Download Minnesota Appeals Court: Lawful Police Stop & Drug Evidence Suppression and more Schemes and Mind Maps Law in PDF only on Docsity! This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A07-2444 State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Stephen Claude Porter, Appellant. Filed December 9, 2008 Affirmed Klaphake, Judge Stearns County District Court File No. 73-K1-07-170 Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Tibor M. Gallo, Assistant Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and Janelle Prokopec Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Room 448, Administration Center, 705 Courthouse Square, St. Cloud, MN 56303 (for respondent) Lawrence Hammerling, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Susan J. Andrews, Assistant State Public Defender, 540 Fairview Avenue North, Suite 300, St. Paul, MN 55104 (for appellant) Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge; Lansing, Judge; and Worke, Judge. 2 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N KLAPHAKE, Judge Appellant Stephen Claude Porter was convicted of first-degree controlled substance crime, Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subds. 1(1), 2(1) (2006), after a stipulated facts trial in order to challenge a pretrial ruling. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. Appellant challenges the district court’s order refusing to suppress evidence discovered after police stopped a Chevrolet Suburban in which he was a passenger, contending that the stop was unlawful. Because police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that appellant, who was subject to arrest for sale of a controlled substance, was in the Suburban, we conclude that the stop was lawful and that the district court properly refused to suppress the drug evidence. We therefore affirm. D E C I S I O N When considering the district court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence, we independently review the facts and determine as a matter of law whether the district court erred in its decision. State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). A police officer may make a warrantless stop of an automobile if the officer has a “particularized and objective basis” to suspect that a particular person is engaged in criminal activity. In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. 1997). The officer assesses the need for a stop based on the totality of circumstances. Id. The officer must rely on more than a “hunch” and cannot stop a car based on “mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.” State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn. 1996). The standard for an 5 Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, does not state what the consequence is for omitting findings with the guilty verdict. It is clear from the rule that this type of trial is for the limited purpose of contesting a pretrial issue that may be dispositive of the case and that by agreeing to this procedure, a defendant is limited to appellate review of the pretrial issue and may not challenge the finding of “guilt, or . . . other issues that could arise at a contested trial.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. Before the enactment of subdivision 4, written findings were not required. See State v. Mahr, 701 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn. App. 2005) (“Because a Lothenbach proceeding is not a court trial or a stipulated facts trial, the findings requirement of rule 26.01 does not apply.”), review denied (Minn. Oct. 26, 2005). In State v. Thomas, 467 N.W.2d 324 (Minn. App. 1991), this court discussed the consequences of failing to make findings as required by Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01 (requiring written or oral findings on the record within seven days after completion of a trial). Because there is no sanction in the rule for a violation, this court concluded that the requirement is directory rather than mandatory, while noting that courts should comply with the rule. Thomas, 467 N.W.2d at 326. Further, this court declined to reverse a conviction for “a technical error” without a demonstration of prejudice to appellant. Id. at 326-27. Like the rule in Thomas, the language of Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, is directory, rather than mandatory. And, because he cannot challenge the sufficiency of the evidence but is limited to challenging the district court’s pretrial ruling, for which there are findings, appellant has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the lack of findings. Although, in this instance, appellant has not demonstrated prejudice, we 6 recommend that in the future, the district court comply with the directive of the rule and include factual findings on the issue of guilt in its order. Affirmed.