Constitutionality of Racial Gerrymandering in Districting: Shaw v. Reno, Schemes and Mind Maps of Law

Download Constitutionality of Racial Gerrymandering in Districting: Shaw v. Reno and more Schemes and Mind Maps Law in PDF only on Docsity! 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:49 PAGES OPINPGT 630 OCTOBER TERM, 1992 Syllabus SHAW et al. v. RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. appeal from the united states district court for the eastern district of north carolina No. 92–357. Argued April 20, 1993—Decided June 28, 1993 To comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965—which prohibits a covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in a “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” without federal authorization— North Carolina submitted to the Attorney General a congressional reap- portionment plan with one majority-black district. The Attorney Gen- eral objected to the plan on the ground that a second district could have been created to give effect to minority voting strength in the State’s south-central to southeastern region. The State’s revised plan con- tained a second majority-black district in the north-central region. The new district stretches approximately 160 miles along Interstate 85 and, for much of its length, is no wider than the I–85 corridor. Appellants, five North Carolina residents, filed this action against appellee state and federal officials, claiming that the State had created an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of, among other things, the Fourteenth Amendment. They alleged that the two districts concentrated a major- ity of black voters arbitrarily without regard to considerations such as compactness, contiguousness, geographical boundaries, or political sub- divisions, in order to create congressional districts along racial lines and to assure the election of two black representatives. The three-judge District Court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the federal appellees. It also dismissed the complaint against the state ap- pellees, finding, among other things, that, under United Jewish Organi- zations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (UJO), appellants had failed to state an equal protection claim because favoring minor- ity voters was not discriminatory in the constitutional sense and the plan did not lead to proportional underrepresentation of white voters statewide. Held: 1. Appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the reapportionment scheme is so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into sepa- rate districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. Pp. 639–652. 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:49 PAGES OPINPGT 631Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993) Syllabus (a) The District Court properly dismissed the claims against the federal appellees. Appellants’ racial gerrymandering claims must be examined against the backdrop of this country’s long history of racial discrimination in voting. Pp. 639–642. (b) Classifications of citizens based solely on race are by their na- ture odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality, because they threaten to stigmatize persons by rea- son of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility. Thus, state legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens on account of race—whether it contains an explicit distinction or is “unex- plainable on grounds other than race,” Arlington Heights v. Metropoli- tan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266—must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. See, e. g., Wy- gant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 277–278 (plurality opinion). Redistricting legislation that is alleged to be so bizarre on its face that it is unexplainable on grounds other than race demands the same close scrutiny, regardless of the motivations underlying its adoption. See, e. g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 341. That it may be difficult to determine from the face of a single-member districting plan that it makes such a distinction does not mean that a racial gerrymander, once established, should receive less scrutiny than other legislation classi- fying citizens by race. By perpetuating stereotypical notions about members of the same racial group—that they think alike, share the same political interests, and prefer the same candidates—a racial gerry- mander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. It also sends to elected representatives the message that their primary obliga- tion is to represent only that group’s members, rather than their constit- uency as a whole. Since the holding here makes it unnecessary to de- cide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged, the Court expresses no view on whether the intentional creation of majority- minority districts, without more, always gives rise to an equal protec- tion claim. Pp. 642–649. (c) The classification of citizens by race threatens special harms that are not present in this Court’s vote-dilution cases and thus war- rants an analysis different from that used in assessing the validity of at- large and multimember gerrymandering schemes. In addition, nothing in the Court’s decisions compels the conclusion that racial and political gerrymanders are subject to the same constitutional scrutiny; in fact, this country’s long and persistent history of racial discrimination in vot- ing and the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence would seem to compel the opposite conclusion. Nor is there any support for the 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:49 PAGES OPINPGT 634 SHAW v. RENO Opinion of the Court tutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. I The voting age population of North Carolina is approxi- mately 78% white, 20% black, and 1% Native American; the remaining 1% is predominantly Asian. App. to Brief for Federal Appellees 16a. The black population is relatively dispersed; blacks constitute a majority of the general popu- lation in only 5 of the State’s 100 counties. Brief for Ap- pellants 57. Geographically, the State divides into three regions: the eastern Coastal Plain, the central Piedmont Plateau, and the western mountains. H. Lefler & A. New- som, The History of a Southern State: North Carolina 18–22 (3d ed. 1973). The largest concentrations of black citizens live in the Coastal Plain, primarily in the northern part. O. Gade & H. Stillwell, North Carolina: People and Envi- ronments 65–68 (1986). The General Assembly’s first redis- tricting plan contained one majority-black district centered in that area of the State. Forty of North Carolina’s one hundred counties are cov- ered by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, which prohibits a jurisdiction subject to its provi- sions from implementing changes in a “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” without federal authoriza- tion, ibid. The jurisdiction must obtain either a judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Co- lumbia declaring that the proposed change “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridg- ing the right to vote on account of race or color” or adminis- trative preclearance from the Attorney General. Ibid. Be- cause the General Assembly’s reapportionment plan affected the covered counties, the parties agree that § 5 applied. Tr. of Oral Arg. 14, 27–29. The State chose to submit its plan to the Attorney General for preclearance. 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:49 PAGES OPINPGT 635Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993) Opinion of the Court The Attorney General, acting through the Assistant At- torney General for the Civil Rights Division, interposed a formal objection to the General Assembly’s plan. The Attorney General specifically objected to the configuration of boundary lines drawn in the south-central to southeastern region of the State. In the Attorney General’s view, the General Assembly could have created a second majority- minority district “to give effect to black and Native Ameri- can voting strength in this area” by using boundary lines “no more irregular than [those] found elsewhere in the proposed plan,” but failed to do so for “pretextual reasons.” See App. to Brief for Federal Appellees 10a–11a. Under § 5, the State remained free to seek a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Colum- bia notwithstanding the Attorney General’s objection. It did not do so. Instead, the General Assembly enacted a re- vised redistricting plan, 1991 N. C. Extra Sess. Laws, ch. 7, that included a second majority-black district. The General Assembly located the second district not in the south-central to southeastern part of the State, but in the north-central region along Interstate 85. See Appendix, infra. The first of the two majority-black districts contained in the revised plan, District 1, is somewhat hook shaped. Cen- tered in the northeast portion of the State, it moves south- ward until it tapers to a narrow band; then, with finger-like extensions, it reaches far into the southernmost part of the State near the South Carolina border. District 1 has been compared to a “Rorschach ink-blot test,” Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 476 (EDNC 1992) (Voorhees, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and a “bug splattered on a windshield,” Wall Street Journal, Feb. 4, 1992, p. A14. The second majority-black district, District 12, is even more unusually shaped. It is approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no wider than the I–85 corridor. It winds in snakelike fashion through tobacco country, finan- cial centers, and manufacturing areas “until it gobbles in 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:49 PAGES OPINPGT 636 SHAW v. RENO Opinion of the Court enough enclaves of black neighborhoods.” 808 F. Supp., at 476–477 (Voorhees, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Northbound and southbound drivers on I–85 some- times find themselves in separate districts in one county, only to “trade” districts when they enter the next county. Of the 10 counties through which District 12 passes, 5 are cut into 3 different districts; even towns are divided. At one point the district remains contiguous only because it in- tersects at a single point with two other districts before crossing over them. See Brief for Republican National Committee as Amicus Curiae 14–15. One state legislator has remarked that “ ‘[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you’d kill most of the people in the dis- trict.’ ” Washington Post, Apr. 20, 1993, p. A4. The dis- trict even has inspired poetry: “Ask not for whom the line is drawn; it is drawn to avoid thee.” Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: “When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn’t Everything, It’s the Only Thing”?, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1237, 1261, n. 96 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Attorney General did not object to the General As- sembly’s revised plan. But numerous North Carolinians did. The North Carolina Republican Party and individual voters brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging that the plan constituted an unconstitutional political gerrymander under Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986). That claim was dismissed, see Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (WDNC), and this Court summarily affirmed, 506 U. S. 801 (1992). Shortly after the complaint in Pope v. Blue was filed, ap- pellants instituted the present action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. Appellants alleged not that the revised plan constituted a political gerrymander, nor that it violated the “one person, one vote” principle, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 558 (1964), but that the State had created an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Appellants are five residents of Dur- 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:49 PAGES OPINPGT 639Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993) Opinion of the Court wide, the majority concluded that appellants had failed to state an equal protection claim. Id., at 472–473. Chief Judge Voorhees agreed that race-conscious redis- tricting is not per se unconstitutional but dissented from the rest of the majority’s equal protection analysis. He read Justice White’s opinion in UJO to authorize race-based re- apportionment only when the State employs traditional dis- tricting principles such as compactness and contiguity. 808 F. Supp., at 475–477 (opinion concurring in part and dissent- ing in part). North Carolina’s failure to respect these prin- ciples, in Judge Voorhees’ view, “augur[ed] a constitutionally suspect, and potentially unlawful, intent” sufficient to defeat the state appellees’ motion to dismiss. Id., at 477. We noted probable jurisdiction. 506 U. S. 1019 (1992). II A “The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society . . . .” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S., at 555. For much of our Nation’s history, that right sadly has been denied to many because of race. The Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870 after a bloody Civil War, promised unequivocally that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote” no longer would be “denied or abridged . . . by any State on account of race, color, or previ- ous condition of servitude.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 15, § 1. But “[a] number of states . . . refused to take no for an answer and continued to circumvent the fifteenth amend- ment’s prohibition through the use of both subtle and blunt instruments, perpetuating ugly patterns of pervasive racial discrimination.” Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose Vs. Results Ap- proach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 Va. L. Rev. 633, 637 (1983). Ostensibly race-neutral devices such as literacy tests with “grandfather” clauses and “good character” provi- sos were devised to deprive black voters of the franchise. 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:49 PAGES OPINPGT 640 SHAW v. RENO Opinion of the Court Another of the weapons in the States’ arsenal was the racial gerrymander—“the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries . . . for [racial] purposes.” Bandemer, 478 U. S., at 164 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the 1870’s, for example, opponents of Reconstruction in Mississippi “concentrated the bulk of the black population in a ‘shoe- string’ Congressional district running the length of the Mis- sissippi River, leaving five others with white majorities.” E. Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877, p. 590 (1988). Some 90 years later, Alabama re- defined the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee “from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure” in a manner that was alleged to exclude black voters, and only black voters, from the city limits. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 340 (1960). Alabama’s exercise in geometry was but one example of the racial discrimination in voting that persisted in parts of this country nearly a century after ratification of the Fif- teenth Amendment. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 309–313 (1966). In some States, registration of eligible black voters ran 50% behind that of whites. Id., at 313. Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as a dramatic and severe response to the situation. The Act proved immediately successful in ensuring racial minorities access to the voting booth; by the early 1970’s, the spread between black and white registration in several of the tar- geted Southern States had fallen to well below 10%. A. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights 44 (1987). But it soon became apparent that guaranteeing equal ac- cess to the polls would not suffice to root out other racially discriminatory voting practices. Drawing on the “one per- son, one vote” principle, this Court recognized that “[t]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot.” 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:49 PAGES OPINPGT 641Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993) Opinion of the Court Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 569 (1969) (em- phasis added). Where members of a racial minority group vote as a cohesive unit, practices such as multimember or at- large electoral systems can reduce or nullify minority voters’ ability, as a group, “to elect the candidate of their choice.” Ibid. Accordingly, the Court held that such schemes violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect of diluting minor- ity voting strength. See, e. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616–617 (1982); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765–766 (1973). Congress, too, responded to the problem of vote di- lution. In 1982, it amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to prohibit legislation that results in the dilution of a minority group’s voting strength, regardless of the legislature’s intent. 42 U. S. C. § 1973; see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986) (applying amended § 2 to vote-dilution claim involving multimember districts); see also Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. 146, 155 (1993) (single-member districts). B It is against this background that we confront the ques- tions presented here. In our view, the District Court prop- erly dismissed appellants’ claims against the federal ap- pellees. Our focus is on appellants’ claim that the State engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. That argument strikes a powerful historical chord: It is unsettling how closely the North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past. An understanding of the nature of appellants’ claim is criti- cal to our resolution of the case. In their complaint, ap- pellants did not claim that the General Assembly’s reap- portionment plan unconstitutionally “diluted” white voting strength. They did not even claim to be white. Rather, ap- pellants’ complaint alleged that the deliberate segregation of voters into separate districts on the basis of race violated their constitutional right to participate in a “color-blind” 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:49 PAGES OPINPGT 644 SHAW v. RENO Opinion of the Court upon an extraordinary justification. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184. This rule applies as well to a classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347; cf. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339.” 442 U. S., at 272. B Appellants contend that redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is “unexplainable on grounds other than race,” Arlington Heights, supra, at 266, demands the same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that clas- sify citizens by race. Our voting rights precedents support that conclusion. In Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915), the Court invalidated under the Fifteenth Amendment a statute that imposed a literacy requirement on voters but contained a “grandfather clause” applicable to individuals and their lineal descendants entitled to vote “on [or prior to] January 1, 1866.” Id., at 357 (internal quotation marks omitted). The determinative consideration for the Court was that the law, though ostensibly race neutral, on its face “embod[ied] no exercise of judgment and rest[ed] upon no discernible rea- son” other than to circumvent the prohibitions of the Fif- teenth Amendment. Id., at 363. In other words, the stat- ute was invalid because, on its face, it could not be explained on grounds other than race. The Court applied the same reasoning to the “uncouth twenty-eight-sided” municipal boundary line at issue in Gomillion. Although the statute that redrew the city limits of Tuskegee was race neutral on its face, plaintiffs alleged that its effect was impermissibly to remove from the city virtually all black voters and no white voters. The Court reasoned: 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:49 PAGES OPINPGT 645Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993) Opinion of the Court “If these allegations upon a trial remained uncontra- dicted or unqualified, the conclusion would be irresist- ible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathe- matical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote.” 364 U. S., at 341. The majority resolved the case under the Fifteenth Amendment. Id., at 342–348. Justice Whittaker, however, concluded that the “unlawful segregation of races of citizens” into different voting districts was cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause. Id., at 349 (concurring opinion). This Court’s subsequent reliance on Gomillion in other Fourteenth Amendment cases suggests the correctness of Justice Whittaker’s view. See, e. g., Feeney, supra, at 272; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 149 (1971); see also Mo- bile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 86 (1980) (Stevens, J., concur- ring in judgment) (Gomillion’s holding “is compelled by the Equal Protection Clause”). Gomillion thus supports appel- lants’ contention that district lines obviously drawn for the purpose of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the motiva- tions underlying their adoption. The Court extended the reasoning of Gomillion to con- gressional districting in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964). At issue in Wright were four districts contained in a New York apportionment statute. The plaintiffs alleged that the statute excluded nonwhites from one district and concentrated them in the other three. Id., at 53–54. Every Member of the Court assumed that the plaintiffs’ allegation that the statute “segregate[d] eligible voters by race and place of origin” stated a constitutional claim. Id., at 56 (in- ternal quotation marks omitted); id., at 58 (Harlan, J., concur- ring); id., at 59–62 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Justices disagreed only as to whether the plaintiffs had carried their burden of proof at trial. The dissenters thought the unusual 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:49 PAGES OPINPGT 646 SHAW v. RENO Opinion of the Court shape of the district lines could “be explained only in racial terms.” Id., at 59. The majority, however, accepted the District Court’s finding that the plaintiffs had failed to estab- lish that the districts were in fact drawn on racial lines. Although the boundary lines were somewhat irregular, the majority reasoned, they were not so bizarre as to permit of no other conclusion. Indeed, because most of the nonwhite voters lived together in one area, it would have been difficult to construct voting districts without concentrations of non- white voters. Id., at 56–58. Wright illustrates the difficulty of determining from the face of a single-member districting plan that it purposefully distinguishes between voters on the basis of race. A reap- portionment statute typically does not classify persons at all; it classifies tracts of land, or addresses. Moreover, redis- tricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, reli- gious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demo- graphic factors. That sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination. As Wright demonstrates, when members of a racial group live together in one community, a reapportionment plan that con- centrates members of the group in one district and excludes them from others may reflect wholly legitimate purposes. The district lines may be drawn, for example, to provide for compact districts of contiguous territory, or to maintain the integrity of political subdivisions. See Reynolds, 377 U. S., at 578 (recognizing these as legitimate state interests). The difficulty of proof, of course, does not mean that a ra- cial gerrymander, once established, should receive less scru- tiny under the Equal Protection Clause than other state legislation classifying citizens by race. Moreover, it seems clear to us that proof sometimes will not be difficult at all. In some exceptional cases, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:49 PAGES OPINPGT 649Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993) Opinion of the Court the democratic ideal, it should find no footing here.” 376 U. S., at 66–67. For these reasons, we conclude that a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race neutral on its face, rationally cannot be under- stood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separa- tion lacks sufficient justification. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged. Thus, we express no view as to whether “the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more,” always gives rise to an equal protection claim. Post, at 668 (White, J., dissenting). We hold only that, on the facts of this case, appellants have stated a claim sufficient to defeat the state appellees’ motion to dismiss. C The dissenters consider the circumstances of this case “functionally indistinguishable” from multimember district- ing and at-large voting systems, which are loosely described as “other varieties of gerrymandering.” Post, at 671 (White, J., dissenting); see also post, at 684 (Souter, J., dis- senting). We have considered the constitutionality of these practices in other Fourteenth Amendment cases and have required plaintiffs to demonstrate that the challenged prac- tice has the purpose and effect of diluting a racial group’s voting strength. See, e. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613 (1982) (at-large system); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980) (same); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973) (multimember districts); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971) (same); see also supra, at 640–641. At-large and multimember schemes, however, do not classify voters on the basis of race. Classifying citizens by race, as we have said, threatens spe- 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:49 PAGES OPINPGT 650 SHAW v. RENO Opinion of the Court cial harms that are not present in our vote-dilution cases. It therefore warrants different analysis. Justice Souter apparently believes that racial gerry- mandering is harmless unless it dilutes a racial group’s vot- ing strength. See post, at 684 (dissenting opinion). As we have explained, however, reapportionment legislation that cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to classify and separate voters by race injures voters in other ways. It reinforces racial stereotypes and threatens to un- dermine our system of representative democracy by signal- ing to elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than their constituency as a whole. See supra, at 647–649. Justice Souter does not adequately explain why these harms are not cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment. The dissenters make two other arguments that cannot be reconciled with our precedents. First, they suggest that a racial gerrymander of the sort alleged here is functionally equivalent to gerrymanders for nonracial purposes, such as political gerrymanders. See post, at 679 (opinion of Ste- vens, J.); see also post, at 662–663 (opinion of White, J.). This Court has held political gerrymanders to be justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause. See Davis v. Bande- mer, 478 U. S., at 118–127. But nothing in our case law com- pels the conclusion that racial and political gerrymanders are subject to precisely the same constitutional scrutiny. In fact, our country’s long and persistent history of racial dis- crimination in voting—as well as our Fourteenth Amend- ment jurisprudence, which always has reserved the strictest scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of race, see supra, at 642–644—would seem to compel the opposite conclusion. Second, Justice Stevens argues that racial gerryman- dering poses no constitutional difficulties when district lines are drawn to favor the minority, rather than the majority. See post, at 678 (dissenting opinion). We have made clear, however, that equal protection analysis “is not dependent 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:49 PAGES OPINPGT 651Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993) Opinion of the Court on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification.” Croson, 488 U. S., at 494 (plurality opinion); see also id., at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Ac- cord, Wygant, 476 U. S., at 273 (plurality opinion). Indeed, racial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they may be said to burden or benefit the races equally. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 410 (1991) (“It is axiomatic that racial classifications do not become legitimate on the assumption that all persons suffer them in equal degree”). Finally, nothing in the Court’s highly fractured decision in UJO—on which the District Court almost exclusively relied, and which the dissenters evidently believe controls, see post, at 664–667 (opinion of White, J.); post, at 684, and n. 6 (opin- ion of Souter, J.)—forecloses the claim we recognize today. UJO concerned New York’s revision of a reapportionment plan to include additional majority-minority districts in re- sponse to the Attorney General’s denial of administrative preclearance under § 5. In that regard, it closely resembles the present case. But the cases are critically different in another way. The plaintiffs in UJO—members of a Hasidic community split between two districts under New York’s re- vised redistricting plan—did not allege that the plan, on its face, was so highly irregular that it rationally could be un- derstood only as an effort to segregate voters by race. In- deed, the facts of the case would not have supported such a claim. Three Justices approved the New York statute, in part, precisely because it adhered to traditional districting principles: “[W]e think it . . . permissible for a State, employing sound districting principles such as compactness and population equality, to attempt to prevent racial minor- ities from being repeatedly outvoted by creating dis- tricts that will afford fair representation to the members of those racial groups who are sufficiently numerous and whose residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating districts in which they will be in the majority.” 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:49 PAGES OPINPGT 654 SHAW v. RENO Opinion of the Court districts in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The States certainly have a very strong interest in comply- ing with federal antidiscrimination laws that are constitu- tionally valid as interpreted and as applied. But in the con- text of a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, courts must bear in mind the difference between what the law permits and what it requires. For example, on remand North Carolina might claim that it adopted the revised plan in order to comply with the § 5 “nonretrogression” principle. Under that principle, a pro- posed voting change cannot be precleared if it will lead to “a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976). In Beer, we held that a reapportionment plan that created one majority- minority district where none existed before passed muster under § 5 because it improved the position of racial minori- ties. Id., at 141–142; see also Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 370–371 (1975) (annexation that reduces per- centage of blacks in population satisfies § 5 where post- annexation districts “fairly reflect” current black voting strength). Although the Court concluded that the redistricting scheme at issue in Beer was nonretrogressive, it did not hold that the plan, for that reason, was immune from constitu- tional challenge. The Court expressly declined to reach that question. See 425 U. S., at 142, n. 14. Indeed, the Vot- ing Rights Act and our case law make clear that a reappor- tionment plan that satisfies § 5 still may be enjoined as un- constitutional. See 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (neither a declaratory judgment by the District Court for the District of Columbia nor preclearance by the Attorney General “shall bar a subse- quent action to enjoin enforcement” of new voting practice); Allen, 393 U. S., at 549–550 (after preclearance, “private par- ties may enjoin the enforcement of the new enactment . . . in traditional suits attacking its constitutionality”). Thus, 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:49 PAGES OPINPGT 655Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993) Opinion of the Court we do not read Beer or any of our other § 5 cases to give covered jurisdictions carte blanche to engage in racial gerry- mandering in the name of nonretrogression. A reapportion- ment plan would not be narrowly tailored to the goal of avoiding retrogression if the State went beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression. Our conclu- sion is supported by the plurality opinion in UJO, in which four Justices determined that New York’s creation of addi- tional majority-minority districts was constitutional because the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the State “did more than the Attorney General was authorized to require it to do under the nonretrogression principle of Beer.” 430 U. S., at 162–163 (opinion of White, J., joined by Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.) (emphasis added). Before us, the state appellees contend that the General Assembly’s revised plan was necessary not to prevent retro- gression, but to avoid dilution of black voting strength in violation of § 2, as construed in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986). In Gingles the Court considered a multi- member redistricting plan for the North Carolina State Leg- islature. The Court held that members of a racial minority group claiming § 2 vote dilution through the use of multi- member districts must prove three threshold conditions: that the minority group “is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member dis- trict,” that the minority group is “politically cohesive,” and that “the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Id., at 50–51. We have indicated that similar preconditions apply in § 2 challenges to single-member districts. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S., at 157–158; Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S., at 40. Appellants maintain that the General Assembly’s revised plan could not have been required by § 2. They contend that the State’s black population is too dispersed to support two geographically compact majority-black districts, as the bi- 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:49 PAGES OPINPGT 656 SHAW v. RENO Opinion of the Court zarre shape of District 12 demonstrates, and that there is no evidence of black political cohesion. They also contend that recent black electoral successes demonstrate the willingness of white voters in North Carolina to vote for black candi- dates. Appellants point out that blacks currently hold the positions of State Auditor, Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, and chair of the North Carolina State Board of Elections. They also point out that in 1990 a black candidate defeated a white opponent in the Democratic Party runoff for a United States Senate seat before being defeated narrowly by the Republican incumbent in the gen- eral election. Appellants further argue that if § 2 did re- quire adoption of North Carolina’s revised plan, § 2 is to that extent unconstitutional. These arguments were not devel- oped below, and the issues remain open for consideration on remand. The state appellees alternatively argue that the General Assembly’s plan advanced a compelling interest entirely dis- tinct from the Voting Rights Act. We previously have rec- ognized a significant state interest in eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination. See, e. g., Croson, 488 U. S., at 491–493 (opinion of O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and White, J.); id., at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Wygant, 476 U. S., at 280– 282 (plurality opinion); id., at 286 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But the State must have a “ ‘strong basis in evidence for [concluding] that reme- dial action [is] necessary.’ ” Croson, supra, at 500 (quoting Wygant, supra, at 277 (plurality opinion)). The state appellees submit that two pieces of evidence gave the General Assembly a strong basis for believing that remedial action was warranted here: the Attorney General’s imposition of the § 5 preclearance requirement on 40 North Carolina counties, and the Gingles District Court’s findings of a long history of official racial discrimination in North Car- olina’s political system and of pervasive racial bloc voting. 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:49 PAGES OPINPGT 659Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993) White, J., dissenting Equal Protection Clause. On the same reasoning, I would affirm the District Court’s dismissal of appellants’ claim in this instance. The Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep, UJO. It does so by glossing over the striking simi- larities, focusing on surface differences, most notably the (ad- mittedly unusual) shape of the newly created district, and imagining an entirely new cause of action. Because the holding is limited to such anomalous circumstances, ante, at 649, it perhaps will not substantially hamper a State’s legiti- mate efforts to redistrict in favor of racial minorities. None- theless, the notion that North Carolina’s plan, under which whites remain a voting majority in a disproportionate num- ber of congressional districts, and pursuant to which the State has sent its first black representatives since Recon- struction to the United States Congress, might have violated appellants’ constitutional rights is both a fiction and a depar- ture from settled equal protection principles. Seeing no good reason to engage in either, I dissent. I A The grounds for my disagreement with the majority are simply stated: Appellants have not presented a cognizable claim, because they have not alleged a cognizable injury. To date, we have held that only two types of state voting prac- tices could give rise to a constitutional claim. The first in- volves direct and outright deprivation of the right to vote, for example by means of a poll tax or literacy test. See, e. g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915). Plainly, this variety is not implicated by appellants’ allegations and need not detain us further. The second type of unconstitu- tional practice is that which “affects the political strength of various groups,” Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 83 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. As for this latter category, we 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:50 PAGES OPINPGT 660 SHAW v. RENO White, J., dissenting have insisted that members of the political or racial group demonstrate that the challenged action have the intent and effect of unduly diminishing their influence on the po- litical process.1 Although this severe burden has limited the number of successful suits, it was adopted for sound reasons. The central explanation has to do with the nature of the redistricting process. As the majority recognizes, “redis- tricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors.” Ante, at 646 (emphasis in original). “Being aware,” in this context, is shorthand for “taking into account,” and it hardly can be doubted that legislators routinely engage in the business of making electoral predic- tions based on group characteristics—racial, ethnic, and the like. “[L]ike bloc-voting by race, [the racial composition of geographic area] too is a fact of life, well known to those responsible for drawing electoral district lines. These lawmakers are quite aware that the districts they create will have a white or a black majority; and with each new district comes the unavoidable choice as to the racial composition of the district.” Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 144 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). As we have said, “it requires no special genius to recognize the political consequences of drawing a district line along one street rather than another.” Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 1 It has been argued that the required showing of discriminatory effect should be lessened once a plaintiff successfully demonstrates intentional discrimination. See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F. 2d 763, 771 (CA9 1990). Although I would leave this question for another day, I would note that even then courts have insisted on “some showing of injury . . . to assure that the district court can impose a meaningful remedy.” Ibid. 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:50 PAGES OPINPGT 661Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993) White, J., dissenting U. S. 735, 753 (1973); see also Mobile v. Bolden, supra, at 86–87 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Because extirpating such considerations from the redistricting proc- ess is unrealistic, the Court has not invalidated all plans that consciously use race, but rather has looked at their impact. Redistricting plans also reflect group interests and inevi- tably are conceived with partisan aims in mind. To allow judicial interference whenever this occurs would be to invite constant and unmanageable intrusion. Moreover, a group’s power to affect the political process does not automatically dissipate by virtue of an electoral loss. Accordingly, we have asked that an identifiable group demonstrate more than mere lack of success at the polls to make out a successful gerrymandering claim. See, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765–766 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 153–155 (1971). With these considerations in mind, we have limited such claims by insisting upon a showing that “the political proc- esses . . . were not equally open to participation by the group in question—that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.” White v. Regester, supra, at 766. Indeed, as a brief survey of deci- sions illustrates, the Court’s gerrymandering cases all carry this theme—that it is not mere suffering at the polls but discrimination in the polity with which the Constitution is concerned. In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S., at 149, we searched in vain for evidence that black voters “had less opportunity than did other . . . residents to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.” More generally, we remarked: “The mere fact that one interest group or another con- cerned with the outcome of [the district’s] elections has found itself outvoted and without legislative seats of its 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:50 PAGES OPINPGT 664 SHAW v. RENO White, J., dissenting against anyone by denying equal access to the political proc- ess. Even Members of the Court least inclined to approve of race-based remedial measures have acknowledged the sig- nificance of this factor. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 524–525, n. 3 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“No person in [UJO] was deprived of his electoral franchise”); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 304–305 (1978) (Powell, J.) (“United Jewish Organizations . . . properly is viewed as a case in which the remedy for an administrative finding of discrimination encompassed measures to improve the previously disadvantaged group’s ability to participate, without excluding individuals belonging to any other group from enjoyment of the relevant opportunity—meaningful participation in the electoral process”) (emphasis added). B The most compelling evidence of the Court’s position prior to this day, for it is most directly on point, is UJO, 430 U. S. 144 (1977). The Court characterizes the decision as “highly fractured,” ante, at 651, but that should not detract attention from the rejection by a majority in UJO of the claim that the State’s intentional creation of majority-minority districts transgressed constitutional norms. As stated above, five Justices were of the view that, absent any contention that the proposed plan was adopted with the intent, or had the effect, of unduly minimizing the white majority’s voting strength, the Fourteenth Amendment was not implicated. Writing for three Members of the Court, I justified this con- clusion as follows: “It is true that New York deliberately increased the nonwhite majorities in certain districts in order to en- hance the opportunity for election of nonwhite repre- sentatives from those districts. Nevertheless, there was no fencing out of the white population from partici- pation in the political processes of the county, and the 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:50 PAGES OPINPGT 665Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993) White, J., dissenting plan did not minimize or unfairly cancel out white voting strength.” 430 U. S., at 165. In a similar vein, Justice Stewart was joined by Justice Powell in stating: “The petitioners have made no showing that a racial criterion was used as a basis for denying them their right to vote, in contravention of the Fifteenth Amend- ment. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339. They have made no showing that the redistricting scheme was employed as part of a ‘contrivance to segregate’; to mini- mize or cancel out the voting strength of a minority class or interest; or otherwise to impair or burden the oppor- tunity of affected persons to participate in the political process.” Id., at 179 (opinion concurring in judgment) (some citations omitted). Under either formulation, it is irrefutable that appellants in this proceeding likewise have failed to state a claim. As was the case in New York, a number of North Carolina’s political subdivisions have interfered with black citizens’ meaningful exercise of the franchise and are therefore sub- ject to §§ 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Cf. UJO, supra, at 148. In other words, North Carolina was found by Con- gress to have “ ‘resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees’ ” and therefore “would be likely to en- gage in ‘similar maneuvers in the future in order to evade the remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act itself.’ ” McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U. S. 236, 245 (1984) (quot- ing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 334, 335 (1966)).5 Like New York, North Carolina failed to prove to 5 In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 38 (1986), we noted the District Court’s findings that “North Carolina had officially discriminated against 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:50 PAGES OPINPGT 666 SHAW v. RENO White, J., dissenting the Attorney General’s satisfaction that its proposed redis- tricting had neither the purpose nor the effect of abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. Cf. UJO, supra, at 150. The Attorney General’s interposition of a § 5 objec- tion “properly is viewed” as “an administrative finding of discrimination” against a racial minority. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, supra, at 305 (opinion of Powell, J.). Fi- nally, like New York, North Carolina reacted by modifying its plan and creating additional majority-minority districts. Cf. UJO, supra, at 151–152. In light of this background, it strains credulity to suggest that North Carolina’s purpose in creating a second majority- minority district was to discriminate against members of the majority group by “impair[ing] or burden[ing their] opportu- nity . . . to participate in the political process.” Id., at 179 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). The State has made no mystery of its intent, which was to respond to the Attor- ney General’s objections, see Brief for State Appellees 13–14, by improving the minority group’s prospects of electing a candidate of its choice. I doubt that this constitutes a discriminatory purpose as defined in the Court’s equal protection cases—i. e., an intent to aggravate “the unequal distribution of electoral power.” Post, at 678 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But even assuming that it does, there is no question that appellants have not alleged the requisite dis- criminatory effects. Whites constitute roughly 76% of the total population and 79% of the voting age population in North Carolina. Yet, under the State’s plan, they still con- stitute a voting majority in 10 (or 83%) of the 12 congres- sional districts. Though they might be dissatisfied at the prospect of casting a vote for a losing candidate—a lot shared by many, including a disproportionate number of minor- its black citizens with respect to their exercise of the voting franchise from approximately 1900 to 1970 by employing a poll tax [and] a literacy test.” 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:50 PAGES OPINPGT 669Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993) White, J., dissenting taker’s concurrence appears to be premised on the notion that black citizens were being “fenc[ed] out” of municipal benefits. Id., at 349. Subsequent decisions of this Court have similarly interpreted Gomillion as turning on the unconstitutional effect of the legislation. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 225 (1971); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 385 (1968). In Gomillion, in short, the group that formed the majority at the state level pur- portedly set out to manipulate city boundaries in order to remove members of the minority, thereby denying them val- uable municipal services. No analogous purpose or effect has been alleged in this case. The only other case invoked by the majority is Wright v. Rockefeller, supra. Wright involved a challenge to a legis- lative plan that created four districts. In the 17th, 19th, and 20th Districts, whites constituted respectively 94.9%, 71.5%, and 72.5% of the population. 86.3% of the population in the 18th District was classified as nonwhite or Puerto Rican. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. 460, 472 (SDNY 1962) (Murphy, J., dissenting); 376 U. S., at 54. The plaintiffs al- leged that the plan was drawn with the intent to segregate voters on the basis of race, in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Id., at 53–54. The Court affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving discrimi- natory intent. See id., at 55, 58. I fail to see how a decision based on a failure to establish discriminatory intent can sup- port the inference that it is unnecessary to prove discrimina- tory effect. Wright is relevant only to the extent that it illustrates a proposition with which I have no problem: that a complaint stating that a plan has carved out districts on the basis of race can, under certain circumstances, state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. To that end, however, there must be an allegation of discriminatory purpose and effect, for the constitutionality of a race-conscious redistricting plan 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:50 PAGES OPINPGT 670 SHAW v. RENO White, J., dissenting depends on these twin elements. In Wright, for example, the facts might have supported the contention that the districts were intended to, and did in fact, shield the 17th District from any minority influence and “pack” black and Puerto Rican voters in the 18th, thereby invidiously min- imizing their voting strength. In other words, the pur- poseful creation of a majority-minority district could have discriminatory effect if it is achieved by means of “pack- ing”—i. e., overconcentration of minority voters. In the present case, the facts could sustain no such allegation. B Lacking support in any of the Court’s precedents, the ma- jority’s novel type of claim also makes no sense. As I under- stand the theory that is put forth, a redistricting plan that uses race to “segregate” voters by drawing “uncouth” lines is harmful in a way that a plan that uses race to distribute voters differently is not, for the former “bears an uncomfort- able resemblance to political apartheid.” See ante, at 647. The distinction is untenable. Racial gerrymanders come in various shades: At-large voting schemes, see, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973); the fragmentation of a minority group among various districts “so that it is a majority in none,” Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. 146, 153 (1993), otherwise known as “crack- ing,” cf. Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 422 (1977); the “stacking” of “a large minority population concentration . . . with a larger white population,” Parker, Racial Gerryman- dering and Legislative Reapportionment, in Minority Vote Dilution 85, 92 (C. Davidson ed. 1984); and, finally, the “con- centration of [minority voters] into districts where they con- stitute an excessive majority,” Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 46, n. 11 (1986), also called “packing,” Voinovich, supra, at 153. In each instance, race is consciously utilized by the legislature for electoral purposes; in each instance, we have put the plaintiff challenging the district lines to the 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:50 PAGES OPINPGT 671Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993) White, J., dissenting burden of demonstrating that the plan was meant to, and did in fact, exclude an identifiable racial group from participation in the political process. Not so, apparently, when the districting “segregates” by drawing odd-shaped lines.7 In that case, we are told, such proof no longer is needed. Instead, it is the State that must rebut the allegation that race was taken into account, a fact that, together with the legislators’ consideration of ethnic, religious, and other group characteristics, I had thought we practically took for granted, see supra, at 660. Part of the explanation for the majority’s approach has to do, perhaps, with the emotions stirred by words such as “segregation” and “political apartheid.” But their loose and imprecise use by today’s majority has, I fear, led it astray. See n. 7, supra. The consideration of race in “segregation” cases is no differ- ent than in other race-conscious districting; from the stand- point of the affected groups, moreover, the line-drawings all act in similar fashion.8 A plan that “segregates” being func- tionally indistinguishable from any of the other varieties of gerrymandering, we should be consistent in what we require from a claimant: proof of discriminatory purpose and effect. The other part of the majority’s explanation of its hold- ing is related to its simultaneous discomfort and fascination with irregularly shaped districts. Lack of compactness or contiguity, like uncouth district lines, certainly is a helpful 7 I borrow the term “segregate” from the majority, but, given its histori- cal connotation, believe that its use is ill advised. Nor is it a particularly accurate description of what has occurred. The majority-minority district that is at the center of the controversy is, according to the State, 54.71% African-American. Brief for State Appellees 5, n. 6. Even if racial dis- tribution was a factor, no racial group can be said to have been “segre- gated”—i. e., “set apart” or “isolate[d].” Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1063 (9th ed. 1983). 8 The black plaintiffs in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), I am confident, would have suffered equally had whites in Tuskegee sought to maintain their control by annexing predominantly white suburbs, rather than splitting the municipality in two. 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:50 PAGES OPINPGT 674 SHAW v. RENO White, J., dissenting a majority-minority district does not unfairly minimize the voting power of any other group, the Constitution does not justify, much less mandate, such obstruction. We said as much in Gaffney: “[C]ourts have [no] constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan, otherwise within tolerable population limits, because it undertakes, not to minimize or eliminate the political strength of any group or party, but to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of pro- portional representation in the legislative halls of the State.” 412 U. S., at 754. III Although I disagree with the holding that appellants’ claim is cognizable, the Court’s discussion of the level of scrutiny it requires warrants a few comments. I have no doubt that a State’s compliance with the Voting Rights Act clearly con- stitutes a compelling interest. Cf. UJO, 430 U. S., at 162– 165 (opinion of White, J.); id., at 175–179 (Brennan, J., con- curring in part); id., at 180 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). Here, the Attorney General objected to the State’s plan on the ground that it failed to draw a second majority-minority district for what appeared to be pretex- tual reasons. Rather than challenge this conclusion, North Carolina chose to draw the second district. As UJO held, a State is entitled to take such action. See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 291 (O’Connor, J., con- curring in part and concurring in judgment). The Court, while seemingly agreeing with this position, warns that the State’s redistricting effort must be “narrowly tailored” to further its interest in complying with the law. Ante, at 658. It is evident to me, however, that what North Carolina did was precisely tailored to meet the objection of the Attorney General to its prior plan. Hence, I see no need 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:50 PAGES OPINPGT 675Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993) White, J., dissenting for a remand at all, even accepting the majority’s basic ap- proach to this case. Furthermore, how it intends to manage this standard, I do not know. Is it more “narrowly tailored” to create an irreg- ular majority-minority district as opposed to one that is com- pact but harms other state interests such as incumbency protection or the representation of rural interests? Of the following two options—creation of two minority influence districts or of a single majority-minority district—is one “narrowly tailored” and the other not? Once the Attorney General has found that a proposed redistricting change vio- lates § 5’s nonretrogression principle in that it will abridge a racial minority’s right to vote, does “narrow tailoring” mean that the most the State can do is preserve the status quo? Or can it maintain that change, while attempting to enhance minority voting power in some other manner? This small sample only begins to scratch the surface of the problems raised by the majority’s test. But it suffices to illustrate the unworkability of a standard that is divorced from any meas- ure of constitutional harm. In that, state efforts to remedy minority vote dilution are wholly unlike what typically has been labeled “affirmative action.” To the extent that no other racial group is injured, remedying a Voting Rights Act violation does not involve preferential treatment. Cf. Wy- gant, supra, at 295 (White, J., concurring in judgment). It involves, instead, an attempt to equalize treatment, and to provide minority voters with an effective voice in the politi- cal process. The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitu- tion, surely, does not stand in the way. IV Since I do not agree that appellants alleged an equal pro- tection violation and because the Court of Appeals faithfully followed the Court’s prior cases, I dissent and would affirm the judgment below. 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:50 PAGES OPINPGT 676 SHAW v. RENO Stevens, J., dissenting Justice Blackmun, dissenting. I join Justice White’s dissenting opinion. I did not join Part IV of his opinion in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977), because I felt that its “additional argument,” id., at 165, was not neces- sary to decide that case. I nevertheless agree that the con- scious use of race in redistricting does not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the effect of the redistricting plan is to deny a particular group equal access to the political process or to minimize its voting strength unduly. See, e. g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 17 (1975); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765–766 (1973). It is particularly ironic that the case in which today’s majority chooses to abandon settled law and to recognize for the first time this “analytically dis- tinct” constitutional claim, ante, at 652, is a challenge by white voters to the plan under which North Carolina has sent black representatives to Congress for the first time since Reconstruction. I dissent. Justice Stevens, dissenting. For the reasons stated by Justice White, the decision of the District Court should be affirmed. I add these com- ments to emphasize that the two critical facts in this case are undisputed: First, the shape of District 12 is so bizarre that it must have been drawn for the purpose of either ad- vantaging or disadvantaging a cognizable group of voters; and, second, regardless of that shape, it was drawn for the purpose of facilitating the election of a second black repre- sentative from North Carolina. These unarguable facts, which the Court devotes most of its opinion to proving, give rise to three constitutional ques- tions: Does the Constitution impose a requirement of conti- guity or compactness on how the States may draw their elec- toral districts? Does the Equal Protection Clause prevent a State from drawing district boundaries for the purpose of 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:50 PAGES OPINPGT 679Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993) Souter, J., dissenting Finally, we must ask whether otherwise permissible re- districting to benefit an underrepresented minority group becomes impermissible when the minority group is defined by its race. The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. If it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide adequate representation for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans, or for Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for members of the very minority group whose history in the United States gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause. See, e. g., ante, at 639–641.4 A contrary conclusion could only be described as perverse. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. Justice Souter, dissenting. Today, the Court recognizes a new cause of action under which a State’s electoral redistricting plan that includes a configuration “so bizarre,” ante, at 644, that it “rationally can- not be understood as anything other than an effort to sepa- rate voters into different districts on the basis of race [with- out] sufficient justification,” ante, at 649, will be subjected to strict scrutiny. In my view there is no justification for the the latter two of these three conditions depend on proving that what the Court today brands as “impermissible racial stereotypes,” ante, at 647, are true. Because Gingles involved North Carolina, which the Court ad- mits has earlier established the existence of “pervasive racial bloc voting,” ante, at 656, its citizens and legislators—as well as those from other States—will no doubt be confused by the Court’s requirement of evidence in one type of case that the Constitution now prevents reliance on in another. The Court offers them no explanation of this paradox. 4 The Court’s opinion suggests that African-Americans may now be the only group to which it is unconstitutional to offer specific benefits from redistricting. Not very long ago, of course, it was argued that minority groups defined by race were the only groups the Equal Protection Clause protected in this context. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S., at 86–90, and nn. 6–10 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:50 PAGES OPINPGT 680 SHAW v. RENO Souter, J., dissenting Court’s determination to depart from our prior decisions by carving out this narrow group of cases for strict scrutiny in place of the review customarily applied in cases dealing with discrimination in electoral districting on the basis of race. I Until today, the Court has analyzed equal protection claims involving race in electoral districting differently from equal protection claims involving other forms of governmen- tal conduct, and before turning to the different regimes of analysis it will be useful to set out the relevant respects in which such districting differs from the characteristic circum- stances in which a State might otherwise consciously con- sider race. Unlike other contexts in which we have ad- dressed the State’s conscious use of race, see, e. g., Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469 (1989) (city contracting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267 (1986) (teacher layoffs), electoral districting calls for decisions that nearly always require some consideration of race for legitimate rea- sons where there is a racially mixed population. As long as members of racial groups have the commonality of interest implicit in our ability to talk about concepts like “minority voting strength,” and “dilution of minority votes,” cf. Thorn- burg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 46–51 (1986), and as long as racial bloc voting takes place,1 legislators will have to take race into account in order to avoid dilution of minority voting strength in the districting plans they adopt.2 One need look 1 “Bloc racial voting is an unfortunate phenomenon, but we are repeat- edly faced with the findings of knowledgeable district courts that it is a fact of life. Where it exists, most often the result is that neither white nor black can be elected from a district in which his race is in the mi- nority.” Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 144 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). 2 Recognition of actual commonality of interest and racially polarized bloc voting cannot be equated with the “ ‘invocation of race stereotypes’ ” described by the Court, ante, at 648 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Con- crete Co., 500 U. S. 614, 630–631 (1991)), and forbidden by our case law. 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:50 PAGES OPINPGT 681Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993) Souter, J., dissenting no further than the Voting Rights Act to understand that this may be required, and we have held that race may consti- tutionally be taken into account in order to comply with that Act. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 161–162 (1977) (UJO) (plurality opin- ion of White, J., joined by Brennan, Blackmun, and Ste- vens, JJ.); id., at 180, and n. (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in judgment).3 A second distinction between districting and most other governmental decisions in which race has figured is that those other decisions using racial criteria characteristically occur in circumstances in which the use of race to the advan- tage of one person is necessarily at the obvious expense of a member of a different race. Thus, for example, awarding government contracts on a racial basis excludes certain firms from competition on racial grounds. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., supra, at 493; see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 484 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C. J.). And when race is used to supplant seniority in layoffs, someone is laid off who would not be otherwise. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., supra, at 282–283 (plurality opinion). The same principle pertains in nondistricting aspects of voting law, where race-based discrimination places the disfavored voters at the disadvantage of exclusion from the franchise without any alternative benefit. See, e. g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 341 (1960) (voters alleged to have been ex- cluded from voting in the municipality). In districting, by contrast, the mere placement of an indi- vidual in one district instead of another denies no one a right 3 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires a covered jurisdiction to demonstrate either to the Attorney General or to the District Court that each new districting plan “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race[,] color, or [membership in a language minority.]” 42 U. S. C. § 1973c; see also § 1973b(f)(2). Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids districting plans that will have a discriminatory effect on minority groups. § 1973. 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:50 PAGES OPINPGT 684 SHAW v. RENO Souter, J., dissenting tution), it has seemed more appropriate for the Court to identify impermissible uses by describing particular effects sufficiently serious to justify recognition under the Four- teenth Amendment. Under our cases there is in general a requirement that in order to obtain relief under the Four- teenth Amendment, the purpose and effect of the districting must be to devalue the effectiveness of a voter compared to what, as a group member, he would otherwise be able to enjoy. See UJO, 430 U. S., at 165–166 (plurality opinion of White, J., joined by Stevens and Rehnquist, JJ.); id., at 179–180 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in judg- ment). Justice White describes the formulations we have used and the common categories of dilutive practice in his dissenting opinion. See ante, at 661–663, 669–670.6 A consequence of this categorical approach is the absence of any need for further searching “scrutiny” once it has been shown that a given districting decision has a purpose and effect falling within one of those categories. If a cognizable harm like dilution or the abridgment of the right to partici- pate in the electoral process is shown, the districting plan violates the Fourteenth Amendment. If not, it does not. Under this approach, in the absence of an allegation of such cognizable harm, there is no need for further scrutiny be- cause a gerrymandering claim cannot be proven without the element of harm. Nor if dilution is proven is there any need for further constitutional scrutiny; there has never been a suggestion that such use of race could be justified under any type of scrutiny, since the dilution of the right to vote can not be said to serve any legitimate governmental purpose. There is thus no theoretical inconsistency in having two distinct approaches to equal protection analysis, one for 6 In this regard, I agree with Justice White’s assessment of the diffi- culty the white plaintiffs would have here in showing that their opportu- nity to participate equally in North Carolina’s electoral process has been unconstitutionally diminished. See ante, at 666–667, and n. 6 (dissenting opinion). 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:50 PAGES OPINPGT 685Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993) Souter, J., dissenting cases of electoral districting and one for most other types of state governmental decisions. Nor, because of the distinc- tions between the two categories, is there any risk that Four- teenth Amendment districting law as such will be taken to imply anything for purposes of general Fourteenth Amend- ment scrutiny about “benign” racial discrimination, or about group entitlement as distinct from individual protection, or about the appropriateness of strict or other heightened scrutiny.7 III The Court appears to accept this, and it does not purport to disturb the law of vote dilution in any way. See ante, at 652 (acknowledging that “UJO set forth a standard under which white voters can establish unconstitutional vote dilu- tion”). Instead, the Court creates a new “analytically dis- tinct,” ibid., cause of action, the principal element of which is that a districting plan be “so bizarre on its face,” ante, at 644, or “irrational on its face,” ante, at 652, or “extremely irregular on its face,” ante, at 642, that it “rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification,” ante, at 652. Pleading such an element, the Court holds, suffices without a further alle- gation of harm, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Fourteenth Amendment. See ante, at 649. It may be that the terms for pleading this cause of action will be met so rarely that this case will wind up an aberra- 7 The Court accuses me of treating the use of race in electoral redistrict- ing as a “benign” form of discrimination. Ante, at 653. What I am say- ing is that in electoral districting there frequently are permissible uses of race, such as its use to comply with the Voting Rights Act, as well as impermissible ones. In determining whether a use of race is permissible in cases in which there is a bizarrely shaped district, we can readily look to its effects, just as we would in evaluating any other electoral district- ing scheme. 509us3116I 03-28-97 20:17:50 PAGES OPINPGT 686 SHAW v. RENO Souter, J., dissenting tion. The shape of the district at issue in this case is indeed so bizarre that few other examples are ever likely to carry the unequivocal implication of impermissible use of race that the Court finds here. It may therefore be that few electoral districting cases are ever likely to employ the strict scrutiny the Court holds to be applicable on remand if appellants’ alle- gations are “not contradicted.” Ante, at 653; see also ante, at 658.8 Nonetheless, in those cases where this cause of action is sufficiently pleaded, the State will have to justify its decision to consider race as being required by a compelling state in- terest, and its use of race as narrowly tailored to that inter- est. Meanwhile, in other districting cases, specific conse- quential harm will still need to be pleaded and proven, in the absence of which the use of race may be invalidated only if it is shown to serve no legitimate state purpose. Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 500 (1954). The Court offers no adequate justification for treating the narrow category of bizarrely shaped district claims differ- ently from other districting claims.9 The only justification I 8 While the Court “express[es] no view as to whether ‘the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more,’ always gives rise to an equal protection claim,” ante, at 649 (quoting ante, at 668 (White, J., dissenting)), it repeatedly emphasizes that there is some reason to be- lieve that a configuration devised with reference to traditional districting principles would present a case falling outside the cause of action recog- nized today. See ante, at 642, 649, 652, 657–658. 9 The Court says its new cause of action is justified by what I understand to be some ingredients of stigmatic harm, see ante, at 647–648, and by a “threa[t] to . . . our system of representative democracy,” ante, at 650, both caused by the mere adoption of a districting plan with the elements I have described in the text, supra, at 685. To begin with, the complaint nowhere alleges any type of stigmatic harm. See App. to Juris. State- ment 67a–100a (Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and For Temporary Restraining Order). Putting that to one side, it seems utterly implausible to me to presume, as the Court does, that North Carolina’s creation of this strangely shaped majority-minority district “generates” within the white plaintiffs here anything comparable to “a feeling of inferi-