The Iranian Hostage Crisis: Decision-Making and Conflict Management, Study notes of Decision Making

Download The Iranian Hostage Crisis: Decision-Making and Conflict Management and more Study notes Decision Making in PDF only on Docsity! Spring 1990 The Structure of Decision-Making in the Iranian Hostage Rescue Attempt and its Implications for Conflict Management by William L. Waugh, Jr. INTRODUCTION On 4 November 1979, fifty-two American diplomats, military personnel, and others were seized in the American Embassy and other sites in Tehran and held until their release on 20 January 1981, 444 days after the event began. The weight of international law, American military threats, and humanitarian appeals were insufficient to secure the release of the hostages. The event became theater. The Iranian students holding the Embassy used the media attention to embarrass the U.S. for its support of the Shah and its alleged complicity in the terroristic operations of SAVAK, the Shah's internal security police. The Iranian government used the event to seek the return of the Shah to Tehran for trial, Iranian funds held in foreign banks, and the wealth removed from Iran by the Shah and his family, as well as to exact revenge on the U.S. for its support of the Pahlavi regime. In the U.S., the event became a symbol of the changing American role in world affairs, a possibly critical variable in the presidential election of 1980, and a very traumatic lesson in the realities of international politics. There have been few events in American history that have had such a profound impact on the American psyche as the Iranian hostage crisis1 of 1979-1981. This frustrating event has also left a lasting impression on American foreign policy in terms of raising questions about relations with regimes with poor human rights records and little popular support, and involvement of the U.S. military in distant parts of the world. The ill-fated rescue attempt six months into the hostage-taking has lead to a fundamental reappraisal of the effectiveness of American military forces and the decision­ making process within the military establishment. The structure and effectiveness of decision-making prior to and during the rescue attempt will be the focus of the analysis here, although the political environment within which that decision-making took place will also require scrutiny. The decision processes will be examined in terms of competing theoretical explanations to determine whether the pathologies of "groupthink",2 faulty organizational design, or misplaced incrementalism may account for the outcome or whether the failure of the mission can be attributed simply to what Charles Perrow calls a "normal accident."3 The implications of each explanation for the failure for conflict management will also be assessed in terms of how such failures can be avoided in future conflicts. In many respects the American involvement in Iran was similar to being in close proximity to a natural hazard. The regime of Reza Shah Pahlavi was quickly losing control in Iran and the increasing risk of being caught in the political upheaval should have been apparent to the Shah's supporters and 26 Conflict Quarterly allies. Although the danger to American personnel and interests was mounting daily, the American intelligence community apparently did not provide an accurate assessment of the risk. While nonessential personnel were being removed from the Embassy, the hostage-taking was not anticipated fully enough to minimize the threat to personnel and to prevent the loss of sensitive diplomatic materials. In a larger sense, the U.S. failed to distance itself from the Shah's regime to minimize the political losses from a popular uprising. The discussion that follows will focus on the nature of the Iranian hostage crisis and on both how it challenged the capacity of the American government to respond to threats beyond its jurisdiction, as exemplified by the failed rescue mission, and how such events can be avoided. The lessons of 1979-1981 have some currency today given the prolonged conflict over hostages taken in Beirut; the Reagan Administration's trading of weapons for hostages exposed during Congressional hearings in 1986-1988 and reexamined minutely during the subsequent criminal investigations of the principals; and the atmosphere of uncertainty in the Persian Gulf area following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Administratively, the crisis has had a positive effect in that it has precipitated an intensive examination of the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the apparatus for advising the president on national security affairs. Reforms are still being implemented in those areas in response to the aborted rescue mission in 1980 and the evident excesses of National Security Council personnel later in the decade. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE HOSTAGE-TAKING The seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979, concluded an era of American influence in Iran that began with CIA involvement in the overthrow of the Mossadegh regime by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1953. During the next two decades strong ties developed between the Shah and an influential group of American leaders, including President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Those close personal ties and the importance of Iran to the U.S.'s strategic interests, as well as the tremendous wealth generated by the Iranian oil fields, resulted in a strong U.S. commitment to the Shah's regime and rapidly expanding military sales. Economic growth and increased Westernization of Iranian society created internal conflicts that eventually led to an "Islamic revolution" headed by the religious leadership. As supporters of the Shah, Americans were principal targets of the violent revolution. By late 1978 it was apparent that the Shah's hold on the Peacock Throne was tenuous, although U.S. intelligence agencies apparently underestimated the strength of popular opposition. The Shah met increasing anti-regime violence with tentative reform efforts. Whether the intent to establish democratic reforms was real or not, the regime eventually fell victim to its own cultural underpinnings. 27 Spring J 990 THE MANAGEMENT OF THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS The events of November 1979 and the following fourteen months presented a number of difficulties for the U.S. government. The seizure of the embassy was a gross violation of international law and the U.S. had the support of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, and other international agencies. The Carter Administration had very little leverage within the Iranian government. The more radical religious elements effectively inhibited negotiations with moderate leaders. Indeed, the political situation was such that the moderate Iranian leaders could not appear overly sensitive to the U.S. position without jeopardizing their own standing. The Revolutionary Council viewed the hostage-taking as an opportunity to expand its own influence and to embarrass the U.S. by attracting international attention to American complicity in the Shah's oppressive regime. In administrative terms, the affair proved a challenge to the crisis decision-making apparatus in the U.S. The State Department activated its operation center with an Iran Working Group providing coordination of the multi-agency response and managing the operations in general, as well as maintaining contact with the families of the hostages. Secretary of State Vance and Deputy Secretary Christopher, along with the Undersecretary for Political Affairs, provided policy guidance, with Assistant Secretary Harold Saunders acting as liaison between the two groups.8 The Special Coordinating Committee of the National Security Council, chaired by National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, handled the development of policy within the White House. At least initially, information was collected directly from Iran via telephone by simply calling public officials and even persons within the U.S. embassy.9 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff represented the Department of Defense in the National Security Council. The Joint Chiefs presented military options to the SCC two days after the hostage crisis began. These options included a rescue attempt and retaliatory strikes and President Carter asked the JCS to develop both plans. A military blockade and other options were also considered seriously, and the Navy moved two naval battle groups into the Arabian Sea outside of the Persian Gulf.10 However, because there were several major problems with choosing military options, including the likelihood that reprisals would be directed against other Americans in Iran as well as against the hostages themselves, the use of military force was generally considered as a last resort — if the hostages were harmed or put on trial. Congress was generally involved in the negotiation process and in the development of military plans. Restrictions on executive freedom of action implemented after the resignation of President Nixon, such as the War Powers Act of 1973, the National Emergency Act of 1976, and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, required consultation with Congress before actions could be taken." 30 Conflict Quarterly The Carter Administration generally pursued a two-pronged strategy in dealing with Iran: maintaining open communications focusing on the condition of the hostages and on negotiation; and, increasing the costs to Iran for holding the hostages.12 The freezing of Iranian assets in the U.S., the trade embargo, export controls, and tightening the control of immigration from Iran were examples of the latter. The declaration of a national emergency on 14 November 1979 increased presidential power to follow through with the trade embargo and travel ban, as well as to comply with many of the conditions in the final settlement with Iran.13 The Administration's policy of encouraging other nations to impose economic sanctions on Iran was not very successful, as the willingness of the Allies to maintain the sanctions waned very quickly. The negotiations stopped and started depending upon the fortunes of the more moderate leaders in Tehran, and generally were impeded by the Ayatullah's insistence that a newly elected Parliament participate in the negotiations. When the negotiations broke down in March 1980 the Carter Administration decided to attempt the rescue of the hostages proposed earlier by the JCS. The likelihood of success was considered slight given the history of such efforts and the problems unique to the Iranian situation. THE ABORTED RESCUE MISSION In very brief terms, the plan for the rescue mission required that helicopters and aircraft be moved close to Tehran so that a small team could be flown into the city and driven by convoy to the Embassy compound to extract the hostages. The expectation ostensibly was that the force could enter the city, rescue the hostages, and retreat with a minimum of fighting. Security at the Embassy, it was felt, had become very lax in the months since the hostage-taking began, probably because the students believed that a rescue was not a feasible option for the U.S. The possibility of a military rescue operation had been raised within days of the seizure of the Embassy. On 6 November National Security Advisor Brzezinski had asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a rescue plan. Brzezinski indicated that the operation was a "matter of honor" for the nation as well as an obligation to the hostages. Brzezinski's own preferences included a broader military response involving an air strike on the oil refineries and/or other strategic targets. The plan was described to President Carter and his staff on 22 March. At that time, Secretary Vance voiced strong objections to the operation. Vance, however, was not present at the meeting on 11 April when the decision was taken to go with the rescue.14 Army Major General James B. Vaught commanded the rescue operation. He designated his own intelligence officer and established liaisons with the intelligence agencies, rather than use the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and an interagency intelligence task force to coordinate information gathering. He also did not use the Joint Chiefs of Staff crisis response procedures or the contingency plans already drawn up. Concerns about security resulted in strict limits being placed on the number of participants in the operation. 31 Spring 1990 Air Force Major General Philip G. Gast was brought in first as a "special Consultant" in charge of aircraft pilot training, and twelve days before the operation was formally designated as the deputy task force commander — despite his outranking Vaught. Similarly, U.S. Marine Colonel Charles H. Pitman was an unofficial participant in the operation, but became the de facto commander of helicopter training — most of the pilots were Marines — and flew one of the helicopters involved in the operation. Marine Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. Seiffert was ostensibly assigned as the helicopter flight leader, although that status was unclear with Col. Pitman involved in the operation. Again, the chain of command lacked coherence.15 Finally, Army Colonel Charlie A. Beckwith was commander of the Delta Force team that was to enter die Embassy and free the hostages. Air Force Colonel James Kyle was in charge of the C-130 transport aircraft and the "Desert One" base fifty miles from Tehran, where the aircraft were to drop off the Army's Delta Force team and supporting Ranger troops and wait for their return with the hostages.16 Troops were moved into the area through Egypt and Oman, without apprising those nations of the mission. Vaught established his base at Qena, Egypt, to oversee the operation. He maintained contact with the JCS and the President, through the Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown.17 On 24 April the rescue force departed the U.S.S. Nimitz. It was expected that six helicopters were the minimum needed to accomplish the mission. Eight left for Tehran. One was abandoned in the desert when a warning light indicated mechanical problems. Another, flown by Col. Pitman, developed problems and returned to the Nimitz. An unanticipated dust cloud ("haboob") delayed arrival at the first desert landing site by fifty to eighty-five minutes, throwing off the timing of the mission. A third helicopter developed hydraulic problems, leaving only five. The mission was aborted but, as the aircraft prepared to leave the air strip, one of the helicopters crashed into the refueling plane. Eight crewmen died and five were injured.18 In the confusion and haste of the departure, the bodies were left at the crash site along with classified materials on board the abandoned helicopters. The public display of the bodies and materials by Iranian authorities later intensified American frustration with the hostage-taking. THE STRUCTURE OF DECISION-MAKING The failed rescue has been examined from a variety of perspectives since 1980. Some part of the failure can be explained by examining the events within common theories of decision-making. They include, firstly, Irving Janis' concept of "groupthink," which suggests that the decision-making processes leading up to the rescue attempt may have been flawed and the rescue should not have been attempted at all; and mat processes within the operation itself may have contributed to the failure of the mission.19 Secondly, the organization of the rescue force violated basic tenets of organizational design, including: diverse military participants causing communications problems and die failure to choose the most appropriate 32 Conflict Quarterly that, to some extent, there was a search for alternative actions, but that political factors had a significant impact on the range of choices. The identification of the problem and the determination of the imperative to act were characterized by "analogizing",28 essentially interpreting the situation to be the same or very nearly the same as another more familiar situation. Faulty analogizing, it is suggested, can affect decision-making when the unique characteristics of a situation or event are overlooked because decision­ makers choose to respond in the same way as they did to a prior situation. In this case, the principals in the decision to attempt the Entebbe rescue tended to relate the event to another recent dramatic event29 with little real attention given to the fit. The search for alternatives was then curtailed when an option was arrived at that matched the predisposition of the group.30 In short, the Israeli leadership was predisposed toward a military operation and massaged the rescue plans until the probability of success reached an acceptable level, according to Moaz. Some adjustments were made in the plan as circumstances changed, but only minor ones. The personalities involved, particularly Defense Minister Peres and Prime Minister Rabin, also contributed to the decision to attempt the rescue, despite Rabin's initial preference for negotiation. The decision to attempt the rescue in Tehran was arrived at in a very similar manner. There was tremendous political pressure to act and there were few options available except for diplomatic and military actions. The effects of economic sanctions were questionable. Because of the hostages and other Americans in Iran, other, broader military actions were not viable options. The "analogizing" may well have been in terms of interpreting the U.S. situation in Iran as comparable to the Israeli situation in Entebbe, although the situations were only superficially similar. American policy on terrorism, as well as broader Middle Eastern policies, had tended to be similar to the Israelis', despite the dissimilarities in the types of violence they were designed to address and the level of threat that the violence presented to each society.31 The successful West German rescue of hostages at the Mogadishu airport in Somalia might also have contributed to the tendency to "analogize," despite the more recent failed attempts by Egypt to use military forces to rescue hostages. Concerns have been expressed about the inappropriate application of the Israeli rescue model in subsequent hostage-takings.32 This analysis certainly does not exhaust the possible explanations, but it does explicate some of the more plausible ones. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT Realistically, the Carter Administration had very few options. The imposition of economic sanctions was impeded by the sheer difficulty of severing economic ties and enlisting the support of allies in such efforts. The military options were constrained by the realization that other Americans, including journalists, were in Iran and could be taken hostage if those in the Embassy were rescued, violence against Iranians civilians might precipitate 35 Spring 1990 violence elsewhere, and a strong military response might force Iran into an alliance with the Soviet Union. Recourse through international law was not promising because Iran simply refused to accept United Nations and International Court of Justice condemnations of the hostage-taking. The lack of a unified military force to deal with hostage situations outside of U.S. borders turned out to be a significant problem, although there is no assurance that the rescue would have been effective under the best of circumstances.33 Since the hostage crisis such a unit has been created by the JCS, along with policy review mechanisms to oversee future rescue efforts.34 The fact of the matter is that diplomatic personnel and facilities are vulnerable to attacks as subsequent assaults on U.S. facilities in Lebanon and elsewhere have demonstrated, despite increased embassy security worldwide and international conventions against such actions. Many analysts and commentators indicate that the decisive factor in the negotiations was the fear by the Iranian government that newly elected President Reagan would use military force without regard for the costs to the U.S. in lives and strategic considerations. Certainly the rhetoric of the 1980 campaign would suggest such an inclination. It must also be noted that the election campaign intensified the pressure on President Carter to act decisively, both to improve his own prospects for reelection and to enhance the prospects for other Democratic candidates. The President's "rose garden" strategy, in which he declined to campaign actively for reelection while the hostages were held, was intended to impress the public with Carter's attention to the business of the presidency, including the hostage crisis. The strategy, in fact, may have attracted greater attention to the hostage crisis and increased the President's political investment in its resolution. When the rescue failed, Carter — hoping to minimize the political damage — reviewed tapes and followed the example provided by President John Kennedy's explanation of the Bay of Pigs fiasco to the American people in 1961. Notwithstanding those concerns, many commentators and several of the hostages commended the President for attempting the rescue.35 The pathology of "groupthink" both among the President's advisors — which was complicated by the conflict between his two principal foreign policy advisors, Vance and Brzezinski — and among the rescue team members provides a compelling explanation of the decision to attempt a rescue and perhaps for its failure. It is uncertain that the rescue would have been a success under any but the most 'ideal' — and unlikely — circumstances. Organizational flaws and the tendency toward misplaced incrementalism and faulty "analogizing" also explain many of the problems that arose during the mission. The notion that the failure was due to a "normal accident" raises the question of whether the mission could have succeeded if the requisite number of helicopters had been available to take the rescue team into Tehran. This is the question that is the most problemmatic. Was the failure simply one of those inexplicable and unpredictable accidents that occur in complex systems, as the Holloway Report concludes? Given the minimal redundancy built into the system itself, that is not the best answer. 36 Conflict Quarterly Perrow's concept of "normal accident" is generally applied to complex systems in which error and accident have been anticipated and prepared for. Such was not the case with the rescue attempt. How, then, can conflict management processes be designed to minimize the likelihood of a similar failure? Certainly the creation of crisis management structures that encourage critical evaluation of policy options and permit critical review of operational plans is necessary. In this case, such structures were in existence but were not used. Mechanisms designed to inhibit the development of "groupthink," such as setting up review agencies to assess plans, are common in the decision-making literature. The organizational design problem can also be alleviated by the creation of permanent response units under a unified command, with clear lines of authority and the delegation of operational decision-making responsibility to a commander close to the operation. Ad hoc units will simply not have the level of coordination and cooperation necessary for the most complex operations. The excessive concern for security that evidently encouraged the creation of an overly compartmentalized organization and limited the attention given to the available military resources, has been called into question by more recent experience. The Grenada and Panama invasions have demonstrated that security can be maintained without eliminating mission review and simulation processes. Faulty "analogizing" may be a continuing problem. Just as Carter Administration policymakers in many ways saw the Tehran hostage situation as similar to the Israeli experience in Entebbe, it is likely that current policymakers will see the latest hostage situation in Beirut as similar to both of those cases. Realistically, however, the number of hostage-holding groups, the uncertain political climate in Lebanon, and the difficulty of locating scattered prisoners in the labyrinth of Beirut strongly suggests that rescue would be a virtual impossibility. The U.S. government cannot put American civilian hostages at even greater risk without very high political costs. In short, we simply cannot pursue the kind of policy that the Israeli government does in rescuing its citizens. The problem of incrementalism may be more fundamental. The decision to launch a military rescue operation in Iran was ill-considered from several standpoints and was likely influenced by the perceived need to assuage the national honor. Because the crisis was defined as a national security or international conflict, the hostages became something more and something less than human beings. That is, in international relations the units of analysis are nations rather than people.36 In that sense, the hostages were of less concern than they would be in, say, a law enforcement-defined event. In another sense, the hostages became very important symbols of the United States. This is all to say, that the issue of hostage safety was lost in the search for alternatives, and the Carter Administration chose to adopt an option that would have seemed to be antithetical to the hoped-for conclusion. The "best case scenarios" provided by both the Department of Defense and the CIA 37