The United States Supreme Court's Ruling in Berghuis v ..., Summaries of Public Law

Download The United States Supreme Court's Ruling in Berghuis v ... and more Summaries Public Law in PDF only on Docsity! The United States Supreme Court’s Ruling in Berghuis v. Thompkins Robert L. Farb Professor of Public Law and Government School of Government The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill June 7, 2010 On June 1, 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided Berghuis v. Thompkins, which ruled that: (1) the defendant impliedly waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); and (2) a defendant must make an unambiguous assertion of the right to remain silent to require an officer to stop custodial interrogation. This memorandum discusses the Court’s decision and its impact on law enforcement practices. The text of the Berghuis opinion is available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1470.pdf. I. Facts Officers were investigating a murder. Before beginning a custodial interrogation, one of the officers presented the defendant with a Miranda form. The form included the four warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to remain silent; use of statements in court; right to have lawyer present; right to have appointed lawyer if indigent), and an additional warning not required by Miranda: “You have the right to decide at any time before or during questioning to use your right to remain silent and your right to talk with a lawyer while you are being questioned.” The officer asked the defendant to read the fifth warning aloud so he could ensure that the defendant understood English, which he did. The officer then read the other four Miranda warnings aloud and asked the defendant to sign the form to demonstrate that he understood his rights. The defendant declined to sign the form. There was conflicting evidence whether the officer verbally confirmed that the defendant understood the rights listed on the form. The officer did not discuss or obtain a waiver of Miranda rights from the defendant. During the interrogation, the defendant never stated that he wanted to remain silent, did not want to talk with the officers, or wanted a lawyer. About two hours and forty-five minutes into the interrogation, during which the defendant was mostly silent, an officer asked the 2 defendant, “Do you believe in God?” The defendant said “yes.” The officer asked, “Do you pray to God?” The defendant said “yes.” The officer then asked, “Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that boy down?” The defendant said “yes” and looked away, and the interview ended shortly thereafter. At trial, the defendant moved to suppress these statements. The issue before the United States Supreme Court was the admissibility of these statements under Miranda v. Arizona and later Miranda-related cases. II. Court’s Ruling on Waiver of Miranda Rights The Court noted that some language in Miranda v. Arizona could be read to indicate that a waiver of Miranda rights is difficult to establish absent an explicit written waiver or a formal, explicit oral statement. However, the Court discussed its rulings since Miranda, particularly North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (valid waiver when defendant read Miranda rights form, said he understood his rights, refused to sign waiver at bottom of form, but said, “I will talk to you but I am not signing any form”), indicating that its later decisions made clear that a waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through the defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of his or her rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver. The Court in effect disavowed the language in Miranda suggesting that it is difficult to establish a Miranda waiver without an explicit written waiver or a formal, explicit oral statement. The Court concluded that if the prosecution shows that a defendant was given Miranda warnings and understood them, a defendant’s uncoerced statements establish an implied waiver of Miranda rights. A defendant’s explicit waiver need not precede custodial interrogation. Any waiver, explicit or implied, may be withdrawn by a defendant’s invocation at any time of the right to counsel or right to remain silent. Turning to the case before it, the Court ruled that the defendant waived his right to remain silent and his statements were admissible at trial. The Court found that there was no basis to conclude that the defendant did not understand his Miranda rights, and he chose not to invoke or rely on those rights when he made his uncoerced statements.