 56 What was the impact? EUROPE 1975-1990 Overview: An awkward partner? • Confirmation of accession came as part of 1975 referendum on Europe. • Referendum designed to resolve issues over Europe. It had really been arranged in order to resolve Labour’s internal divisions over the European question rather than Britain’s relations with Europe. • Poor economic performance of 1970’s had been caused in part by adjustments that had to be made on entering the EEC Thatcher: • 1979 – Thatcher’s personality and political style began to ruffle the feathers of consensual politics favoured by European leaders. Her concerns included: 1. Protectionism – principle on which Europe operated, was outmoded in an age of economic globalisation 2. Europe was obsessed with a dated concept of centralisation when this policy was clearly collapsing elsewhere (e.g. USSR). This idea ran counter to her attempted revolution in Britain 3. Disparity between the budget payments made by the separate member states rewarded the inefficient nations and penalised the efficient and productive ones - late 1980’s (esp. speech in Bruges in 1988) Thatcher was increasingly reluctant to see further moves towards political integration - fears of federal Europe and pooling British sovereignty. She also disliked the inefficiency of Brussels bureaucracy • 1990 – circumstances of Thatcher’s fall and state of relations with EEC meant that relationship with Europe was unsettled A positive start? Thatcher’s priority: Secure a better deal for Britain over financial contributions to the EEC. Britain was paying in much more to the EEC than was being returned in benefits e.g. Common Agricultural Policy (subsidies for farmers, whilst Britain was an economy less dependent on agriculture)  Campaign for rebate was successful by 1984 Outcome: • Played well with supporters at home • Irritated European partners • European relations generally remained good with Thatcher enthusiastic about the Single European Market when it was negotiated 1985-86 POSITIVE 1. In domestic politics, Thatcher’s previously unpopular government soared in the opinion polls – it was the springboard to her 1983 election victory 2. Grass root Conservative activists were galvanised 3. Thatcher gained self confidence and began to dominate the party in a way she had never done before 4. Rolling television coverage showed huge and enthusiastic crowds giving the fleets emotional send offs 5. Patriotic national mood took must people, including the press, completely by surprise – ‘The Empire strikes back’. This was in contrast to feelings in the 1970’s that Britain international position was in miserable decline. 6. The Special Relationship was strengthened – Britain could not fight a war 8000 miles away without the use of US bases. The Americans gave the green light and the personal ties between Thatcher and Reagan became even stronger. NEGATIVE • Suggested the Falklands diminished relationships with Europe • Thatcher attracted criticism for trying to make out that the Falklands was a WW2 style victory • Critics argued that Britain would have to sign a deal with Argentina sooner or later so why fight a war now? • Objection to the gloating in the tabloids 57 • Established a good working relationship with the French president – Francois Mitterand. • Cooperated with France over complexities of the Channel Tunnel project (agreed 1986, opened 1994). Sharing in the creation of a symbolic link between France and Britain is evidence that Thatcher was not all out anti-European • Most of her cabinet were strongly pro-Europe • Thatcher enthusiastically in favour of expanding the EEC to include the new states in Eastern Europe (though her main motive here was the idea that this would weaken the power of the European Commission in Brussels) Thatcher: Anti-Europe? Problem 1: Anti-Federalism • Last years of power, Thatcher did seem to associate herself with negative perceptions of Europe and attacked the notions of Jacques Delors • Was is Thatcher or Europe that changed? TURNING POINT: Bruges speech 1988 ‘ erosion of democracy by centralisation and bureaucracy’ • Speech was intended to be positive and set out her vision for Europe • However it contained a number of provocative statements that infuriated many European leaders and raised doubts about Britain’s commitment to further European integration > Speech emphasised that the EEC was a trade association with sovereign states - Resolutely opposed to FEDERALISM and the idea of ‘ever closer political union’ (especially with young European institutions not pre-dating 1945) > Opposed to pooling sovereignty and creating a federal super-state - Each country must retain its own customs, traditions and identity and not try to fit them into an identikit European personality. There must not be a Europe with a central power overseeing other countries, USSR collapse had shown the problems of centralised power so why try to introduce it into Europe? - Attempt at populism – rally cry to ordinary Brits, Germans and French people = Jacques Delores (European Commission president) thought the EEC should adopt federalism, leading to clashes with Thatcher This was egged on by British tabloids – “UP YOURS DELORS!” (1990) Problem 2: The German Issue • Fractious relationship with German chancellor Kohl. • In theory they should have got on well as they agreed on many policy areas. However, personality matters more than policy:  Difference in style  Thatcher’s anti-German view of European history and her tendency to point out the past (‘What is wrong with the Germans’) • German reunification was coming close from 1988 and Thatcher feared a united Germany dominating Europe. She wanted Gorbachev’s vision of a neutral federal Germany to succeed compared to the idea of the old German Democratic Republic (East Germany) being swallowed by up West Germany • The latter idea occurred, and Thatcher was denied an invite to the 10th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1999 PARADOX Despite all this, it was Thatcher who presided over the process by which Britain was drawn even closer to Europe Single European Act (accepted 1986) (biggest step towards a centralised Europe that had yet been taken). This included: • Signatory countries committed themselves to closer monetary and political union • The principle of supra-nationality (subordination of individual member states to the EU) was established • The right of individual member states to veto majority decisions was abolished Exchange Rate Mechanism (1990) • Precursor to monetary union with the EU • Thought it would be a means by which to fight inflation (in the event it did the opposite by 1992) • Did not want a single European currency however, “No, no, no!” (Oct, 1990) Importance of Europe to Thatcher • Thatcher claimed she was mislead into the ERM by former Chancellor Lawson and Foreign Secretary Howe. 60 she had a polarising effect on politics, rather than her policies. • Memory of Thatcher haunted the party for another 15 years after her fall – she did not disappear quietly and there were plenty of times when she would tell Major how to steer the government • Remember! Thatcher never got more than 44% of the popular vote (1979); she did not notably increase the Conservative vote; and in fact only gained 42% in 1983 and 1987 despite a very weak opposition There are 3 opinions regarding the legacy of Thatcher: 1. A period of ‘revolution’ – beneficial and basically needed to bring Britain out of an economic ‘malaise’ 2. Time of social and political upheaval which damaged British manufacturing and gave rise to Delboy/Loadsofmoney deregulatory culture which is impacting so badly on 2009/2010 Britain? 3. No ‘revolution’ at all – just a period of failure to transform Britain Conclusions and paradoxes…… • On entering power, Thatcher intended to bring harmony. There was plenty of change but it involved confrontation not harmony – there were riots at the start, middle and end. • A survey by the LSE showed that expenditure on the Welfare State was 1/3 higher in real terms 1987-8 than it had been in 1973-4 – ironic for someone who wanted to cut back government expenditure • She left Britain more of a welfare state than an enterprise culture • Even though she was a Conservative she attacked most of the traditional values and institutions • She was destroyed partly by her own party – an ironic “enemy within” • Her Bruges speech could not hide the fact that Britain had become more attached to Europe than at any other time • Her unyielding style was to keep the Conservatives out of power for another 12 (13?) years • Instead of a slimmer state she interfered and local government finances were virtually centralised • There was little or no industrial recovery, north-south divide remained • Instead of proper investment for economic modernisation, much of the profits from the North Sea Oil went on fuelling the consumer boom • Despite years of a radical doctrine, the result was John Major – a centrist and conciliator – and the arrival of New Labour ASSESSING THE LEGACY Was Thatcher a great PM? Yes: transformational leader who ‘changed everything, a great PM who saved the nation from disaster at home and restored Britain’s pride abroad POLITICAL  Never more than 44% popular vote, did not notably increase total Tory vote, 42% 1983&1987 despite weak opposition  Minimised the political threat of trade unions during the Miner’s Strike which had been holding governments to ransom since Wilson. Ability for TU’s to intimidate government had gone forever  Opened the door for females in politics  End consensus which had allowed Britain to slip into harmful social and economic habits. It was false economic and bad social practice Thatcher arrived and outwardly rejected this, including criticising Heath. This heralded a change that the electorate needed.  Clipped the wings of leftist local councils – 1986 Local Government Act abolished big metropolitan local authorities increasing central power  Conservatives enjoyed power for 18 years  Successive governments continued her policies - Major and Blair  Centralisation: talked about too much government at 1986 conference but Thatcher could not resist interefering in all aspects of government HISTORICAL OPINION TO SUPPORT THIS VIEW  Sergeant: Lady Thatcher had a strong power of veto over whether any Conservative party policy fitted in with the most powerful myth in British politics. She had become a personality cult.  Blair: Thatcher had a very defined political philosophy – rolling back the state, curbing TU power and putting the emphasis on the individual. It was an inevitable reaction against the welfare state and a public sector which had become very large – a vested interest that was out of touch  Denis Thatcher: The whole situation in the Conservative Party today springs from that night when they dismissed the best PM Britain had had since Churchill  Howe: Thatcher was beyond argument a great PM  Thatcher: Well, there’s not much point being a weak and floppy thing in the chair is there?’  Thatcher: As PM I could not waste time having any internal arguments  Waldegrave: That it was not clear in 1979 manifesto how radical she intended to be simply reflects the fact that it took her time to establish complete dominance. That only came after the Falklands, after the 1983 election victory, and finally after the defeat of the miners  Clarke: her real contempt was for those Conservatives whom she called ‘wet’ 61 ECONOMICS  3 policies: reverse economic decline, cost all policies and if they could not be accommodated within public expenditure plans they would not be approved, and to introduce a new change in direction no matter the costs along the way – offered a new approach: stimulation of free enterprise through tax cuts and regulation  Restoration of free market principles to replace Keynesianism – deregulation of financial markets  Tackle inflation through monetarism leading to government spending cuts. Unpopular and led to unemployment of nearly 3 million, but successful in it’s primary objective to cut inflation: 19% in 1979 to 5% in 1983. Abandoned monetary targets after 1985  Unemployment rose from 1.09 million 1979 >3.13 million 1986, sank to 1.66million 1990 but new recession led to 2.9million by 1993  Tax cuts central >income tax cut, Thatcher boom with freer banking = personal debt doubled 1980-88, VAT doubled 1979 from 8%>15% and 17.5% post poll tax fiasco. Earners above £30,000 benefitted.  Trade union reform – Miner’s strikes saw her smash unions and Scargill  Local government reform and ‘taking on’ of left wing local councils – Local Government Act 1986  Privatisation of industry – “rolling back the frontiers of the state’ BP 1979, British Telecom 1984, brought in huge amounts of money for the government  Sale of council houses – Housing Act 1980 ‘right to buy’ – property owning democracy  Deregulation of financial markets and modernisation of City of London (Big Bang 1986) which internationalised the stock market  Income tax cut e.g. 1987 budget 29%-->27%  1988 Lawson Boom – rapid expansion of economy HISTORICAL OPINION TO SUPPORT THIS VIEW  Hennessey: No other PM would have pushed these policies so far, so firmly or swiftly. Here was the undoing of substantial slices of the Attlee nationalisations FOREIGN POLICY  Falklands – united country, galvanised Tory Party, brought relations closer with US, helped to boost British confidence in the face of decline from Empire, optimism amongst country and restoration of national pride  Continued to dismantle Britain’s empire  Achieved CAP rebate & Channel Tunnel project with Mitterand  Resolution of Ian Smith Rhodesian problem – elections held 1980  Ireland and Brooke 1990 – government must act imaginavitely if the IRA offered a ceasefire. Paved the wat for the later ‘peace process’ of the 1990’s  Played key role in the ending of the Cold War SOCIAL POLICY  Cut taxation with income and housing  Right to Buy – property owning democracy, stake holder mentality, 1000’s took advantage of the scheme to buy their Thatcher had a very defined political philosophy – rolling back the state, curbing TU power and putting the emphasis on the individual. It homes  Launch of personal pensions  Tried to roll back the frontiers of the state to prevent a welfare dependency culture, “toughen” Britain up  Britain turned into even more middle class society HISTORICAL OPINION TO SUPPORT THIS VIEW  Blair: Thatcher had a very defined political philosophy – rolling back the state, curbing TU power and putting the emphasis on the individual. It was an inevitable reaction against the welfare state and a public sector which had become very large – a vested interest that was out of touch  Portillo: Because she liked to create enemies, a lot of people made her the source of ills in their lives. So they think she destroyed manufacturing industry; she was cruel to the miners’ families; she belived in no social benefits and destroyed the health service. It’s all nonsense but that’s the myth that has been built up around her. The rhetoric and the reality were so different. Welfare spending and health spending went up; spending on the armed forces and the police went down. ASSESSING THE LEGACY Was Thatcher a great PM? NO: worst PM of our time, responsible for intensifying social divisions, and responsible for her own downfall. FOREIGN POLICY  Alienated Britain’s partners in Europe with her ‘handbagging’ and Bruges Speech 1988 whcih warned against federalism  Poor relations with Kohl  Meant to resist European Federalism but actually led us further into it  Not invited to the 10th anniversary of fall of Berlin Wall. Gorbachev the reason for end of Cold War rather than Thatcher?  Rhodesian solution saw the rise of Mugabe to power  Did not put enough pressure on South Africa and the apartheid issue HISTORICAL OPINIONS ON THIS VIEW  She succumbed, in her dealing with her colleagues, on European questions especially, to the language of the battlefield rather than the language of partnership  Hennessey: Had she fallen with the Falkland Islands, her brief 3 year premiership would have featured in a book as ‘a study in failure’ 62 POTENTIAL ESSAY QUESTION: ‘Margaret Thatcher did not ‘turn Britain around’ despite her claims to have done so’ How convincing is this view of the record of the Conservative governments 1979-1990 • Political changes ECONOMICS  Monetarism initial impact – by 1981 there was steeply rising unemployment, social upheaval and massive unpopularity for Thatcher. Forced to slacken onetarist policies by 1982-3.  1982 – unemployment 3 million  Taxation cuts income tax or property saw tax raised on services and goods (VAT) – led to increases in unemployment and a contraction of industrial production  1980 serious recession and stagflation made worse by deflationary policies  ‘unemployment a price worth paying’ in order to curb inflation and to force British industry to become more competitive – steel production cut by 30%, plants closed permanently. Unnecessary damage to industrial base?  Deregulation and freeing up of City of London led to higher risks – coe home to roost in 2009-2010? Led to stock market crash in 1987 leading to balance eof payments problem post ‘Lawson Boom’. 1990 saw inflation at 10.9%, higher than it had been in 1980  Poll tax – failed!  Private greed at the expense of the public good! POLITICAL  1980’s unrest saw party divisions between wets and day open – Thatcher seen as ‘steering the ship of state straight onto the rocks’  27% approval in 1981  Centralisation of power away from local councils meant that central government was now in the firing line dealing with issues it had not needed to previously worry about, Jenkins ‘nationalisation of blame’  Polarising effect of Thatcher – policies actually seemed more divisive than they were due to her influence  Contined to impact on Major’s government despite promising to be a ‘good back street driver’  Alienated female voters “a woman but not a sister” – Tories no longer gained the majority of the female vote  Enabled the Labour Party to have 13 years in power from 1997  Meant to reduce bureaucracy but actually increased it HISTORICAL OPINIONS ON THIS VIEW  Watkins: large claims were made of Thatcher as a great PM, they ar letting before our eyes. My prediction is that history will judge her as just above average  Hurd: The main reason for Thatcher’s loss of leadership wsas her failure over the years to make the best of the cabinet system which depends on mutual tolerance and utual respect  Gilmour: her belief was that dialogue was a waste of time  Lawson: she treated Geoffrey Howe as a cross between a doormat and a punchbag  Ridley: she was PM, she knew what she wanted to do, and she didn’t believe her policies should be subject to being voted down by a group she had selected to advice and assist her  Critchley: she cannot see an institution without hitting it with her handbag  Wyatt: She is not a Conservative...she is a radical making a revolution which horrifies many Conservatives  Patten: The price she paid for her style of government was to wreck the Conservative party for ten years, fifteen, or whatever. She encouraged the suicidal tendencies in the party and in the media. The curiosity about Thatcher is that she became more radical and fundamentalist out of office than she ever had been in SOCIAL POLICY  Taxation cuts benefitted the rich exacerbating the rich poor divide – cuts on income tax or property saw tax raised on services and goods (VAT) – led to increases in unemployment and a contraction of industrial production  Cuts in grants to local councils as part of 1981 budget  Contraction of traditional industries led to unemployment most noticeable in Midlands, North, central Scotland and South Wales. Led to social unrest especially in city centres e.g. Bristol 1980  Fear of breakdown of social cohesion.  Politicisation of police – Miner’s Strike, Anti-poll tax riots  Right to Buy – houses and privatised industries mainly bought up by big commercial concerns rather than the ‘little people’, emergency B&B, lack of homes to rent  Rioting (anti-poll tax), rise in hooliganism (Hillsbrough)  Polarised society and decay of inner cities  Growth of juvenile crime and despairing underclass  Private greed at the expense of public good  Individualistic and selfish society – “no such thing as society” – attack on welfare state system and civic responsibility  Emergence of radical extra-parliamentary groups  Sharpening of north-south divide  Enterprise culture aroused hostility in society and amongst TU’s  Miner’s strike impact  Industrial areas saw unemployment – communities broke down, increase in mental health, alcoholism, drug taking, depression, radicalism, women as bread winners HISTORICAL OPINIONS ON THIS VIEW  Clarke: There is more than one paradox in the fact that the first woman P did so little for other women 65 • Longer than usual electoral campaign saw the polls swing back towards the Conservatives (due in part to role of The Sun according to Lynch) • Eve of election predictions: Cons: 303 Labour: 298 • Actual outcome: Cons: 336 Labour: 271 51.6% 41.6% ‘Elections are always lost as well as won’ (Rowe) - Tory strength or Labour weakness? Labour Weakness • Labour expectations set high e.g. American style rally in Sheffield – over confidence! Set themselves up as the caring party and assumed from the opinion polls they would win • Smith made commitments on taxation via a shadow budget that allowed the Conservatives to scare off middle class voters • Labour loyalists claim the right wing press wrecked their chances – headlines such as “It was The Sun what won it!” Main leaders and shapers of popular opinion was now against Labour. • Many did not feel Labour had reformed enough, memories of the 1980’s were still too strong Conservative Strength • Ran a good campaign - Patten was an effective party chairman - Major won a lot of respect for his old fashioned ‘soapbox’ politics, making impromptu speeches on the street e.g. Luton • Although people blamed the Conservatives for the economic recession, they were seen as the party best able to get the country out of the mess THE BRITISH ECONOMY 1992-1997 Rowe argues there were two factors which took the glow off Major’s election victory in 1992. • Black Wednesday • Europe The mixture of a financial crisis and internal divisions meant that Major never really recovered. 1. Black Wednesday 1992 The build-up…. • ERM – Joined 1990 with Thatcher. Devised as a system for reducing inflation. Britain’s inflation at 10.9% 1990 when it joined, higher than in 1980 > ERM required Britain to be at a fixed rate of exchange by pegging them to the value of the Deutschmark, with a narrow band allowed for fluctuations. • September 1992 British currency (along with other ERM currencies) coming under pressure from foreign exchange speculators: - £ was trading at a low level (close to minimum of 2.77 marks) - The exchange value of the £ was unrealistically high and caused British exports to become overpriced - international bankers sensed overvaluation >began speculating against it on money markets – £ BEGAN TO FALL ALARMINGLY! = Crisis of 16th September 1992 The events.... Wave of speculative selling of £ on financial markets. Major forced to undertake panic measures taken to avoid devaluing £ and to remain with ERM. 1. Chancellor Lamont announced an increase in interest rates (already high at 10%) to 12%, sold off £30 billion worth of foreign reserves 2. Dealers continued to sell pounds = Lamont pushed interest rates to 15% 3. Bank of England spent high amounts from its reserves in buying up the pounds = all these desperate measures failed........ Major and Lamont summoned key members of the cabinet > emergency meeting Admiralty House. - accepted decision to give up the struggle and withdraw from ERM 66 - interest rates fixed at 12%, down from the 15% earlier in the day Impact of Black Wednesday • Humiliating defeat > withdrawal from ERM • Effects of BW proved to be less catastrophic than feared – within a short amount of time economy stabilised and it could be seen that coming out of the ERM had as many positive as negative points – ‘White Wednesday’ • Major’s popularity took a hammering from right wing press who had done so much to get him re-elected during the election. He was also hammered by opposition leaders, Brown (Labour), Ashdown (Liberals). Authority as PM being undermined. • Conservatives reputation for economic competence and expertise destroyed • Steep drop in opinion polls > Labour gained 15 point lead • Divisions within party about personalities and Europe widened. Cabinet split between Eurosceptics (Lilley, Portillo, Howard) and pro-Europeans (Clarke, Heseltine, Hurd) began a spate of infighting • The Eurosceptic wing of the Tories was strengthened, happy to see moves towards European integration suffer such a setback. • Public opinion turned against Conservatives just as the Labour Party was reinventing itself as party of moderation and economic competence. • Lamont’s position as chancellor was badly weakened (did not lose post until 7 months later) ECONOMY 1992-1997  Leaving ERM – Positives > Prevented Britain from having to keep high interest rates to protect stability of sterling, allowed exchange rates to float downwards, which helped British exporters  General economic conditions improving – unemployment slowed down, housing market began to pick up = 1993-1997 economic recovery accelerated and government borrowing reduced as inflation came under control  Why recovery?: 1. Clarke as Chancellor 1994 – good communicator, air of confidence, lucky. Took over when US economy coming out of recession 2. American economy coming out of recession > world trade expanding 3. British practices – Britain doing better than foreign competitors due in part to benefits from financial deregulation and flexible working practices (compared to German economy > sluggish growth rates, huge costs of reunification) 4. Privatization – coal industry privatized 1994, railways 1996, tried to privatise Post Office (abandoned) > many people acquired shares in the new privatized industries and the stock market was buoyed up = 1997 > economic indicators positive > unemployment was down, productivity up (though not by much), consumer spending up, car ownership increased, house prices rose sharply and negative equity thing of past, business was supportive of government policies BUT! Despite promising situation of 1997 people were surprisingly reluctant to give Major’s government credit for this > ‘Feel good factor’ missing Rowe argues there were two factors which took the glow off Major’s election victory in 1992. • Black Wednesday • Europe The mixture of a financial crisis and internal divisions meant that Major never really recovered. The Maastricht Treaty (joined 1992 to show that he was a good European and unlike his predecessor) Declared aim of the Treaty was ‘to create an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ Main terms included:  Full European integration  A European Central Bank  A single European currency, the euro, to be adopted by 1999: Britain obtained an opt-out clause, which it exercised in 1999  The Treaty to come into effect in November 1993 For Treaty to become binding on Britain it had to be ratified by Parliament – the ERM fiasco made this problematical. - Many in Major’s own party, and a significant number of Labour MP’s, were so concerned over the loss of sovereignty entailed by the treaty that they voted against ratifying bills when they were introduced. • Climax 1993 when organised resistance by Eurorebels defeated key Bill necessary for the Treaty to come into effect in 1993 67 • Having committed his government to Maastricht, Major was not prepared to accept the verdict of the Commons....... Major Moves • Major reintroduced proposal to accept Maastricht Treaty > made it part of a formal vote of confidence in the government > proposal forced through = desperate means Major had used gave strength to the growing number of Eurosceptics within and outside Parliament who claimed that Britain was being RAILROADED INTO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. • Calls for referendum rejected on the grounds of being “unconstitutional” – really it was because they knew they would lose • Opposition from within own party caused Major to be so offended he was accidentally recorded as describing his critics within the party as ‘bastards’ = PM who does not have full support of his Cabinet and party is in a very difficult position and this was the case for Major throughout the period of his office Growing internal divisions in the Conservative Party after 1992 Major – an ‘unlucky PM’? Exhausting battles began to drown out the positive achievements in a sea of party infighting and political setbacks. Achievements of his premiership include: • Substantial economic recovery • Shared in a freeing of Kuwait • Signing of Maastricht Treaty • Winning of 1992 election • Substantial progress on Northern Ireland However, Major did not win popularity or political support > Blair that claimed credit for what Major had begun. Between Black Wednesday and the 1997 election, Major suffered a slow political death. Major’s tribulations can be summed up as: 1. Satire - Easy target for satirists and cartoonists: Private Eye, Rory Bremner, Spitting Image’s grey man. None of this Satire vicious and Major remained personally more popular than his party, but the image of Major as a well-meaning but bumbling and inadequate leader stuck to him 2. Sabotage - Blatant actions by anti-Europe elements in own party > 1993 Maastricht Treaty was initially blocked by rebel MP’s. Major won the vote in the end but authority was damaged. “Do we want 3 more of the bastards” accidentally recorded = press, e.g. Daily Mail, speculating as to whom Major was referring to > speculation as to whether a leadership challenge would occur. It did not but the threat was damaging enough. Major tried to reshuffle his cabinet in 1994 with little impact Eurosceptics Cash and Duncan-Smith felt free to express active opposition, rebel backbenchers e.g. Gorman continued to make provocative statements, Press speculation continued about possible challengers for leadership from disaffected cabinet members = 1995 Major called for leadership election so that he could be re-elected to do his own job (Back me or sack me) From what we have studied so far, what divisions and problems existed within the Tory party by 1992? Many right wingers pushed for more radical social policies Politicians with leadership ambitions saw an opportunity to advance their claims Eurosceptics saw an opening to push the government to the edges of Europe, if not out of the EU altogether Exhausting battles were continuing to dominate everything about Major’s policies Cabinet splits between pro- Europeans and Eurosceptics Beginning to fall behind Labour in the opinion polls Successes of 1995 Party leader election • Heseltine – loyal and effective ally, good at defending the government in media interviews • Had won in spite of national press, Daily Telgraph ‘inflicted a spell of humility on the scribblers’ Failures of 1995 Party leader election • 89 had voted against him (time when his government only had a small majority) • Press as hostile as ever e.g. The Times ‘Yesterday, Conservative MPs threw away their last best opportunity to win the next election’ • Opposition to Major within the party continued almost as intensively as before his re-election • Did not have support of Thatcher. Back seat driving of Thatcher who encouraged Maastricht rebels to call for a referendum, gave support to Redwood in 1995, and continued to draw parallels between her dynamic 70 REVIVAL OF LABOUR Labour danger of being marginalised by Thatcherism and rise of the SDP, Foot played key role as leader in taking Labour to left of political spectrum = lack of credibility, ‘longest suicide note in history’ THEN! Needed change occurred.... Loss of the election = Kinnock replacing Foot as party leader. must be credited for leaving behind a party infinitely stronger than it had been in 1983 John Smith helped to further reinvigorate the Labour party before his death too cautious to have achieved what Blair did? Tony Blair Revival of the party in 1990’s seemed to be dominated by ideas and personality of Blair Objectives: • Use great skill to remodel the Labour ‘brand’ • The promotion of ‘New Labour’ to live down his party’s extremism in the 1980’s when seemed unelectable • Convince Middle England that Labour had fundamentally changed, ideologically and in party unity. Intended to appeal to middle class Britain (bulk of vote) • Capture uncertain Conservative voters and floating voters • Get elected (!) sometime in the next 3 years How did Blair turn the Labour party around? Avoid extremes and adopt progressive ideas.... 1. Curbing trade union influence on party – One Member One Vote 1993, break from past, avoid Winter of Discontent SUCCESS THREE: 1992 Election/7 years in power POINT: Major led party to victory achieving more electoral % (51.6%) than Blair achieved in 1997 election (42%) despite internal divisions, the ghost of Thatcher, and the revival of Labour EVIDENCE: Major resorted to high public spending due in part to unemployment. Huge government borrowing spent on transport /NHS, party unity through carefully selected cabinet (Heseltine, Lamont), riding off wave 1991 Gulf War victory, Patten ran a good campaign, ‘soapbox’ tactics by Major in Luton EXPLANATION: despite many inherited problems, Major able to successful side step memories of Thatcher to achieve conclusive victory 1992. Through careful electioneering tactics, as employed during the 1955/1959 pre-election tax cuts, Major able to effectively woe electorate and overcome many crises’ in Britain and own party to lead the party through 7 years of power. BUT!!! Would it have been better to have lost 1992 so that it could have concentrated on reinventing itself earlier? (Lynch) HISTORICAL OPINION: won despite ‘these are the least favourable circumstances for re-electing a sitting government since 1964’ (The Guardian) SUCCESS FOUR: Economics POINT: Major inherited disturbing economic circumstances (recession, high inflation, unemployment 2.6million)) and despite events of 1990-1992 managed to ensure by 1997 Britain experienced a pleasing level of economic recovery. EVIDENCE: abandonment poll tax>council tax, left ERM prevented Britain from having to keep high interest rates, unemployment slowed, housing market picked up = 1993-1997 economic recovery accelerated, government borrowing reduced as inflation came under control. Clarke as Chancellor 1994. By 1997 economic indicators positive > unemployment down, productivity&consumer spending up, car ownership increased, house prices rose sharply, negative equity thing of past, business supportive of government policies EXPLANATION: able to blame poll tax on Maggie, seen as turning party around, ensuring still seen as party best able to get Britain out of the mess. Leaving ERM stabilised sterling, allowing exchange rates to float downwards > helped British exporters, by 1997 economic indicators positive due to Major and Clarke’s careful management of the economy HISTORICAL OPINION: ‘Britains growth rate out performed that of its European partners and Major’s record of poor economic management was not entirely justified’ Objectives: • Drag Labour back into the political mainstream • Marginalize leftist elements in the party and ensure party discipline by centralisation of power around leadership– ‘iron grip’ • Move the party back to the centre ground Actions • Took on the extreme left (Militant Tendency and the ‘Bennites’) • After 1987 election defeat, reorganisation of the party • Consideration of the party’s ideology and more centrist policy proposals 71 2. Abolition of Clause IV – wiped out socialism from party constitution, embrace modern capitalist economy, woo city and businesses as well as middle class, stop talking socialism to avoid scaring electorate! 3. Party unity and discipline – Blair-Brown deal and partnership, role of Gould and Mandelson to coordinate party  ‘on message’ 4. ‘Spin’ – schmoozing of the press – Campbell’s relations with press, New Labour slogan, buzz words (third way, ‘cool Britannia’ (fashionable and in touch, ‘inclusiveness’ – society where nobody was left out (no ‘social exclusion’), ‘stakeholder society’ – ordinary persons having state protected investments and pensions (feel they belong collectively to a society), Welfare to work, Joined up government, Economic prudence Key ideology: Communitarism Individualistic philosophies had influenced Britain too much and led to the breakdown of family and traditional morales. Need to reassert the notion of communities and responsibility Stakeholding (Hutton) Thatcherism had led to decline in industrial base so stakeholder society was needed. Strengthening of welfare state and people having a stake in societies future. Socially excluded need to be reincorporated into one unit (respect between top and bottom) Third Way Defining concept (Giddens) End of tradition is good! > Changing status of women, people being more reflexive. = Left/centre must respond by restructuring public institutions, rejuvenation of civil society (pressure groups), infrastructural investment, and restructuring of welfare state to meet demands of modern society. REASONS FOR THE OUTCOME OF THE 1997 ELECTION Conservative failings or Labour skill?  Labour : 419 seats (63.6% of total seats); 43.2% of popular vote. Gained 146 seats from 1992; lost no seats from 1992 results • Tories : 165 seats (25.1% of total seats); 30.7% of popular vote. Gained 0 seats from 1992; lost 178 seats from 1992 results. • Liberal Democrats : 46 seats (7% of total seats); 16.8% of popular vote. Gained 28 seats from 1992; lost 2 seats from 1992 results. DOWNFALL OF CONSERVATISM SINCE 1979 (GRAY) • Erosion of institutions and cultural traditions that had always underpinned Conservatism • Time for a change - widely held public sentiment • Thatcherism had moved away from old Tory party values and from traditional supporters in rural and suburban areas TRANSFORMATION OF LABOUR • Abandonment traditional socialist/social democratic principles, acceptance of market economics, low inflation and interest rates, cuts in taxation, spending and welfare. Pre-election commitment to maintain existing tax levels for a five-year term and present spending levels for two years, ‘welfare to work’, tough law and order especially for juvenile offenders. Difficult for the Conservatives to criticise what were, largely, their own policies • Desire for power, combined with growing party discipline, largely silenced left-wing Labour dissidents. Campaign hit by no major blows from extreme left which could have de-stabilised the election effort. Europe was not an obviously contentious issue as it was for the Tories. • Labour Party no longer an easy target to attack but was a formidable fighting force. The usual Tory tactics of frightening voters away from Labour’s ‘socialist extremism’ simply didn’t work anymore • Labour was longer the party of ‘tax and spend’ economic policies. Brown done lot to convince people that Labour was the party of prudence and economic competence • Internal reforms of Labour > some reduction in TU power; One Member One Vote • Smith’s death 1994 allowed creation of New Labour by more modernising Blair - notably, abandonment of Clause IV in 1995 DAMAGE TO CONSERVATIVE PARTY DURING MAJOR ERA • Accusations of ‘Tory sleaze’ damaging. Bell’s campaign against Hamilton dominated news > adverse effects on wider Conservative campaign. Refusal of MP’s to take responsibility and resign • Traditional Conservative image of party unity shattered by Eurosceptic rebellions. (had survived before e.g. Accession of Macmillan). ‘Wait and see’ approach of single currency caused discontent, not helped by defections by pro-Europeans Howarth and Nicolson • Economic situation had improved by 1997, but was no ‘feel good factor’ or approval for Conservative economic policies. Blame for Black Wednesday and forced withdrawal from ERM still loomed over Major’s government • Lamont: ‘Party in office but not in power’. Minority government by end of 1996. Government dependent in Commons on Unionists; abandonment of IRA ceasefire early in 1996. CAMPAIGNING AND ELECTIONEERING OF LABOUR • Rapid centralisation of Labour party and presentation around leader, spin-doctors and highly polished campaign including Wilson-esque celebrity endorsement • Newspapers that had always strongly supported the Conservatives (e.g. The Sun) were now lukewarm or had even gone over to support for Labour • Blair skilful communicator, particularly effective in presenting an air of moderation and winning over ‘Middle England’. Blair did especially well with women and young voters • The Labour campaign was run by disciplined ‘spin machine’ . Effective in dealing with the media and press, both in refuting Conservative attacks and in selling Labour policies. Labour spokesmen were always ‘on message’ with access to up-to-date information. Long election campaign backfired on Tory’s (further sleaze) as well as their use of poster (Blair, a stated Christian, shown with demonic eyes) 72 What is Blairism? – goal had not changed but the means of achieving the goal did! 1. Renewed type of social democracy, or a ‘third way’ (Giddens, 1998) Labour needed coherent message to take on Thatcherism. Blair and his ‘big tent’ government dominated to 1997. Wanted to incorporate talents from other parties and offer Britain a consensus he called.....THE THIRD WAY: New Labour term promising to get away from the divisive and out-of-date ideas of the old Labour left, dominated by trade unions and Marxism, and from the old right, dominated by selfish capitalism. Idea of communal endeavour (combine individualism and collectivism). Economic efficiency AND social justice 2. Continuation of Thatcherism/neo-liberalism (Hay, 1999) accepted new economic settlement that Thatcher had established, but believed it could be made more sustainable if it was tempered with a concern for social justice (variation on One Nation Toryism?) Significant constitutional reforms in first term, but privatization and the injection of market mechanisms into hitherto autonomous institutions has remained the central thrust of policy. Blair committed to modernizing Britain, but his conception of modernization was a variation on Thatcher's. More Thatcherite than Thatcher e.g. privatisation of post-office 3. Continuation of ‘Old Labour’ style politics (Allender, 2001) British social democracy realised it needed to change with the modern time. Labour reflects these changes but the core values still exist. New Labour is the continuation of old traditional Labour. New Labour is different from the post-1945 Labour of Wilson Arrival into office: POSITIVE • Blair could rely on huge majority in parliament • Labour appeared most united since 1945 • Led a group of talented politicians • Spent 3 years preparing for power • ‘Blair project’ -clear idea of direction • Conservative opposition demoralised • Economic situation favourable • Basked in glow of goodwill from public and press TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE? • Extent of Labour support was deceptive – massive parliamentary majority did not reflect a massive surge in the Labour vote • 43% of vote but still low turn out – fewer voted for Labour in 1997 than in any 1945-1966 and less than Major’s victory in 1992 • Landslide based on Tory voters staying at home, tactical voting for Liberals, and FPTP system? Labour’s Expectations – 1997 Manifesto ECONOMICS PLEDGE IN THE MANIFESTO PURPOSE? MET? PARTIALLY MET? OR NOT MET? Third way? Thatcherism? Or Old Labour? ROLE OF THIRD PARTIES • Referendum Party, lavishly funded by Goldsmith, won no seats but attracted enough voters to cause Conservative defeats in some marginal seats e.g. Mellor in Putney. Compounded by Sked’s Independence Party. • Lack of ‘clear blue water’ between two main parties threatened to squeeze the Liberal Democrats but - despite lower vote than 1992 - they won over twice as many seats due to careful targeting of their limited resources and there was widespread tactical voting, with Labour supporters voting Liberal (and vice versa) according to how the anti-Conservative vote could be maximized = election of new Liberal MP’s. It also secured the defeat of many Conservative candidates by their Labour opponents National distribution of MPs after 1997 election Labour Conservative Liberal Democrat Nationalists Other 328 56 10 6 34 2 4 16534 2 75 CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM Conservatives side stepped constitutional reform 1992-1997 1997 election manifesto opposed devolution but supported parliamentary reform, strongly against a European federal super state, and committed to wait and see approach. Labourspeech 1994, Blair stated party’s programme of constitutional reform was ‘the biggest programme of change to democracy ever proposed’ = introduced 12 constitutional bills 1st parliamentary session after 1997. There were four main themes: 1. THE MODERNISATION OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS - Houses of Parliament (stage 1 removal of all but 92 peers, Wakeham Committee proposed combination of partly elected and partly appointed peers)  ran out of steam, civil service and local government (largely unrealised – decentralisation to local governments has occurred to a degree but at same time as centralisation of PM’s office). 2. GREATER DEMOCRATISATION OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM - been directed at increased popular participation in institutions and decision-making process. Acceptance of use of referendums, but there has also been some movement towards electoral reform and number of other, less heralded, proposals. England now the only system not using PR voting system due to concerns that adoption of the system may affect the Labour majority in future elections. 3. DEVOLUTION - decentralisation of powers from Westminster and Whitehall. Talk of greater powers for local government and even the introduction of regional government in England. SNP has been strengthened as a result (opposite to intention) 4. IMPROVING AND SAFEGUARDING INDIVIDUAL AND MINORITY RIGHTS - Human Rights Act 2000 (however this depends on interpretation of judges), Freedom of Information Act (still possible to block information if it threatens ‘national interest’) 3. NORTHERN IRELAND - Close working relationship Ahern (vital on keeping the Republicans on track) - Proved capable of reassuring Trimble and Ulster Unionists during final negotiations - Good Friday Agreement 1998 Blair’s greatest achievement? Hands on involvement and detailed negotiations during first term. Peace process had been pushed a long way before Blair and there were other contributing factors that led to GFA, BUT Blair’s personal commitment was vital. Opposition to Good Friday Agreement came from both sides - SINN FEIN (Adams, McGuinness) nervous of Republican backlash against them “selling out” e.g. Omagh bombing 1998 (killed 30) - ULSTER UNIONISTS (Trimble) feared the powerful negative influence of Paisley leader of the hard-line Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) BUT STILL OVERALL SUCCESSFUL..... Contributors to the Peace Good Friday Agreement 1998 John Hume SDLP Gerry Adams Sinn Fein Mo Mowlem Northern Ireland Secretary George Mitchell US Senator David Trimble Ulster Unionists Blair British PM Bertie Ahern Irish Taoiseach Had already persuaded Adams to commit to a peace plan Had much success bringing together the loyalist paramilitaries Superb mediator Developed a close working relationship - a vital factor for keeping the Republicans on track. Refused to accept cycle of violence was unbreakable. Brought parties to negotiating table Proved capable of reassuring Trimble during the tense final negotiations SUCCESSES  Vast, far-reaching programme of change, meeting most of the demands of the majority of ardent reformers, and representing the biggest changes in our system of government since 1911.  In a purely constitutional sense, the Britain pre-Blair was a foreign country. There was no Edinburgh Parliament or Cardiff Assembly, no London elected mayor or the promise of more mayors to come in towns and cities. Hereditary peers held balance of power in House of Lords. Proportional representation was something they did on the Continent, like the European Convention on Human Rights. Most of the heavyweight constitutional changes figured in the first Queen’s Speech  Tony Blair boasts that 100 years after the creation of the Labour Party, he has delivered three of Keir Hardie’s historic benchmarks for a Labour Government: the minimum wage, devolution and abolition of the hereditary peers. It was what Labour wanted 76 NEW LABOUR ECONOMICS • Need to escape boom-bust cycle • Need to cut national debt • Keep inflation low • Avoid reputation for increasing public spending when in power and having to reverse policy when a crisis arose • Gain economic credibility including proving to Middle England that they were pro-business • Try to merge economic strategy with welfare strategy (first ensure economic stability through economic prudence, then use the money saved to fund welfare provision) PHASE ONE: 1997-2001 Mainly about achieving economic efficiency and social justice Macro-economic: Stability and flexibility in labour market, free from electoral changes ‘Rules based’ economic management: Rules to be held to in hope of creating stability - GOLDEN RULE (stopping spending more than it can afford on public services) - Inflation rate of 2.5% This stabilises expectations of the market Bank of England independence: Set interest rates to acquire credibility, symbol of commitment to low inflation Pro-business, pro-competition: Appealing to business, Middle England and industrialists!!! - Cuts in corporation tax - More deregulation freeing employers from red tape bureaucracy - Private Finance Initiative (PFI) business encouraged to invest in public sector e.g. Schooling, hospitals. Started by Conservatives, expanded by Labour Microlevel redistributionL Series of measures to redistribute wealth to poorest in the country (end social exclusion) - National minimum wage - Working families tax credit. Overall...successful • Replaced Conservatives as ‘party of economic competence’ • Appealed to Middle England, industrialists and financiers • Brown’s prudent budgets swelled British reserve funds whilst keeping inflation down But!!! • This began to change after 2001 WEAKNESSES  Largely overshadowed by shady deals and political fixes through which it has been introduced, and the lack of any real desire by Labour to make Parliament more effective.  many voters failed to understand why the first Labour Government for 20 years took up so much parliamentary time on reforms when there were far more pressing problems such as the NHS.  constitutional settlement has been handed has almost torn the party apart, earned Blair the title of ‘control freak’ and at times come at a heavy cost to his standing in the Labour ranks Objectives: 77 New Labour’s Economic Strategy 2001-2007 • Big injection of money into public services - into new schools and pay rises in NHS - apparently catching up for years of neglect • Critics argued that - public spending and government borrowing was too high - funding of new projects through PFI got buildings completed quickly but resulted in large debts stored up for the future POLICY RESULT Income and expenditure From 2001 the prudence of earlier Brown-Blair years gave way to high public spending High inflation Pensions Government raid on pensions fund Rapid £8million fall in pension values. Decline of British pensions industry. Savings ratio fell Employment To reduce unemployment 2.5million more in work 2007 than 1997 5.4million people of working age still living on unemployment benefit 37% of increase in jobs were in unproductive public sector Borrowing To borrow in order to find expansion of public services Costs of services outran revenue returns = increased borrowing. Government borrowing encouraged a consumer credit boom. Britain not prepared for international economic downturn by end of 2007 Golden Brown To sell of half of Britain’s gold reserves since gold prices were falling Subsequent recovery of gold market meant Britain had sold at a heavy loss amounting to £3 billion POLITICAL IMPACT OF IRAQ Iraq War and Blair-Bush relationship is argued to be the defining issue of Blair’s second term. Why? • It aroused bitter opposition to Blair, including previously enthusiastic supporters. People were concerned about protecting civil liberties. • The controversies of the war in Iraq and the War on Terror shaped domestic politics • Blair’s links with Bush aroused intense hostility dye to unpopularity of Bush in both Europe and Britain. = Blair had to fight two wars over Iraq > One against Saddam Hussein > One to win over political and public opinion at home Both went badly....... Why get involved? • September 11th had a profound impact on both Blair and Britain. • Blair convinced that global terrorism was a deadly danger and that special measures were needed to provide greater security. • Blair’s links with Bush Who was opposed to the war? • Within the party – Cook and Short resigned • Public – most supportive but were those who were against war in principle/morally and due to lack of backing from UN (large and vocal minority) • Media: initially supportive. Continually supportive of “our lads” but not of the governments/countries who led Britain into Iraq Opposition mainly came from methods used to excuse going to war rather than the actual war itself: Method: Intelligence dossier on WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (2002) > idea Hussein had biological and nuclear weapons. Backfired! Why was it questioned? - Failed to convince those who though WMD had been exaggerated/overrated - Questions over why Campbell (Press Sec) played such a large role in drafting dossier – ‘sexed up dossier’ (Gilligan, 2003) to exaggerate the threat from Saddam and that it was intended for political purposes - accusations dossier was about political presentation rather than hard evidence 80 = They again lost the 2005 election (a) Weaknesses of Conservative Party - Conservatives had supported the government’s decision to go to Iraq = unlikely to gain from mounting criticism of war, had 3 different leaders in 2 years which did not sit well with public who regarded the Conservatives as a divided party lacking in confidence and unlikely to govern well. Howard competent leader but he was no match for Blair in presidential-style campaign that PM conducted. Howard made a bad choice of issues on which to fight (immigration, law and order) concerns on which his own record of dealing with them as Home Secretary in Major’s government was not impressive, proved something of an embarrassment. (b) Role of Blair - Although Blair’s involvement in the Iraq war lost him some popularity still regarded by the electorate as the outstanding choice among party leaders, backed by wily team of spin doctors. Blair by 2005 was an experienced political operator who knew how to project his image. (c) Successes of Labour gov – Knowledge of economic and financial difficulties that were beginning to face Britain had not become widespread for it to count as factor against government. Brown had established party as one of economic competence with a consumer boom and rising house prices, still utilising this to gain popularity with financiers and the middle class.  Cameron as leader: committed to modernising party (role in 2005 manifesto), new breed of Conservative/MP. Cameroons ‘decontaminated the Conservative brand’ > reached out beyond narrow core supporters by making party more inclusive and not hostile to ethnic minorities, single mothers, homosexuals and the young = This worked to his advantage as Labour were unable to accuse him of being ‘smooth but superficial’ due to his similarities with Blair and the same when for being vague in party policies (same tactic as NL since 1994) Rowe: first time since 1997, the Conservatives offered a credible alternative to Labour recovering much of the ground lost by 1997 and opinion polls suggest that seats lost to the Liberals in 1997 could be won back. SOCIETY DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE came as a result of 3 reasons:  IMMIGRATION 2007 Immigration argued by pressure groups, blogs, newspapers to be problem needing urgent attention to protect ‘social cohesion’ and ‘British way of life’ and stop Britain from being overpopulated (2001 election 3% considered immigration important, 2007 30% considered it important)  GREYING OF BRITAIN – people living longer due to better health care provision and living standards  1997 average 37, 2007 average age 39  2007 more people of retirement age than under 16 (result of 1960’s baby boomers growing up and retiring)  % population over 80 had doubled in 20 years NEGATIVE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES = surge in demand for medical treatments for elderly, NHS and LA nursing homes struggled to cope in need for long term care (e.g. dementia), increasing costs of pensions become political issue > pension schemes skyrocket. Those dependent wholly on state pensions suffered > fuel poverty POSITIVE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES = ‘grey pound’/disposable income led to new generation of active retired people (second homes, holidays, new markets in property, shopping and leisure), change in advertising 1990 • Population rising but uneven • Ethnic mix simpler: Ethnic mix largest non- whites were Indian, then Caribbean, Pakistani • No political concern about integration • Largest white immigration was Ireland • Any Polish/Russian immigration were diplomats or communist refugees • ‘Bogus asylum seeker’ unknown term • Britain not really penetrated by foreign culture 2007 • Population 3 million more • Increased non-white immigration • Largest white immigration is Poland and immigration is now increasingly white rather than trend post 1948 which was from Commonwealth, now EU countries. Come in search of jobs and better prospects rather than as refugee • ‘Bogus asylum seeker’ term often used to attack government policies on immigration • Britain’s culture has not changed reflecting new immigration IMPACT of changes: - Population (size/shape) - Social Attitudes - Culture - Media 81  END OF COUNTRYSIDE? - changes in where people lived and shopped. Traced back to before 1945 but 1990’s saw impact on society become cause of public concern. Had been happened for while but culminated so they all became noticed at once  Rise in out-of-town shopping centers and housing estates = swallowing up of countryside  Increase in ‘single occupiers’  London and south-east growing rapidly including housing, social services and transport stretch on services and provisions. Scotland and old industrial north population declining, urban decline and depressed house prices.  Government tried to stop this > regeneration funds, relocation of departments out of London, regeneration projects (Glasgow, Leeds, Gateshead > successful) BUT London still lion share of economic growth during prosperity years 1990- 2007  1951 ½ population lived in rural/semi-rural > 2000 only 3% employed in agriculture, many farmers out of business, had to try to exploit EU grants instead of producing food.  Alienation of countryside as result of decline of agriculture: Impact of BSE/CJD scare in cattle and ban on beef exports (1990’s) and foot and mouth which caused mass slaughter of livestock (2001) meant much of Britain’s countryside closed down >rural communities faced economic hardship coupled with discontent over fuel costs (end up joining in fuel blockade 2002) and fox hunting (Countryside Alliance deeply opposed to ban pushed through by Labour) = countryside rebellion?  Intensive farming changed landscape of Britain and country life hollowed out > villages now without school, shop, post office or pub  Young people forced to leave as couldn’t afford house prices due to 2nd homes/commuters Labour urban orientated and unsympathetic but did try to help = subsidies for diversitifcation, for rural public transport, schemes to create affordable local housing, push of farmer’s markets and organic farming to counter supermarkets ONLY MARGINAL DIFFERENCE!!!! Britain now a more urban country than ever. MIGRATION – been happening since 1951 changing communities  1989-2007 – immigration increasingly a central social and political issue  Increases came due to traditional migration, relatives joining families established, foreign students, skilled workers filling skills shortages, impact of globalisation, famine and regional conflicts, expansion of EU (A8 countries) opened up Eastern European immigration, big increase in asylum seekers in 1990’s = sometimes strain on local authorities and community relations  Asylum seekers some genuine, some associated with economic migrants using the system as a means of entry – ‘bogus’ asylum seekers = massive public controversy, weight of numbers meant authorities unable to process so many claims  Increase in outward migration – went abroad for employment opportunities, retire to sunnier locations  A8 country migrants (those who had just joined EU 2004-2007 e.g. Poland) not technically immigrants! Moving within EU system but press lumped them together as incomers under label ‘immigrants’  NEGATIVE REACTION – press reaction e.g. Daily Express >focus on criminal behaviour, taking jobs, driving down wage levels, pressure groups e.g. Migrationwatch >focus on impact of sudden surge of large numbers on public services like health/education, overstretch and social cohesion concerns. Genuine as well as alarmist reaction.  POSITIVE REACTION – economists claim nation benefitted positively from migrants (filled labour shortage, valuable skills, small businesses = net gain to economy), most migrants young/healthy so didn’t strain social services. Migration did not flow one way, many returned home (1/3) and many British people were leaving.  Hard to analyse due to sheer numbers and hard to predict long term trends due to fluctuations as a result of changing economic conditions (migrants return home during difficult times) BRITAIN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY?  Ethnic diversity issue since 1951 but more noticeable by 2007  Key questions: ‘Was white Britain failing to do enough to ensure the equality of respect and opportunities for ethnic minorities?’ VERSUS ‘Were ethnic minorities doing enough to adapt to the British way of life and was the identity of traditional working class communities being unfairly neglected?’  YES 82  Mosques, other religious/cultural buildings throughout Britain  Schools, local government and corporations launched initiatives to assimilate and celebrate different cultures  Cuisine, radio stations, TV programmes all changed to incorporate or reflect multicultural nature  NO  Police accused of being ‘institutionally racist’ MacPherson Report > Murder of Stephen Lawrence (1993) by white racist youths and failings of police to find sufficient evidence to convict accused. National issue and landmark in race relations  7/7 2005 Jihadist terrorist attacks in London brought suicide bombing to British soil. Later shooting of an innocent Brazilian mistaken for a suicide bomber caused further race tensions = attacks caused much soul searching about security issues and community relations as bombers had been British citizens who had seemingly been assimilated into society. Why had they become alienated? How could community relations be improved to make ethnic minorities feel more British?  Impact of war in Iraq > alienated some British Muslims  BBC director Greg Dyke called his workforce ‘hideously white’  7/7 bombings led to divide: greater security through border controls and ID cards versus arguments IRA had carried out similar attacks in 1970-1990s and that it was important not to overreact and impinge on civil liberties MEDIA AND CULTURE  Increasing technological change > 1990-2007 faster than ever, ‘age of the gadget’  Already in use pre-1990 but by 2007 technologies had advanced massively e.g. mobile phones, laptops, internet > personal communication now by text, email and phone, decrease in CD sales due to MP3, DVD replaces VHS, laptops affordable, impact on politics and education, convenience of many different digital TV channels  Impact of globalisation transforming culture, leisure and world economy:  Increase in individualism and isolation  Increase in communication in one sense but decline in personal approach  Rapid growth in key information industries  24/7 immediate press culture  More accessible to some, but others left behind due to age or economic situation  Cultural pursuits: decline in cinema and communal endeavours outdoors but rise in those engaging in online communal endeavours, change in TV programmes, shopping patterns/methods FOREIGN EUROPE IMPACT OF END OF COLD WAR • Europe’s centre of gravity began to shift eastwards as previous Communist countries moved towards the EU • NATO needed to find a new role post Cold War • Post-Soviet Russia, weak economically and politically • US now unchallenged • Britain and US special relationship stronger than ever = EU hoped that as it expanded it could play a greater role in world affairs by setting up new collective security and resolving disputes BRITAIN’S AIMS: focus on….  Maintaining special relationship AND use special relationship to build diplomatic bridge between US and Europe  Governments of expanding EU  Continued focus on Irish Republic  Governments of expanding UN CHANGING NATURE OF EU 85  Britain confident they could make a major contribution during constitutional arrangements > efforts of European diplomats fail due to range of aims and ideas = Major 1992 organises joint EU and UN peace conference in London >creates Vance-Owen plan  Major praised for efforts, no concerted effort from Europe and US reluctant to intervene = mediation ineffectual while war continues including Srebrenica massacre 1995 > UN peacekeeping mission had not intervened = impact on British, European and American foreign policy  UN peacekeeping and EU diplomacy seen as weak/failed = Britain turns to America and NATO persuading Clinton to intervene  Following air strikes a conference is achieved guaranteeing Bosnian independence 1995  1997 Blair continues Major’s policy of involving US and NATO and persuades Clinton to back military action against Serbia = Milosevic overthrown and Yugoslavia collapses creating new states.  Blair: seen as a big success and strengthens belief in LIBERAL INTERVENTIONISM and importance of special relationship with the US and need to bring American and European policy closer together. Shapes Blair’s future policies. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP Post-Yugoslavia (1999), Blair’s aims regarding Britain’s allies and international role changed focus: • America in, Europe out: Blair decided that Yugoslavia had shown in terms of foreign policy Europe and the UN were not to be relied upon, and using America had been far more effective • Keep America informed of European affairs • Make full use of NATO to defend new world order • Liberal interventionism – needed to prevent the recurrence of massacres • Blair 1999 onwards: ‘NO MORE SREBRENICAS’ • Lynch: ‘he was an anti-appeaser; best way to defeat tyranny was not simply by using diplomacy. Of course, diplomacy should be tried first, but if this did not work, it was legitimate to use force to oblige aggressor states to conform to internationally agreed standards of conduct’ Impact of 9/11 US had previously felt invulnerable. This came as a shock and so result was reactionary and drastic. Why? IMPACT.... 1. Led to US led coalition/NATO invasion of Afghanistan Oct 2001 2. Led to WAR ON TERROR: = widened divisions between Western world and Muslims = widened divisions between West itself AFGHANISTAN - 9/11 led to US led coalition/NATO invasion of Afghanistan Oct 2001 • Taliban was disliked and so initially this was an accepted move as part of liberal interventionism. • Inability to capture targets such as Bin Laden and disillusionment with the establishment of a ‘MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATE’ have had serious negative implications including the loss of support of European governments. • Economic and political development has been slow, realisation ‘quick fix democracy’ has not been successful however has been a much quicker realisation. • Attention turned to Iraq 2002, Afghanistan neglected as a result = August 2007 renewed threat from Taliban in Afghanistan Impact of Afghanistan • Disillusionment with outcomes of war and the establishment of ‘modern democratic state’ • Focus on Iraq from 2002 meant the Afghan government struggled to cope with complex political situation left in Kabul = Taliban regrouped and fighting has continued, security situation at low 2006-2007 leading to increase in troops • Continued death toll – Afghan, coalition forces • Detention of ‘enemy combatants’ at Guantanamo Bay and torture techniques as part of ‘special interrogations’ (waterboarding, taken to Egypt) = criticism of Bush-Blair 86 • Ideals of liberal interventionism were discredited • Media backlash • Moral backlash from within countries and other countries IRAQ - Shortcomings and failures of Afghanistan reconstruction came as price of focus on Iraq? • Bush’s neo-conservatism saw him want to deal with ‘unfinished business’ of Iraq – ‘containing’ Saddam had failed and so intervention was necessary • Concerns: (a) Saddam might team up with al-Qaeda (b) WMD development – fuelled by genuine fear following expulsion of UN weapons inspectors 1997 • Diplomatic efforts 2002 > Oct 2002 failure to agree 2nd UN resolution > Invasion and overthrow of Saddam 2003 > 2007 Brown announces withdrawal from Iraq Outcomes of Iraq • Liberal interventionism discredited • Saddam overthrown but no neat, decisive end to war • No WDM found! • Cost of war: financial and loss of life • Democracy in place but political and economic progress is again slow and flawed – growth of extremist groups, suicide bombings • Failure to win ‘hearts and minds’ of Iraqi’s • Backlash against Bush-Blair - what evidence was there to support intervening in Iraq? - Was this a war of imperialism/oil rather than humanitarian/democratic good? - ‘Blair’s War’ to further political career • Britain regarded as American lapdog • Divisions amongst Western nations • Divisions in America and Britain themselves e.g. Protests, questions over legality of war IMPACT ON BLAIR CRITICS OF BLAIR • Blair’s War’ to further political career • Knew that Bush was going to invade Iraq anyway and was simply using UN resolutions as a way of bringing Europe round • Efforts to be bridge between US and Europe was flawed as he was so closely linked to Bush he had no power to influence either American nor European policy • No WMD found despite dossier • Blair was Bush's ‘poodle’ • Removing Saddam was not enough of a reason to justify war • Tactics and targets had encouraged the very forces of terrorism that they were trying to defeat – extremist jihadists DEFENDERS OF BLAIR • Convinced WMD threat was real • Tried to use diplomatic actions through UN to try to prevent splits between Europe and US, as shown by attempt at 2nd UN resolution • Correct in his analysis that US was needed to resolve situation, as they had done in Yugoslavia, and that ‘leave it to the UN’ and ‘the Europeans are right’ may result in another Srebrenica • His judgement may be faulted but it should not be denied that throughout he was his own man driven by conviction and a sense of mission – special relationship was one of equals • Jihadist terror pre-dates Iraq War IMPACT ON BRITAIN: NEGATIVE • Britain regarded as American lap dog • Iraq war was a failure, question only remains as to how much of a failure it was • Had not achieved goals/expectations of 2003 • Not able to ‘bring the boys home’ – sent to stabilise Afghan once withdrawn from Iraq • Loss of lives, expense and diplomatic effort • 7/7 bombings the result of Iraq? • Rather than being a war on terror, this had spread terror – West had lost moral high ground IMPACT ON BRITAIN: POSITIVE • Had used UN and diplomacy • Had tried to forge bridges between US and Europe • Liberal interventionism fuelled by positive outcome in Yugoslavia • Had ended a dictatorship in Iraq – still hope of a stable future • Anglo-American military campaigns since 1990s has been undertaken largely to protect Muslims: Kuwait 1991, Bosnia 1995, Kosovo 1999 • Greater number of Muslim deaths were caused by other Muslims • Saddam had money and will to produce WMD – better to defeat him in 2003 than face a nuclear-weaponed Iraq later 87 ASSESSING BLAIR • Blair always wanted to choose to leave, not be shoved like Thatcher, with Brown as successor • 2006 mounting pressure to leave. Why? (a) Brown and co becoming impatient (b) Fall out of Iraq War (c) Honeymoon with press losing glow (d) ‘Cash for honours’ scandal looming (e) Calls for return to ‘Old Labour’ values bubbling (f) Jump ship before shoved? Blair and his supporters wanted to stay longer as they felt he was only getting started, ‘last two years most productive’ but times had changed since 2007 • Despite September 2006 coup never occurring, civil war and speculation led to his announcement to step down as party leader and an MP within a year (June 2007) = Blair set about on a furious round of activity at home and abroad, determined to make the most of the Blair legacy THE SYNOPTIC APPROACH  An examination of approx 50 years assessing change and continuity  What was the situation in the beginning > what was the situation in the end  During this time a) what changed? b) what stayed the same?  There must have been some periods of success and some periods of decline e.g. 1950s versus 1970’s  Identify KEY TURNING POINTS/ISSUES/EVENTS between the years and assess the ones promoting change (e.g. arrival of North Sea Oil) and those promoting continuity (e.g. role of ‘boom and bust’)  DONT just offer a list of factors – there needs to be central argument with balance  I STRONGLY SUGGEST AVOIDING CHRONOLOGICAL APPROACH!!!! Instead identity the success/failures, changes/continuities e.g. social revolution: ethnic/immigration changes as one factor, class as another factor, rural/urban Britain as another factor. POLITICS 1951 2007 Change Continuity Predictions that two- Sum total of changes less 1980s Labour came close to disintegration Two party trench continued: SUCCESS • Won three elections, unmatched by any other Labour PM • Sustained economic prosperity and stability • Dominated British politics and forced the Conservatives to undergo massive change • Achieved historic peace settlement in NI • Played an important leadership role in Europe • Strong lead in ‘war against terror’ • World statesman, strong lead on Africa and climate change • Policy of ‘liberal interventionism’ helped bring stability to Balkans AGAINST • Achieved less in power than he could have done. Attlee’s 1951 legacy was greater • Blair and Brown were lucky to inherit such as favourable situation in 1997; government debt high by 2007 • Alienated many traditional Labour supporters by moving away from traditional values and being pro-business • Later attempts to mediate peace in the Middle East failed • Failed to secure British entry into Euro by ceding influence to Brown and national press • Drive for identity cards and greater powers for police undermined civil liberties • Strengths were in presentation – practical results did not match up • Invasion of Iraq was a massive error Cash for Honours Accusations Labour fund raisers were awarding honours to people making large donations. Police questioned key Labour members including Blair. No charges brought. Bad publicity lingered 90 intake. Private eye part of the furniture > now more Establishment than fiery revolutionary? BRITAIN’S POSITION IN THE WORLD Although there are specific conflicts such as Suez and Iraq, you need to focus on the bigger picture. Do not write an essay which covers the different crises/events! E.g. decline in position by looking at Suez, Rhodesia, Falklands and Iraq, INSTEAD > decline in empire role (Suez, Rhodesia but success of peaceful decolonisation), decline in Europe (rejection but then success in Balkans), special relationship (nuclear weapons but success in Ireland), decline world stage (Suez but then success with UN/NATO)  Reasons for decolonization in the light of changing British and world circumstances  Decision to join Europe: reasons for and against  Britain’s special relationship with USA  Britain’s changing priorities post Cold War: Europe, Special Relationship, relations between Europe and US, Balkans, Ireland, Middle East  How far Britain’s role has changed since 1951 Some key areas: 1951-64: time of adjustment and search for a new role  Britain already in retreat from empire but a public brought up on imperial illusions found realism difficult to accept. Commonwealth an acceptable substitute?  Britain misunderstood the speed of independence and ramifications  Suez a defining moment and showed Britain’s dependence on the US  Britain economically overstretched – defence spending and independent nuclear deterrent  Links with USA seemed more relevant than joining European movement  By 1964 Winds of Change was blowing for Britain and there had been some successes in providing independence 1964-1975: a change in direction and antagonism with US  Decision to join Europe had an impact on relations with US, especially in light of Vietnam  Wilson’s relations with Rhodesia and ramifications for foreign policy  Britian’s need to cut military commitments and the withdrawal from ‘east of Suez’ after 1967 devaluation crisis  By 1975 Britain’s focus seemed to be Europe and the Mediterranean > form of realism finally taking place  Heath’s focus on Europe caused a rift in relations with US 1975-1990: time of hubris  Resolution of the issue of Rhodesia but continued controversy with the Commonwealth over South Africa and apartheid  Falkland – remnant of Empire, a second Suez or a change to make Thatcher?  Post Falklands, resurgence in nationalism and pride  Europe central focus for Thatcher yet caused immense problems with Europe and the British government  Thatcher as cold war warrior > admiration for Atlantic Alliance and Reagan, contribution to end of Cold War 1990-2007: chance to forge new relationships  Britain’s continued dialogue with, and ambivalence towards, Europe and the promotion of an enlarged Europe  Blair’s attempts to bridge the European-American divide  Britain’s involvement with NATO and its ramifications in Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan: principled or opportunistic?  How far had Blair damaged Britain’s reputation in the world by 2007? 1951 2007 Change Continuity Empire still vast and considered to be main focus of attention and future of Britain economically and strategically Long retreat from Empire over (Hong Kong 1997) – no longer an imperial power in the C19th notion Shift in focus towards Europe in 1970’s following disillusionment with outcomes of Commonwealth. Acceptance to some degree of decline from Empire Long process of decolonization started earlier than 1951. Attitudes of Empire and what it represents persisted – Queen head of Commonwealth, role in solving problems such as Africa, Blair’s ‘gunboat diplomacy’ as part 91 of ‘liberal interventionism’ showed grandeur illusions still continue. Continue hark backs to Britain’s empire ruling world Britain as an island focused on Empire, happy to aid creation of European community but not to integrate themselves Integrated into EU and most compliant country in terms of introducing laws/doctrines into our customs under Blair EEC/EU member 1973 saw integration into Europe. Willingness to pool some level of sovereignty by accepting European laws/regulations e.g. Human Rights European attitude: Unsure concept of where we belong in Europe, ‘awkward neighbour’, still unsure of how involved we want to be and whether we are British or European e.g. euro currency, constitution Reliant on US loans and their support in key issues. Notion that perhaps we don’t need to negotiate with them on everything (e.g. Suez) which is shown as naive and impossible in later years Cold War over 1989. Close relationship with presidents and work with US during key events – realise need to negotiate with US in order to maximise success Perhaps more equal in the special relationship – e.g. Clinton being coerced into Balkan intervention, Iraq saw Blair playing a lead role. Equals at some points? Special relationship dominates foreign policy coupled with Cold War – constant preoccupation with attempts to maintain relationship (except Heath’s) Close working relationship with President and attempts to work at top table with them to secure global influence. EXAM QUESTIONS!  All questions are 45 marks each, you will answer 2 questions from a choice of 3  One question will be SYNOPTIC, the other two questions will usually, but not necessarily, be set on political events, issues and personalities and will be set from two of the 4 areas > 1951-64, 1964-75, 1975-1990 and 1990-2007 (they may cut across two time periods where appropriate)  You must be BALANCED! This does not mean 50/50 but that more than one viewpoint has been considered e.g. a success as well as all the failures  Historical opinion. There must be understanding (by arguing/supporting) not just a list of different opinions NARROW PERIOD There will not be a direct question on the 1960’s as this is left to the Sixties module you did last year.  ‘The post-war consensus was a mirage.’ To what extent do you agree with this view?  ‘During the period 1951-1964 Britain experienced economic decline as a result of a failure to invest and restructure.’ How accurate is this view?  Why did the Conservatives dominate British politics 1951-1964?  To what extent was the impact of immigration on demographic change the cause of social change and tensions 1951-1964?  In what ways did post-war prosperity bring social change in Britain between 1951-1964?  ‘Social degeneration rather than social revolution occurred 1951-1964’. How valid is this view?  ‘De Gaulle was the single most important factor in Britain’s exclusion from the process of European integration between 1951- 1963.’ How accurate is this view?  ‘The foreign policy failures of British governments in the years 1951-1964 were due to a lack of realism about Britain’s position in the post-war world.’ Assess the validity of this view.  In what ways did environmental issues influence society in Britain 1964-1975?  ‘The record of the Labour governments in the years 1964-1979 was one of continiuous failure.’ Assess the validity of this view.  For what reasons did the Conservatives win in 1979 but not 1974? 92  ‘The Winter of Discontent lost Labour their government in 1979’. To what extent do you agree with this view?  Why was political opposition towards Thatcher so ineffectual during the 1980’s?  ‘The Falklands Factor saved Thatcher from defeat in 1983.’ How valid is this view?  ‘Thatcher toughened and enabled British society to adapt to changing circumstances.’ To what extent do you agree?  ‘Thatcher failed to achieve any lasting social or economic transformation of Britain despite her claims to have done so.’ How convincing is this view of her record in power in the years 1979-1990?  ‘Thatcher did not turn Britain around despite her claims to have done so.’ How convincing is this view of the record of the Conservative governments in the years 1979-1990?  In what ways did class loyalties change in Britain 1975-1990?  ‘Margaret Thatcher’s legacy was deep divisions in British society.’ With reference to the years 1975-1990, assess the validity of this view.  Assess the importance of Thatcher’s personality and prejudices in influencing Britain’s relations with her European partners  ‘Far from damaging the Labour Party, the formation of the SDP in 1981 paved the way for Labour’s recovery.’ How valid is this view?  To what extent was the decline of the Conservative Party in the 1990’s due to economic factors?  ‘During his first term, Blair promised much but delivered little.’ To what extent is this true?  ‘Between 1997-2005, the Conservative Party made itself unelectable.’ How valid is this view?  To what extent was Blair ‘all spin and no Labour’?  ‘The mismanagement of Britain’s foreign policies in the years 1990-2007 did lasting harm to Britain’s position in the world.’ Assess the validity of this view. SYNOPTIC  For ECONOMIC, SOCIAL and FOREIGN it would be a very good idea to do a list of successes and failures.  I STRONGLY ADVISE AGAINST A CHRONOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE SYNOPTIC!!! This will tempt you to tell the story rather than analyse factors. I would instead identify themes e.g. successes/failures, changes/continuities  They will be based on mainstream themes e.g. economic, social or international position  Require demonstration of breadth of period but must also be selective and concise – don’t kitchen sink it!  Assess the change and continuity between the state and the people during those years.  Needs judgement based on debate and evaluation Political  Between 1964 and 2007, the Conservative Party ceased to be the natural party of government in Britain.’ Assess the validity of this view. Economic  How far is it true to say that Britain was in economic decline between 1951 and 2007?  How beneficial actually was the post-war boom 1951-2007?  How accurate is it to see the period 1951-1997 as just a series of ‘booms and busts’?  How economically important was Britain’s entry into Europe compared to the years outside?  How true is it to talk of a post-war consensus and its ramifications for the economy?  How complicit are politicians from both major parties in Britain’s decline? Social  To what extent had Britain experienced a social revolution 1951-2007?  To what extent was Britain a multicultural society by 2007? Foreign  How far has Britain’s role in the world changed from 1951-1990?  Was Britain still punching above her weight in terms of foreign affairs after 1951?  From grandeur to decline. To what extent is this an accurate view of Britain’s international position 1951-2007?  How important had Thatcher and Blair been in creating a new image of Britain abroad and has it been successful?  How well had Britain adjusted to changing circumstances 1951-2007?