The Security Dilemma and Levels of Analysis, Slides of Humanities

Download The Security Dilemma and Levels of Analysis and more Slides Humanities in PDF only on Docsity! Lecture 2: The Security Dilemma and Levels of Analysis Contrasts among Realism, Liberalism and the Identity Perspective Strategic Interaction in IR • IR concerns choices made by states – Between war and peace – Between trade and boycotts – Between emitting and restricting greenhouse gases • Usually the advantage or disadvantage of a choice for each state depends not only on what that state chooses but also on what other states choose • Thus IR is fundamentally about “strategic interaction,” or how states make choices when the consequences depend on choices by other states Why Arm? • Why states choose to arm: What if one state disarms when another state arms? • States that disarm when others arm become vulnerable to conquest – Very old idea: Si vis pacem, para bellum. • “If you want peace, prepare for war.” • This idea was known to the ancient Romans, as its Latin formulation suggests • Formulated by the fourth or fifth century writer Vegetius as Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum. – Alguien que desira la paz, prepara para la guerra. • He was writing during the decline of the Roman empire when fear of conquest was a particular concern The Security Dilemma Depicted State B Disarm Arm Disarm B conquers A State A Arm A conquers B “Structural Neo-Realism” • So far in the discussion of the security dilemma, states have not been assumed to have any preferences – You will sometimes hear that the security dilemma assumes that states are “unitary rational actors” with a preference for survival – Such a statement need not be true – States that have not armed may have all disappeared because they were conquered by states that did arm • “Structural neo-realism” assumes that only states that arm can survive in world politics – “Arm” here has a broad definition that we will get to – Selection as a concept of explanation: states are “selected” for the behavior of “arming” Preferences in the Security Dilemma • States may be assumed to prefer only security – You may see the expression “guns or butter” – In some versions of the security dilemma, arms are assumed not to cost anything except the risk of war – The state is assumed to have no other goals such as economic welfare • Alternatively states may be assumed to trade off between preferences for arming and preferences for other goals, such as economic growth or consumption – In this case “guns or butter” makes sense “Prisoner’s Dilemma” or PD • For states with preferences of either kind, the security dilemma is an instance of what game theorists call “prisoner’s dilemma” or PD – Nau tells a story about a district attorney who separately offers a deal to each of two prisoners who have conspired to commit a crime – The district attorney’s deal is designed to force each prisoner to testify against the other one – While you should read Nau’s story, it is better to think of the interaction as simply PD with no district attorney – World politics features no counterpart to a district attorney who can define the choices for the states • PD is interesting for IR because if both agents try to achieve the outcome they prefer, each receives a worse outcome than it could achieve by a different choice – Thus in world politics, states trying to achieve peace get the possibility of war The PD Game Better for A Better for B Worst for A Best for B Best for A Worst for B Worse for A Worse for B Strategy b1 Strategy b2 Agent B Strategy a1 Strategy a2 Agent A Game theory uses four concepts: (1) “agents” who have (2) “strategies” that combine into (3) “outcomes” consisting of “strategy sets” with (4) “values” to each agent depicted in “cells” Neither agent picks a cell; each agent picks only a strategy designed to get into a cell given the strategy of the other agent PD in Daily Life: You Go to the Grocery Store Make Purchase (you get food, store gets money) Sell Empty Package (store gets money, keeps food to resell) Shoplift (you get food, keep money to pay UCLA fees) No Purchase (you keep money, store keeps food) Strategy b1 Strategy b2 Grocery Store Strategy a1 Strategy a2 You Choosing in PD Better for A Better for B Worst for A Best for B Best for A Worst for B Worse for A Worse for B Strategy b1 Strategy b2 Agent B Strategy a1 Strategy a2 Agent A If A wants A’s best strategy pair, A can try choosing a2; If B chooses b1 , A gets A’s best strategy pair But if B chooses b2 , A and B both do worse than if A were to choose a1 and B were to choose b1 But “nice guy” doesn’t work for A either; what if B chooses b2 ? A is stuck; A must choose a2 and B must choose b2 Why Does PD Matter for World Politics? • The “security dilemma” looks very much like a PD • The “security dilemma” originally defined the the perspective called “realism” • The perspective called “liberalism” was a response to the realist understanding of the security dilemma • The identity perspective is a reaction against both realist and liberal understandings of the security dilemma Liberals, PD and the Security Dilemma • How do you get out of the lower right hand corner in PD – from red to green? • PD can be understood as a series of repeated choices over time (“iterated PD”) Cooperation in PD • Suppose at the first opportunity A tries a1 and watches what B does • If B chooses b1 , A continues choosing a1 as long as B continues choosing b1 • A’s and B’s mutual threat to revert to strategy 2 moves both from the red to the green corner Liberals, the Security Dilemma, and Peace • State A can disarm a little and watch whether State B reciprocates • Peace is possible if both states choose to disarm • The choice to disarm can be fostered by negotiations • Negotiations work better if they occur within permanent institutions such as the United Nations or the European Union • Negotiating within institutions secures peace; wars happen because negotiations break down or institutions fail • In daily life you can buy food at the grocery store because there is an institution called the police Identity • If states are realists or states are liberals, the identity perspective agrees with realism or liberalism • The identity perspective points out that this agreement means that the effect of anarchy depends on the identity of states • Identity: how a person or a collectivity (such as a state) would define the self – E.g., as a “realist” – E.g., as a “liberal” – But aren’t other identities possible? • If state identities change, either war or peace can be the consequence of the security dilemma Identity and Constructivism • Because state identities include the possibility that a state may adhere to the ideas of realism or liberalism, Nau thinks that the identity perspective includes anyone who thinks ideas matter • Nau contrasts “rationalism” to “constructivism” – To him “rationalism” analyzes cause and effect – To him “constructivism” concerns context and language Ideas versus Identities • Being a constructivist, I think Nau is confused • Some holders of any perspective argue that ideas can matter • To me constructivism concerns identity – Again, how states define themselves – Of course, a self definition is a special kind of idea, but people sharing an identity can hold very different ideas • Realists and liberals share the identity of political scientists • They hold sharply contrasting ideas • Constructivists are political scientists too The Three Levels of Analysis • Trying to understand why armed standoffs end and wars begin, writers identified three kinds of possible reasons – The individual level, or “nature of man” • Overwhelming written by men, this literature was and to a considerable extent remains sexist • Feminism has reverted to an argument about the “nature of man” after this category of argument had largely disappeared – The domestic level, or “nature of the state” – The systemic level, or nature of the interaction between states, known as the international system • Nau identifies a fourth, “foreign policy” level, concerning how interactions within states influence interactions among states The Nature of Man • War might be attributed to supposed characteristics of male humans such as lust, greed, or aggressiveness • In the LA Times in fall 2008, the journalist Timothy Rutten claimed that Iranian President Ahmedinejad wants to attack Israel and the West because the sect of Islam to which he belongs believes that the sowing chaos will bring nearer the arrival of a holy man • This is a “nature of man” argument – Ahmedinejad’s supposed religious beliefs supposedly drive his policies Transformation of Arguments at the Individual Level • It used to be common in political science five decades ago to write about Hitler’s or Stalin’s belief systems or psychological characteristics • “Nature of man” arguments now more commonly concern cognitive processes that shape how people making policy for a state understand the international situation they are trying to influence • Feminists sometimes argue that men’s efforts to exert dominance over women make men behave dominantly toward each other, engendering conflict – Nature of masculinity replaces the nature of man – This argument might belong at the domestic level instead, if masculinity is a social construction rather than an individual choice The International System • Arguments at the level of the international system deliberately ignore variation among states and among individuals – Scholars working at this level know perfectly well that individuals matter and that state characteristics matter – They deliberately refrain from considering states and individuals (“abstract” from them or “bracket” them) – By abstracting or bracketing, these theorists are able to analyze the relation of the interaction among states to the behavior of each state • The security dilemma is itself a concept posed at the level of the international system, or interaction among states – “State A” and “State B” represent any state regardless of whether it is Nazi, Islamic, democratic, or has any other characteristics – Influences at the level of the individual and the level of the state cause the state to deviate from what the interaction would cause the state to do Nau’s “Foreign Policy” Level • When states make foreign policy choices, organizations or officials of the state negotiate about whether and how to negotiate with other states – The US President takes advice from the National Security Council consisting of the Vice-President, the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Defense, and the Assistant for National Security, with the Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attending • They do not always all give the President the same advice – Two Democrats, two Republicans, one technocrat, and two Republican attendees • If resignation by one of them would reduce President Obama’s approval rating, he must negotiate a compromise policy that each of them can accept – Negotiation within the US therefore limits whether and how the US negotiates with other states • E.g., whether President Obama should go forward with his campaign proposal to negotiate with Iran • E.g., what President Obama should say about an independent Palestinian state to the new Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, who has not endorsed such a state • This level can be thought of as bridging or linking the domestic and systemic levels • There is no reason to refrain from analyzing the individuals who negotiate within states about negotiating with foreign states – bridging all three levels “Levels” • These were called “levels” because it seemed that each was “higher” than the preceding one – The state is “above” man – The international system is “above” the state – But of course neither is really above • Nau also talks about two more levels of analysis – “Structure” and “Process” – But neither is “above,” and I don’t see how it makes sense to call either of these “levels”