Thompson and Brody's Arguments on Abortion: A Comparative Analysis, Study notes of Modern Philosophy

Download Thompson and Brody's Arguments on Abortion: A Comparative Analysis and more Study notes Modern Philosophy in PDF only on Docsity! 1 Notes: Discussion sections 0202, 0206, 0207 TA: Kallfelz PHIL140 February 9, 2007 • Some general remarks on Thompson and Brody Their form of argumentation is much different from Marquis. Marquis used a relatively sophisticated I-B-E technique (or inference to the best explanation—see pp 7, 8 in Feb. 2 notes), while Thompson, by and large, uses the argument from analogy technique, “the most common kind of argument found in applied ethics.” (What’s Wrong? pg. 10) Also, in terms of content, as Christopher Young § 0206 noted, Marquis’ argument is based on what one ought not to do, i.e. abortion being generally morally impermissible. Though on the face of it, Thompson’s argument is for abortion being morally permissible, it is also based on what one must not do; i.e. infringe on a mother’s right over her body. So both arguments (Marquis and Thompson) are based on restrictive claims, though Thompson’s is stronger than Marquis. The distinction between must and ought (or should) is a central one, for Thompson, as we’ll see. Brody likewise uses argument by and analogy to try to refute Thompson’s point. Whether or not you agreed or disagreed with Thompson and Brody’s conclusions, perhaps you may have felt that their way or reasoning or the logic they used, was flat-footed and crude. In their efforts to form simple and appropriately general claims, that have a ring of deductive necessity to them, may have caused you to feel that such claims don’t address the nuanced and subtle issues of ethical dilemma adequately enough. Or to put it another way, their arguments may have struck you like trying to seat a flat building theory and logic on the bumpy ground of experience. This is a general problem in ethics—the relationship between logic and moral reasoning. Obviously when reasoning morally, we want to avoid contradicting ourselves, that much is true. So logic is relevant. The question, however, becomes what is the most appropriate logic for ethics? This is an open question. Many researchers are developing far more sophisticated logics which they hope can model moral reasoning better. 1 Certainly the simple logic (premise-premise-…→one conclusion) adopted by the authors may seem rather crude and clunky. But, if nothing else, it’s a good start, in terms of seeing how challenging it is to think precisely in such matters. • Thompson In her overall argument by analogy, she developed thought experiments to test the strength of her conclusion. She adopted the method of variant cases when testing her thought-experiments. “Consider the variant case and ask if your intuitive reaction to it is any different from what it was to the original, non-variant case.” (What’s Wrong? p.12) In certain cases, she also used the method of bare differences (What’s Wrong? pp. 13-16) In general, form of bare-difference argument is: P1: Case A has feature P and case B differs from A only in feature Q P2: Case A and case B are morally equivalent. C: Therefore, features P and Q are morally equivalent. Basically, the method of bare differences is similar to the case in science, one controls all the variables in an experimental and in a control sample, and varies each one (keeping all the toerh 1 For instance, the field of default logics 2 variables fixed) to test the experiment against the control. Here, one varies Q against P for cases B and A respectively, to see whether or not the ‘null hypothesis’ holds—i.e. are P and Q still morally equivalent? As the authors point out, what guarantees validity of bare-difference strategy is the notion that “what’s good for the goose is good for the gander. As long as one accepts this principle, the inference made by bare difference arguments should seem well-grounded.” (16) Critiquing the argument by analogy and bare difference have similar strategies. • In the case of critiquing an argument by analogy, one should: (What’s Wrong? p.12) (A) Look for disanalogies (B) Use method of variant cases to test the merits of the disanalogies • In the case of critiquing bare difference, one may: (What’s Wrong? p.16) (1) Critique P1: Could there be other features that are different from cases A and B, that weren’t discussed? (2) Critique P2: Are cases A and B really morally on par? So, for example, Vanessa Morales § 0202 asked the question concerning the Famous Violinist thought-experiment, in which she varied the ‘consent’ issue. Specifically she asked how would Thompson respond if someone volunteered the use of their kidney (as opposed to being abducted by the Society of Music Lovers?) Vanessa was adopting (B) above, by varying cases to see whether or not there are disanalogies (or differences that would make a moral difference, so to speak) between the issues concerning rights of the mother over her body versus the Violinist thought experiment. (Thompson would answer the question by pointing out, perhaps, that in such an instance when someone volunteers, or ‘steps up to the plate’, and offers the use of her body in this manner, certainly she’s being exceptionally generous—an exceptional Samaritan—as she later writes, but this is a separate issue from discussing rights or claims. No one should legislate being a Samaritan, and no one has the right to ask someone to do so.) Many found the analogies misleading or problematic. (Adil Zaman § 0206, Jasmine Tirado § 0207, etc.) In fact, some found Thompson’s style of argumentation so cluttered with so many Baroque analogies and thought-experiments here and there, as to render the argument she was making virtually impossible to distil. (Oneg Pruitt § 0207, Shelby Watson § 0207) Others, however, found her rather contrived thought-experiments helpful, as it forces the reader to divorce him or herself from the ‘loaded emotional/religious/psychological issues’ surrounding the actual question of abortion (Lauren Grimes § 0202), as well as serving a useful and essential purpose in her overall framework of argumentation (Jessica Elmore § 0202). All of the above points are valid and apt. As your instructor Darren Hick already pointed out in a first lecture, philosophical prose can often be tedious and frustrating to read. Philosophers strain ‘to get all their ducks in a row’ in the sense that they tend to overexplain—lest their arguments be accused of incoherence or invalidity because some essential information was kept implicit. “In argumentation, it is important to make explicit what one has in mind, and not leave it to your opponent to fill in the gaps…good argument avoids ambiguities.” (What’s Wrong ? p.5) So reading over all this stuff can feel a bit like trying to decipher a legal contract, sometimes. Aside from that, unfortunately good philosophers aren’t necessarily good writers. Good writing takes a special talent, as well as experience, to express subtle prose in an elegant and seamless fashion,