The Military Decision-Making Process, Lecture notes of Decision Making

Download The Military Decision-Making Process and more Lecture notes Decision Making in PDF only on Docsity! Chapter 5 The Military Decision-Making Process Decision making is knowing if to decide, then when and what to decide. It includes understanding the conse- quence of decisions. Decisions are the means by which the commander translates his vision of the end state into action. Decision making is both science and art. Many as- pects of military operations—movement rates, fuel con- sumption, weapons effects—are quantifiable and, therefore, part of the science of war. Other aspects—the impact of leadership, complexity of operations, and un- certainty regarding enemy intentions—belong to the art of war. The military decision-making process (MDMP) is a single, established, and proven analytical process. (See Figure 5-1, page 5-2.) The MDMP is an adaptation of the Army’s analytical approach to problem solving. The MDMP is a tool that assists the commander and staff in developing estimates and a plan. While the formal problem-solving process described in this chapter may start with the receipt of a mission, and has as its goal the production of an order, the analytical aspects of the MDMP continue at all levels during operations. The MDMP helps the commander and his staff exam- ine a battlefield situation and reach logical decisions. The process helps them apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to reach a decision. The full MDMP is a detailed, deliber- ate, sequential, and time-consuming process used when adequate planning time and sufficient staff support are available to thoroughly examine numerous friendly and enemy courses of action (COAs). This typically occurs when developing the commander’s estimate and opera- tion plans (OPLANs), when planning for an entirely new mission, during extended operations, and during staff training designed specifically to teach the MDMP. The MDMP is the foundation on which planning in a time-constrained environment is based. The products created during the full MDMP can and should be used during subsequent planning sessions when time may not be available for a thorough relook, but where existing METT-T factors have not changed substantially. (See page 5-27 for a discussion of decision making in a time- constrained environment.) The MDMP relies on doctrine, especially the terms and symbols (graphics) found in FM 101-5-1. The use of approved terms and symbols facilitates the rapid and consistent assessment of the situation and creation and implementation of plans and orders by minimizing con- fusion over the meanings of terms and symbols used in the process. The advantages of using the complete MDMP in- stead of abbreviating the process are that— • It analyzes and compares multiple friendly and en- emy COAs in an attempt to identify the best possible friendly COA. • It produces the greatest integration, coordination, and synchronization for an operation and minimizes the risk of overlooking a critical aspect of the operation. • It results in a detailed operation order or operation plan. The disadvantage of using the complete MDMP is that it is a time-consuming process. ROLES OF THE COMMANDER AND STAFF The commander is in charge of the military decision-making process and decides what procedures to use in each situation. The planning process hinges on a clear articulation of his battlefield visualization. He is personally responsible for planning, preparing for, and executing operations. From start to finish, the com- mander’s personal role is central: his participation in the process provides focus and guidance to the staff. How- ever, there are responsibilities and decisions that are the commander’s alone (Figure 5-1). The amount of his di- rect involvement is driven by the time available, his per- sonal preferences, and the experience and accessibility of the staff. The less time available, the less experienced the staff, and the less accessible the staff, generally the greater the commander involvement. Examples for dis- cussion of increased commander involvement are found in Decision Making in a Time-Constrained Environ- ment, page 5-27. The commander uses the entire staff during the MDMP to explore the full range of probable and likely 5-1 enemy and friendly COAs, and to analyze and compare his own organization’s capabilities with the enemy’s. This staff effort has one objective—to collectively inte- grate information with sound doctrine and technical competence to assist the commander in his decisions, leading ultimately to effective plans. The CofS (XO) manages, coordinates, and disci- plines the staff’s work and provides quality control. He must understand the commander’s guidance because he supervises the entire process. He ensures the staff has the information, guidance, and facilities it needs. He provides time lines to the staff, establishes briefback times and locations, and provides any unique instructions. By issuing guidance and participating in formal and informal briefings, the commander and CofS (XO) guide the staff through the decision-making process. Such interaction helps the staff resolve questions and in- volves the entire staff in the total process. The selected course of action and its implementing operation order are directly linked to how well both the commander and staff accomplish each phase of the MDMP. THE ROLE OF RECONNAISSANCE DURING THE PLANNING PROCESS The commander and staff deploy reconnaissance assets early in the planning process to facilitate early collection. However, reconnaissance assets should not be launched without using, as a minimum, the reconnaissance planning factors found in step 9 of mission analysis (page 5-8). The 5-2 FM 101-5 RECEIPT OF MISSION Issue cdr’s initial guidance MISSION ANALYSIS Approve restated mission State commander’s intent Approve CCIR Issue cdr’s guidance COA DEVELOPMENT REHEARSAL EXECUTION & ASSESSMENT COA COMPARISON COA ANALYSIS (War Game) COA APPROVAL Approve COA Refine commander’s intent Specify type of rehearsal Specify type of order ORDERS PRODUCTION Approve order Staff Estimates (continual process) Commander’s Estimate (continual process) WARNING ORDER WARNING ORDER WARNING ORDER Commander’s Responsibility NOTE 4: At any time during execution and assessment, situation may require the process to start again. NOTE 3: For a discussion of rehearsals, execution, and assessment, see Chapter 6 and Appendix G. NOTE 1: Commander may conduct phases independently or in conjunction with staff. NOTE 2: Staff coordination is continual up and down. Figure 5-1. The military decision-making process allow subordinates the maximum time for their own planning and preparation for operations. This, in turn, requires aggressive coordination, deconfliction, integra- tion, and assessment of plans at all levels, both vertically and horizontally. As a general rule, the commander allocates a mini- mum of two-thirds of available time for subordinate units to conduct their planning and preparation. This leaves one-third of the time for the commander and his staff to do their planning. They use the other two-thirds for their own preparation. Time, more than any other factor, determines the de- tail with which the staff can plan. Once time allocation is made, the commander must determine whether or not to do the full MDMP, or to abbreviate the process. The commander then issues his initial guidance (not to be confused with commander’s guidance, Step 15, mission analysis). Although brief, it includes— • How to abbreviate the MDMP, if required (page 5-27). • Initial time allocation. • Liaison officers to dispatch. • Initial reconnaissance to begin. • Authorized movement. • Additional tasks the commander wants the staff to accomplish. The last step in the mission receipt phase is to issue a warning order to subordinate and supporting units. This order must include as a minimum the type of operation, the general location of the operation, the initial time line, and any movement or reconnaissance to initiate. (See Figure H-6, page H-27.) Warning orders facilitate paral- lel planning. Parallel planning means that several eche- lons will be working on their MDMP concurrently. This is essential to speed up the process for subordinate units and allow subordinates the maximum time to conduct their own planning. Parallel planning relies on accurate and timely warning orders and a full sharing of informa- tion between echelons as it becomes available. Parallel planning is a routine procedure for the MDMP. Mission Analysis Mission analysis is crucial to the MDMP. It allows the commander to begin his battlefield visualization. The result of mission analysis is defining the tactical problem and beginning the process of determining feasible solutions. It consists of 17 steps, not neces- sarily sequential, and results in the staff formally briefing the commander. (See Figure 5-4.) In addi- tion to the staff ’s mission analysis, the commander conducts his own mission analysis so that he has a frame of reference to assess the staff’s work. During mission analysis, estimates continue. Anticipation, prior preparation, and a trained staff are the keys to a timely mission analysis. Step 1. Analyze the Higher Headquarters’ Order The commander and his staff thoroughly analyze the higher headquarters’ order to establish horizontal and vertical nesting, not just for maneuver, but also for all combat support and combat service support. This step is to ensure they completely understand— • The higher headquarters’— — Commander’s intent. — Mission, including tasks, constraints, risk, available assets, and area of operations. — Concept of the operation, including the decep- tion plan. 5-5 FM 101-5 Step 1. Analyze the higher headquarters' order. Step 2. Conduct initial intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). Step 3. Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks. Step 4. Review available assets. Step 5. Determine constraints. Step 6. Identify critical facts and assumptions. Step 7. Conduct risk assessment. Step 8. Determine initial commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). Step 9. Determine the initial reconnaissance annex. Step 10. Plan use of available time. Step 11. Write the restated mission. Step 12. Conduct a mission analysis briefing Step 13. Approve the restated mission. Step 14. Develop the initial commander's intent. Step 15. Issue the commander's guidance. Step 16. Issue a warning order. Step 17. Review facts and assumptions. Figure 5-4. The steps in the mission analysis — Time line for mission execution. • The missions of adjacent (to include front and rear) units and their relation to higher headquarters’ plan. • The assigned area of operations. Staffs periodically misinterpret the higher headquar- ters’ mission, intent, and guidance, resulting in wasted time. If confused by the higher headquarters’ order or guidance, the staff must seek clarification immediately. Liaison officers (LNOs) who are familiar with the higher headquarters’ plan can assist by attending and participating in the planning process. Step 2. Conduct Initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) The IPB is a systematic, continuous process of ana- lyzing the threat and the effects of the environment on the unit. It identifies facts and assumptions that deter- mine likely threat COAs. The IPB supports the com- mander and staff and is essential to estimates and decision making. It provides the basis for intelligence collection and synchronization to support COA devel- opment and analysis. It is a dynamic staff process, driven by the commander, that continually integrates new information into the process. To facilitate parallel planning, the G2 (S2) of the higher headquarters must provide all intelligence products to subordinate units as soon as they are us- able, even if only partially complete. The higher headquarters G2 (S2) should have most intelligence products near completion prior to the orders briefing. The G2 (S2) should not wait until after the orders briefing to release these products. If parallel planning is to occur, and the planning process is to be IPB-driven, this is the only way it can be conducted in a timely fash- ion. Again, an experienced LNO can contribute signifi- cantly by providing warning orders to the unit and passing all intelligence products as soon as they become available. The IPB is the commander’s and each staff officer’s responsibility; the G2 (S2) does not do the entire IPB himself. Staff officers must assist the G2 (S2) in devel- oping the situation template (SITTEMP) within their own areas of expertise. The intelligence preparation of the battlefield— • Defines the battlefield or operational environment in order to identify the characteristics of the environ- ment that influence friendly and threat operations, to help determine the area of interest (AI), and to identify gaps in current intelligence. • Describes the battlefield’s effects, including the evaluation of all aspects of the environment with which both sides must contend, to include terrain and weather and any infrastructure and demographics in the area of operations. • Evaluates the threat by analyzing current intelli- gence to determine how the threat normally organizes for combat and conducts operations under similar cir- cumstances. This step results in a doctrinal template that depicts how the threat operates when unconstrained by the effects of the environment. • Using the results of the previous steps, and the ef- fects of the specific environment in which the enemy currently operates, determines the threat’s possible COAs and arranges them in probable order of adoption. They are expressed as SITTEMPs, which include all combat multipliers the enemy will use. SITTEMPs must be done prior to the mission analysis briefing; they are used to brief the commander on likely enemy COAs. The G2 (S2) develops and war-games these threat COAs during COA analysis. The G2 (S2), with staff assistance, continues the IPB, developing event templates from SITTEMPs. The event template is not required for the mission analysis brief- ing. However, it should be done prior to the staff’s COA development as it will help them identify where specific enemy activities may occur. The results of the initial IPB are the modified com- bined obstacle overlay and enemy SITTEMPs. Once completed, the products of the IPB are updated and used throughout the operation. The initial IPB should also re- sult in an initial intelligence-collection plan and may re- sult in the launching of available reconnaissance assets to help fill in gaps in the intelligence picture. (However, this follows the process in Step 9 of mission analysis.) NOTE: See FM 34-130 for detailed information on IPB. Step 3. Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks Specified tasks are those specifically assigned to a unit by its higher headquarters. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the higher headquarters’ order or plan state specified tasks. Specified tasks are also found in annexes and overlays. CS and CSS units may find them in para- graphs 4 and 5 also. 5-6 FM 101-5 Implied tasks are those that must be performed to ac- complish a specified task, but which are not stated in the higher headquarters’ order. Implied tasks are derived from a detailed analysis of the higher headquarters’ or- der, the enemy situation and courses of action, and the terrain. Analysis of the unit’s current location in relation to its future area of operations provides insights into im- plied tasks that may be required to perform specified tasks. Additionally, an analysis of the doctrinal require- ments for each specified task may provide implied tasks. Only those implied tasks that require allocation of re- sources should be retained. Once staff officers have a list of specified and im- plied tasks, they ensure they understand each task’s spe- cific requirements. After analyzing specified and implied tasks, they present to the commander for his ap- proval a tentative list of tasks that must be executed to accomplish the mission. These tasks are the essential tasks. Step 4. Review Available Assets The commander and staff examine additions to and deletions from the current task organization, support re- lationships, and status (current capabilities and limita- tions) of all units. They consider the relationship between specified and implied tasks and available as- sets. From this they determine if they have the assets to perform all specified and implied tasks. If there are shortages, they identify additional resources needed for mission success. The staff needs to pay particular atten- tion to deviations from what the commander considers his normal task organization. Step 5. Determine Constraints A higher commander normally places some con- straints on his subordinate commanders that restrict their freedom of action. Constraints can take the form of a re- quirement to do something (for example, maintain a re- serve of one company) or a prohibition on action (for example, no reconnaissance forward of a line before H-hour). The commander and his staff must identify and understand these constraints. They are normally found in the scheme of maneuver, the concept of opera- tions, and coordinating instructions. Step 6. Identify Critical Facts and Assumptions The staff gathers two categories of information con- cerning assigned task—facts and assumptions. Facts are statements of known data concerning the situation, including enemy and friendly dispositions, available troops, unit strengths, and material readiness. Assumptions are suppositions about the current or fu- ture situation that are assumed to be true in the absence of facts. They take the place of necessary, but unavail- able, facts and fill the gaps in what the commander and staff know about a situation. An assumption is appropri- ate if it meets the tests of validity and necessity. Validity means the assumption is likely to be true. “Assuming away” potential problems, such as weather or likely en- emy options, would result in an invalid assumption. Ne- cessity is whether or not the assumption is essential for planning. If planning can continue without the assump- tion, it is not necessary and should be discarded. When possible, assumptions are cleared with the higher head- quarters to ensure they are consistent with higher head- quarters’ plan. Assumptions are replaced with facts as soon as possible. To determine assumptions, planners should— • List all appropriate assumptions received from higher headquarters. • State expected conditions over which the com- mander has no control but which are relevant to the plan. • List conditions that would invalidate the plan or its concept of operations. Step 7. Conduct Risk Assessment The commander and staff identify accident risk haz- ards and make an initial assessment of the risk level for each hazard. The commander also makes an initial assessment of where he might take tactical risk. (See Appendix J.) Step 8. Determine Initial Commander’s Critical In- formation Requirements (CCIR) The CCIR identify information needed by the com- mander to support his battlefield visualization and to make critical decisions, especially to determine or vali- date courses of action. They help the commander filter information available to him by defining what is impor- tant to mission accomplishment. They also help focus the efforts of his subordinates and staff, assist in the allo- cation of resources, and assist staff officers in making recommendations. The CCIR should be limited to 10 or less to enhance comprehension. The CCIR directly af- fect the success or failure of the mission and they are time-sensitive in that they drive decisions at decision points. The key question is, “What does the commander 5-7 FM 101-5 example, the Fire Support Annex to an OPORD will con- tain a concept of support, but not an intent statement. However, the OPORD issued to an artillery battalion sup- porting a maneuver brigade contains the intent statement of the artillery battalion commander. The intent statement in an OPORD or OPLAN is af- ter the heading for paragraph 3, Operations, and before paragraph 3a, Concept of Operations. The intent state- ments of the next two higher echelon commanders are contained in paragraph 1b of the OPORD or OPLAN to ensure that the staff and supporting commanders under- stand the intent two echelons up. At battalion level and higher, the order, containing the intent, is also written. This decreases the chances of misunderstanding. Step 15. Issue the Commander’s Guidance After the commander approves the restated mission and states his intent, he provides the staff with enough additional guidance (preliminary decisions) to focus staff activities in planning the operation. This guidance is essential for timely COA development and analysis. By stating the planning options he does or does not want them to consider, he can save staff members time and ef- fort by allowing them to concentrate on developing COAs that meet the commander’s intent. The comman- der’s guidance may be written or oral. The commander’s guidance must focus on the essen- tial tasks supporting mission accomplishment. The guidance emphasizes in broad terms when, where, and how he intends to mass his combat power to accomplish the mission according to his higher commander’s intent. Commander’s guidance should include priorities for all combat, CS, and CSS elements and how he envisions their support of his concept. The amount of detail in the guidance depends on the time available, the staff’s level of proficiency, and the flexibility the next higher com- mander provides. Guidance that is broad and general in nature provides the staff maximum latitude, allowing a proficient staff to develop flexible and effective options. As time becomes more constrained, the commander’s guidance must become more specific and directive. The more detailed the guidance, the more quickly the staff can complete the plan. However, this increases the risk of overlooking or insufficiently examining things that might affect mission execution. See Appendix B for in- formation that can be included in detailed guidance. If, during the estimate process, the commander has identified one or more decisive points, or an action he considers decisive, he should convey this to the staff. This should be a point where an enemy weakness allows maximum combat power to be applied, leading to mis- sion accomplishment. This point can be a location on the ground, a time, or an event. It is not an end state, but a point where decisive results can be achieved. The commander can describe it verbally, with a sketch, or on a map. It should explain how he visualizes the array of forces at the decisive point, what effects he sees it hav- ing on the enemy, and how these effects will lead to mis- sion accomplishment. As a minimum, the commander’s guidance should address— • Specific courses of action to consider or not to con- sider, both friendly and enemy, and the priority for ad- dressing them. • The CCIR. • The reconnaissance guidance. • Risk guidance. • Deception guidance. • Fire support guidance. • Mobility and countermobility guidance. • Security measures to be implemented. • Additional specific priorities for combat support and combat service support. • Any other information the commander wants the staff to consider. • The time plan. • The type of order to issue. • The type of rehearsal to conduct. Step 16. Issue a Warning Order Immediately after the commander gives his guid- ance, the staff sends subordinate and supporting units a warning order that contains, as a minimum— • The restated mission. • The commander’s intent. • The unit’s AO (a sketch, an overlay, or some other description). • The CCIR. • Risk guidance. • Reconnaissance to be initiated by subordinate units. 5-10 FM 101-5 • Security measures. • Deception guidance. • Mobility and countermobility guidance. • Specific priorities. • The time plan. • Guidance on rehearsals. Step 17. Review Facts and Assumptions During the rest of the decision-making process, the commander and staff periodically review all available facts and assumptions. New facts may alter require- ments and analysis of the mission. Assumptions may have become facts or may have become invalid. When- ever the facts or assumptions change, the commander and staff must assess the impact of these changes on the plan and make the necessary adjustments. Course of Action Development After receiving guidance, the staff develops COAs for analysis and comparison. The commander must in- volve the entire staff in their development. His guidance and intent focus the staff’s creativity to produce a com- prehensive, flexible plan within the time constraints. His direct participation helps the staff get quick, accu- rate answers to questions that occur during the process. COA development is a deliberate attempt to design un- predictable COAs (difficult for the enemy to deduce). Qualities of COAs Each COA considered must meet the criteria of— • Suitability. It must accomplish the mission and comply with the commander’s guidance. However, the commander may modify his guidance at any time. When the guidance changes, the staff records and coor- dinates the new guidance and reevaluates each COA to ensure it complies with the change. • Feasibility. The unit must have the capability to accomplish the mission in terms of available time, space, and resources. • Acceptability. The tactical or operational advan- tage gained by executing the COA must justify the cost in resources, especially casualties. This assessment is largely subjective. • Distinguishability. Each COA must differ signifi- cantly from any others. Significant differences may re- sult from use of reserves, different task organizations, day or night operations, or a different scheme of maneu- ver. This criteria is also largely subjective. • Completeness. It must be a complete mission statement. (See page 5-8.) A good COA positions the force for future operations and provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events dur- ing execution. It also provides the maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates. The order from higher headquarters normally pro- vides the what, when, and why for the force as a whole. The who in the COA does not specify the designation of units; it arrays units by type (for example, generic ar- mored battalion or mechanized battalion). Designation of specific units comes later. During COA development, the commander and staff continue the risk management process, focusing on Steps 1 through 3. (See Appendix J.) Guidelines and Steps to Develop COAs There are normally six steps in COA development: 1. Analyze relative combat power. 2. Generate options. 3. Array initial forces. 4. Develop the scheme of maneuver. 5. Assign headquarters. 6. Prepare COA statements and sketches. The following paragraphs describe each step in detail. Step 1. Analyze Relative Combat Power. Combat power is the effect created by combining the elements of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership in com- bat against the enemy. The commander integrates and applies the effects of these elements with other potential combat multipliers (combat support (CS), combat ser- vice support (CSS), and available assets of other ser- vices) against the enemy. His goal is to generate over- whelming combat power to accomplish the mission at minimal cost. By analyzing force ratios and determining and com- paring each force’s strengths and weaknesses as a func- tion of combat power, planners can gain some insight into— • What friendly capabilities pertain to the operation. • What type operations may be possible from both friendly and enemy perspectives. 5-11 FM 101-5 • How and where the enemy may be vulnerable. • What additional resources may be required to exe- cute the mission. • How to allocate existing resources. Planners initially make a rough estimate of force ra- tios. At corps and division levels, relative combat power is an evaluation of rough ratios of combat units two lev- els down. For example, at division level, planners com- pare all types of combat battalions; at corps level, they compare friendly brigades versus enemy regiments. At brigade and battalion levels, they may study, in detail, the personnel or weapons on either side. Planners must not develop and recommend COAs based solely on mathematical analyses of force ratios. Although some numerical relationships are used in this process, the estimate is largely subjective. It requires as- sessing both tangible and intangible factors, such as fric- tion or enemy will and intentions. Numerical force ratios do not include the human factors of warfare that, many times, are more important than the number of tanks or tubes of artillery. The staff must carefully con- sider and integrate the intangible factors into their comparisons. Planners can compare friendly strengths against en- emy weaknesses, and vice versa, for each element of combat power. From these comparisons, they may de- duce particular vulnerabilities for each force that may be exploitable or may need to be protected. These compari- sons may provide planners insights into effective force employment. By using historical minimum-planning ratios for vari- ous combat missions and carefully considering terrain and enemy templating assumptions, the planner can generally conclude what types of operations can be conducted suc- cessfully. This step provides the planners with what might be possible, not a specific course of action. NOTE: FM 34-130 contains planning factors and data for estimating force ratios. Step 2. Generate Options. Based on the commander’s guidance and the results of Step 1, the staff generates op- tions for COA development. A good COA should be ca- pable of defeating all feasible enemy COAs. In a totally unconstrained environment, the goal is to develop sev- eral such COAs. Since there is rarely enough time to do this, the commander usually limits the options with his commander’s guidance. The options should focus on enemy COAs arranged in order of probable adoption. Brainstorming is the preferred technique for gen- erating options. It requires time, imagination, and creativity, but it produces the widest range of options. The staff must be unbiased and open-minded in evaluating proposed options. Staff members can quickly identify COAs obviously not feasible in their particular areas of expertise. They can also quickly decide if they can modify a COA to accomplish the requirement or eliminate it immediately. If one staff member identifies information that might affect an- other’s analysis, he shares it immediately. This elimi- nates wasted time and effort. In developing COAs, staff members must deter- mine the doctrinal requirements for each type of op- eration they are considering, to include doctrinal tasks to be assigned to subordinate units. For exam- ple, a deliberate breach requires a breach force, a sup- port force, and an assault force. In addition, COA development must look at possibilities created by at- tachments (a light infantry brigade attached to an ar- mored division opens up the possibility of an air assault), options not feasible because of detachments, assets available for deep operations, and assets needed to support deception operations. The staff first determines the decisive point, if not already determined by the commander. This is where the unit will mass the effects of overwhelming com- bat power to achieve a result with respect to terrain, enemy, and time that will accomplish the unit’s pur- pose. This will be the main effort. Next, the staff de- termines supporting efforts—those tasks other than the main effort that must be accomplished to allow the main effort to succeed. The staff then determines the purposes of the main and supporting efforts. The main effort’s purpose is directly related to the mis- sion of the unit; the supporting effort’s purpose re- lates directly to the main effort. The staff then determines the essential tasks for the main and sup- porting efforts to achieve these purposes. Once staff members have explored each COA’s pos- sibilities, they can examine each (changing, adding, or eliminating COAs as appropriate) to determine if it sat- isfies COA-selection criteria. The staff must avoid the common pitfall of presenting one good COA among several “throwaway” COAs. Often the commander will find he can combine COAs or move desirable elements from one to another. Step 3. Array Initial Forces. To determine the forces necessary to accomplish the mission and to provide a 5-12 FM 101-5 5-15 FM 101-5 At 130400 Aug XX, a mechanized division attacks to seize OBJ SLAM to protect the northern flank of the corps main effort. A mechanized brigade attacks in the north, as an economy of force, to fix enemy forces in zone denying them the ability to interfere with the main effort’s attack in the south.Amechanized brigade in the south attacks to penetrate enemy forces vicinity PL AMBER to create sufficient maneuver space to allow the main effort to pass to the east without interference from the defending enemy infantry regiment (-). A tank-heavy brigade, the main effort, passes through the southern mechanized brigade and attacks to seize the terrain vicinity of OBJ SLAM denying the enemy access to the terrain south and west of RIVER TOWN. The division reserve, a tank task force, initially follows the southern mechanized brigade prepared to contain enemy forces capable of threatening the main effort’s passage, then, if not committed west of PL GREEN, follows the main effort prepared to block enemy forces capable of threatening its movement west, ensuring the seizure of OBJ SLAM. The divisional cavalry squadron screens the division’s northern flank to provide early warning of any enemy force capable of threatening the division’s northern mechanized brigade. Division deep operations will: 1. Initially attrit enemy artillery capable of ranging the point of penetration to prevent it from massing fires against the two southern brigades; 2. then interdict the enemy tank battalion (-) south of WEST TOWN to prevent its movement south and west towards the main effort. 3. Interdict the enemy tank regiment (-) north of EAST TOWN to prevent its movement west of the PL BLUE allowing the main effort sufficient time to seize OBJ SLAM. Division fires will: 1. Isolate the point of penetration allowing the southern mechanized brigade to conduct a penetration. 2. Prevent enemy artillery from massing fires against the two southern brigades. 3. Support deep operations to prevent uncommitted enemy forces from interfering with the initial penetration or the seizure of OBJ SLAM. A mechanized infantry team acts as the division TCF with priority of responding to any Level III threat to the division’s Class III supply point vicinity METRO CITY to ensure the uninterrupted flow of Class III. (-) X X AA EAGLE AA TANK XX XX XX XX PL RED (FSCL) PL AMBER (LD) PL ORANGE NORTH TOWN PL BLUE PL BLUE PL GREEN PL GREEN X X X I I NORTHERN MTNS SOUTHERN MTNS M U D D Y R IV E R METRO CITY PL AMBER (LD)PL ORANGE PL RED (FSCL) OBJ SLAM X X X X X I I X RIVER TOWN EAST TOWN WEST TOWN (-) (-) (-) (-) s s s XX TAC XX REAR XX MAIN CENTRAL CITY BIG TOWN DSA TCF I I I s s I I I I Figure 5-5. Example of course of action statement and sketch (division offense) COA Briefing (Optional) After the COAs have been developed, they are briefed to the commander for review. The COA briefing includes— • Updated intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). • Possible enemy COAs (event templates). • The restated mission. • The commander’s and the higher commanders’ in- tent (two echelons above). • The COA statement and sketch. • The rationale for each COA, including— — Considerations that might affect enemy COAs. — Deductions resulting from a relative combat power analysis. — Reason units are arrayed as shown on the sketch. — Reason the staff used the selected control measures. — Updated facts and assumptions. After the briefings, the commander gives any addi- tional guidance. If he rejects all COAs, the staff begins again. If he accepts one or more of the COAs, staff members begin the war-gaming process. Course of Action Analysis (War Game) The COA analysis identifies which COA accom- plishes the mission with minimum casualties while best positioning the force to retain the initiative for future op- erations. It helps the commander and his staff to— • Determine how to maximize combat power against the enemy while protecting the friendly forces and mini- mizing collateral damage. • Have as near an identical vision of the battle as possible. • Anticipate battlefield events. • Determine conditions and resources required for success. • Determine when and where to apply the force’s capabilities. • Focus IPB on enemy strengths, weakneses, center of gravity, desired end state, and decisive points. • Identify the coordination requirements to produce synchronized results. • Determine the most flexible course of action. The War-Gaming Process Course of action analysis is conducted using war gaming. The war game is a disciplined process, with rules and steps, that attempts to visualize the flow of a battle. The process considers friendly dispositions, strengths, and weaknesses; enemy assets and probable COAs; and characteristics of the area of operations. It relies heavily on a doctrinal foundation, tactical judg- ment, and experience. It focuses the staff’s attention on each phase of the operation in a logical sequence. It is an iterative process of action, reaction, and counteraction. War gaming stimulates ideas and provides insights that might not otherwise be discovered. It highlights critical tasks and provides familiarity with tactical possibilities otherwise difficult to achieve. War gaming is the most valuable step during COA analysis and comparison and should be allocated more time than any other step. How- ever, the commander or CofS (XO) must determine at this point how much time he can commit to the war- gaming process, and ensure this time line is followed. During the war game, the staff takes a COA and be- gins to develop a detailed plan, while determining the strengths or weaknesses of each COA. War gaming tests a COA or improves a developed COA. The com- mander and his staff may change an existing COA or de- velop a new COA after identifying unforeseen critical events, tasks, requirements, or problems. The General Rules of War Gaming War gamers need to— • Remain objective, not allowing personality or their sensing of “what the commander wants” to influence them. They must avoid defending a COA just because they personally developed it. • Accurately record advantages and disadvantages of each COA as they become evident. • Continually assess feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of the COA. If a COA fails any of these tests during the war game, they must reject it. • Avoid drawing premature conclusions and gather- ing facts to support such conclusions. 5-16 FM 101-5 • Avoid comparing one COA with another during the war game. This must wait until the comparison phase. War-Gaming Responsibilities The CofS (XO) is responsible for coordinating ac- tions of the staff during the war game. The G1 (S1) analyzes COAs to project potential per- sonnel battle losses and determine how CSS provides personnel support during operations. The G2 (S2) role-plays the enemy commander. He develops critical enemy decision points in relation to the friendly COA, projects enemy reactions to friendly ac- tions, and projects enemy losses. He captures the results of each enemy action and counteraction and correspond- ing friendly enemy strengths and vulnerabilities. By try- ing to win the war game for the enemy, he ensures that the staff fully addresses friendly responses for each en- emy COA. For the friendly force, he— • Identifies information requirements and refines the event template to include NAIs that support decision points and refines the event matrix with corresponding DPs, target areas of interest (TAIs), and high-value tar- gets (HVTs). • Refines situation templates. • Participates in the targeting conference and identi- fies high-value targets as determined by IPB. The G3 (S3) normally selects the techniques and methods that the staff will use for war gaming. He en- sures the war game of the COA covers every operational aspect of the mission, records each event’s strengths and weaknesses, and annotates the rationale. This is used later to compare COAs. The G4 (S4) analyzes each COA to assess its sustain- ment feasibility. He determines critical requirements for each sustainment function by analyzing each COA to identify potential problems and deficiencies. He as- sesses the status of all sustainment functions required to support the COA and compares this to available assets. He identifies potential shortfalls and recommends ac- tions to eliminate or reduce their effect for that COA. While improvisation can contribute to responsiveness, only accurate prediction of requirements for each sus- tainment function can ensure the continuous sustain- ment of the force. In addition, the G4 (S4) ensures that available movement times and assets will support the course of action. Special staff officers help the coordinating staff by analyzing the COAs in their own areas of expertise, indi- cating how they could best support the mission. Every staff member must determine the force requirements for external support, the risks, and each COA’s strengths and weaknesses. War-Gaming Steps The staff follows eight steps during the war-gaming process: 1. Gather the tools. 2. List all friendly forces. 3. List assumptions. 4. List known critical events and decision points. 5. Determine evaluation criteria. 6. Select the war-game method. 7. Select a method to record and display results. 8. War-game the battle and assess the results. Step 1. Gather the Tools. The CofS (XO) directs the staff to gather the necessary tools, materials, and data for the war game. Units need to war-game on maps, sand ta- bles, or other tools that accurately reflect the nature of the terrain. The staff then posts the COA on a map dis- playing the operations area. Tools required include, but are not limited to— • Current coordinating staff estimates. • Event template. • Recording method. • Completed COAs, to include maneuver and R&S graphics. • Means to post enemy and friendly unit symbols. • Map of AO. Step 2. List all Friendly Forces. The commander and staff consider all available combat, CS, and CSS units that can be committed to the battle, paying special atten- tion to support relationships and constraints. The friendly force list remains constant for all COAs the staff analyzes. Step 3. List Assumptions. The commander and staff review previous assumptions for continued validity and necessity. 5-17 FM 101-5 5-20 FM 101-5 PLUM BLUE WHITE BLACK 1 2 3 4 PL BOB PL BILL PL TOM C A B L E B O X E S X X ROSE EA ACE OBJ LARRY OBJ PAUL ATK 1 ATK 2 TIME -18hr -14hr Enemy monitors movements Continue deep preparation Cav prepares to screen north flank I Bde moves on routes 1 & 2 3 Bde moves on routes 1 & 2 Initiate movement Recon secures routes Confirm second belt and RAG position Route maintenance Cannibalization authorized at DS level Cache artillery ammunition Initiate movement from AA ROSE Finance service suspended TAC CP with lead bde NOTE: The first column is representative only and can be modified to fit individual needs such as including information operations. Establish div main CP Replacements held at division Confirm reserve position Weapons HOLD Weapons TIGHT AA ROSE -12hr ENEMY ACTION DECISION POINTS DEEP SECURITY CLOSE M A N E U V E R C S S RESERVE REAR AIR DEFENSE FIRE SUPPORT IEW ENGINEER MAN ARM FIX FUEL MOVE SUSTAIN C 2 Figure 5-9. Example of synchronization matrix 5-21 FM 101-5 PLUM BLUE WHITE BLACK 1 2 3 4 PL BOB PL BILL PL TOM C A B L E B O X E S X X ROSE EA ACE OBJ LARRY OBJ PAUL ATK 1 ATK 2 H-hr- 8hr + 6hr Fights from first belt position Defend from second belt position I Bde seizes OBJ LARRY Launch deep attack Avn bde attacks reserve in EA ACE Bdes cross LD/LC Conduct nonlethal fires Prepare forward log sites Move stocks forward Main CP prepares to moveDiv rear boundary moves east of PL BOB Establish forward cl I I I point Establish forward cl V point Confirm reserve movement Weapons FREE Weapons TIGHT + 10 hr Cav screen north flank 2 Bde moves on routes 3 & 4 TCF moves on route 3 Protect lead bde Prepare fire Provide DS/GS Fire SEAD Refuel bdes Establish AXP M1 Establish AXP M2 Finance service reinstated Figure 5-9. Example of synchronization matrix (continued) The sketch note method uses brief notes concerning critical locations or tasks. These notes reference specific locations on the map or relate to general considerations covering broad areas. The commander and staff note lo- cations on the map and on a separate war-game work sheet (Figure 5-10). Staff members use sequence num- bers to reference the notes to the corresponding loca- tions on the map or overlay, using the same numbers on the war-game work sheet for easy reference. Staff mem- bers also identify actions by grouping them into sequen- tial action groups, giving each subtask a separate number. They use the war-game work sheet to identify all pertinent data for a critical event. They assign the event a number and a title and use the columns on the work sheet to identify and list in sequence— • Tasks and assets (allocated forces). • Expected enemy actions and reactions. • Friendly counteractions and assets. • Total assets needed for the task. • Estimated time to accomplish the task. • Decision points when the commander must decide to execute the task. • CCIR. • Control measures. Step 8. War-Game the Battle and Assess the Results. During war gaming, the commander and staff try to fore- see the dynamics of a battle’s action, reaction, and counteraction. The staff analyzes each selected event by identifying the tasks the force must accomplish one echelon down, using assets two echelons down. Identi- fying the COAs’ strengths and weaknesses allows the staff to make adjustments as necessary. The war game follows an action-reaction- counteraction cycle. Actions are those events initiated by the side with the initiative (normally the force on the offensive). Reactions are the other side’s actions in re- sponse. Counteractions are the first side’s responses to reactions. This sequence of action-reaction- counteraction is continued until the critical event is com- pleted or until the commander determines that he must use some other COA to accomplish the mission. The staff considers all possible forces, including tem- plated enemy forces outside the AO, that could conduct a counterattack. The staff evaluates each friendly move to determine the assets and actions required to defeat the enemy at each turn. The staff should continually evalu- ate the need for branches to the plan that promote suc- cess against likely enemy moves in response to the friendly COA. The staff lists assets used in the appropriate columns of the worksheet and lists the totals in the assets column (not considering any assets lower than two command levels down). The commander and staff look at many areas in detail during the war game, including movement considera- tions, closure rates, lengths of columns, depths of forma- tions, ranges and capabilities of weapons systems, and 5-22 FM 101-5 Sequence Number Action Reaction Counter- action Assets Time Decision Point CCIR Control Measures Remarks CRITICAL EVENT Figure 5-10. War-game work sheet commander’s decision briefing. The staff then briefs the commander. The decision-briefing format includes— • The intent of the higher headquarters (higher and next higher commanders). • The restated mission. • The status of own forces. • An updated IPB. • Own COAs, including— — Assumptions used in planning. — Results of staff estimates. — Advantages and disadvantages (including risk) of each COA (with decision matrix or table showing COA comparison). • The recommended COA. 5-25 FM 101-5 Maneuver 3 2 3 1 (6) (9) (3) Simplicity 3 3 1 2 (9) (3) (6) Fires 4 2 1 3 (8) (4) (12) Intelligence 1 3 2 1 (3) (2) (1) ADA 1 1 3 2 (1) (3) (2) Mobility/ 1 3 2 1 Survivability (3) (2) (1) CSS 1 2 1 3 (2) (1) (3) C 1 1 2 3 (1) (2) (3) Residual 2 1 2 3 Risk (2) (4) (6) C W 1 2 1 3 (2) (1) (3) TOTAL 20 18 22 Weighted TOTAL (37) (31) (40) 2 2 NOTES: Procedure: 1. Criteria are those assigned in Step 5 of the war-gaming process. 2. Should the CofS/XO desire to emphasize one as more important than another, he assigns weights to each criterion based on relative importance. 3. Courses of action are those selected for war gaming. The staff assigns numerical values for each criterion after war-gaming the COA. Values reflect the relative advantages or disadvantages of each criterion for each COA action. The lowest number is best. The initially assigned score in each column is multiplied by the weight and the product put in parenthesis in the column. When using weighted value, the lower value assigned indicates the best option. The numbers are totaled to provide a subjective evaluation of the best COAwithout weighing one criterion over another. The scores are then totaled to provide “best” (lowest number value) COA based on weights the commander assigns. Although the lowest value denotes the best solution, the best solution may be more subjective than the objective numbers indicate. The matrix must be examined for sensitivity. Although COA 2 is the “best” COA, it may not be supportable from a CSS standpoint. The decision maker must either determine if he can acquire additional support or if he must alter or delete the COA. (note 2) 1 2 3 (note 3) (note 3) (note 3) CRITERIA WT COA COA COA (note 1) Figure 5-11. Sample decision matrix: numerical analysis Course of Action Approval After the decision briefing, the commander de- cides on the COA he believes to be the most advanta- geous. If he rejects all developed COAs, the staff will have to start the process over again. If the com- mander modifies a proposed COA or gives the staff an entirely different one, the staff must war-game the revised or new one to derive the products that result from the war-game process. Once the commander has selected a COA, he may refine his intent state- ment and CCIR to support the selected COA. He then issues any additional guidance on priorities for CS or CSS activities (particularly for resources he needs to preserve his freedom of action and to ensure continu- ous service support), orders preparation, rehearsal, and preparation for mission execution. Having already identified the risks associated with the selected COA, the commander decides what level of residual risk he will accept to accomplish the mission and approves control measures that will reduce the risks. If there is time, he discusses the acceptable risks with adjacent and senior commanders. However, he must ob- tain the higher commanders’ approval to accept any risk that might imperil the higher commanders’ intent. Based on the commander’s decision, the staff imme- diately issues a warning order with essential information so that subordinate units can refine their plans. Orders Production Based on the commander’s decision and final guid- ance, the staff refines the COA and completes the plan and prepares to issue the order. The staff prepares the order or plan to implement the selected COA by turning it into a clear, concise concept of operations, a scheme of maneuver, and the required fire support. The com- mander can use the COA statement as his concept of op- erations statement. The COA sketch can become the basis for the operation overlay. Orders and plans provide all necessary information subordinates require for exe- cution, but without unnecessary constraints that would inhibit subordinate initiative. The staff assists 5-26 FM 101-5 1 2 Casualty estimate + - Medical evacuation routes - + Suitable location for medical facilities 0 0 Available EPW facilities - + Suitable CP locations - + Courier and distribution routes - + Effects of attachments and detachments - + casualty reporting, and Residual Risk + - on force cohesion, replacement operations DECISION MATRIX DISCUSSION: NOTE: The factors in the above example are neither all-inclusive nor always applicable. BROAD CATEGORIES COA 1 Main attack avoids major terrain obstacles. Main attack faces stronger resistance at Adequate maneuver room reserve. COA 2 Main attack gains good observation Initially, reserve may have to be employed Supporting attack provides supporting attack. main attack. procedural beginning. for main attack and early. in zone flank protection to of Needs detailed and rehearsed and positive controls. Advantages Disadvantages Course of ActionFactors Course of Action Figure 5-12. Sample decision matrix: subjective analysis and broad categories subordinate staffs as needed with their planning and coordination. The concept of operations is the commander’s clear, concise statement of where, when, and how he intends to concentrate combat power to accomplish the mission in accordance with his higher commander’s intent. It broadly outlines considerations necessary for develop- ing a scheme of maneuver. It includes actions within the battlefield organization, designation of the main effort, the commander’s plan to defeat the enemy, and specific command and support relationships. These relation- ships are then included in the task organization and or- ganization for combat in plans and orders. During orders production, the staff implements acci- dent risk controls by coordinating and integrating them into the appropriate paragraphs and graphics of the OPORD. It is essential to communicate how controls will be put into effect, who will implement them, and how they fit into the overall operation. Finally, the commander reviews and approves orders before the staff reproduces and briefs them. The com- mander and staff should conduct confirmation briefings with subordinates immediately following order issue to ensure subordinates understand the commander’s intent and concept. DECISION MAKING IN A TIME-CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT The focus of any planning process should be to quickly develop a flexible, tactically sound, and fully in- tegrated and synchronized plan that increases the likeli- hood of mission success with the fewest casualties possible. However, any operation may “outrun” the ini- tial plan. The most detailed estimates cannot anticipate every possible branch or sequel, enemy action, unex- pected opportunities, or changes in mission directed from higher headquarters. Fleeting opportunities or un- expected enemy actions may require a quick decision to implement a new or modified plan. Before a unit can conduct decision making in a time- constrained environment, it must master the steps in the full MDMP. A unit can only shorten the process if it fully understands the role of each and every step of the process and the requirements to produce the necessary products. Training on these steps must be thorough and result in a series of staff battle drills that can be tailored to the time available. Training on the MDMP must be stressful and replicate realistic conditions and time lines. (See Appendix K.) Although the task is difficult, all staffs must be able to produce a simple, flexible, tactically sound plan in a time-constrained environment. METT-T factors, but especially limited time, may make it diffi- cult to follow the entire MDMP. An inflexible pro- cess used in all situations will not work. The MDMP is a sound and proven process that must be modified with slightly different techniques to be effective when time is limited. There is still only one process, however, and omitting steps of the MDMP is not the solution. Anticipation, organization, and prior preparation are the keys to success in a time- constrained environment. Throughout the remainder of the chapter, reference to a process that is abbrevi- ated is for simplicity only. It does not mean a sepa- rate process, but the same process shortened. The commander decides how to shorten the process. What follows are suggested techniques and procedures that will save time. They are not exhaustive or the only ways to save time, but they have proved useful to units in the past. These techniques are not necessarily sequential in nature, nor are all of them useful in all situations. What works for a unit depends on its training and the factors of METT-T in a given situation. The com- mander can use these, or techniques of his own choos- ing, to abbreviate the process. (See Figure 5-13, page 5-28.) General Considerations The process is abbreviated any time there is too little time for its thorough and comprehensive application. The most significant factor to consider is time. It is the only nonrenewable, and often the most critical, resource. There are four primary techniques to save time. The first is to increase the commander’s involvement, allow- ing him to make decisions during the process without waiting for detailed briefings after each step. The second technique is for the commander to be- come more directive in his guidance, limiting options. This saves the staff time by focusing members on those things the commander feels are most important. The third technique, and the one that saves the most time, is for the commander to limit the number of COAs developed and war-gamed. In extreme cases, he can di- rect that only one course of action be developed. The 5-27 FM 101-5 work within. Commander’s guidance must be constantly reviewed and analyzed. As the situation changes and in- formation becomes available, the commander may have to alter his guidance. This type of detailed guidance lim- its the staff’s flexibility and initiative to save time, but it allows the staff more time to synchronize the COA dur- ing the war-game session. Once the guidance is issued, the staff immediately sends a warning order to subordinate units. Course of Action Development Significant time is saved by increased commander involvement in COA development, resulting in detailed and directive commander’s guidance. The greatest sav- ings in time for the MDMP comes from the commander directing the staff to develop only a few courses of action instead of many. The commander and selected staff save additional time by conducting a hasty war game once the COAs are developed. The hasty war game allows the commander to determine if he favors one or more COAs out of sev- eral proposed. It develops and matures one or more COAs prior to the formal war game. If the commander cannot be present during the hasty war-game session, then the staff conducts a COA backbrief to the com- mander after the hasty war game. From the hasty war game, the commander can make an early decision, al- lowing him to refine his COA and make any necessary adjustments prior to the detailed war game. In extreme situations, this may be the only opportunity to conduct the war-game process. The hasty war game can also be used to select a single COA for further development. A commander’s early decision to go with a single COA allows his staff to fo- cus on the selected COA instead of on multiple COAs. It also allows the staff to concentrate on synchronizing the COA rather than on continuing to develop the COA dur- ing the formal war-game session. When time is severely limited, the quickest process comes from the commander deciding to immediately begin personally developing one COA, with branch plans, against the enemy’s most likely course of action. The commander determines which staff officers are critical to assist him in this phase, depending on the type of operation being planned. The minimum is normally the G2 (S2), G3 (S3), FSCOORD, engineer coordinator (ENCOORD), and CofS (XO). The commander may also include subordinate commanders, if available. This team must quickly develop a flexible COA that it feels will accomplish the mission. Limiting the number of COAs developed carries with it the risk of overlooking a significantly better COA. Developing only one COA is the most risky approach. It provides the staff with the least flexibility to apply its creativity and explore options. Saving time by not using the enemy event templates is a poor technique. The commander and staff must use the enemy event templates when developing COAs. Without them, they cannot conduct the analysis of rela- tive combat power and the arraying of initial forces. Course of Action Analysis The commander and staff must war-game the COAs to ensure all elements are fully integrated and synchro- nized. An early decision to limit the number of COAs war-gamed, or to develop only one COA, saves the greatest amount of time in this process. When war- gaming the COAs, it is best to do so against all feasible enemy courses of action. However, the commander can save additional time by having the staff war-game against a smaller number of enemy COAs. The commander’s involvement can save significant time in this step by allowing the staff to focus on only the most essential aspects of the war game. The com- mander can supervise the war game and be prepared to make decisions, provide guidance, delete unsatisfactory concepts, and assist in keeping the staff focused. If the commander is present during the war gaming of multiple COAs, he may identify the COA he favors. He can then discard unwanted COAs, allocating more time to refine the selected COA. The commander must always assess risk, especially since by limiting the number of COAs, he has increased risk to the command. He must evaluate the COA to en- sure it will not render the force incapable of anticipated operations or lower the unit’s combat effectiveness be- yond acceptable levels. The staff should use the box technique, focusing on the most critical event first, such as actions at the objec- tive or the engagement area. If time permits, the staff war-games other critical events or boxes as well. The commander and staff must identify and prioritize the critical events they want analyzed. These critical events can be identified by analyzing essential tasks. The staff war-games as many critical events as possible in the allotted amount of time. 5-30 FM 101-5 Staff officers save time if they specifically define and limit the evaluation criteria before they begin the war-game process. Significant factors can be quanti- fied, if possible, and limited to the four or five most important, based on the mission statement, comman- der’s intent, and commander’s guidance. The staff must work to support the commander’s plan. However, as the staff refines the plan, it cannot be- come so biased that it develops a plan that is infeasible and insupportable. If the staff determines that it cannot support the commander’s plan, a new COA must be developed. The use of recorders is particularly important. These recorders should be trained to capture coordinating in- structions, subunit instructions, and information re- quired to synchronize the operation during the war-gaming process. If this occurs, a portion of the order is written before the planning process is complete. The location used for the war game must be prepared and configured by the time the staff is ready to conduct the war game. Charts and boards must be cleaned and prepared for use. The blown-up terrain sketch and en- emy SITTEMPs must be prepared and present for the war-game session. When only one COA is developed, the purpose of the COA analysis is to verify, refine, synchronize, and inte- grate the commander’s COA and recommend modifica- tions as necessary. However, the analysis should follow the formal war-game process as much as time allows to help the commander visualize the outcome and identify potential branches and sequels. As time allows, the staff can further war-game and develop these branches and sequels. Course of Action Comparison If the commander decides to war-game only one COA, or if he chooses one during the war game, no course of action comparison is needed. If multiple COAs have been war-gamed and the commander has not made a decision, the staff must conduct the COA comparison detailed on page 5-24. Limiting the evaluation criteria is the only significant shortcut in this step. Course of Action Approval If the commander has observed and participated in the planning process, the decision may be rapidly apparent and the commander can make an on-the-spot decision. If the commander has not participated in the process to this point, or has not made a decision, a decision briefing will still be required. Good COA comparison charts and sketches assist the commander in visualizing and distin- guishing between each COA. The staff must ensure the COAs are complete with tentative task organization, COA statement, and task and purpose for each subordinate unit. Time can also be saved by limiting the course of action briefing to only the most critical points. If only one COA was developed, no decision is re- quired, unless the developed COA becomes unsuitable, infeasible, or unacceptable. If this occurs, another COA must be developed. Once the decision is made, the staff immediately sends out a warning order. Orders Production There are several ways to save time in orders produc- tion. These are addressed in Appendix H, Plans and Orders. 5-31 FM 101-5