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Rousseau's Account: Birth Order of Social Passions - Pity, Gratitude, or Sexual Passion?, Study notes of Introduction to Philosophy

Jean-jacques rousseau's 'emile' discusses the emergence of social passions - pity, gratitude, and sexual passion - but offers conflicting accounts of their birth order. This analysis explores rousseau's arguments for pity being the first social sentiment, criticizing alternative hypotheses of sexual passion and gratitude as the initial passion.

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Uploaded on 04/28/2013

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Download Rousseau's Account: Birth Order of Social Passions - Pity, Gratitude, or Sexual Passion? and more Study notes Introduction to Philosophy in PDF only on Docsity! Prompt: Book IV of Emile details the birth of the social passions (i.e., pity, gratitude, and sexual passion), but provides seemingly different accounts of the order in which these passions are born. Which, if any, of these passions is born first? Explain which of the social passions is prior to the others (or if they are all born simultaneously, explain why). In the course of doing so, be sure to entertain and criticize at least one alternative hypothesis. Jean-Jacques Rousseau wishes for his pupil, Emile, to be a man that is both good for himself and good for others. This is an arguably impossible task. As Emile's tutor, Rousseau oversees this intense shift in the boy's life. This second birth (212) is a time where sexual passion, gratuity, and pity are actualized in the boy. Each of the social sentiments are modifications of the original passion of self- love (213) and have importance pertaining to Emile's ability to be good for others. Sexual passion is needed to link society together, gratitude is required to understand the sentiment behind another's actions, and pity is needed in order to become sensitive. Rousseau makes the case for each and leaves us with conflicting reasons for each being the first. Through analysis we find that because of the corrupting nature of sexual desire and the required empathy for gratitude, Rousseau offers pity, born out of our self-love, as the initial social sentiment. Although Rousseau notes a few possible reasons for sexual passion to come first, he ultimately concludes that it should not be. He sees that the first stirrings of curiosity are sexual in origin (218). This raises the possibility that sexual passion is the original social sentiment. He says a child is supposed to view themselves in relation to things and a man is to view himself in relation to the rest of his species (214). Following, he is no longer isolated, thus in need of a companion and “from the need for a mistress is soon born the need for a friend” (215). This leads us to believe that sexual desire will be the first to develop, as it would be the bridge into society that would allow for the others (233). But Rousseau also notes the dangers in this ordering. If sexual passion is to develop first in a youth, corrupting behavior follows. Rousseau sees those as “impatient, vindictive, and wild,” since they put all their effort into one object (220). In this case, without pity they would give anything to satisfy themselves. The focus on this one object over all others attacks the imagination (220). Gratitude is also one of the social sentiments, however Rousseau concludes it too should not come first. He writes that “we love ourselves to preserve ourselves, and it follows immediately from the same sentiment that we love what preserves us” (213). But, gratitude cannot be the first social sentiment, for it requires understanding the intentions behind actions of another. This ability is not yet available in children, who are often not even aware of what they need (65), therefore it would be impossible for them to be thankful for it. Gratitude requires that Emile supplicates himself toward another, and at this time Emile is not capable of doing so. Our natural self-love would prevent this step until we have gained the understanding of the relative suffering of others. For in order to be gracious, he needs to identify the fact that the other has, to some extent, sacrificed for him. Gratitude, as Rousseau notes, is a natural sentiment and it will be born out of the recognition of the value of your care, but at this point he is unable to understand it (234). On further reading, Rousseau champions pity as the sentiment prior to the others, for it “man's weakness which makes him sociable” (221). As the tutor, he will influence Emile's passions toward pity, as it can be used as a tool for building a healthy ego. Rousseau sees pity as sweet, for “putting ourselves in the place of the one who suffers, we nevertheless feel the pleasure of not suffering as he does” (221). Children and teenagers know about suffering, but at first, do not fully understand that other beings suffer too. Self-love, the original passion, tells us to love ourselves, and in doing so, we acknowledge our sufferings. Pity is the transplantation of recognition of suffering into another person. When he first compares himself with others, self-love is transformed into amour-propre (relative self- love) (235). Rousseau sees this as where all other passions rise, and determining point of whether he will be “humane and gentle or cruel and malignant” (235). Pity allows him to be “touched and not hardened by human miseries” (231), and the sensitivity allows for tender and affectionate passions (220). Therefore, Rousseau has shown us that pity is to be the first social sentiment in Emile in order to try and achieve the goal of making him good for himself and good for others.
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