Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases: Standards for Ineffectiveness Claims, Study notes of Law

Download Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases: Standards for Ineffectiveness Claims and more Study notes Law in PDF only on Docsity! OCTOBER TERM, 1983 Syllabus 466 U. S. STRICKLAND, SUPERINTENDENT, FLORIDA STATE PRISON, ET AL. v. WASHINGTON CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 82-1554. Argued January 10, 1984-Decided May 14, 1984 Respondent pleaded guilty in a Florida trial court to an indictment that included three capital murder charges. In the plea colloquy, respondent told the trial judge that, although he had committed a string of burglar- ies, he had no significant prior criminal record and that at the time of his criminal spree he was under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family. The trial judge told respondent that he had "a great deal of respect for people who are willing to step forward and admit their responsibility." In preparing for the sentencing hearing, defense coun- sel spoke with respondent about his background, but did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric examination. Counsel's decision not to present evidence concerning respondent's character and emotional state reflected his judgment that it was advisable to rely on the plea colloquy for evidence as to such matters, thus preventing the State from cross-examining respondent and from presenting psychiatric evidence of its own. Counsel did not request a presentence report be- cause it would have included respondent's criminal history and thereby would have undermined the claim of no significant prior criminal record. Finding numerous aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circum- stance, the trial judge sentenced respondent to death on each of the mur- der counts. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, and respondent then sought collateral relief in state court on the ground, inter alia, that coun- sel had rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing proceeding in several respects, including his failure to request a psychiatric report, to investigate and present character witnesses, and to seek a presentence report. The trial court denied relief, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Respondent then filed a habeas corpus petition in Federal District Court advancing numerous grounds for relief, including the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied relief, concluding that although counsel made errors in judgment in failing to investigate mitigating evidence further than he did, no prejudice to respondent's sentence resulted from any such error in judgment. The Court of Appeals ultimately reversed, stating that the Sixth Amendment accorded criminal defendants a right STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON 668 Syllabus to counsel rendering "reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances." After outlining standards for judging whether a defense counsel fulfilled the duty to investigate nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and whether counsel's errors were sufficiently prejudicial to justify reversal, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for applica- tion of the standards. Held: 1. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel, and the benchmark for judging any claim of ineffec- tiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. The same principle applies to a capital sentencing proceeding-such as the one provided by Florida law-that is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for decision that counsel's role in the proceeding is comparable to counsel's role at trial. Pp. 684-687. 2. A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so de- fective as to require reversal of a conviction or setting aside of a death sentence requires that the defendant show, first, that counsel's perform- ance was deficient and, second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Pp. 687-696. (a) The proper standard for judging attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance, considering all the circumstances. When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and a fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. A court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable profes- sional assistance. These standards require no special amplification in order to define counsel's duty to investigate, the duty at issue in this case. Pp. 687-691. (b) With regard to the required showing of prejudice, the proper standard requires the defendant to show that there is a reasonable prob- ability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. A court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evi- dence before the judge or jury. Pp. 691-696. OCTOBER TERM, 1983 Opinion of the Court 466 U. S. cluded three brutal stabbing murders, torture, kidnaping, se- vere assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft. After his two accomplices were arrested, respondent surrendered to police and voluntarily gave a lengthy state- ment confessing to the third of the criminal episodes. The State of Florida indicted respondent for kidnaping and mur- der and appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to repre- sent him. Counsel actively pursued pretrial motions and discovery. He cut his efforts short, however, and he experienced a sense of hopelessness about the case, when he learned that, against his specific advice, respondent had also confessed to the first two murders. By the date set for trial, respondent was sub- ject to indictment for three counts of first-degree murder and multiple counts of robbery, kidnaping for ransom, breaking and entering and assault, attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit robbery. Respondent waived his right to a jury trial, again acting against counsel's advice, and pleaded guilty to all charges, including the three capital murder charges. In the plea colloquy, respondent told the trial judge that, although he had committed a string of burglaries, he had no significant prior criminal record and that at the time of his criminal spree he was under extreme stress caused by his in- ability to support his family. App. 50-53. He also stated, however, that he accepted responsibility for the crimes. E. g., id., at 54, 57. The trial judge told respondent that he had "a great deal of respect for people who are willing to step forward and admit their responsibility" but that he was making no statement at all about his likely sentencing decision. Id., at 62. Counsel advised respondent to invoke his right under Flor- ida law to an advisory jury at his capital sentencing hearing. Respondent rejected the advice and waived the right. He chose instead to be sentenced by the trial judge without a jury recommendation. In preparing for the sentencing hearing, counsel spoke with respondent about his background. He also spoke on STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON 668 Opinion of the Court the telephone with respondent's wife and mother, though he did not follow up on the one unsuccessful effort to meet with them. He did not otherwise seek out character witnesses for respondent. App. to Pet. for Cert. A265. Nor did he request a psychiatric examination, since his conversations with his client gave no indication that respondent had psycho- logical problems. Id., at A266. Counsel decided not to present and hence not to look fur- ther for evidence concerning respondent's character and emo- tional state. That decision reflected trial counsel's sense of hopelessness about overcoming the evidentiary effect of re- spondent's confessions to the gruesome crimes. See id., at A282. It also reflected the judgment that it was advisable to rely on the plea colloquy for evidence about respondent's background aid about his claim of emotional stress: the plea colloquy communicated sufficient information about these sub- jects, and by forgoing the opportunity to present new evi- dence on these subjects, counsel prevented the State from cross-examining respondent on his claim and from putting on psychiatric evidence of its own. Id., at A223-A225. Counsel also excluded from the sentencing hearing other evidence he thought was potentially damaging. He success- fully moved to exclude respondent's "rap sheet." Id., at A227; App. 311. Because he judged that a presentence re- port might prove more detrimental than helpful, as it would have included respondent's criminal history and thereby would have undermined the claim of no significant history of criminal activity, he did not request that one be prepared. App. to Pet. for Cert. A227-A228, A265-A266. At the sentencing hearing, counsel's strategy was based primarily on the trial judge's remarks at the plea colloquy as well as on his reputation as a sentencing judge who thought it important for a convicted defendant to own up to his crime. Counsel argued that respondent's remorse and acceptance of responsibility justified sparing him from the death penalty. Id., at A265-A266. Counsel also argued that respondent had no history of criminal activity and that respondent com- OCTOBER TERM, 1983 Opinion of the Court 466 U. S. mitted the crimes under extreme mental or emotional dis- turbance, thus coming within the statutory list of mitigating circumstances. He further argued that respondent should be spared death because he had surrendered, confessed, and offered to testify against a codefendant and because respond- ent was fundamentally a good person who had briefly gone badly wrong in extremely stressful circumstances. The State put on evidence and witnesses largely for the purpose of describing the details of the crimes. Counsel did not cross-examine the medical experts who testified about the manner of death of respondent's victims. The trial judge found several aggravating circumstances with respect to each of the three murders. He found that all three murders were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel, all involving repeated stabbings. All three murders were committed in the course of at least one other dangerous and violent felony, and since all involved robbery, the murders were for pecuniary gain. All three murders were committed to avoid arrest for the accompanying crimes and to hinder law enforcement. In the course of one of the murders, respondent knowingly subjected numerous persons to a grave risk of death by deliberately stabbing and shooting the murder victim's sisters-in-law, who sustained severe-in one case, ultimately fatal-injuries. With respect to mitigating circumstances, the trial judge made the same findings for all three capital murders. First, although there was no admitted evidence of prior convictions, respondent had stated that he had engaged in a course of stealing. In any case, even if respondent had no significant history of criminal activity, the aggravating circumstances "would still clearly far outweigh" that mitigating factor. Second, the judge found that, during all three crimes, re- spondent was not suffering from extreme mental or emo- tional disturbance and could appreciate the criminality of his acts. Third, none of the victims was a participant in, or consented to, respondent's conduct. Fourth, respondent's STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON 668 Opinion of the Court reports thus directly undermine the contention made at the sentencing hearing that respondent was suffering from ex- treme mental or emotional disturbance during his crime spree. Accordingly, counsel could reasonably decide not to seek psychiatric reports; indeed, by relying solely on the plea colloquy to support the emotional disturbance contention, counsel denied the State an opportunity to rebut his claim with psychiatric testimony. In any event, the aggravating circumstances were so overwhelming that no substantial prejudice resulted from the absence at sentencing of the psychiatric evidence offered in the collateral attack. The court rejected the challenge to counsel's failure to de- velop and to present character evidence for much the same reasons. The affidavits submitted in the collateral proceed- ing showed nothing more than that certain persons would have testified that respondent was basically a good person who was worried about his family's financial problems. Re- spondent himself had already testified along those lines at the plea colloquy. Moreover, respondent's admission of a course of stealing rebutted many of the factual allegations in the affi- davits. For those reasons, and because the sentencing judge had stated that the death sentence would be appropriate even if respondent had no significant prior criminal history, no substantial prejudice resulted from the absence at sen- tencing of the character evidence offered in the collateral attack. Applying the standard for ineffectiveness claims articu- lated by the Florida Supreme Court in Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997 (1981), the trial court concluded that respondent had not shown that counsel's assistance reflected any sub- stantial and serious deficiency measurably below that of com- petent counsel that was likely to have affected the outcome of the sentencing proceeding. The court specifically found: "[A]s a matter of law, the record affirmatively demonstrates beyond any doubt that even if [counsel] had done each of the ... things [that respondent alleged counsel had failed to do] OCTOBER TERM, 1988 Opinion of the Court 466 U. S. at the time of sentencing, there is not even the remotest chance that the outcome would have been any different. The plain fact is that the aggravating circumstances proved in this case were completely overwhelming .... " App. to Pet. for Cert. A230. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief. Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285 (1981). For essentially the reasons given by the trial court, the State Supreme Court concluded that respondent had failed to make out a prima facie case of either "substantial deficiency or possible preju- dice" and, indeed, had "failed to such a degree that we believe, to the point of a moral certainty, that he is entitled to no relief. . . ." Id., at 287. Respondent's claims were "shown conclusively to be without merit so as to obviate the need for an evidentiary hearing." Id., at 286. C Respondent next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. He advanced numerous grounds for relief, among them ineffective assistance of counsel based on the same errors, except for the failure to move for a continuance, as those he had identified in state court. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing to inquire into trial counsel's ef- forts to investigate and to present mitigating circumstances. Respondent offered the affidavits and reports he had submit- ted in the state collateral proceedings; he also called his trial counsel to testify. The State of Florida, over respondent's objection, called the trial judge to testify. The District Court disputed none of the state court factual findings concerning trial counsel's assistance and made find- ings of its own that are consistent with the state court find- ings. The account of trial counsel's actions and decisions given above reflects the combined findings. On the legal issue of ineffectiveness, the District Court concluded that, although trial counsel made errors in judgment in failing to STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON 668 Opinion of the Court investigate nonstatutory mitigating evidence further than he did, no prejudice to respondent's sentence resulted from any such error in judgment. Relying in part on the trial judge's testimony but also on the same factors that led the state courts to find no prejudice, the District Court concluded that "there does not appear to be a likelihood, or even a significant possibility," that any errors of trial counsel had affected the outcome of the sentencing proceeding. App. to Pet. for Cert. A285-A286. The District Court went on to reject all of respondent's other grounds for relief, including one not ex- hausted in state court, which the District Court considered because, among other reasons, the State urged its consider- ation. Id., at A286-A292. The court accordingly denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions to apply to the particular facts the framework for analyzing ineffectiveness claims that it developed in its opinion. 673 F. 2d 879 (1982). The panel decision was itself vacated when Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit, now the Eleventh Circuit, decided to rehear the case en banc. 679 F. 2d 23 (1982). The full Court of Ap- peals developed its own framework for analyzing ineffective assistance claims and reversed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case for new factfinding under the newly announced standards. 693 F. 2d 1243 (1982). The court noted at the outset that, because respondent had raised an unexhausted claim at his evidentiary hearing in the District Court, the habeas petition might be characterized as a mixed petition subject to the rule of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509 (1982), requiring dismissal of the entire petition. The court held, however, that the exhaustion requirement is "a matter of comity rather than a matter of jurisdiction" and hence admitted of exceptions. The court agreed with the District Court that this case came within an exception to the mixed petition rule. 693 F. 2d, at 1248, n. 7. OCTOBER TERM, 1983 Opinion of the Court 466 U. S. defense that must be shown before counsel's errors justify reversal of the judgment. The court observed that only in cases of outright denial of counsel, of affirmative government interference in the representation process, or of inherently prejudicial conflicts of interest had this Court said that no special showing of prejudice need be made. Id., at 1258- 1259. For cases of deficient performance by counsel, where the government is not directly responsible for the deficiencies and where evidence of deficiency may be more accessible to the defendant than to the prosecution, the defendant must show that counsel's errors "resulted in actual and substantial disadvantage to the course of his defense." Id., at 1262. This standard, the Court of Appeals reasoned, is compatible with the "cause and prejudice" standard for overcoming procedural defaults in federal collateral proceedings and discourages insubstantial claims by requiring more than a showing, which could virtually always be made, of some con- ceivable adverse effect on the defense from counsel's errors. The specified showing of prejudice would result in reversal of the judgment, the court concluded, unless the prosecution showed that the constitutionally deficient performance was, in light of all the evidence, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 1260-1262. The Court of Appeals thus laid down the tests to be applied in the Eleventh Circuit in challenges to convictions on the ground of ineffectiveness of counsel. Although some of the judges of the court proposed different approaches to judging ineffectiveness claims either generally or when raised in fed- eral habeas petitions from state prisoners, id., at 1264-1280 (opinion of Tjoflat, J.); id., at 1280 (opinion of Clark, J.); id., at 1285-1288 (opinion of Roney, J., joined by Fay and Hill, JJ.); id., at 1288-1291 (opinion of Hill, J.), and although some believed that no remand was necessary in this case, id., at 1281-1285 (opinion of Johnson, J., joined by Anderson, J.); id., at 1285-1288 (opinion of Roney, J., joined by Fay and Hill, JJ.); id., at 1288-1291 (opinion of Hill, J.), a majority STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON 668 Opinion of the Court of the judges of the en banc court agreed that the case should be remanded for application of the newly announced stand- ards. Summarily rejecting respondent's claims other than ineffectiveness of counsel, the court accordingly reversed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case. On remand, the court finally ruled, the state trial judge's testi- mony, though admissible "to the extent that it contains per- sonal knowledge of historical facts or expert opinion," was not to be considered admitted into evidence to explain the judge's mental processes in reaching his sentencing decision. Id., at 1262-1263; see Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U. S. 276, 306-307 (1904). D Petitioners, who are officials of the State of Florida, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The petition presents a type of Sixth Amendment claim that this Court has not previously considered in any generality. The Court has considered Sixth Amendment claims based on actual or constructive de- nial of the assistance of counsel altogether, as well as claims based on state interference with the ability of counsel to ren- der effective assistance to the accused. E. g., United States v. Cronic, ante, p. 648. With the exception of Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335 (1980), however, which involved a claim that counsel's assistance was rendered ineffective by a conffict of interest, the Court has never directly and fully addressed a claim of "actual ineffectiveness" of counsel's assistance in a case going to trial. Cf. United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 102, n. 5 (1976). In assessing attorney performance, all the Federal Courts of Appeals and all but a few state courts have now adopted the "reasonably effective assistance" standard in one formulation or another. See Trapnell v. United States, 725 F. 2d 149, 151-152 (CA2 1983); App. B to Brief for United States in United States v. Cronic, 0. T. 1983, No. 82-660, pp. 3a-6a; Sarno, OCTOBER TERM, 1983 Opinion of the Court 466 U. S. Modern Status of Rules and Standards in State Courts as to Adequacy of Defense Counsel's Representation of Criminal Client, 2 A. L. R. 4th 99-157, §§ 7-10 (1980). Yet this Court has not had occasion squarely to decide whether that is the proper standard. With respect to the prejudice that a de- fendant must show from deficient attorney performance, the lower courts have adopted tests that purport to differ in more than formulation. See App. C to Brief for United States in United States v. Cronic, supra, at 7a-10a; Sarno, supra, at 83-99, § 6. In particular, the Court of Appeals in this case expressly rejected the prejudice standard articulated by Judge Leventhal in his plurality opinion in United States v. Decoster, 199 U. S. App. D. C. 359, 371, 374-375, 624 F. 2d 196, 208, 211-212 (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 944 (1979), and adopted by the State of Florida in Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d, at 1001, a standard that requires a show- ing that specified deficient conduct of counsel was likely to have affected the outcome of the proceeding. 693 F. 2d, at 1261-1262. For these reasons, we granted certiorari to consider the standards by which to judge a contention that the Constitu- tion requires that a criminal judgment be overturned because of the actual ineffective assistance of counsel. 462 U. S. 1105 (1983). We agree with the Court of Appeals that the exhaustion rule requiring dismissal of mixed petitions, though to be strictly enforced, is not jurisdictional. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S., at 515-520. We therefore ad- dress the merits of the constitutional issue. II In a long line of cases that includes Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), this Court has recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial. The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON 668 Opinion of the Court v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939, 952-954 (1983); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 (1981), that counsel's role in the proceeding is comparable to counsel's role at trial-to en- sure that the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result under the standards governing decision. For purposes of describing counsel's duties, therefore, Florida's capital sentencing proceeding need not be distinguished from an ordinary trial. III A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This re- quires showing that counsel made errors so serious that coun- sel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the de- fendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sen- tence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. A As all the Federal Courts of Appeals have now held, the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reason- ably effective assistance. See Trapnell v. United States, 725 F. 2d, at 151-152. The Court indirectly recognized as much when it stated in McMann v. Richardson, supra, at 770, 771, that a guilty plea cannot be attacked as based on inadequate legal advice unless counsel was not "a reasonably competent attorney" and the advice was not "within the range of compe- tence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." See also Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 344. When a convicted de- OCTOBER TERM, 1983 Opinion of the Court 466 U. S. fendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assist- ance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. More specific guidelines are not appropriate. The Sixth Amendment refers simply to "counsel," not specifying par- ticular requirements of effective assistance. It relies instead on the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions. See Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 100-101 (1955). The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties. Counsel's function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 346. From counsel's function as assistant to the defendant derive the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and the more particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution. Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adver- sarial testing process. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S., at 68-69. These basic duties neither exhaustively define the obliga- tions of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance. In any case presenting an ineffec- tiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the cir- cumstances. Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like, e. g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980) ("The Defense Function"), are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides. No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON 668 Opinion of the Court account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude coun- sel must have in making tactical decisions. See United States v. Decoster, 199 U. S. App. D. C., at 371, 624 F. 2d, at 208. Indeed, the existence of detailed guidelines for rep- resentation could distract counsel from the overriding mis- sion of vigorous advocacy of the defendant's cause. More- over, the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation, although that is a goal of considerable impor- tance to the legal system. The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second- guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sen- tence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. Cf. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 133-134 (1982). A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every ef- fort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged con- duct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of rea- sonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered sound trial strat- egy." See Michel v. Louisiana, supra, at 101. There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way. See Goodpaster, OCTOBER TERM, 1983 Opinion of the Court 466 U. S. sure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel's performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution. In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is pre- sumed. Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice. So are various kinds of state interference with counsel's assistance. See United States v. Cronic, ante, at 659, and n. 25. Prejudice in these circumstances is so likely that case- by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost. Ante, at 658. Moreover, such circumstances involve impairments of the Sixth Amendment right that are easy to identify and, for that reason and because the prosecution is directly responsible, easy for the government to prevent. One type of actual ineffectiveness claim warrants a similar, though more limited, presumption of prejudice. In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S., at 345-350, the Court held that preju- dice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual con- flict of interest. In those circumstances, counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's du- ties. Moreover, it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests. Given the obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts of interest and the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in certain situations likely to give rise to conflicts, see, e. g., Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 44(c), it is reasonable for the criminal justice system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice for conflicts of interest. Even so, the rule is not quite the per se rule of prejudice that exists for the Sixth Amendment claims mentioned above. Prejudice is pre- sumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel "ac- tively represented conflicting interests" and that "an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's perform- ance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 350, 348 (footnote omitted). STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON 668 Opinion of the Court Conflict of interest claims aside, actual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are sub- ject to a general requirement that the defendant affirma- tively prove prejudice. The government is not responsible for, and hence not able to prevent, attorney errors that will result in reversal of a conviction or sentence. Attorney er- rors come in an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial. They cannot be classified according to likelihood of causing prejudice. Nor can they be defined with sufficient precision to inform defense attorneys correctly just what conduct to avoid. Representation is an art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another. Even if a defendant shows that particular errors of counsel were unreasonable, therefore, the defendant must show that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense. It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceed- ing. Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test, cf. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U. S. 858, 866-867 (1982), and not every error that conceivably could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability of the result of the proceeding. Respondent suggests re- quiring a showing that the errors "impaired the presentation of the defense." Brief for Respondent 58. That standard, however, provides no workable principle. Since any error, if it is indeed an error, "impairs" the presentation of the de- fense, the proposed standard is inadequate because it pro- vides no way of deciding what impairments are sufficiently se- rious to warrant setting aside the outcome of the proceeding. On the other hand, we believe that a defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not al- tered the outcome in the case. This outcome-determinative standard has several strengths. It defines the relevant in- quiry in a way familiar to courts, though the inquiry, as is inevitable, is anything but precise. The standard also re- flects the profound importance of finality in criminal proceed- OCTOBER TERM, 1983 Opinion of the Court 466 U. S. ings. Moreover, it comports with the widely used standard for assessing motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19-20, and nn. 10, 11. Nevertheless, the standard is not quite appropriate. Even when the specified attorney error results in the omis- sion of certain evidence, the newly discovered evidence standard is not an apt source from which to draw a prejudice standard for ineffectiveness claims. The high standard for newly discovered evidence claims presupposes that all the essential elements of a presumptively accurate and fair pro- ceeding were present in the proceeding whose result is chal- lenged. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 327 U. S. 106, 112 (1946). An ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence of one of the crucial assurances that the result of the proceed- ing is reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat weaker and the appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat lower. The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreli- able, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evi- dence to have determined the outcome. Accordingly, the appropriate test for prejudice finds its roots in the test for materiality of exculpatory information not disclosed to the defense by the prosecution, United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S., at 104, 112-113, and in the test for ma- teriality of testimony made unavailable to the defense by Government deportatiori of a witness, United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, supra, at 872-874. The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for coun- sel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probabil- ity sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. In making the determination whether the specified errors resulted in the required prejudice, a court should presume, absent challenge to the judgment on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, that the judge or jury acted according to law. STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON 668 Opinion of the Court formulations are mere variations of the overarching reason- ableness standard. With regard to the prejudice inquiry, only the strict outcome-determinative test, among the stand- ards articulated in the lower courts, imposes a heavier bur- den on defendants than the tests laid down today. The dif- ference, however, should alter the merit of an ineffectiveness claim only in the rarest case. Although we have discussed the performance component of an ineffectiveness claim prior to the prejudice component, there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assist- ance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was defi- cient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defend- ant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel's performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed. Courts should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal jus- tice system suffers as a result. The principles governing ineffectiveness claims should apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do on direct appeal or in motions for a new trial. As indicated by the "cause and prejudice" test for overcoming procedural waivers of claims of error, the presumption that a criminal judgment is final is at its strongest in collateral attacks on that judg- ment. See United States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 162-169 (1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126-129 (1982). An ineffectiveness claim, however, as our articulation of the standards that govern decision of such claims makes clear, is an attack on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is challenged. Since fundamental fairness is the central concern of the writ of habeas corpus, see id., OCTOBER TERM, 1983 Opinion of the Court 466 U. S. at 126, no special standards ought to apply to ineffectiveness claims made in habeas proceedings. Finally, in a federal habeas challenge to a state criminal judgment, a state court conclusion that counsel rendered ef- fective assistance is not a finding of fact binding on the fed- eral court to the extent stated by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). In- effectiveness is not a question of "basic, primary, or historical fac[t]," Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 309, n. 6 (1963). Rather, like the question whether multiple representation in a particular case gave rise to a conflict of interest, it is a mixed question of law and fact. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S., at 342. Although state court findings of fact made in the course of deciding an ineffectiveness claim are subject to the deference requirement of § 2254(d), and although district court findings are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), both the perform- ance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact. V Having articulated general standards for judging ineffec- tiveness claims, we think it useful to apply those standards to the facts of this case in order to illustrate the meaning of the general principles. The record makes it possible to do so. There are no conflicts between the state and federal courts over findings of fact, and the principles we have articulated are sufficiently close to the principles applied both in the Florida courts and in the District Court that it is clear that the factfinding was not affected by erroneous legal principles. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 291-292 (1982). Application of the governing principles is not difficult in this case. The facts as described above, see supra, at 671- 678, make clear that the conduct of respondent's counsel at and before respondent's sentencing proceeding cannot be found unreasonable. They also make clear that, even assuming the STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON 668 Opinion of the Court challenged conduct of counsel was unreasonable, respondent suffered insufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside his death sentence. With respect to the performance component, the record shows that respondent's counsel made a strategic choice to argue for the extreme emotional distress mitigating circum- stance and to rely as fully as possible on respondent's accept- ance of responsibility for his crimes. Although counsel un- derstandably felt hopeless about respondent's prospects, see App. 383-384, 400-401, nothing in the record indicates, as one possible reading of the District Court's opinion suggests, see App. to Pet. for Cert. A282, that counsel's sense of hope- lessness distorted his professional judgment. Counsel's strategy choice was well within the range of professionally reasonable judgments, and the decision not to seek more character or psychological evidence than was already in hand was likewise reasonable. The trial judge's views on the importance of owning up to one's crimes were well known to counsel. The aggravating circumstances were utterly overwhelming. Trial counsel could reasonably surmise from his conversations with re- spondent that character and psychological evidence would be of little help. Respondent had already been able to mention at the plea colloquy the substance of what there was to know about his financial and emotional troubles. Restricting testi- mony on respondent's character to what had come in at the plea colloquy ensured that contrary character and psychologi- cal evidence and respondent's criminal history, which counsel had successfully moved to exclude, would not come in. On these facts, there can be little question, even without applica- tion of the presumption of adequate performance, that trial counsel's defense, though unsuccessful, was the result of rea- sonable professional judgment. With respect to the prejudice component, the lack of merit of respondent's claim is even more stark. The evidence that respondent says his trial counsel should have offered at the OCTOBER TERM, 1983 Opinion of BRENNAN, J. 466 U. S. I This case and United States v. Cronic, ante, p. 648, present our first occasions to elaborate the appropriate standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Cronic, the Court considers such claims in the context of cases "in which the surrounding circumstances [make] it so unlikely that any lawyer could provide effec- tive assistance that ineffectiveness [is] properly presumed without inquiry into actual performance at trial," ante, at 661. This case, in contrast, concerns claims of ineffective assistance based on allegations of specific errors by counsel- claims which, by their very nature, require courts to evaluate both the attorney's performance and the effect of that per- formance on the reliability and fairness of the proceeding. Accordingly, a defendant making a claim of this kind must show not only that his lawyer's performance was inadequate but also that he was prejudiced thereby. See also Cronic, ante, at 659, n. 26. I join the Court's opinion because I believe that the stand- ards it sets out today will both provide helpful guidance to courts considering claims of actual ineffectiveness of counsel and also permit those courts to continue their efforts to achieve progressive development of this area of the law. Like all federal courts and most state courts that have previously ad- dressed the matter, see ante, at 683-684, the Court concludes that "the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance." Ante, at 687. And, administration of justice into [a] sporting contest"); Autry v. Estelle, 464 U. S. 1, 6 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Court's practice in reviewing applications in death cases "injects uncertainty and disparity into the review procedure, adds to the burdens of counsel, dis- torts the deliberative process within this Court, and increases the risk of error"). It is difficult to believe that the decision whether to put an indi- vidual to death generates any less emotional pressure among juries, trial judges, and appellate courts than it does among Members of this Court. STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON 668 Opinion of BRENNAN, J. rejecting the strict "outcome-determinative" test employed by some courts, the Court adopts as the appropriate stand- ard for prejudice a requirement that the defendant "show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," defining a "reasonable probability" as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Ante, at 694. I believe these standards are sufficiently precise to permit meaningful distinctions between those attorney derelictions that deprive defendants of their constitutional rights and those that do not; at the same time, the standards are sufficiently flexible to accommodate the wide variety of situations giving rise to claims of this kind. With respect to the performance standard, I agree with the Court's conclusion that a "particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct" would be inappropriate. Ante, at 688. Precisely because the standard of "reasonably effective as- sistance" adopted today requires that counsel's performance be measured in light of the particular circumstances of the case, I do not believe our decision "will stunt the develop- ment of constitutional doctrine in this area," post, at 709 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Court's suggestion that today's decision is largely consistent with the approach taken by the lower courts, ante, at 696, simply indicates that those courts may continue to develop governing principles on a case-by-case basis in the common-law tradition, as they have in the past. Similarly, the prejudice standard announced today does not erect an insurmountable obstacle to meri- torious claims, but rather simply requires courts carefully to examine trial records in light of both the nature and seri- ousness of counsel's errors and their effect in the particular circumstances of the case. Ante, at 695.2 21 Indeed, counsel's incompetence can be so serious that it rises to the level of a constructive denial of counsel which can constitute constitutional error without any showing of prejudice. See Cronic, ante, at 659-660; OCTOBER TERM, 1983 Opinion of BRENNAN, J. 466 U. S. II Because of their flexibility and the requirement that they be considered in light of the particular circumstances of the case, the standards announced today can and should be applied with concern for the special considerations that must attend review of counsel's performance in a capital sen- tencing proceeding. In contrast to a case in which a finding of ineffective assistance requires a new trial, a conclusion that counsel was ineffective with respect to only the penalty phase of a capital trial imposes on the State the far lesser burden of reconsideration of the sentence alone. On the other hand, the consequences to the defendant of incompe- tent assistance at a capital sentencing could not, of course, be greater. Recognizing the unique seriousness of such a proceeding, we have repeatedly emphasized that "'where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."' Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 874 (1983) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 188-189 (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.)). For that reason, we have consistently required that capital proceedings be policed at all stages by an especially vigilant concern for procedural fairness and for the accuracy of fact- finding. As JUSTICE MARSHALL emphasized last Term: "This Court has always insisted that the need for pro- cedural safeguards is particularly great where life is at stake. Long before the Court established the right to counsel in all felony cases, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), it recognized that right in capital cases, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 71-72 (1932). Time Javor v. United States, 724 F. 2d 831, 834 (CA9 1984) ("Prejudice is inher- ent in this case because unconscious or sleeping counsel is equivalent to no counsel at all"). STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON 668 MARSHALL, J., dissenting ance of counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771, n. 14 (1970). The state and lower federal courts have developed standards for distinguishing effective from inade- quate assistance.' Today, for the first time, this Court at- tempts to synthesize and clarify those standards. For the most part, the majority's efforts are unhelpful. Neither of its two principal holdings seems to me likely to improve the adjudication of Sixth Amendment claims. And, in its zeal to survey comprehensively this field of doctrine, the majority makes many other generalizations and suggestions that I find unacceptable. Most importantly, the majority fails to take adequate account of the fact that the locus of this case is a capital sentencing proceeding. Accordingly, I join neither the Court's opinion nor its judgment. I The opinion of the Court revolves around two holdings. First, the majority ties the constitutional minima of attorney performance to a simple "standard of reasonableness." Ante, at 688. Second, the majority holds that only an error of counsel that has sufficient impact on a trial to "undermine confidence in the outcome" is grounds for overturning a con- viction. Ante, at 694. I disagree with both of these rulings. A My objection to the performance standard adopted by the Court is that it is so malleable that, in practice, it will either have no grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the manner in which the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied by different courts. To tell lawyers and the lower courts that counsel for a criminal defendant must behave I See Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Crimi- nal Defense Counsel: A New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 752, 756-758 (1980); Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Sixth Amendment and the Fair Trial Guarantee, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1380, 1386-1387, 1399-1401, 1408-1410 (1983). OCTOBER TERM, 1983 MARSHALL, J., dissenting 466 U. S. "reasonably" and must act like "a reasonably competent at- torney," ante, at 687, is to tell them almost nothing. In essence, the majority has instructed judges called upon to assess claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to advert to their own intuitions regarding what constitutes "profes- sional" representation, and has discouraged them from trying to develop more detailed standards governing the perform- ance of defense counsel. In my view, the Court has thereby not only abdicated its own responsiblity to interpret the Con- stitution, but also impaired the ability of the lower courts to exercise theirs. The debilitating ambiguity of an "objective standard of rea- sonableness" in this context is illustrated by the majority's failure to address important issues concerning the quality of representation mandated by the Constitution. It is an unfortunate but undeniable fact that a person of means, by selecting a lawyer and paying him enough to ensure he pre- pares thoroughly, usually can obtain better representation than that available to an indigent defendant, who must rely on appointed counsel, who, in turn, has limited time and re- sources to devote to a given case. Is a "reasonably compe- tent attorney" a reasonably competent adequately paid re- tained lawyer or a reasonably competent appointed attorney? It is also a fact that the quality of representation available to ordinary defendants in different parts of the country varies significantly. Should the standard of performance mandated by the Sixth Amendment vary by locale? 2 The majority of- fers no clues as to the proper responses to these questions. The majority defends its refusal to adopt more specific standards primarily on the ground that "[n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take ac- 2Cf., e. g., Moore v. United States, 432 F. 2d 730, 736 (CA3 1970) (defin- ing the constitutionally required level of performance as "the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place"). STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON 668 MARSHALL, J., dissenting count of the variety of circumstances faced by defense coun- sel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant." Ante, at 688-689. I agree that counsel must be afforded "wide latitude" when making "tactical decisions" regarding trial strategy, see ante, at 689; cf. infra, at 712, 713, but many aspects of the job of a criminal defense attorney are more amenable to judicial oversight. For example, much of the work involved in preparing for a trial, applying for bail, conferring with one's client, making timely objections to significant, arguably erroneous rulings of the trial judge, and filing a notice of appeal if there are color- able grounds therefor could profitably be made the subject of uniform standards. The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case represents one sound attempt to develop particularized standards de- signed to ensure that all defendants receive effective legal assistance. See 693 F. 2d 1243, 1251-1258 (CA5 1982) (en banc). For other, generally consistent efforts, see United States v. Decoster, 159 U. S. App. D. C. 326, 333-334, 487 F. 2d 1197, 1203-1204 (1973), disapproved on rehearing, 199 U. S. App. D. C. 359, 624 F. 2d 196 (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 944 (1979); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F. 2d 224, 226 (CA4), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 849 (1968); People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 424-425, 590 P. 2d 859, 866 (1979); State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 550-557, 205 N. W. 2d 1, 6-9 (1973).1 By refusing to address the merits of these proposals, and indeed suggesting that no such effort is worthwhile, the opinion of the Court, I fear, will stunt the development of constitutional doctrine in this area. 'For a review of other decisions attempting to develop guidelines for assessment of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, see Erickson, Standards of Competency for Defense Counsel in a Criminal Case, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 233, 242-248 (1979). Many of these decisions rely heavily on the standards developed by the American Bar Association. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1-4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980). OCTOBER TERM, 1983 MARSHALL, J., dissenting 466 U. S. to effective assistance of counsel is entailed by the right to counsel, and abridgment of the former is equivalent to abridgment of the latter.' I would thus hold that a show- ing that the performance of a defendant's lawyer departed from constitutionally prescribed standards requires a new trial regardless of whether the defendant suffered demon- strable prejudice thereby. II Even if I were inclined to join the majority's two central holdings, I could not abide the manner in which the majority elaborates upon its rulings. Particularly regrettable are the majority's discussion of the "presumption" of reasonableness to be accorded lawyers' decisions and its attempt to prejudge the merits of claims previously rejected by lower courts using different legal standards. A In defining the standard of attorney performance required by the Constitution, the majority appropriately notes that many problems confronting criminal defense attorneys admit of "a range of legitimate" responses. Ante, at 689. And the majority properly cautions courts, when reviewing a lawyer's selection amongst a set of options, to avoid the hubris of hind- sight. Ibid. The majority goes on, however, to suggest that reviewing courts should "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct" was constitutionally acceptable, ibid.; see ante, at 690, 696, and should "appl[y] a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments," ante, at 691. I am not sure what these phrases mean, and I doubt that they will be self-explanatory to lower courts. If they denote nothing more than that a defendant claiming he was denied effective assistance of counsel has the burden of proof, I 7See United States v. Yelardy, 567 F. 2d 863, 865, n. 1 (CA6), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 842 (1978); Beasley v. United States, 491 F. 2d 687, 696 (CA6 1974); Commonwealth v. Badger, 482 Pa. 240, 243-244, 393 A. 2d 642, 644 (1978). STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON 668 MARSHALL, J., dissenting would agree. See United States v. Cronic, ante, at 658. But the adjectives "strong" and "heavy" might be read as imposing upon defendants an unusually weighty burden of persuasion. If that is the majority's intent, I must respect- fully dissent. The range of acceptable behavior defined by "prevailing professional norms," ante, at 688, seems to me sufficiently broad to allow defense counsel the flexibility they need in responding to novel problems of trial strategy. To afford attorneys more latitude, by "strongly presuming" that their behavior will fall within the zone of reasonableness, is covertly to legitimate convictions and sentences obtained on the basis of incompetent conduct by defense counsel. The only justification the majority itself provides for its proposed presumption is that undue receptivity to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel would encourage too many defendants to raise such claims and thereby would clog the courts with frivolous suits and "dampen the ardor" of defense counsel. See ante, at 690. I have more confidence than the majority in the ability of state and federal courts expedi- tiously to dispose of meritless arguments and to ensure that responsible, innovative lawyering is not inhibited. In my view, little will be gained and much may be lost by instruct- ing the lower courts to proceed on the assumption that a defendant's challenge to his lawyer's performance will be insubstantial. B For many years the lower courts have been debating the meaning of "effective" assistance of counsel. Different courts have developed different standards. On the issue of the level of performance required by the Constitution, some courts have adopted the forgiving "farce-and-mockery" standard,8 while others have adopted various versions of 'See, e. g., State v. Pacheco, 121 Ariz. 88, 91, 588 P. 2d 830, 833 (1978); Hoover v. State, 270 Ark. 978, 980, 606 S. W. 2d 749, 751 (1980); Line v. State, 272 Ind. 353, 354-355, 397 N. E. 2d 975, 976 (1979). OCTOBER TERM, 1983 MARSHALL, J., dissenting 466 U. S. the "reasonable competence" standard.' On the issue of the level of prejudice necessary to compel a new trial, the courts have taken a wide variety of positions, ranging from the stringent "outcome-determinative" test,1" to the rule that a showing of incompetence on the part of defense counsel automatically requires reversal of the conviction regardless of the injury to the defendant." The Court today substantially resolves these disputes. The majority holds that the Constitution is violated when de- fense counsel's representation falls below the level expected of reasonably competent defense counsel, ante, at 687-691, and so affects the trial that there is a "reasonable probability" that, absent counsel's error, the outcome would have been different, ante, at 691-696. Curiously, though, the Court discounts the significance of its rulings, suggesting that its choice of standards matters little and that few if any cases would have been decided differently if the lower courts had always applied the tests announced today. See ante, at 696-697. Surely the judges in the state and lower federal courts will be surprised to learn that the distinctions they have so fiercely debated for many years are in fact unimportant. The majority's comments on this point seem to be prompted principally by a reluctance to acknowledge that to- day's decision will require a reassessment of many previously rejected ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The ma- jority's unhappiness on this score is understandable, but its efforts to mitigate the perceived problem will be ineffectual. Nothing the majority says can relieve lower courts that hith- 'See, e. g., Trapnell v. United States, 725 F. 2d 149, 155 (CA2 1983); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F. 2d 1325, 1328-1330 (CA9 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U. S. 974 (1979). "See, e. g., United States v. Decoster, 199 U. S. App. D. C., at 370, and n. 74, 624 F. 2d, at 208, and n. 74 (plurality opinion); Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 1981). See n. 7, supra. STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON 668 MARSHALL, J., dissenting ability" that he would have been given a life sentence if his lawyer had been competent, see ante, at 694; if the defendant can establish a significant chance that the outcome would have been different, he surely should be entitled to a redeter- mination of his fate. Cf. United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 121-122 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).17 IV The views expressed in the preceding section oblige me to dissent from the majority's disposition of the case before us.18 It is undisputed that respondent's trial counsel made virtu- ally no investigation of the possibility of obtaining testimony from respondent's relatives, friends, or former employers pertaining to respondent's character or background. Had counsel done so, he would have found several persons willing and able to testify that, in their experience, respondent was a responsible, nonviolent man, devoted to his family, and active in the affairs of his church. See App. 338-365. Re- spondent contends that his lawyer could have and should have used that testimony to "humanize" respondent, to coun- teract the impression conveyed by the trial that he was little more than a cold-blooded killer. Had this evidence been admitted, respondent argues, his chances of obtaining a life sentence would have been significantly better. '"As I read the opinion of the Court, it does not preclude this kind of adjustment of the legal standard. The majority defines "reasonable prob- ability" as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the out- come." Ante, at 694. In view of the nature of the sanction at issue, and the difficulty of determining how a sentencer would have responded if pre- sented with a different set of facts, it could be argued that a lower estimate of the likelihood that the outcome of a capital sentencing proceeding was influenced by attorney error is sufficient to "undermine confidence" in that outcome than would be true in an ordinary criminal case. "Adhering to my view that the death penalty is unconstitutional under all circumstances, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), I would vote to vacate respondent's sentence even if he had not presented a substantial Sixth Amendment claim. OCTOBER TERM, 1983 MARSHALL, J., dissenting 466 U. S. Measured against the standards outlined above, respond- ent's contentions are substantial. Experienced members of the death-penalty bar have long recognized the crucial impor- tance of adducing evidence at a sentencing proceeding that establishes the defendant's social and familial connections. See Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 299, 300-303, 334-335 (1983). The State makes a colorable- though in my view not compelling-argument that defense counsel in this case might have made a reasonable "strategic" decision not to present such evidence at the sentencing hear- ing on the assumption that an unadorned acknowledgment of respondent's responsibility for his crimes would be more likely to appeal to the trial judge, who was reputed to respect persons who accepted responsiblity for their actions.9 But however justifiable such a choice might have been after coun- sel had fairly assessed the potential strength of the mitigat- ing evidence available to him, counsel's failure to make any significant effort to find out what evidence might be garnered from respondent's relatives and acquaintances surely cannot be described as "reasonable." Counsel's failure to investi- gate is particularly suspicious in light of his candid admission that respondent's confessions and conduct in the course of the trial gave him a feeling of "hopelessness" regarding the possibility of saving respondent's life, see App. 383-384, 400-401. "Two considerations undercut the State's explanation of counsel's deci- sion. First, it is not apparent why adducement of evidence pertaining to respondent's character and familial connections would have been inconsist- ent with respondent's acknowledgment that he was responsible for his be- havior. Second, the Florida Supreme Court possesses-and frequently exercises-the power to overturn death sentences it deems unwarranted by the facts of a case. See State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (1973). Even if counsel's decision not to try to humanize respondent for the benefit of the trial judge were deemed reasonable, counsel's failure to create a record for the benefit of the State Supreme Court might well be deemed unreasonable. STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON 668 MARSHALL, J., dissenting That the aggravating circumstances implicated by re- spondent's criminal conduct were substantial, see ante, at 700, does not vitiate respondent's constitutional claim; judges and juries in cases involving behavior at least as egregious have shown mercy, particularly when afforded an oppor- tunity to see other facets of the defendant's personality and life. 2° Nor is respondent's contention defeated by the possibility that the material his counsel turned up might not have been sufficient to establish a statutory mitigating circumstance under Florida law; Florida sentencing judges and the Florida Supreme Court sometimes refuse to impose death sentences in cases "in which, even though statutory mitigating circumstances do not outweigh statutory aggra- vating circumstances, the addition of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances tips the scales in favor of life imprisonment." Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939, 964 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis in original). If counsel had investigated the availability of mitigating evidence, he might well have decided to present some such material at the hearing. If he had done so, there is a sig- nificant chance that respondent would have been given a life sentence. In my view, those possibilities, conjoined with the unreasonableness of counsel's failure to investigate, are more than sufficient to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment and to entitle respondent to a new sentencing proceeding. I respectfully dissent. I See, e. g., Farmer & Kinard, The Trial of the Penalty Phase (1976), reprinted in 2 California State Public Defender, California Death Penalty Manual N-33, N-45 (1980).