Download Constitutionality of Statutory Damage Caps in Sexual Assault Cases and more Study notes Law in PDF only on Docsity! [Cite as Simpkins v. Grace Brethren Church of Delaware, Ohio, 149 Ohio St.3d 307, 2016- Ohio-8118.] SIMPKINS ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. GRACE BRETHREN CHURCH OF DELAWARE, OHIO, APPELLEE, ET AL. [Cite as Simpkins v. Grace Brethren Church of Delaware, Ohio, 149 Ohio St.3d 307, 2016-Ohio-8118.] TortsâDamagesâR.C. 2315.18âStatutory cap on noneconomic damages constitutional as applied to damage awards to minor victim of sexual assaultâOral and vaginal penetrations occurring within short period of time, within confined space, and without intervening factors constitute single âoccurrenceâ for purposes of damages cap. (No. 2014-1953âSubmitted December 15, 2015âDecided December 14, 2016.) APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Delaware County, No. 13 CAE 10 0073, 2014-Ohio-3465. _____________________ FRENCH, J. {¶ 1} This appeal presents as-applied constitutional challenges to the caps on noneconomic tort damages set out in R.C. 2315.18(B). In this opinion, we consider whether application of the damage caps to damages awarded to a minor who was the victim of sexual assault violates the minorâs constitutional rights to a jury trial, to a remedy and open courts, to equal protection, and to due process. We also review and apply the statutory definition of âoccurrenceâ in R.C. 2315.18(A)(5). We do not consider here whether there may exist any set of facts under which application of the statutory damage caps would prove unconstitutional. We conclude only that R.C. 2315.18(B) is constitutional as applied to the facts before us and that this case involves a single âoccurrenceâ for purposes of applying the caps. We affirm the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals. SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 2 Background: noneconomic-damage caps {¶ 2} The General Assembly enacted R.C. 2315.18 as part of a broader tort-reform bill in Am.Sub.S.B. 80, 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, 7915 (âS.B. 80â), effective April 7, 2005. In support of those reforms, the General Assembly recognized the stateâs interest in âa fair, predictable system of civil justiceâ that preserves the rights of injured parties while curbing frivolous lawsuits, which increase the costs of doing business, threaten Ohio jobs, drive up consumer costs, and may hinder innovation. S.B. 80, Section 3(A)(3), 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, at 8024. {¶ 3} R.C. 2315.18 sets out procedures for imposing tort damages. When there is a jury trial, the jury returns a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories. R.C. 2315.18(D). The verdict must specify the juryâs determination of the total compensatory damages recoverable as well as the portions of that total that represent economic and noneconomic losses. Id. The trial court then enters judgment for the total amount of economic damages determined by the jury and for the amount of noneconomic damages determined by the jury, up to the limits established by R.C. 2315.18(B). R.C. 2315.18(B)(1), (B)(2), (E)(1). {¶ 4} R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) establishes a cap on compensatory tort damages for ânoneconomic loss,â which includes but is not limited to âpain and suffering, loss of society, consortium, companionship, care, assistance, attention, protection, advice, guidance, counsel, instruction, training, or education, disfigurement, mental anguish, and any other intangible loss.â R.C. 2315.18(A)(4). R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) provides: [T]he amount of compensatory damages that represents damages for noneconomic loss * * * shall not exceed the greater of two hundred fifty thousand dollars or an amount that is equal to three January Term, 2016 5 {¶ 11} Appellants allege that Delaware Grace knew or should have known that Williams was unqualified to serve as a pastor and that Delaware Grace was negligent in retaining Williams as an employee and in assisting Williams to become the senior pastor at Sunbury Grace. In support of that claim, appellants allege that prior to the fall of 2004, Delaware Grace was aware of at least two incidents during which Williams, while in its employ, engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior with young women. {¶ 12} The first incident allegedly occurred during a mission trip in the early 1990s. Jeffrey Gill, the senior pastor at Delaware Grace from 1982 to 2002, testified that a teenage girl from another Grace Brethren church accused Williams of touching her inappropriately while on the mission trip. Williams admitted to Gill that he rubbed the girlâs shoulders, but he denied any impropriety. Gill and Williams met with the pastor from the other church, the teenage girl, and her mother, and Williams read a prepared statement of apology. After that meeting, Gill felt that the accusations against Williams were resolved. {¶ 13} The second alleged incident of sexual impropriety occurred in May 2002. Anderson, the former senior pastor at Delaware Grace, testified about a young womanâs substantiated allegations of inappropriate sexual comments and touching by Williams. Although he did not make any notes regarding Williamsâs conduct, Anderson met with Williams and told him âhow highly inappropriateâ that conduct was. Anderson did not, however, report Williamsâs conduct to Gill, who was until June 2002 a senior pastor at Delaware Grace, or to the Delaware Grace Elder Board, of which Williams was a member. Nor did he inform Gary Underwood, who was hired as Delaware Graceâs senior pastor in October 2004, about the 2002 incident. Underwood, in fact, testified that he was unaware of any personnel records reflecting the allegations or incidents of inappropriate sexual conduct by Williams. SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 6 {¶ 14} In September 2004, Delaware Grace executed a letter of understanding with Williams regarding the planting of Sunbury Grace. At that time, Anderson, who had personal knowledge of the 2002 incident, was the acting senior pastor of Delaware Grace. Anderson also served as Williamsâs supervisor for a period of time following the execution of the letter of understanding, while Williams was attending to Sunbury Grace business. The Delaware Grace Elder Board supported Williams as head pastor of Sunbury Grace. Underwood, however, stated that he would not have supported Williams in his goal to become head pastor of Sunbury Grace had he known about Williamsâs prior incidents of inappropriate sexual misconduct. {¶ 15} The trial court conducted a jury trial on appellantsâ claim of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and the jury returned a verdict for appellants. The jury found that Simpkins was entitled to $3,651,378.85 in compensatory damages, which included the following: $1,378.85 for past economic damages, $150,000 for future economic damages, $1,500,000 for past noneconomic damages, and $2,000,000 for future noneconomic damages. The jury awarded Gene Simpkins $75,000 for loss of consortium. {¶ 16} Before entering judgment, the trial court set off $1,378.85 based on appellantsâ settlement with Sunbury Grace and it applied the cap in R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) to reduce Simpkinsâs noneconomic damages from $3.5 million to $350,000. Accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment of $500,000 for Simpkins and $75,000 for her father. The trial court subsequently granted Delaware Graceâs request to reduce Simpkinsâs future economic damages from $150,000 to $60,000, but its order gave Simpkins until 30 days after all appeals are concluded and the time for further appeal has expired to accept the reduction in lieu of a partial new trial limited to the amount of her future economic damages. January Term, 2016 7 {¶ 17} Appellants and Delaware Grace appealed, and the Fifth District affirmed the judgment in part and reversed it in part and remanded the cause. 2014-Ohio-3465, 16 N.E.3d 687. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred by refusing to submit to the jury the issue of apportionment of liability between Williams and Delaware Grace and by granting summary judgment in favor of Delaware Grace on appellantsâ claim for punitive damages. But the court of appeals rejected appellantsâ constitutional challenges to R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) as well as their argument that Simpkinsâs noneconomic damages arose out of two occurrences for purposes of applying the damage caps. {¶ 18} This court accepted jurisdiction to consider two propositions of law. 142 Ohio St.3d 1464, 2015-Ohio-1896, 30 N.E.3d 973. The first contends that application of the R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) damage caps to damages awarded to minors who are victims of sexual assault violates the minorsâ rights under the Ohio Constitution to a jury trial, open courts and a remedy, due process, and equal protection. The second proposition of law concerns the definition of âoccurrenceâ in R.C. 2315.18(A)(5) and asserts that distinct acts of sexual battery constitute separate occurrences that are subject to separate damage caps. Analysis Constitutional Challenges {¶ 19} Appellantsâ first proposition of law states that as applied to damages awarded to minors who are victims of sexual assault, R.C. 2315.18 violates the constitutional rights to trial by jury, open courts and a remedy, due process of law, and equal protection. Although the proposition mentions both the Ohio Constitution and the United States Constitution, appellantsâ arguments relate solely to the Ohio Constitution. {¶ 20} A party may challenge the constitutionality of a statute with either a facial challenge or an as-applied challenge. Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 26. A facial challenge SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 10 trial any differently than it affects any tort claimant whose damages are capped as a matter of law. {¶ 26} Appellants implicitly acknowledge that their position is contrary to Arbino, but they do not offer any basis for avoiding stare decisisâthe doctrine that âan established legal decision [should] be recognized and followed in subsequent cases where the question of law is again in controversy.â Clark v. Snapper Power Equip., Inc., 21 Ohio St.3d 58, 60, 488 N.E.2d 138 (1986). A departure from stare decisis demands special justification, Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 44, citing Wampler v. Higgins, 93 Ohio St.3d 111, 120, 752 N.E.2d 962 (2001), and appellants offer no special justification for departing from Arbino here. {¶ 27} For these reasons, appellants have not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that R.C. 2315.18 violates the right to a jury trial when applied to the facts of this case. Open courts and right to remedy {¶ 28} We next address appellantsâ argument that application of R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) to Simpkinsâs damages violates her rights to open courts and a remedy. The constitutional rights to open courts and a remedy stem from Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution, which provides, âAll courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.â (Emphasis added.) As with their arguments regarding the right to trial by jury, Arbino requires us to reject appellantsâ arguments regarding the rights to open courts and a remedy. {¶ 29} The constitutional right to a remedy ârequires an opportunity granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.â Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St.3d 45, 47, 512 N.E.2d 626 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Ruther v. Kaiser, 134 Ohio St.3d 408, 2012-Ohio-5686, 983 N.E.2d 291. Article I, January Term, 2016 11 Section 16 prohibits statutes that âeffectively prevent individuals from pursuing relief for their injuries,â Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 44, but it âdoes not provide for remedies without limitation or for any perceived injury,â Ruther at ¶ 12. The General Assembly has the authority to determine what causes of action the law will recognize, to alter the common law by abolishing, defining or limiting those causes of action, and to determine what remedies are available. Id. at ¶ 13-14. See also Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 214, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (1988), quoting Leis v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 101 Ohio St. 162, 128 N.E. 73 (1920), syllabus (holding that R.C. 2305.29âs elimination of common-law amatory actions was constitutional because there was â âno property or vested right in any of the rules of the common law, as guides of conductâ â). {¶ 30} Appellants claim that the reduction of the juryâs award of noneconomic damages from $3.5 million to $350,000 denies Simpkins a meaningful remedy and violates her constitutional rights to open courts and a remedy. This court has recognized that the rights to open courts and a remedy become hollow when an individual is wholly foreclosed from relief after a verdict in his or her favor. Arbino at ¶ 45. But although R.C. 2315.18 limits the amount of noneconomic damages that a plaintiff may recover, it does not âwholly deny persons a remedy for their injuries.â Id. at ¶ 47. And the types of damages that remain available to plaintiffsâunlimited economic damages, up to $350,000 in noneconomic damages, and punitive damagesâare meaningful remedies under the Ohio Constitution. Id. {¶ 31} As with the right to trial by jury, appellants do not demonstrate that R.C. 2315.18 affects Simpkins differently than it does any other tort plaintiff. As we stated in Arbino, R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) does not foreclose a plaintiff from pursuing a claim nor does it completely obliterate the jury award. Arbino at ¶ 47. And neither the amount of the reduction of noneconomic damages nor appellantsâ assertion that minors who are victims of sexual assault will generally have SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 12 noneconomic damages that far outweigh their economic damages demonstrates that those victims are denied a meaningful remedy. {¶ 32} As a final argument that application of R.C. 2315.18 violates Simpkinsâs rights to open courts and a remedy, appellants state that they have incurred significant litigation expenses and attorney fees. Appellants are not unique in that regard, however, and the impact of litigation expenses and attorney fees does not render the available remedies unmeaningful. In Ohio, a prevailing party in a civil action may not recover attorney fees unless provided for by contract or statute or when the prevailing party proves bad faith on the part of the unsuccessful party. Wilborn v. Bank One Corp., 121 Ohio St.3d 546, 2009-Ohio- 306, 906 N.E.2d 396, ¶ 7. {¶ 33} Appellants have not demonstrated that application of R.C. 2315.18 in this case violates the constitutional rights to open courts and a remedy. Due course of law {¶ 34} Appellants next challenge application of R.C. 2315.18 under the âdue course of lawâ clause in Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution. We have generally recognized the Ohio Constitutionâs âdue course of lawâ provision as the equivalent of the Due Process Clause in the United States Constitution. Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 48, citing Sorrell v. Thevenir, 69 Ohio St.3d 415, 422-423, 633 N.E.2d 504 (1994), citing Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dayton, 138 Ohio St. 540, 544, 38 N.E.2d 70 (1941). This court recently deviated from the general rule and held that the Ohio Constitutionâs âdue course of lawâ provision afforded a juvenile a broader right to counsel than that afforded by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, see State v. Bode, 144 Ohio St.3d 155, 2015-Ohio-1519, 41 N.E.3d 1156, ¶ 23-24, but appellants here do not argue in favor of broader protections under the Ohio Constitution. Instead, they acknowledge that it provides âthe equivalentâ of the federal Due Process Clauseâs protections. January Term, 2016 15 quoting Nero v. Pritchard, 5th Dist. Stark No. CA-6560, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 7986, 9 (June 10, 1985). In Arbino, however, we distinguished Morris, stating that R.C. 2315.18 alleviates the concern of imposing the costs of the legislative benefit upon those most severely injured by allowing for limitless noneconomic damages for those suffering catastrophic physical injuries pursuant to the exceptions in R.C. 2315.18(B)(3). 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 60. Although damages awarded to minors who are victims of sexual assault may be unlikely to qualify for an exception to the application of the noneconomic-damage caps, the General Assemblyâs policy decision to exclude from the damage caps only those awards to plaintiffs who suffer catastrophic physical damages does not place upon Simpkins and those similarly situated an undue portion of the cost of ameliorating the deleterious economic effects of the tort system, as the damage cap in Morris did. {¶ 41} Appellants state that â[n]o person of good conscienceâ could characterize Simpkinsâs injuries as ânoncatastrophic,â but their argument misses the point. Appellantsâ as-applied challenge essentially asserts that the General Assembly acted unreasonably and arbitrarily by distinguishing between catastrophic physical and catastrophic nonphysical injuries for purposes of applying caps on noneconomic damages. But in Arbino, we held that the General Assembly distinguished between plaintiffs who suffered the catastrophic physical injuries specified in R.C. 2315.18(B)(3) and plaintiffs suffering other injuries based on the conclusion that the injuries specified in R.C. 2315.18(B)(3) âoffer more concrete evidence of noneconomic damages and thus calculation of those damages poses a lesser risk of being tainted by improper external considerations.â Arbino at ¶ 72. In the end, R.C. 2315.18 does not affect Simpkins any differently than it affects any other victim whose injuries do not fall within the R.C. 2315.18(B)(3) exceptions to the damage caps. SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 16 {¶ 42} Appellants also seize upon the Fifth Districtâs acknowledgment that âthere may be nonphysical injuries the effects of which approximate those listed in R.C. 2315.18(B)(3)â as an acknowledgment that subjecting all awards for nonphysical injuries to a damage cap might be arbitrary and unreasonable. 2014- Ohio-3465, 16 N.E.3d 687, at ¶ 78. But we leave that question for another day. Because that situation does not exist here, we need not opine whether there may be some instance in which application of the damage caps to damage awards for emotional injuries that rise to the level of the physical injuries excepted from the damage caps by R.C. 2315.18(B)(3) would violate due process. {¶ 43} R.C. 2315.18(B)(3) excludes from the damage caps in R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) noneconomic damages for â[p]ermanent and substantial physical deformity, loss of use of a limb, or loss of a bodily organ systemâ or for â[p]ermanent physical functional injury that permanently prevents the injured person from being able to independently care for self and perform life-sustaining activities.â The exceptions to the damage caps in R.C. 2315.18(B)(3) require âextreme qualifications.â Weldon v. Presley, N.D.Ohio No. 1:10 CV 1077, 2011 WL 3749469, *6 (Aug. 9, 2011). For example, the Weldon court noted a case in which the complete loss of sight in one eye fell short of âloss of a bodily organ systemâ because the plaintiff, who was able to partially see out of the other eye, had not suffered a complete loss of her ocular system. Id., citing Williams v. Bausch & Lomb Co., S.D.Ohio No. 2:08-cv-910, 2010 WL 2521753, *4 (June 22, 2010). {¶ 44} The Fifth District acknowledged the testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Smalldon, a psychologist who examined Simpkins, who testified that Simpkins suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder and low-grade depression as a result of the sexual assault by Williams. The court also noted evidence that Simpkins is afraid of the dark, suffers from anxiety, and has trust issues with men. But it also recognized evidence that âSimpkins played basketball in high school and college, January Term, 2016 17 got good grades in college, is currently employed full-time, has not sought or participated in mental health treatment or counseling since 2008 and does not have current plans to seek treatment.â 2014-Ohio-3465, 16 N.E.3d 687, at ¶ 78. Based on that evidence, the court concluded that Simpkins âis able to independently care for herself and perform life-sustaining activities.â Id. While we do not doubt the reality and seriousness of Simpkinsâs emotional and psychological injuries as a result of Williamsâs conduct, Simpkinsâs noneconomic injuries do not meet the âextreme qualificationsâ that the law requires in order to avoid the operation of the damage caps in R.C. 2315.18(B)(2). {¶ 45} For these reasons, we conclude that appellants failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that application of the R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) damage caps to Simpkinsâs damages amounted to a violation of due process. Equal protection {¶ 46} Appellantsâ final constitutional challenge asserts that as applied here, R.C. 2315.18 violates the right to equal protection guaranteed by Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution. We have interpreted Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution to be the equivalent of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 63, citing McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-6505, 839 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 7. But see State v. Mole, 149 Ohio St.3d 215, 2016-Ohio-5124, 74 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 23 (plurality opinion) (finding greater protection under the Ohio Equal Protection Clause than under the federal Equal Protection Clause). Appellants here do not argue that Ohioâs Equal Protection Clause provides greater protections than the federal Equal Protection Clause. {¶ 47} As in Arbino, because R.C. 2315.18 involves neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class, we review the statute under the rational-basis test, which requires us to uphold it if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 20 {¶ 52} Under their second proposition of law, appellants argue that even if the damage caps in R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) are constitutional, Simpkins suffered injuries as a result of two occurrencesâoral penetration and vaginal penetrationâ and that a separate $350,000 damage cap applies to each occurrence. The trial court disagreed and held that Simpkinsâs injuries arose from âa single course of wrongful conduct at the same time and placeâ that constituted a single occurrence. The court of appeals affirmed the application of a single damage cap. 2014-Ohio- 3465, 16 N.E.3d 687, at ¶ 92. {¶ 53} The plain statutory language of R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) requires us to reject appellantsâ argument. A courtâs primary goal in statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislatureâs intent. Christe v. GMS Mgt. Co., Inc., 88 Ohio St.3d 376, 377, 726 N.E.2d 497 (2000). In determining that intent, the court first looks to and gives effect to the statutory language without deleting words used or inserting words not used. Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 39-40, 741 N.E.2d 121 (2001), citing Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105, 304 N.E.2d 378 (1973), and Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cleveland, 37 Ohio St.3d 50, 524 N.E.2d 441 (1988), paragraph three of the syllabus. If the meaning of the statute is unambiguous, we must apply it as written. State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545, 660 N.E.2d 463 (1996). {¶ 54} Except as provided in R.C. 2315.18(B)(3), a trial court may not enter judgment for noneconomic damages that exceed the applicable R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) damage cap. R.C. 2315.18(E)(1). The cap limits compensatory damages for noneconomic loss to the greater of $250,000 or âan amount that is equal to three times the economic loss, as determined by the trier of fact,â to a maximum of $350,000 for each plaintiff or a maximum of $500,000 âfor each occurrence that is the basis of that tort action.â R.C. 2315.18(B)(2). January Term, 2016 21 {¶ 55} Appellants argue that Williamsâs oral and vaginal penetrations of Simpkins constitute separate occurrences because they gave rise to separate criminal counts and were determined to be of dissimilar import in Williamsâs criminal case. They therefore argue that separate $350,000 caps should be applied to each occurrence. But even if appellants were correct that the existence of two âoccurrencesâ would entitle Simpkins to noneconomic damages up to the damage cap for each occurrence despite the per-plaintiff maximum of $350,000, both the trial court and the court of appeals correctly held that this case involves a single âoccurrence.â {¶ 56} Appellants cite Madvad v. Russell, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 96CA006652, 1997 WL 760898 (Nov. 19, 1997), as support for their multiple- occurrences theory, but that case is inapposite. The issue in Madvad was whether a separate limitations period applied to multiple sexual assaults that occurred throughout the victimâs childhood. The Ninth District reasoned that â[b]ecause one offensive contact is all that is required to commit a battery, it would seem that each abusive act resulting in an offensive contact constitutes one separate and independent tort.â Id. at *2. Essentially, the court held that each assault gave rise to its own tort claim. But pursuant to R.C. 2315.18(A)(5), an âoccurrenceâ for purposes of the R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) damage caps includes âall claims resulting from or arising out of any one personâs bodily injury.â (Emphasis added.) Thus, even if the vaginal and oral penetrations gave rise to separate tort claims, they would nevertheless both be part of a single occurrence under R.C. 2315.18âas claims arising out of Simpkinsâs indivisible injury. {¶ 57} The oral and vaginal penetrations in this case occurred within a short period of time, in a confined space, without intervening factors, and there is no evidence that Williamsâs separate criminal acts affected Simpkins differently. Dr. Smalldon did not attribute separate injury to the separate incidents of penetration, and he opined that Simpkinsâs posttraumatic stress disorder is a direct SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 22 result âof the incident with Brian Williams.â (Emphasis added.) For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court and the Fifth District appropriately applied a single damage cap under R.C. 2315.18(B). Conclusion {¶ 58} Having rejected each of appellantsâ as-applied constitutional challenges to R.C. 2315.18 and having determined that the trial and appellate courts properly subjected appellantsâ claims to a single damage cap under R.C. 2315.18, we affirm the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals. Judgment affirmed. KENNEDY, J., concurs. LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion. OâCONNOR, C.J., and OâDONNELL, J., would dismiss the cause as having been improvidently accepted. PFEIFER, J., dissents, with an opinion. OâNEILL, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by PFEIFER, J. _________________ LANZINGER, J., concurring in judgment only. {¶ 59} I concur in the courtâs judgment affirming the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals, but I respectfully decline to join the lead opinionâs constitutional analysis. {¶ 60} The lead opinion notes that we have recently held that the Ohio Constitution provides a juvenile a broader right to counsel than that afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See State v. Bode, 144 Ohio St.3d 155, 2015-Ohio-1519, 41 N.E.3d 1156, ¶ 23-24. The lead opinion dismisses Bode as a case in which this court âdeviated from the general rule,â lead opinion at ¶ 34, and it accordingly bases its analysis on federal constitutional law. But Bode is just one instance in which we have stated that the Ohio Constitution can provide more protection than its federal January Term, 2016 25 {¶ 66} A plaintiffâs damages, in terms of pain and suffering and future medical costs, could be astronomical. Or they could be nothing. Our system of civil justice leaves that question for the jury to decide, not the General Assembly. That is the point: a cookie-cutter approach simply does not work. In this case, a duly empaneled jury heard all the facts and found the damages to be over $3.6 million. By reducing that award to $500,000, the trial court has removed the jury from the process. If the General Assembly can limit damages for claims to $500,000, or $350,000, what would prevent it from limiting damages to $1? Would the court find that result to be constitutional? As stated by Justice Pfeifer in his well-reasoned dissent in Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 170, âthe General Assembly does not have this power; only the people by the amendment process have this power. After today, what meaning is left in a litigantâs constitutional right to have a jury determine damages?â {¶ 67} Justice Pfeifer further noted in his dissent in Arbino: âSo long as the trial by jury is a part of our system of jurisprudence, its constitutional integrity and importance should be jealously safeguarded. The right of trial by jury should be as inviolate in the working of our courts as it is in the wording of our Constitutions.â Gibbs v. Girard (1913), 88 Ohio St. 34, 47, 102 N.E. 299. Instead of jealously safeguarding the right to trial by jury, the majority opinion in this case eviscerates it by holding constitutional a statute that enables courts to âenter judgments in disregard of the juryâs verdict.â Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 415, 422, 633 N.E.2d 504. Instead of jealously safeguarding the right to trial by jury, the majority opinion employs shallow reasoning and shoddy logic in concluding that SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 26 juries can meaningfully determine only facts that do not conflict with predetermined assessments of the General Assembly. Instead of jealously safeguarding the right to trial by jury, the majority opinion âcleans the scalpel for the legislature to cut away unrestrainedly at the whole field of tort redress.â Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc. (1989), 238 Mont. 21, 52, 776 P.2d 488 (Sheehy, J., dissenting). Arbino at ¶ 163. {¶ 68} The only way to bypass the Ohio Constitution and make changes to the tort system in Ohio would be by constitutional amendment. Unless and until that happens, arbitrary caps on damages are unconstitutional. {¶ 69} This child was raped in a church office by a minister, and a duly empaneled jury established an appropriate level of compensation for the loss of her childhood innocence. We have no right to interfere with that process. Shame on the General Assembly. The children are watching. And I for one do not like what they are seeing. {¶ 70} I would reverse the decision of the trial court and reinstate the judgment of the jury. PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. _________________ The Fitch Law Firm and John K. Fitch; David A. Fitch; and Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Stephen C. Fitch, and Celia M. Kilgard, for appellants. Weston Hurd, L.L.P., and W. Charles Curley, for appellee. Harris, Meyer, Heckman & Denkewalter, L.L.C., and Darrell L. Heckman, urging reversal for amicus curiae National Center for Victims of Crime. January Term, 2016 27 The DiCello Law Firm and Robert F. DiCello, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice. Tucker Ellis, L.L.P., Susan M. Audey, and Benjamin C. SassĂ©, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Academy of Medicine of Cleveland & Northern Ohio. Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Anne Marie Sferra, and Kara Herrnstein, urging affirmance for amici curiae Ohio Alliance for Civil Justice and Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. _________________