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The Great Depression: Causes, Effects and Recovery - Prof. Moore, Study notes of Development Economics

An analysis of the great depression, focusing on key economic indicators, factors contributing to the decline, and its impact on various sectors. The depth and duration of the economic decline, the role of deflation, bank failures, and stock prices in the prolonged recovery. It also discusses the structural weaknesses of the 1920s economy and the fed's response.

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2010/2011

Uploaded on 04/17/2011

turcotte25193
turcotte25193 🇺🇸

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Download The Great Depression: Causes, Effects and Recovery - Prof. Moore and more Study notes Development Economics in PDF only on Docsity! Amelie Turcotte ECON 2200 4/12/11 The Great Depression: Chapter 23, Part 1 I. Key Economic Indicators (Figures 23.1 - 23.4):  Note both the depth & the duration of the decline. 1. Note that recovery isn’t complete until the economy reaches and maintains its pre- depression levels of output  1929-1933: Real GDP fell by 1/3 o Industrial output fell by 1/2 o Gross investment (I) reduced to almost nothing  I < replacement rate 1. (level of investment spending necessary just to maintain the capital that firms have currently; repairing, restoring current stock)  Real capital stock actually declined! 1. Ability to produce actually fell 2. I ↓ => productive capacity ↓ o Consumer durables output fell by 80%, and did not fully recover until 1940.  C ↓ 1. By comparison, consumer durables output fell by 43% in early 1920s recession. However, it had fully recovered by 192  Unemployment Rate: o 1929: UR = 3.2% (1.5 million) o 1933: UR approaching 25% 1. Underemployed- many people not unemployed, but high business people doing menial labor  11.5 mill unemployed  2.2 mill in government-created emergency jobs  Many more were “underemployed”: working, but for fewer hours than desired or at a job that does not fully utilize worker’s human capital  33% of the labor force = 1933 estimate of an “unemployment” rate that includes: 1. Official unemployed 2. Government Emergency Workers 3. Underemployed o Duration  UR remained > 10% for a decade  Many workers never recovered  Deflation: o 1929-1933: CPI fell by 25%  Page 1 AD1933 P Level AS P1 Amelie Turcotte ECON 2200 4/12/11  Bank Failures (both losses for shareholders and lenders): o 1930-33: nearly 10,000 banks closed  About 1/3 of banks that existed in 1929 had failed by 1933.  Billions of dollars in depositor & shareholder losses  Stock Prices: o S&P Composite Index (annual average):  1929: $26.02  1932: $6.93 o 1929-33: $85 billion in stock losses o Impact: Wealth (Fig 23.4) & Psychological  May not explain why the depression happened, but may explain why it took so long to recover (because it made people afraid)  While stock market “crashes” don’t typically cause recessions (just a symptom), the wealth losses and negative expectations can add to recessionary pressures and extend the duration of the recession  The wealth losses and negative expectations can add to recessionary pressures and extend the duration of the recession (less confident and nervous  demand and purchasing power ↓)  Long, slow recovery: o Real GDP did not reach & maintain pre-Depression rates until late 1930s o Manufacturing did not do so until 1939-40 II. Factors Contributing to the Decline A. Recall the structural weaknesses we identified in the 1920s economy:  After 1925: Big decline in construction sector (especially residential, but also commercial) o over-building (1918-25) led to market saturation o cyclical swing in a major component of GDP 1. I ↓ 2. Construction sector experienced a “gentle slide” downward from 1925- 1928, and then a “marked decline” after 1928  Troubled agricultural sector o Farm income growth lagged behind other sectors o Farm debt & bankruptcies (Growing debt burden of US farmers => ↑ defaults/ foreclosures => ↑ bank failures)  (Rural) bank failures, especially in South and Midwest Page 2 AD1929 P2 Real GDP GDP2 GDP1 Amelie Turcotte ECON 2200 4/12/11 o No, based on the cliometric evidence, D was increasing more rapidly than S in the call-loan market. Thus, credit (s) was/were being drawn into the market by rising call-loan interest rates Page 5 Amelie Turcotte ECON 2200 4/12/11  Bust: The Crash of '29 o Spring 1929: A mild decline in consumer durables output began. Followed by a decline in nondurables output in Summer 1929 o Sept 1929: The stock market peaked o In Fall of 1929, stock investors began to feel nervous. Mild decline in stock prices begins in early October, but trading volume is normal o Mid-to-late Oct 1929: Stock prices began to decline rapidly  "Black Thursday" (10/24/29)  13 mill shares traded (> 4x normal trading volume)  NYC banks & financiers eased situation by buying 1. Attempted to “prop up” stock prices by adding demand to market, but unable to prevent overall decrease in stock prices  Following week panic resumed: Black Tues(10/29)  >16 mill shares traded  Average stock price fell by 25%  Sell off continued thru November  Stock prices 1/2 of August value 1. Note that individual shareholder losses depended on when shares were purchased, but many had bought during the 1928-29 “bubble” expansion o Through 1930, prices for most stocks were still above 1926 levels. (See Figure 23.4) o $1000 invested in Sept. 1926 was worth  $2116 in Sept. 1929  $360 in July 1932 (low-point of market) o Panic selling fueled by  margin buyers faced w/ inflated losses  loans called in by (nonbank) lenders o Optimism of '20s became pessimism & fear of '30s  Note that consumer durables market was/is heavily impacted by changes in consumer confidence D. 3 Waves of 1930s Bank Failures: Table 23.1 (Preceded by foreclosures & rural bank failures of 1920s)  1st Wave: Late 1930 o Banks in South & Midwest fail o Panic spreads o Dec. 1930: Bank of U.S. (NYC commercial bank) fails  confusion b/c of the name  largest bank to have failed up to that point o Fed’s response? (none; “let the irresponsible banks fail”) Page 6 Amelie Turcotte ECON 2200 4/12/11  2nd Wave: Spring-Summer 1931 o International crisis o Sept. 1931: Britain leaves gold standard, which fuels further banking panic  1930-1932: 5,000 US banks close; deposit losses = $3 billion  3rd Wave: Early 1933 o Worst run yet o 4,000 US banks close; deposit losses = $3.5 billion  Mar. 6, 1933: FDR imposes national, 1-week "bank holiday" o Inspection o Psychological impact  Gold hoarding ended: All monetary gold must be exchanged at Fed for paper currency  Federal Deposit Insurance Corp (FDIC) established; began operations Jan. 1934  Banking crisis subsides for rest of 1930s o 1934: 61 banks fail o Rest of 1930s: <100 bank failures per year Page 7
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