Supreme Court Case: Swann v. Board of Education - Desegregation of Schools, Study notes of Remedies

Download Supreme Court Case: Swann v. Board of Education - Desegregation of Schools and more Study notes Remedies in PDF only on Docsity! CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT OCTOBER TERM, 1970 SWANN ET AL. v. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 281. Argued October 12, 1970-Decided April 20, 1971* The Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system, which includes the city of Charlotte, North Carolina, had more than 84,000 students in 107 schools in the 1968-1969 school year. Approximately 29% (24,000) of the pupils were Negro, about 14,000 of whom attended 21 schools that were at least 99% Negro. This resulted from a desegregation plan approved by the District Court in 1965, at the commencement of this litigation. In 1968 petitioner Swann moved for further relief based on Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, which required school boards to "come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work ...now . . .until it is. clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely re- moved." The District Court ordered the school board in April 1969 to provide a plan for faculty and student desegregation. Finding the board's submission unsatisfactory, the District Court appointed an expert to submit a desegregation plan. In February 1970, the expert and the board presented plans, and the court adopted the board's plan, as modified, for the junior and senior high schools, and the expert's proposed plan for the elementary schools. The Court of Appealt affirmed the District Court's order as to faculty desegregation and the secondary school plans, *Together with No. 349, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa- tion et al. v. Swain et al., also on certiorari to the same court. 1 OCTOBR TERM, 1970 Syllabus 402 U. S. but vacated the order respecting elementary schools, fearing that the provisions for pairing and grouping of elementary schools would unreasonably burden the pupils and the board. The case was remanded to the District Court for reconsideration and sub- mission of further plans. This Court granted certiorari and di- rected reinstatement of the District Court's order pending further proceedings in that court. On remand the District Court received two new plans, and ordered the board to adopt a plan, or the expert's plan would remain in effect. After the board "acquiesced" in the expert's plan, the District Court directed that it remain in effect. Held: 1. Today's objective is to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation that was held violative of equal protection guarantees by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, in 1954. P. 15. 2. In default by the school authorities of their affirmative obli- gation to proffer acceptable remedies, the district courts have broad power to fashion remedies that will assure unitary school systems. P. 16. 3. Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not restrict or withdraw from the federal courts their historic equitable remedial powers. The proviso in 42 U. S. C. § 2000c-6 was designed simply to foreclose any interpretation of the Act as expanding the existing powers of the federal courts to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Pp. 16-18. 4. Policy and practice with regard to faculty, staff, transporta- tion, extracurricular activities, and facilities are among the most important indicia of a segregated .system, and the first remedial responsibility of school authorities is to eliminate invidious racial distinctions in those respects. Normal administrative practice should then produce schools of like quality; facilities, and staffs. Pp. 18-19. 5. The Constitution does not prohibit district courts from using their equity power to order assignment of teachers to achieve a particular degree of faculty desegregation. United States v. Mont- gomery County Board of Education, 395 U. S. 225, was properly followed by the lower courts in this case. Pp. 19-20. 6. In devising remedies to eliminate legally imposed segregation, local authorities and district courts must see to it that future school construction and abandonment are not used and do not serve to perpetuate or re-establish a dual system. Pp. 20-21. SWANN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1 Opinion of the Court Jr., Charles R. Jonas, and Ernest F. Hollings for the Classroom Teachers Association of the Charlotte- Meckleiburg School System, Inc.; by Mark Wells White,, Jr., for Mrs. H. W. Cullen et al., members of the Board of Education of the Houston Independent School Dis- trict; by Jack Petree for the Board of Education of Memphis City Schools; by Sherwood W. Wise for the Jackson Chamber of Commerce, Inc., et al.; by Stephen J. Pollak, Benjamin W. Boley, and David Rubin for the National Education Association; by William L. Taylor, Richard B. Sobol, and Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., for the United Negro College Fund, Inc., et al.; by Owen H. Page for Concerned Citizens Association, Inc.; by Charles S. Conle, Floyd B. McKissick, and Charles S. Scott for the Congress of Racial Equality; by the Tennessee Fed- eration for Constitutional Government et al.; by William C. Cramer. pro se, and Richard B. Peet, joined by Albert W. Watson et al., for William C. Cramer; by Charles E. Bennett, pro se, James C. Rinaman, Jr., and Yardley D. Buckman for Charles E. Bennett; by Calvin H. Childress and M. T. Bohannon, Jr., for David E. Allgood et al.; by William B. Spong, Jr., and by Newton Collier Estes. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari in this case to review important issues as to the duties of school authorities and .the scope of powers of federal courts under this Court's -mandates to eliminate racially separate public schools established and maintained by state action. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) (Brown I). This case and those argued with it' arose in States hav- ing a long history of maintaining two sets of schools in a I McDaniel v. Barresi, No. 420, post, p. 39; Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, No. 436, post, p. 33; Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, No. 444, post, OCTOBER TERM, 1970 Opinion of the Court 402 U. S. single school system deliberately operated to carry out a governmental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of race. That was what Brown v. Board of Education was all about. These cases present us with the problem of defining in more precise terms than here- tofore the scope of the duty of school authorities and district courts in implementing Broum I and the man- date to eliminate dual systems and establish unitary systems at once. Meanwhile district courts and courts of appeals have struggled in hundreds of cases with a multitude and variety of problems under this Court's general directive. Understandably, in an area of evolv- ing remedies, those courts had to improvise and experi- ment without detailed or specific guidelines. This Court, in Brown I, appropriately dealt with the large consti- tutional principles; other federal courts had to grapple with the flinty, intractable realities of day-to-day imple- mentation of those constitutional commands. Their efforts, of necessity, embraced a process of "trial and error," and our effort to formulate guidelines must take into account their experience. I The Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system, the 43d largest in the Nation, encompasses the city of Charlotte and surrounding Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. The area is large-550 square miles--spanning roughly 22 miles east-west and 36 miles north-south. During the 1968-1969 school year the system served more than 84,000 pupils in 107 schools. Approximately 71% of the pupils were found to be white and 29% Negro. As of p. 47; North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, No. 498, post, p. 43. For purposes of this opinion the cross-petitions in Nos. 281 and 349 are treated as a single case and will be referred to as "this case." SWANN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1 Opinion of the Court June 1969 there were approximately 24,000 Negro stu- dents in the system, of whom 21,000 attended schools within the city of Charlotte. Two-thirds of those 21,000-approximately 14,000 Negro students-attended 21 schools which were either totally Negro or more than 99% Negro. This situation came about under a desegregation plan approved by the District Court at the commencement of the present litigation in 1965, 243 F. Supp. 667 (WDNC), aff'd, 369 F. 2d 29 (CA4 1966), based upon geographic zoning with a free-transfer provision. The present proceedings were initiated in September 1968 by petitioner Swann's motion for further relief based on Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430 (1968), and its companion cases.' All parties now agree that in 1969 the system fell short of achieving the unitary school system that those cases require. The District Court held numerous hearings and re- ceived voluminous evidence. In addition to finding cer- tain actions of the school board to be discriminatory, the court also found that residential patterns in the city and county resulted in part from federal, state, and local government action other than school board decisions. School board action based on these patterns, for example, by locating schools in Negro residential areas and fixing the size of the schools to accommodate the needs of im- mediate neighborhoods, resulted in segregated education. These findings were subsequently accepted by the Court of Appeals. In April 1969 the. District Court ordered the school board to come forward with a plan for both faculty and student desegregation. Proposed plans were accepted by the court in June and August 1969 on an interim basis 2 Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 443 (1968), and Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 391 U. S. 450 (1968). OCTOBER TERM, 1970 Opinion of the Court 402 U. S. be accomplished. However, unlike the board plan, it does not stop there. It goes further and desegre- gates all the rest of the elementary schools by the technique of grouping two or three outlying schools with one black inner city school; by transporting black students from grades one through four to the outlying white schools; and by transporting white students from the fifth and sixth grades from the outlying white schools to the inner city black school." Under the Finger plan, nine inner-city Negro schools were grouped in this manner with 24 suburban white schools. On February 5, 1970, the District Court adopted, the board plan, as modified by Dr. Finger, for the junior and senior high schools. The court rejected the board ele- mentary school plan and adopted the Finger plan as presented. Implementa.tion was partially stayed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on March 5, and this Court declined to disturb the Fourth Circuit's order, 397 U. S. 978 (1970). On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's order as to faculty desegregation and the second- ary school plans, but vacated the order respecting ele- mientary schools. While agreeing that the District Court properly disapproved the board plan concerning these schools, the Court of Appeals feared that the pairing and grouping of elementary schools would place an unrea- sonable burden on the board and the system's pupils. The case was remanded to the District Court for recon- sideration and submission of further-plans. 431 F. 2d tions in pupil ratios. In default of any such plan from the school board, the court will start with the thought . . . that efforts should be made to reach a 71-29 ratio in the various schools so that there will be no basis for contending that one school is racially different from the others, but to understand that variations from that norm may be unavoidable." 306 F. Supp. 1299, 1312. SWANN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1 Opinion of the Court 138. This Court granted certiorari, 399 U. S. 926, and directed reinstatement of the District Court's order pend- ing further proceedings in that court. On remand the District Court received two new plans for the elementary schools: a plan prepared by the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (the HEW plan) based on contiguous grouping and zoning of schools, and a plan prepared by four mem- bers of the nine-member school board (the minority plan) achieving substantially the same results as the Finger plan but apparently with slightly less transportation. A majority of the school board declined to amend its pro- posal. After a lengthy evidentiary hearing the District Court concluded that its own plan (the Finger plan), the minority plan, and an earlier draft of the Finger plan were all reasonable and acceptable. It directed the board to adopt one of the three or in the alternative to come forward with a new, equally effective plan of its own; the court ordered that the Finger plan would remain in effect in the event the school board declined to adopt a new plan. On August 7, the board indicated it would "acquiesce" in the Finger plan, reiterating its view that the plan was unreasonable. The District Court, by order dated August 7, 1970, directed that the Finger plan re- main in effect. II Nearly 17 years ago this Court held, in explicit terms, that state-imposed segregation by race in public schools denies equal protection of the laws. At no time has the Court deviated in the slightest degree from that holding or its constitutional underpinnings. None of the parties before us challenges the Court's decision of May 17, 1954, that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educa- tional facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, 419-882 0 - 72 - 6 OCTOBER TERM, 1970 Opinion of the Court 402 U. S. we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situ- ated . . . are, by reason of the segregation com- plained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.... "Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of con- siderable complexity." Brown v. Board of Educa- tion, supra, at 495. None of the parties before us questions the Court's 1955 holding in Brown II, that "School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these prob- lems; courts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith imple- mentation of the governing constitutional principles. Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for further hearings, the courts which originally heard these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal. Accordingly, we believe it appropriate to remand the cases to those courts. "In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Tra- ditionally, equity has been characterized by a prac- tical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in ad- mission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate this inter- est may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated in accordance with the constitutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of SWANN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION Opinion of the Court III The objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation. Segregation was the evil struck down by Brown I as contrary to the equal protection guarantees of the Con- stitution. That was the violation sought to be corrected by the remedial measures of Brown II. That was the basis for the holding in Green that school authorities are "clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." 391 U. S., at 437-438. If school authorities fail in their affirmative obligations under these holdings, judicial authority may be invoked. Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies. "The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The- qualities of mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and recon- ciliation between the public interest and private needs as'well as between competing private claims." Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329-330 (1944), cited in Brown II, supra, at 300. This allocation of responsibility once made, the Court attempted from time to time to provide some guidelines for the exercise of the district judge's discretion and for the reviewing function of the courts of appeals. How- ever, a school desegregation case does not differ funda- mentally from other cases involving the framing of OCTOBER TERM, 1970 Opinion of the Court 402 U. S. equitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional right. The task is to correct, by a balancing of the in- dividual and collective interests, the condition that of- fends the Constitution. In seeking to define even in broad and general terms how far this remedial power extends it is important to remember that judicial powers may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation. Remedial judi- cial authority does not put judges automatically in the shoes of school authorities whose powers are plenary. Judicial authority enters only when local authority defaults. School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of §chool authorities; ab- sent a finding of a constitutional violation, however, that would not be within the authority of a federal court. As with any equity case, the nature of the violation de- termines the scope of the remedy. In default by the school authorities of their obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school system. The school authorities argue that the equity powers of federal district courts have been limited by Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000c. The language and the history, of Title IV show that it was enacted not to limit but to define the role of the Federal Government in the implementation of the Brown I de- cision. It authorizes the Commissioner of Education to provide technical assistance to local boards in the prepara- tion of desegregation plans, to arrange "training insti- SWANN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1 Opinion of the Court tutes" for school personnel involved in desegregation efforts, and to make grants directly to schools to ease the transition to unitary. systems. It also authorizes the Attorney General, in specified circumstances, to initiate federal desegregation suits. Section 2000c (b) defines "desegregation" as it is used in Title IV: " 'Desegregation' means the assignment of students to public schools and within such schools without regard to their race, color, religion, or national origin, but 'desegregation' shall not mean the assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome racial imbalance." Section 2000c-6, authorizing the Attorney General to in- stitute federal suits, contains the following proviso: "nothing herein shall empower any official or court of the United States to issue any order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring the transportation of pupils or students from one school to another or one school district to another in order to achieve such racial balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing power of the court to insure compliance with constitutional standards." On their face, the sections quoted purport only to in- sure that the provisions of Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 will not be read as granting new powers. The proviso in § 2000c-6 is in terms designed to foreclose any interpretation of the Act as expanding the existing powers of federal courts to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. There is no suggestion of an intention to restrict those powers or withdraw from courts their historic equitable remedial powers. The legislative history of Title IV indicates that Congress was concerned that the Act might be read as creating a right of action under the Fourteenth Amendment in the situation of so-called "de facto segregation," where racial imbalance exists in the OCTOBER TERM, 1970 Opinion of the Court 402 U. S. We reversed the Court of Appeals and restored the District Court's order in its entirety, holding that the order of the District Judge "was adopted in the spirit of this Court's opinion in Green . . . in that his plan 'promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now.' The modifications ordered by the panel of the Court of Appeals, while of course not intended to do so, would, we think, take from the order some of its capacity to expedite, by means of specific commands, the day when a completely unified, unitary, nondis- criminatory school system becomes a reality instead of a hope. . . . We also believe that under all the circumstances of this case we follow the original plan outlined in Brown II . . . by accepting the more specific and expeditious order of [District] Judge Johnson . . . ." 395 U. S., at 235-236 (emphasis in original). The principles of Montgomery have been properly fol- lowed by the District Court and the Court of Appeals in this case. The construction of new schools and the closing of old ones are two of the most important functions of local school authorities and also two of the most complex. They must decide questions of location and capacity in light of population growth, finances, land values, site availability, through an almost endless list of factors to be considered. The result of this will be a decision which, when combined with one technique or another of student assignment, will determine the racial composi- tion of the student body in each school in the system. Over the long run, the consequences of the choices will be far reaching. People gravitate toward school facili- ties, just as schools are located in response to the needs of people. The location of schools may thus influence SWANN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1 Opinion of the Court the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on composition of inner- city neighborhoods. In the past, choices in this respect have been used as a potent weapon for creating or maintaining a state- segregated school system. In addition to the classic pattern of building schools specifically intended for Negro or white students, school authorities have sometimes, since Brown, closed schools which appeared likely to become racially mixed through changes in neighborhood residential patterns. This was sometimes accompanied by building new schools in the areas of white suburban expansion farthest from Negro population centers in order to maintain the separation of the races with a minimum departure from the formal principles of "neigh- borhood zoning." Such a policy does more than simply influence the short-run composition of the student body of. a new school. It may well promote segregated resi- dential patterns which, when combined with "neighbor- hood zoning," further lock the school system into the mold of separation of the races. Upon a proper showing a district court may consider this in fashioning a remedy. In ascertaining the existence of legally imposed school segregation, the existence of a pattern of school construc- tion and abandonment is thus a factor of great weight. In devising remedies where legally imposed segregation has been established, it is the responsibility of local authorities and district courts to see to it that future school construction and abandonment are not used and do not serve to perpetuate or re-establish the dual sys- tem. When necessary, district courts should retain jurisdiction to assure that these responsibilities are carried out. Cf. United States v. Board of Public In- struction, 395 F. 2d 66 (CA5 1968); Brewer v. School Board, 397 F. 2d 37 (CA4 1968). OCTOBER TERM, 1970 Opinion of the Court 402 U. S. V The central issue in this case is that of student assign- ment, and there are essentially four problem areas: (1) to what extent racial balance or racial quotas may be used as an implement in a remedial order to correct a previously segregated system; (2) whether every all-Negro and all-white school must be eliminated as an indispensable part -of a remedial process of desegregation; (3) what the limits are, if any, on the rearrangement of school districts and attendance zones, as a remedial measure; and (4) what the limits are, if any, on the use of transpor- tation facilities to correct state-enforced racial school segregation. (1) Racial Balances or Racial Quotas. The constant theme and thrust of every holding from Brown I to date is that state-enforced separation of races in public schools is discrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause. The remedy commanded was to dis- mantle dual school systems. We are concerned in these cases with the elimination of the discrimination inherent in the dual school systems, not with myriad factors of human existence which can cause discrimination in a multitude of ways on racial, religious, or ethnic grounds. The target of the cases from Brown I to the present was the dual school system. The elimination of racial discrimination in public schools is a large task and one that should not be retarded by efforts to achieve broader purposes lying beyond the jurisdiction of school authorities. One vehicle can carry only a limited amount of baggage. It would not serve the important objective of Brown I to seek to use school desegregation cases for purposes beyond their scope, al- though desegregation of schools ultimately will have SWANN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1 Opinion of the Court dantly supported by the record. It was because of this total failure of the school board that the District Court was obliged to turn to other qualified sources, and Dr. Finger was designated to assist the District Court to do what the board should have done. We see therefore that the use made of mathematical ratios was no more than a starting point in the process of shaping a remedy, rather than an inflexible require- ment. From that starting point the District Court pro- ceeded to frame a decree that was within its discretionary powers, as an equitable remedy for the particular circum- stances.' As we said in Green, a school authority's remedial plan or a district court's remedial decree is to be judged by its effectiveness. Awareness of the racial composition of the whole school system is likely to be a useful starting point in shaping a remedy to correct past constitutional violations. In sum, the very limited use made of mathematical ratios was within the equitable remedial discretion of the District Court. (2) One-race Schools. The record in this case reveals the familiar phenome- non that in metropolitan areas minority groups are often found concentrated in one part of the city. In some circumstances certain schools may remain all or largely of one race until new schools can be provided or neigh- borhood patterns change. Schools all or predominately 9 In its August 3, 1970, memorandum holding that the District Court plan was ."reasonable" under the standard laid down by the Fourth Circuit on appeal, the District Court explained the approach taken as follows: "This court has not ruled, and does not rule that 'racial balance' is required under the Constitution; nor that all black schools in all cities are unlawful; nor that all school boards must bus children or violate the Constitution; nor that the particular order entered in this case would be correct in other circumstances not before this court." (Emphasis in original.) OCTOBER TERM, 1970 Opinion of the Court 402 U. S. of one race in a district of mixed population will require close scrutiny to determine that school assignments are not part of state-enforced segregation. In light of the above, it should be clear that the existence of some small number of one-race, or virtually one-race, schools within a district is not in and of itself the mark of a system that still practices segregation. by law. The district judge or school authorities should make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation and will thus necessarily be con- cerned with the elimination of one-race schools. No per se rule can adequately embrace all the difficulties of reconciling the competing interests involved; but in a system with a history of segregation the need for re- medial criteria of sufficient specificity to assure a school authority's compliance with its constitutional duty war- rants a presumption against schools that are substan- tially disproportionate in their racial composition. Where the school authority's proposed plan for conversion from a dual to a unitary system contemplates the continued existence of some schools that are all or predominately of one race, they have the burden of showing that such school assignments are genuinely nondiscriminatory. The court should scrutinize such schools, and the burden upon the school authorities will be to satisfy the court that their racial composition is not the result of present or past discriminatory action on their part. An optional majority-to-minority transfer provision has long been recognized as a useful part of every desegre- gation plan. Provision for optional transfer of those in the majority racial group of a particular school to other schools where they will be in the minority is an indis- pensable remedy for those students willing to transfer to other schools in order to lessen the impact on them of the state-imposed stigma of segregation. In order to be effective, such a transfer arrangement must grant SWANN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION I Opinion of the Court the transferring student free transportation and space must be made available in the school to which he desires to move. Cf. Ellis v. Board of Public Instruction, 423 F. 2d 203, 206 (CA5 1970). The court orders in this and the companion Davis case now provide such an option. (3) Remedial Altering of Attendance Zones. The maps submitted in these cases graphically demon- strate that one of the principal tools employed by school planners and by courts to break up the dual school sys- tem has been a frank-and sometimes drastic-gerry- mandering of school districts and attendance zones. An additional step was pairing, "clustering," or "grouping" of schools with attendance assignments made deliberately to accomplish the transfer of Negro students out of formerly segregated Negro schools and transfer of white students to formerly all-Negro schools. More often than not, these zones are neither compact 11 nor contiguous; indeed they may be on opposite ends of the city. As an interim corrective measure, this cannot be said to be beyond the broad remedial powers of a court. 10 The reliance of school authorities on the reference to the "revi- sion of ... attendance areas into compact units," Brown H, at 300 (emphasis supplied), is misplaced. The enumeration in that opin- ion of considerations to be taken into account by district courts was patently intended to be suggestive rather than exhaustive. The deci- sion in Brown H to remand the cases decided in Brown I to local courts for the framing of specific decrees was premised on a recogni- tion that this Court could not at that time foresee the particular means which would be required to implement the constitutional prin- ciples announced. We said in Green, supra, at 439: "The obligation of the district courts, as it always has been, is to assess the effectiveness of a proposed plan in achieving desegrega- tion. There is no universal answer to complex problems of desegre- gation; there is obviously no one plan that will do the job in every case. The matter must be assessed in light of the circumstances present and the options available in each instance." 419-882 0 - 72 - 7 OCTOBER TERM, 1970 Opinion of the Court 402 U. S. Charlotte school authorities did not purport -to assign students on the basis of geographically drawn zones-until 1965 and then they allowed almost unlimited transfer privileges. The District Court's conclusion that assign- ment of children to the school nearest their home serving their grade would not produce an effective dismantling of the dual system is supported by the record. Thus the remedial techniques used in the District Court's order were within that court's power to provide equitable relief; implementation of- the decree is well within the capacity of the school authority. The decree provided that the buses used to implement the plan would operate on direct routes. Students would be picked up at schools near their homes and transported to the schools they were to attend. The trips for ele- mentary school pupils average about seven miles and the District Court found that they would take "not over 35 minutes at the most." 12 This system compares favor- ably with the transportation plan previously operated in Charlotte under which each day 23,600 students on all grade levels were transported an average of 15 miles one way for an average trip requiring over an hour. In these circumstances, we find no basis for holding that the local school authorities may not be required to employ bus transportation as one tool of school desegregation. De- segregation plans cannot be limited to the walk-in school. An objection to transportation of students may have validity when the time or distance of travel is so great as to either risk the'health of the children or significantly 12 The District Court found that the school system would have to employ 138 more buses than it had previously operated. But 105 of those buses were already available and the others could easify be obtained. Additionally, it should be noted that North Carolina requires provision of transportation for all students who are assigned to schools more than one and one-half miles from their homes. N. C. Gen. Stat. § 115-186 (b) (1966). SWANN .v. BOARD OF EDUCATION Opinion of the Court impinge on the educational process. District courts must weigh the soundness of any transportation plan in light of what is said in subdivisions (1), (2), and (3) above. It hardly needs stating that the limits on time of travel will vary with many factors, but probably with none more than the age of the students. The reconciliation of competing values in a desegregation case is, of course, a difficult task with many sensitive facets but fundamen- tally no more so than remedial measures courts of equity have traditionally employed. VI The Court of Appeals, searching for a term to define the equitable remedial power of the district courts, used the term "reasonableness," In Green, supra, this Court used the term "feasible" and by implication, "workable," "effective," and "realistic" in the mandate to develop "a plan that promises realistically to work, and . . . to work now." On the facts of this case, we are unable to con- clude that the order of the District Court is not reason- able, feasible and workable. However, in seeking to define the scope of remedial power or the limits on remedial power of courts in an area as sensitive as we deal with here, words are poor instruments to convey the sense of basic fairness inherent in equity. Substance, not semantics, must govern, and we have sought to suggest the nature of limitations without frustrating the appropriate scope of equity. At some point, these school authorities and others like them should have achieved full compliance with this Court's decision in Brown I. The systems would then be "unitary" in the sense required by our decisions in Green and Alexander. It does not follow that the communities served by such systems will remain demographically stable, for in a growing, mobile society, few will do so. Neither OCTOBER TERM, 1970 Opinion of the Court 402 U. S. school authorities nor district courts are constitution- ally required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the system. This does not mean that federal courts are without power to deal with future problems; but in the absence of a showing that either the school au- thorities or some other agency of the State has delib- erately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composition of the schools, further intervention by a district court should not be necessary. For the reasons herein set forth, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as to those parts in which it affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The order of the District Court, dated August 7, 1970, is also affirmed. It is so ordered.