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Discrimination & Equality Cases: Constitutional Amendments & Article 14, 15, 16 in India, Essays (university) of Law

Legal StudiesEquality and DiscriminationConstitutional LawJurisprudenceIndian Constitution

An analysis of various court cases in india that revolve around constitutional amendments and their impact on articles 14, 15, and 16. The cases cover topics such as discrimination based on place of birth, residence, and citizenship, as well as reservations and their implications for equality and efficiency. The document also discusses the role of the court in upholding the constitutional provisions and the limitations of the government in matters of reservation.

What you will learn

  • How does the court interpret the concept of 'discrimination' under Articles 14, 15, and 16?
  • What are the requirements for constitutional amendments under Article 3 in India?
  • What are the consequences of not following the principles of natural justice (PNJ) in the context of Article 14?
  • What role does the government's efficiency requirement (Article 335) play in reservations?
  • Can reservations be applied to unaided private educational institutions in India?

Typology: Essays (university)

2018/2019

Uploaded on 11/04/2019

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Download Discrimination & Equality Cases: Constitutional Amendments & Article 14, 15, 16 in India and more Essays (university) Law in PDF only on Docsity! Constitutional Law Case List Article 1-4 1. In Re Berubari Union- Pakistan and India had a dispute regarding the ownership of the piece of land known as Berubari Union. India had control over the region but to put an end to the conflict, India offered to split Berubari Union in two and give one half to Pakistan, as per the agreement. The question before the court was whether an ordinary legislation was all that was required in order to put the agreement into effect as the law as per Article 3 or if a constitutional amendment with respect to Article 368 was required to implement the agreement. The court before answering this question answered the preliminary question that the giving away of part of the area would amount to cession of territory to Pakistan. The court held that the power to acquire and give away territory to foreign countries was an integral part of sovereignty and the agreement in question was along the lines of a cession rather than a determination of borders. The court then moved on to note that the scope of Article 3 did not include cession of territory therefore a law using Articles 3 and 4 would not be permissible. In order for the agreement to be enforced , an amendment of the constitution with respect to Article 368 would have to be made. 2. RC Poudyal v Union of India- The case was regarding the admission of Sikkim as a state into India and the amendments made to Article 371F as a consequence. The court reaffirmed the judgement of In Re Berubari Union and noted that the government was given a wide latitude in deciding what were the terms and conditions of admission as long as the terms and conditions did not violate the limits placed by the constitution. The court noted that first Sikkim was made an associate state through amendment and bringing forth Article 2A, following which the government made the appropriate constitutional amendments. Regarding the composition of the assembly which was below 60 as mandated by Article 170. The court noted that this was merely an interim measure which was required due to Sikkim’s small population and with time such number in the assembly could be increased to bring it in line with Article 170, due to necessity it could not be done immediately at the time of admission of Sikkim into the country. 3. N Masthan v Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry- The question in front of the court was whether after the treaty of cession between France and India in 1954 was the region of Pondicherry deemed to have been “acquired” as stated under Article 1(3)(c). The Supreme Court said no as the Union had still not considered Pondicherry to be part of the Union of India and was administering the region using the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1947. Secondly, the court noted that the French had no sovereignty over the region as it was the Indian government which exercised all the power, however, by the mere fact that the government was exercising power it could not be said that the region was acquired by India. The treaty was signed in 1956 but was ratified only in 1962 and therefore while the de facto transfer happened in 1956, de jure transfer took place in 1962. The court held that there can be no retrospective application of fundamental rights. 4. Babulal Parate v State of Bombay- The State Reorganisation Commission had suggested the division of the State of Bombay into three distinct units of the UT of Bombay, State of Maharashtra and State of Gujarat. The Bill regarding Bombay’s reorganisation was introduced in parliament and then referred to a joint-committee who suggested some changes, then was reintroduced into parliament where further modifications were made. The petitioner argued that the State legislature had not had a chance to express views on the modifications therefore the process violated Article 3 of the constitution. The court rejected this argument and noted that Article 3 only had two requirements, firstly, that the bill in parliament be made on the recommendation of the President, and secondly, that the legislature be able to give its views on the bill. The parliament is not bound by the views of the legislature, nor has to wait indefinitely for the views to arrive. If later amendments are made, parliament does not have to solicit the views of the state legislature repeatedly for every fresh amendment. 5. Mangal Singh v Union of India- The Punjab Reorganisation Act gave birth to the three entities, the states of Punjab and Haryana and the UT of Himachal Pradesh. During the re-organisation the Himachal Pradesh Legislative assembly only had 54 members, below the 60 requirements of Article 170. The court upheld the legislation saying that the power of Article 4 was to allow the government to tide over temporary difficulties posed by reorganisation and hence the Haryana Legislative Assembly was not void for not abiding by the requirement set down in Article 170. The court reasoned that the power to set up a legislative assembly below the limit of Art. 170 was implicit in the powers of Article 4. Article 5-11 6. Mohd. Raza Dabstani v State of Bombay- Iranian national came to India in 1938 when he was 13 years old. Then in 1945 got Iranian passport and went for pilgrimage to Iraq, Article 12 1. University of Madras v. Shanta Bai- The Madras High Court used the principle of ‘ejusdem generis’ i.e. of the like nature with regard to “other authorities” in Article 12. It means that only those authorities are covered under the expression ‘other authorities’ which perform governmental or sovereign functions. Further, it cannot include persons, natural or juristic, for example, Unaided universities. 2. Ujjammabai v. the State of U.P.- The court rejected the above restrictive scope and held that the ‘ejusdem generis’ rule could no be resorted to the in interpreting ‘other authorities’. The bodies named under Article 12 have no common genus running through them and they cannot be placed in one single category on any rational basis. 3. Rajasthan Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal- The Supreme Court held that ‘other authorities’ would include all authorities created by the constitution or statute on whom powers are conferred by law. Such statutory authority need not be engaged in performing government or sovereign functions. The court emphasized that it is immaterial that the power conferred on the body is of a commercial nature or not. Article 14 1. The State of West Bengal v Anwar Ali Sarkar (7 Judges) The West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1949 which empowered the state government to by order assign a case or group of cases to the special courts created under the act. It is to be noted that the special courts would have had a different procedure from the CrPC in order to allow for speedy trials. The court approved of previous utilisation of the reasonable classification test ( Except Justice Vivian Bose’s opinion). The Majority of the court held that as the discretion vested by Section 5 to the government to be able to send cases to the special court was not guided in any way by the statute and therefore the discretion was uncontrolled, this would lead to arbitrary and discriminatory applications of the law and therefore held the act to be unconstitutional. In essence, as the statute did not say what was the basis of the classification, it could not be said to be reasonable, a person X could have committed an offence and is made to go through the regular CrPc procedure while person Y who committed the same offence could be made to go through the special courts system and there was no particular rationale based on which the court made this decision. 2. Kathi Raning Rawat v State of Saurashtra (7 Judges) - The facts of the case are ver y similar to the Anwar Ali Sarkar however there was one crucial difference in the two legislations (here the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance) which was that while in West Bengal, the state government had the discretion to refer certain trials of persons to the special court in the instant case the state government had the power to refer certain offences affecting public safety, public order of the state to special courts and the majority of the court (same court as Anwar Ali) held that such a change made the case distinguishable from Anwar Ali Sarkar and therefore such a classification was permissible. 3. Chiranjeet Lal Chowdhuri v Union of India- The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act which closed down the Mill of the same name, the appellant was a shareholder of the company and contended that act violated Article 14 as only the company in question was closed up by the act. The court held that a classification which was made specifically for a single entity or single person is not rendered unconstitutional and will have to satisfy the same test of Equality as a classification for many people. The number of people affected by the classification is not a relevant factor in deciding validity. 4. In Re: Special Courts Bill and RK Dalmia v Union of India- Said the same as Chiranjeet Lal Chowdhuri that single entity as a class is permissible under Article 14 as long as the other requirements of the article are fulfilled. Further the court also held that presumption of constitutionality on part of the legislative shall exist because only the legislature can understand the needs of the people, their problems etc. because they are formally the people's representative and so it must be presumed that they are working for the benefit of the people and would not on purpose pass a law which they knew was unconstitutional, therefore that good intention must be presumed on their part. Hence the court must attempt to make an interpretation which will preserve the constitutionality as part of the doctrine(also said in chiranjeet lal chowdhuri). The classification test was reiterated by the judgements 5. Northern Indian Caterers v State of Punjab (5 Judges, 3-2)- Under the relevant act, the state government had the right to evict people who were encroaching on public premises through a different procedure than that laid down in the CPC as the procedure laid down in the statute was much more drastic and speedier. The court noted that the statute gave an additional remedy to the government along with the one given in the CPC as the act had not ousted the jurisdiction of the CPC in the situation. The court held that when providing such discretion in the form of additional, alternative forms of remedies the government must provide the reasons and basis on which such remedies shall be opted for and it cannot be an uncontrollable discretion which is granted to the government and therefore held that the relevant section of the statute was void as it gave no guidelines as to when the government would resort to the alternative drastic procedure. 6. Maganlal Chhagganlal (P) Ltd v Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay- Section 105A and 105B of the Bombay Municipal Act 1888 vested the power to the commissioner to be able to evict people who have committed an unauthorised occupation of corporation premises. The commissioner would have the same power as CPC but a different procedure was followed in order for speedy justice. Similar to Northern Indian Caterers there were two procedures available to the corporation and state government, one under ordinary law and one under the special procedure which is harsher to the occupants. The court held differently from Northern Indian caterers and noted that a differing alternate procedure may not by itself cause it to be unconstitutional. The court held that because there is an indication to the officers through the act that the government should be able to speedily evict unauthorised persons, “Even normally one cannot imagine an officer having the choice of two procedures, one which enables him to get possession of the property quickly and the other which would be a prolonged one, to resort to the latter. Administrative officers, no less than the courts, do not function in a vacuum. It would be extremely unreal to hold that an administrative officer would in taking proceedings for eviction of unauthorised occupants of Government property or Municipal property resort to the procedure prescribed by the two Acts in one case and to the ordinary Civil Court in the other. The provisions of these two Acts cannot be struck down on the fanciful theory that power would be exercised in such an unrealistic fashion” 7. Deepak Sibal v Punjab University- DS was a temporary employee along with a lady Ritu Khanna. Both were denied admission in evening classes saying that they were temporary employees, SC said this was unconstitutional as nature of employment itself cannot be criteria for distinction, it is only a provision made for convenience. The government permanent employee criterion was held unconstitutional, only morning and evening class distinction was upheld. The court said that making a criterion as employment to distinguish students would defeat the purpose of ‘Education’. Creation of a special law for the police was baseless and only hardened prisoners could be chained and for that, reasons would have to be given. Article 15 1. DP Joshi v State of Madhya Pradesh- A college was distinguishing between residents and non-residents regarding payment of capitation fee. A petition was brought forth that this violated the prohibition based in Article 15(1) on discrimination on the basis of “Place of birth” however the majority of the court noted that the concept of residence was akin to domicile and not place of birth and hence Article 15(1) was not attracted in the instant case. 2. Pradeep Jain v Union of India- Court upheld the concept of domicile reservations on the ground that the state government provides considerable financial assistance to the universities within its borders and money which is used is derived from taxes paid by the people domiciled in the state, hence there was a legitimate state interest to promote education within its borders. The court said that the outer limit for reservation should not exceed 70% at the MBBS level. The court said for medical postgraduate courses, a person who has passed MBBS from a medical college may be given preference in the post graduation course of the same college but such reservation could not exceed 50% of the total open seats available for reservation. 3. RC Poudyal v Union of India- The Case was regarding amendments to the constitution which would allow the Buddhist Sangha to nominate a member to the Sikkim legislative assembly, petitioners argued that such an amendment would be foul of Article 15(1) and therefore would destroy the basic structure of the constitution. The Supreme Court held that the Buddhist Sangha was not just a religious institution but also a socio-political one and keeping in view the role of the Sangha in the political development of Sikkim the court noted that it was not invoking the impermissible idea of separate electorates. Further, the Sangha was being given a chance to nominate a person and therefore as it was merely a nomination the amendment was upheld. Reservation Cases - Both Article 16 and Article 15 cases have been discussed here because they are very intertwined 4. State of Madras v Champakam Dorairajan- The Tamil Nadu scheme for reservation in educational institutions was challenged by the respondent who was a brahmin woman who had got higher marks than people from the reserved category and argued that her Article 15(1) right to equality was violated by reservation. Note there was no Article 15(4) at the time this case was before the first amendment. The Government contended that they were attempting to fulfil a DPSP Article 46 which asked for the government to promote educational interests of SC ST and other weaker sections of society. However, the court rejected this contention, noting that DPSP cannot be given primacy over Fundamental rights as this will upset the scheme of the constitution. 5. MR Balaji v State of Mysore- The Mysore Government-mandated 68% reservation (28% Backward Classes, 22% more Backward Classes and 18% SC and ST). The government said that they had used a four factor test to determine backwardness which was class, occupation, poverty and place of habitation (These four factors were reiterated in the case of KC Vasanta Kumar v State of Kerala). The court struck down the government order for reservation stating that the government can only have a maximum of 50% reservation in any institution. The logic behind this was that as Article 15(4) was an exception to the norm of Article 15(1) the exception could not be allowed to be more than the norm. Further the Court also held that caste cannot be the sole criterion on which backwardness was judged as this would violate Art. 15(1). However, if multiple factors along with caste were used, such classification would survive the test of equality. 6. State of Uttar Pradesh v Pradeep Tandon- The Uttar Pradesh Government had allowed reservation for people coming from a rural background, hilly regions of the state and Uttrakhand areas. The State government had argued that such classification was permissible as Article 15(4) were socially and educationally backward areas as understood under Article 15(4). Court held that case, neither race nor religion can be made the basis for classification within Article 15(4). The Court struck down the reservation for rural backgrounds as the court said that people may be economically poor but not necessarily from a socially and educationally backward class and as the classification of rural people was not homogenous for this reason, it is an unconstitutional classification. The court cited DP Joshi to hold that the reservation for residents of Uttrakhand and Hilly areas was valid. 7. T Devadasan v Union of India- The Case pertains to Article 16(4) as well as it deals with the carry-forward rule. The rule said that if reserved seats were not filled for three years they would have to be carried forward as reserved seats for the backward classes for at least three years. (Imagine in 2019 there are 100 seats in the class, out of which 50 are reserved, for some reason only 30 seats in the reserved category are filled leaving 20 vacant. When the list of seats for 2020 is made, those 20 seats will be carried forward and added to the already existing 100 seats, effectively making class size 120) The court struck down the rule saying that the rule would make reservation breach the 50% limit set in the Balaji case and therefore held it to be unconstitutional. The court considered the percentage within a single year as the criteria to decide and not the strength of the total cadre. 8. NM Thomas v Union of India- Employees from SC ST background were given premature promotion and were given a two year time period in order to earn the qualification requirements for promotion, The court in NM Thomas held that Article 15(4) and Article 16(4) were not exceptions to Article 15(1) and Article 16(1) but rather they were illustrations of it. The court noted that reservation in the manner described did not contradict Article 335 requirement of efficiency as well. 9. Indira Sawhney v Union of India- The challenge was to the government implementation of the Mandal Commission. The court held that caste may be used as the dominant factor for identifying backwardness. The court reiterated NM Thomas in holding that Article 15(4) and Article 16(4) were not exceptions to Article 15(1) and Article 16(1) respectively but were illustrations of it. Further, the court held that the government should respect the 50% rule regarding the maximum amount of reservation but in extraordinary circumstances the rule could be broken, Court also overruled Devadasan by holding that the carry forward rule was constitutional but the government should make efforts to ensure that the total number of reserved seats does not breach 50% though in extraordinary circumstances the rule could be broken. The Court also held that the creamy layer doctrine was to be applied in the case of OBC’s only and that there was no right for reservations in promotions only at the first stage of appointment would reservations apply. (this was effectively reversed by the legislature through amendment) 10. S Vinod Kumar v Union of India- There was a relaxation of marks done in the qualifying examination of promotion for people from reserved category and the constitutionality of such a concession was challenged. The court struck down the concession of reservation and noted that such concession may only be done in the case of direct recruitment and not in the act of promotion. The reasoning of the court was that such a relaxation of marks requirement would lead to the concept of efficiency being eroded and therefore (qualitative exclusion) the sub-classification between OBC SC and ST had not been obliterated. The ceiling limit of 50%, creamy layer in OBC and inadequacy of representation being balanced with the efficiency of administration were constitutional requirements without which the structure of equality of opportunity would collapse. Reservation in Educational Institutions 16. Sadhna Devi v State of UP- The State of UP with respect to post graduate courses had cancelled the minimum qualifying marks for admission into course and petitioners argued that with this order in force, people from reserved categories who did not score a single mark would be able to get a seat in Post Graduate and Diploma courses. The court stated that ordinarily, the only deviation from merit between general category students and reserved category students is that reserved category students may have to score less to qualify for a seat but by the order of the government, this was taken a step further as reserved category students do not need to obtain minimum qualifying marks to get admission meaning that the test would be only a formality as even if they do not get a single mark they could qualify. Once the government has laid down a scheme of holding admission tests it cannot do away with the requirement of obtaining minimum qualifying marks. There may be a difference in minimum qualifying scores for different categories but cannot be done away with completely. 17. Preeti Srivastava v State of MP- There can be no reservation in super speciality courses as it would defeat the purpose of creation of such courses which required the most skilled and meritorious minds. As the level of specialisation and technicality increased the amount of reservation was to decrease (Reiterated in Saurabh Chaudhary v Union of India) Following the Sadhna Devi case the State of Madhya Pradesh changed the minimum qualification score to 20% for ST and 40% for OBC and 45% for General Candidates. The court held this to be unconstitutional as there could not be a big disparity in the difference in qualifying marks, the difference should be minimal and be in consonance with the public interest in maintaining excellence in the field. 18. Saurabh Chaudhary v Union of India- There can be no reservation in super speciality courses as it would defeat the purpose of creation of such courses which required the most skilled and meritorious mind. (as said in Preeti Srivastava v State of MP). Further after having done MBBS, candidates were at a level playing field and therefore reservation should not be given at those higher level super-speciality courses.(Landmark case on this point) 19. Mohini Jain v State of Karnataka- The issue before the court was whether private colleges were entitled to charge a capitation fee on students who entered a private medical college and did not have government seats. The Supreme Court held that though the right to education was not guaranteed as a fundamental right explicitly, it became clear from a reading of the preamble and DPSP that the constitution intended the state to provide education for citizens at all levels. Therefore the state is to attempt to implement the right within its economic capacity. If the government has decided to discharge its obligation through private educational institutions, the private institution is supposed to fulfil such obligation and bound by the same requirements as the government including the obligation to ensure there is the accessibility to education for all economic classes. Therefore capitation fees would be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 as admissions become based on income and not merit, therefore the concept was unconstitutional. 20. Unnikrishnan v State of Andhra Pradesh- The case involved private professional educational institutions challenging the constitutionality of state laws regulating capitation fees charged by the institution. The court held that there was a right to basic education which was implied in the right to life. The parameters of the right had to be understood in the context of the DPSP which asked the state to endeavour to provide free and compulsory education to all children under the age of 14. Therefore there was no fundamental right to education for a professional degree. The institutions argued that their article 19(1)(g) right to conduct a business were violated by state laws debarring capitation fees. The court agreed and said that a division of seats into 50% merit and 50% paid was valid as autonomy was to be given to the institutions, and the reservation for NRI was to come out of the paid seat quota. However the court said that educational institutions could not be treated as centres of profit and commercialised, therefore the government interest in regulating capitation fees is valid. 21. TMA Pai v State of Karnataka- The TMA Pai case held that there was a fundamental right to start an educational institution under Article 19(1)(g) however it could not be seen to be a profitable enterprise. The court stressed the need for there to be some form of common entrance test or common criteria to assess merit. Admission was to be based on merit alone. Private educational institutions could not be regulated but no capitation fee could be allowed. The fees were to be reasonable and not exorbitant. The selection process for the seats had to be fair and transparent. Further, they distinguished between non-minority and minority educational institutions. The latter did not have an extra benefit of any sort as all seats could not be given to minority students, there had to be a sprinkling of diversity within the institution. 22. Islamic Academy- The case was supposed to clarify the TMA Pai case but ended up causing more confusion. They interpreted TMA Pai’s urge for a transparent admission process as a requirement to create an ad hoc committee in each institution to ensure fairness in admission process and to frame the admission process, which was never said in the Pai judgement. Secondly, they said that there had to be a compulsory admission and entrance test which was not what Pai had said, in the previous judgement the court had merely suggested it and stated the ultimate form of admission would be left up to the individual private institution to decide. The court in Islamic Academy then reiterated that reservation in unaided private institutions was not required and that aided private institutions would be required to have reservations. Also correctly reiterated that unaided private institutions had a large degree of autonomy but incorrectly stated that minority institutions had a special right as opposed to majority institutions. 23. PA Inamdar- The case had to re-clarify TMA Pai in light of the confusion caused by Islamic Academy. The court held that admission had to be merit-based and there had to be a fair and reasonable process which was not exploitative, further the fee levelled by the institution had to also be reasonable and not exorbitant. The court said that there could be no difference between minority and non-minority institutions and that unaided private institution would be given more autonomy than aided institutions. Further, the government could not have reservations within private unaided institutions as this would otherwise impinge on their autonomy. 24. Society for Unaided Private Schools v State of Rajasthan- The majority held that unaided minority educational institutions were exempted from giving reservations as they had to be given autonomy but the part of the statute which forced private non-minority educational institutions to give reservations was held to be constitutional. Justice Radhakrishnan dissented as he felt this ignored TMA Pai’s caution to not differentiate between minority and non-minority institutions. 25. Paramati Case- The amended Article 15(5) was challenged as a violation of the basic structure as it created an inequality between non-minority and minority educational institutions. The court upheld the amendment saying that minority educational institutions had special rights due to the presence of Article 30(1) and therefore it was not a violation of the right to equality to make a distinction between minority and non-minority educational institutions. The only requirement for minority educational institutions was that
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